The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics

G.E. Moore and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy

Consuelo Preti

History of Analytic Philosophy

More information about this series at
http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14867

Consuelo Preti

The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics

G.E. Moore and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy

palgrave
macmillan

Consuelo Preti
New York, USA

Cover illustration: mikroman6 / Getty Images

Series Editor's Foreword

During the first half of the twentieth century, analytic philosophy gradually established itself as the dominant tradition in the English-speaking world, and over the last few decades it has taken firm root in many other parts of the world. There has been increasing debate over just what 'analytic philosophy' means, as the movement has ramified into the complex tradition that we know today, but the influence of the concerns, ideas and methods of early analytic philosophy on contemporary thought is indisputable. All this has led to greater self-consciousness among analytic philosophers about the nature and origins of their tradition, and scholarly interest in its historical development and philosophical foundations has blossomed in recent years, with the result that history of analytic philosophy is now recognized as a major field of philosophy in its own right.

The main aim of the series in which the present book appears, the first series of its kind, is to create a venue for work on the history of analytic philosophy, consolidating the area as a major field of philosophy and promoting further research and debate. The 'history of analytic philosophy' is understood broadly, as covering the period from the last three decades of the nineteenth century to the start of the twenty-first century, beginning with the work of Frege, Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein, who are generally regarded as its main founders, and the influences upon

them, and going right up to the most recent developments. In allowing the 'history' to extend to the present, the aim is to encourage engagement with contemporary debates in philosophy, for example, in showing how the concerns of early analytic philosophy relate to current concerns. In focusing on analytic philosophy, the aim is not to exclude comparisons with other—earlier or contemporary—traditions, or consideration of figures or themes that some might regard as marginal to the analytic tradition but which also throw light on analytic philosophy. Indeed, a further aim of the series is to deepen our understanding of the broader context in which analytic philosophy developed, by looking, for example, at the roots of analytic philosophy in neo-Kantianism or British idealism, or the connections between analytic philosophy and phenomenology, or discussing the work of philosophers who were important in the development of analytic philosophy but who are now often forgotten.

G. E. Moore (1873–1958) is credited, alongside Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), with the rebellion against British idealism that is seen as one of the key events that inaugurated analytic philosophy around the turn of the twentieth century. But there has been far less written on Moore than on any of the other acknowledged main founders of analytic philosophy—Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. In one respect, this is not surprising, since Moore—unlike Frege and Russell—played no role in the development of modern logic which was to become the most significant legacy of the analytic revolution. Nor did he—unlike Wittgenstein—have a major influence on logical positivism, which was to form one of the main branches of analytic philosophy in the 1930s, especially influential in the United States when many of the logical positivists emigrated there with the rise of Nazi Germany. On the other hand, Moore was a central figure in the Cambridge School of Analysis and from 1921 to 1947 was editor of *Mind*, the leading journal of philosophy in Britain, during the time that analytic philosophy established itself as the major tradition in the English-speaking world. A volume of papers on Moore was published in 1942, in the Library of Living Philosophers, and several books and collections appeared in the decade or so immediately following his death,

but it was only with the publication of Thomas Baldwin's book on Moore in 1990, as history of analytic philosophy itself emerged as a field of philosophy, that scholarly interest in his philosophy started to grow.

Consuelo Preti collaborated with Baldwin on an edition of Moore's two fellowship dissertations, which were published as *G. E. Moore: Early Philosophical Writings* by Cambridge University Press in 2011, and she has been delving deeper into Moore's papers, housed in Cambridge University Library, in the decade since. The present volume is the fruits of that research. What we have been lacking in (the field of) history of analytic philosophy is a detailed account of Moore's early work and the influences upon him, and I am delighted that the book we have long needed is now appearing in this series. Preti focuses on Moore's formative period from 1894, when he began studying philosophy at Cambridge (after two years studying classics), to 1899, when he published 'The Nature of Judgment', the paper that marks the rejection of the ideas of F. H. Bradley (1846–1924), the leading figure in British idealism.

In the first chapter Preti sets the scene by describing the development of what was called the 'moral sciences' at Cambridge in the second half of the nineteenth century, which came to include 'mental science' as interest in psychology grew, influenced by the work that was then being done in Germany, by Hermann Lotze (1817–81) and Franz Brentano (1838–1917), among others. This gave rise to the intense debates about psychologism that form such a central feature in the landscape of early analytic philosophy. In the second chapter she turns to the more direct influences of Moore's teachers, and especially James Ward (1843–1925) and G. F. Stout (1860–1944), who introduced mental science to Cambridge. In the third chapter she examines the influence of Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) on Moore's ethics and his attitude to both Kant and Bradley; and in the final chapter she discusses Moore's work on the 'metaphysical basis of ethics', focusing on the two dissertations that he submitted to Cambridge for a Prize Fellowship at Trinity College, the second of which was successful and established Moore's career in philosophy. Throughout her book, Preti draws expertly on the full range of

Moore's unpublished writings in this period, as well as on other material, and the result is an extraordinarily rich and insightful account of his early development. It is not just the book on Moore that scholars of the history of analytic philosophy have long wanted, to complement the extensive research that has been done on the early Russell, but it raises the bar considerably for all future work on Moore's philosophy. The history of Moore's analytic philosophy has finally come of age.

Berlin, Germany   Michael Beaney
October 2021

Acknowledgements

Many people assisted me over the years while I was researching and writing this book, which involved repeated visits to the Cambridge University Library. The Dean's office at the College of New Jersey consistently supported my research trip requests. Michael Esposito, Bruno and Polly Kenway, Liz and Jeremy Stubbins, Frankie Stubbins, Christina Stubbins, and Hugh Stubbins did everything they could to make my visits to Cambridge stress-free, and I could not have completed this work without them. The librarians in the Manuscripts Reading Room at the Cambridge University Library were unflappably accommodating as I surfaced year after year with repeated Moorean material requests, allowing me to photograph the documents and even wear a scarf (it was always freezing in there). The UL levels of security (four of them, to get to the Manuscripts Reading Room), the internecine fetching rules, and the Tea Room became welcome routines after a few years.

It is impossible to thank Tom Baldwin enough for having supplied hours of advice, talk, and walks over the years, without which I never would have embarked on my work on Moore, let alone produced any of it. Tom was in particular very encouraging when I asked him why Moore's Fellowship dissertations had never been published. Timothy Moore had refused to allow Tom to do it 20 years before, but the new executor (Moore's grandson, Peregrine Moore) permitted it. Tom and

Contents

Introduction: G. E. Moore and the Origins of Early Analytic Philosophy

This book is an account of the development of G. E. Moore's early philosophy, with a specific focus on the progress of his thought from 1894 to 1899. During this period, Moore evolved from Classics undergraduate to philosophical innovator, one whose work touched off the start of analytic philosophy in the twentieth century. *Principia Ethica* (PE)*,* published in 1903, is bound inextricably to Moore's reputation and the study and influence of his philosophy. It may be his *chef d'oeuvre*. But it is not the first sustained work of philosophy that he produced. In what follows, I examine the influences on and the development of Moore's early views, building as detailed a picture as possible using unpublished archival material as well as more familiar primary and secondary sources.

After Moore's death in 1958, his personal papers and correspondence remained at his home (86 Chesterton Road, Cambridge).[1] This material included important early philosophical work—his Apostles Society papers, for instance, and his 1898–1899 lectures for the London School

---

[1] The majority of the Moore papers are in the Manuscripts Reading Room at the Cambridge University Library. Moore's Trinity College Prize Fellowship dissertations are at the Wren Library at Trinity College, along with his copy of what was known as Wittgenstein's Typescript 230iii. For details on the former, see Baldwin and Preti (BP, 2011). For details on the latter, see Von Wright (1969). A number of Moore's diaries were destroyed or lost. It is not possible to determine whether Moore edited his own papers or whether they were culled after his death by his family (but see Levy (1979, 13)). He did annotate his correspondence and (surviving) diaries, adding dates and marginalia.

of Ethics.[2] Other material—drafts of philosophical papers, lecture notes, and so on—had been in the care of Casimir Lewy, who in due course published some of the material in his possession.[3] In the late 1960s, with the permission of Moore's widow Dorothy and their son Timothy (literary executors of the estate), Paul Levy began to catalogue and sort the papers that Moore had left at home, using some of the material for Levy (1979). Dorothy Moore died in 1977, and the papers were then offered for sale through Sotheby's in December 1979 and were purchased by the Cambridge University Library (with additional financial help from Trinity College).[4] After Lewy's death in 1991, the material that had been in his possession was given by Timothy Moore to the Cambridge University Library.

One obstacle to the pursuit of detailed historical scholarship on Moore's early philosophy, therefore, was that a good deal of the relevant material was not available until fairly recently.[5] Moore himself mostly refused to publish early material or even reprint his early published papers.[6] The general neglect led to some inevitable distortions in the usual accounts of Moore's philosophical development. With little or no access to prior work, many commentators have tended to treat PE as if it were the first thing Moore ever wrote. Moreover, given Moore's long presence at Cambridge, it was all but inevitable that his later published work throughout the 1920s and 1930s eclipsed notice of his early papers,

---

[2] See Regan (1991) and Chap. 4.

[3] Casimir Lewy (1919–1991) was a student of Moore's and eventually, Fellow of Trinity College Cambridge. In the preface to Lewy (1962), he notes "G.E. Moore expressed a wish that after his death I should go through his philosophical papers and consider the possibility of preparing a selection of them for publication." What Lewy prepared for publication (with approval from Dorothy Moore and Timothy Moore) was (1) selections from a set of notebooks in which Moore used to jot down notes and other philosophical musings (Lewy 1962) and selections from Moore's lectures (Lewy 1966). The notebook jottings date from 1919 to 1953, and Lewy titled the selections "Commonplace Book," after Moore's own title for a number of the notebooks. A large number of Moore's lectures at Cambridge are preserved in the archive, dating from 1911 (his first year as a Lecturer). The lectures Lewy chose to publish date from 1928 to 1929; 1925 to 1926; and 1933 to 1934.

[4] The highest bid was £48,000 (£216, 960/$340,117 at current exchange rates). See editor's notes, *Russell*, nos. 35–6 (Autumn-Winter 1979–1980).

[5] See Baldwin (1990, 1993), Griffin (1991), and Hylton (1990), who included material from the Moore papers in their discussions of the early work of Moore and of Russell.

[6] One exception was Moore (1953).

which were scattered throughout the professional journals and in any case not reprinted until almost 30 years after his death (Regan 1986a). Moore's most essential pre-*Principia* work was not published until 2011,[7] and there is philosophical material still unpublished.[8]

The archival material has been divided into three collections: Moore's personal papers (Add. Ms. 8330), his philosophical papers (Add. Ms. 8875), and additional material that from time to time is discovered and added to the collection (Add. Ms. 9978). Some of Moore's own books are also archived at the Library, including his copy of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* (complete with fading marginal notations). Moore kept a series of meticulous lists early on, and his personal papers include various lists and chronologies that record his early years at Cambridge, along with "summaries of activities," which include lists of what books he was reading, how many hours of work he devoted to what, his summer holidays, reading parties, and music he was learning (Add. Ms. 8330 1/1/1-2). The complete surviving diaries are from 1908, 1909–1916, 1924 (some extracts from diaries also survive), and there is an ample correspondence. Letters from Moore to his parents, to his sisters and brothers, and to his close friends Desmond MacCarthy (1877–1952) and Robert Trevelyan (1872–1951) survive, as well as letters from MacCarthy, Russell, and Wittgenstein.[9] These documents all contain fragments of information that together help to build a picture of Moore's early philosophical (and personal) development.

Moore's initiation into philosophy is an important part of the story. Moore added a Part II Tripos in Moral Science to his Part I in Classics, and for two years (1894–1896) attended philosophy lectures, writing

---

[7] Baldwin and Preti (BP, 2011).

[8] The Russell and Wittgenstein papers have fared better. The Bertrand Russell Research Centre at McMaster University has been engaged in the project of publishing Russell's *Collected Papers* (36 volumes in total), since McMaster acquired Russell's papers in 1968 and established the Bertrand Russell Archive. The archive is currently in the process of making Russell's correspondence digitally accessible. Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* was described by von Wright (1969) as a vast number of notebooks, manuscripts, typescripts, and other documents, comprising over 20,000 pages of material. Though almost entirely unpublished at the time of Wittgenstein's death in 1951, it is now widely available through the University of Bergen (http://wab.uib.no/index.page).

[9] These latter are published in McGuinness (2008). See also Griffin (1992). Letters from Moore to Russell are at the Russell Archive at McMaster University.

essays for Ward, Stout, McTaggart, and Sidgwick. He was also warmly embraced into the exclusive Cambridge Conversazione Society (the Apostles), whose weekly meetings were frequently lively (even facetious) debates on philosophical questions. The intellectual incubator at Cambridge at the turn of the twentieth century was in many ways tailored to Moore's personality. He was intense and somewhat reserved, but flourished among the very small, compatible, and intellectually buoyant set of young men that surrounded him not just at Trinity but in the Apostles. Though difficult to square with the later portrayals of him as a grand old man of inter-war Cambridge philosophy, Russell, for one, described Moore's early forays into philosophy as examples of "intellectual intensity," and his contemporaneous impressions of Moore at their first meetings were nearly farcically enthusiastic.[10] Moore's friends were deeply loyal, as their letters show, and he was described by J. M. Keynes, Lytton Strachey, and Leonard Woolf as having had a captivating effect on them in the early 1900s.[11] Wittgenstein, though notoriously prickly, became an affectionate correspondent.[12] Those who heard him lecture— even into the 1940s—stressed his individual affect; as a lecturer, his style and method of inquiry was thought to be unique, engrossing, and even memorable.[13]

Almost none of this stirring effect, it must be said, is evident in Moore's published work. In a remembrance published after Moore's death, and in spite of the substantial encomiums he lavished on Moore, Russell unsparingly criticised Moore's later work—what Russell called his "more minute discussions"—as pedantic and lacking in the intellectual gusto that his fellow Apostle had exhibited as a young philosopher.[14] And perhaps Russell rightly mourned the loss of the more philosophically daring Moore. After 1899, Moore seems to have lost some of the *sang-froid* with which we see him taking on his sceptical (even horrified) examiners in

---

[10] See Griffin (1991, 1992), Preti (2008a, 2019; OHBR).

[11] See Keynes (1949), Woolf (1960), Levy (2005).

[12] At least after 1929, when they became colleagues. Their relationship was rocky for some time before that. See Monk (1991), Preti (2008a; OHBR).

[13] See for instance White (1960).

[14] Russell (1959a).

1898, although PE kindled admiration of his intellectual audaciousness in some of its readers after it appeared in 1903.[15]

It may be that the burdens of his job took their toll on Moore's philosophical dynamism—he lectured three times a week without fail from 1911 to 1939 at Cambridge, took a turn as secretary of the Moral Sciences Club, regularly gave papers at philosophical meetings like the Aristotelian Society, and was editor of *Mind* from 1921 to 1947. But as a young man, engaged in a two-year exposure to philosophy (and with Saturday night Apostolic reinforcement), he found himself systematically contending with the defence of his own philosophical views in the company of dynamic young (some quite brilliant) fellow scholars, and in his attempts to work them out, he shows composure and even some assertive asperity in answering his critics and sticking to his guns.

Moore's early work adapted and assimilated the philosophical views that made up his *milieu*, but, contrary to the traditional accounts of this period, the intellectual setting was not as Bradleyan as it has been depicted.[16] It is not entirely clear, for instance, that Moore engaged as deeply with Bradley's work as has been commonly claimed, in spite of his acknowledgement to Bradley's metaphysics in his 1897 dissertation (and elsewhere). He did read a good deal of Kant's work in preparation for his Prize Fellowship dissertation(s), and his own construal of the malicious effect of Kant's psychologism on his ethical views raises the question of, among other things, the source of Moore's Kant interpretation. I will make the case here that it was Moore's unique combination of lukewarm Bradleyean metaphysics, criticism of Kant's psychologism, and late nineteenth century mental science that was at the core of the nerve in his philosophical approach, and that Russell found so appealing, early on.

My own interest in this came about mostly by accident. I had been wondering what exactly was behind Moore's formulation of the nature of judgment in terms of a mind-independent proposition in "The Nature of Judgment" (Moore 1899a). This was what Russell long celebrated not only

---

[16] The term *milieu* is used by Dummett (1993, 3) in denying that Moore and Russell, at Cambridge, could have been familiar with the "true" origins of analytical philosophy, in the work of Austrian and German thinkers of the period. I will show that Dummett was wrong about the intellectual environment at Cambridge.

as a pioneering influence on his own work, but the beginning of a radical change in philosophy.[17] It is not clear how exactly Moore "revolted" against Bradleyan idealism with this new conception of judgment, and it cannot be said that Moore (1899a) is perspicuous or even entirely coherent. Finding out how Moore came to his views led me to wonder whether what motivated him could be traced through what was left of his early papers, so I went to Cambridge to look through them. I will say that building a case for the influences on his thinking, *pace* Dummett, actually did involve investigation of "the usual sort," namely long hours in the library, year after year.[18] The conception of judgment that featured in Moore's early philosophy had to have come from somewhere, and as it turns out, it did, and through the usual intellectual channels—his own study of primary and secondary sources, journal articles, discussions with teachers and friends, and the sustained undertaking of defending his own philosophical views.

I will focus below on Moore's work between 1894 and 1899. It will emerge that PE is a mature stage of ideas that first found root in some of his Apostles papers, developed in his Fellowship dissertations (1897 and 1898), and were further refined through his 1898 and 1899 London School of Ethics lectures.[19] In Chap. 1, I examine the influences on Moore's evolving intellectual life between 1894 and 1897 in the philosophical themes then in active debate at Cambridge. I will focus in particular on the anti-psychologism that was making its way across the continent in the development of the new science of psychology, and how this was assimilated at Cambridge by Moore's teachers. In Chap. 2, I assess the role of what was then known as mental science in the work of Stout and Ward, and the ways in which this influenced Moore's own developing thought. In Chap. 3, I discuss how Moore's views on Kant's philosophy were influenced by the way in which his own teachers read and taught Kant, with a focus on Sidgwick's role in Moore's philosophical growth. In Chap. 4, I examine Moore's 1897 and 1898 dissertations, in order to show and explain the roots, development, and defence of the revolutionary

---

[17] Russell (1903, xxviii, 1944, 12, 1959a, 54).

[18] Dummett (1993, 1–2) is a notable example of the dismissive attitude to history of philosophy that was common for some time.

[19] Moore himself preferred his own 1912 to PE, but it cannot be said to have had an impact equal to that of PE. For his London School of Ethics lectures, see Chap. 4 and Regan (1991).

account of judgment that makes its appearance in 1898. I close with a look at some of the work that Moore produced immediately after 1898.

Most accounts of the origins of early analytic philosophy in late nineteenth century Cambridge naturally feature, but also tend to link, the efforts of Moore and Russell, and not without reason. Both Moore and Russell helped to entrench the by-now accepted key elements of the story of their role in the beginnings of analytic philosophy, each at various times crediting the other for influence on significant ideas in those early days. But Moore's and Russell's recollections of the early years of their emerging philosophical views—mostly decades after the fact and mutually, even self-consciously, cordial—were those of a pair of esteemed elders of mid-twentieth-century professional academic philosophy. This was a discipline very different from that of their youth, and one they themselves, even unwittingly, had had a hand in shaping. Neither was necessarily in the best position to accurately describe—let alone appraise—their early philosophical development in its own context. But their recollections stood for some time as the official portrait—not always totally reliable, as I will argue—of those early years. Certainly, the mature Moore himself gave his own role in the origins of early analytic philosophy, and the impact of his early work on this period, very short shrift. It is noticeably missing from the reflections on his work in Schilpp (1942), which for some time stood as the authorized account of Moore's role in twentieth century philosophy. But there is no particular reason to take Moore's later word for the assessment of his early philosophical endeavours. His views, in their own context, can speak for themselves.

References

Baldwin, T. 1990. *G.E. Moore.* London: Routledge.

Baldwin, T, ed. 1993. *G.E. Moore: Principia Ethica*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baldwin, T., and C. Preti, eds. 2011. *G.E. Moore: Early Philosophical Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [BP]

Dummett, M. 1993. *Origins of Analytical Philosophy*. London: Duckworth.

Griffin, N. 1991. *Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Griffin, N. 1992. *The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, vol. 1: The Private Years (1884–1914)*. London: Penguin.

Hylton, P. 1990. *Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Keynes, J.M. 1949. *Two Memoirs*. New York and London: Augustus Kelly.

Levy, P. 1979. *G.E. Moore and the Cambridge Apostles*. London: Harcourt.

Levy, P. 2005. *The Letters of Lytton Strachey*. New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux.

Lewy, C., ed. 1962. *G.E. Moore: Commonplace Book 1951–1953*. London: Thoemmes.

Lewy, C., ed. 1966. *Lectures on Philosophy by G.E. Moore*. London: Allen and Unwin.

McGuinness, B. 2008. *Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents (1911–1951)*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Monk, R. 1991. *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius*. New York and London: Penguin.

Moore, G. E. 1899a. The Nature of Judgment. *Mind*, n.s. 8 (30): 176–193. [NJ].

Moore, G. E. 1912. *Ethics*. London: Williams and Norgate.

Moore, G.E. 1953. *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*. London: Collier Books.

Preti, C. 2008a. He Was In Those Days Beautiful and Slim: Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore, 1894–1901. *Russell* 28 (2): 97–192.

Preti, C. 2019. What Russell Meant When He Called Moore A Logician. In LaPointe, ed. 2019: 189–205.

Regan, T. 1986a. *G.E. Moore: The Early Essays*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Regan, T. 1991. *G. E. Moore: The Elements of Ethics*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Rosenbaum, S. 1984. Bertrand Russell in Bloomsbury. *Russell* Summer (1): 11–29.

Russell, B. 1903. *The Principles of Mathematics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [PoM].

Russell, B. 1944. My Mental Development. In Schilpp, ed., 1–20. [MMD]

Russell, B. 1959a. *My Philosophical Development*. New York: Simon and Schuster. [MPD].

Russell, R. 1959b. The Influence and Thought of G.E. Moore: A Symposium of Reminiscence by Four of His Friends. *The Listener* (April 30, pp. 755–758).

Schilpp, P. 1942. *The Philosophy of G.E. Moore (Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. IV)*. Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press.

Von Wright, G.H. 1969. The Wittgenstein Papers. *Philosophical Review* 78 (4): 483–503.

Woolf, L. 1960. *Sowing: An Autobiography of the Years 1880–1904*. London: Hogarth Press.

1

Mental Science and Moral Science in Nineteenth Century Cambridge

1 Introduction

The origins of analytic philosophy in the English-speaking world can be traced to the early work of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, in the period roughly between 1894 and 1903. It is the origin of Moore's early work in particular that is my focus here. But there are some challenges in reconstructing the genesis of the views that led to the new analytic approach, the first phase of which culminated in the tandem 1903 publication of *Principia Ethica* (PE) and *Principles of Mathematics* (PoM). As I noted in the introduction, (i) Moore and Russell themselves were responsible for the preliminary accounts of their maiden forays into philosophy, accounts that remained unopposed for some time; (ii) it was nearly 100 years after the initial publication of PE and PoM before scholars could comprehensively examine and query some of the early particulars that had burrowed their way into the narrative; and (iii) contextual/historical work in the origins of analytic philosophy was subject to mid-to-late century analytic philosophy's general disregard for history of

philosophy.[1] I believe that the story has become encumbered by some distortions that could use some revision, and there are puzzles, in addition, that have not yet been entirely resolved. I will set out the case for this in what follows.

In this chapter, I will give an account of how the intellectual atmosphere at Cambridge was shaped in the nineteenth century. I particularly want to emphasize the robust presence of what was then known as mental science in philosophical study at Cambridge, a line of influence in this story that has received, on the whole, limited attention. This will set the stage for the examination and analysis of Moore's undergraduate work (1894–1896) and his post-graduate philosophical achievements (1897–1899) in the subsequent chapters and will serve as a general introduction to the story of the rise of analytic philosophy that we can extract from Moore's work of this period.

2   The Moral Sciences at Cambridge

In a 1953 symposium paper, the philosopher C. D. Broad gave what he titled a "local historical" account of the study and teaching of philosophy in Cambridge (Broad 1966). Terminological details squared away (that philosophy at Cambridge was long officially known as moral science), Broad went on to say that philosophy at Cambridge was not, as at Oxford or at the Scottish universities, a subject that formed part of the curriculum for all or most students; instead, it was the object of a specialized and small group of practitioners. There were few actual teaching positions at Cambridge in philosophy, for one thing: up to 1896, the only professorial chair was the Knightbridge Professorship, though in 1896, Henry Sidgwick endowed another philosophy chair, the Professorship of Mental Philosophy and Logic. All in all, Broad remarked, "Cambridge philosophy tends to be a thin stream, confined to a rather narrow and isolated, if deep, channel, and always in danger of almost drying up for considerable periods … it has been and is somewhat a peculiar growth, in fact a kind of hot-house plant" (Broad 1966, 15–16).

---

[1] See Beaney (2007a, 2013), Sorrell and Rogers (2005), and Textor (2006), among others. An early example of the depth of hostilities is captured in the dispute in Frege scholarship between Sluga and Dummett (Heis 2013, 113–5). More recent disputes involve the reception of Soames (2003, 2 vols.): see the papers in *Philosophical Studies* (2006, vol. 129, no. 3: 605–665). See also Preti (2017).

Broad's characterization had been anticipated in Sidgwick's account of philosophy at Cambridge (Sidgwick 1876). Sidgwick noted in the previous 50 years (circa 1826), there was no official recognition of philosophical studies in the academic curriculum. In general, he noted, "The educational movement in Cambridge was entirely absorbed in developing and determining the mutual relations of Classics, Mathematics, and Physics: and was content to leave Ethics and Metaphysics to the care of Scotland and Germany" (Sidgwick 1876, 236). It was mathematics and mathematical physics, Sidgwick noted, that became the "peculiar study of Cambridge" (Sidgwick 1876, 237). The Mathematical Tripos is the oldest examination at Cambridge, and for the first half of the nineteenth century, the curriculum was characterized by "the long-cherished superstition that mathematics and classics alone gave a liberal education" (Winstanley 1947, Chap. V). Throughout the eighteenth and into the mid-nineteenth century, the only avenue to a degree at Cambridge—particularly an honours degree—was mathematics. The road to the introduction of the Moral Sciences Tripos, however, contains some important details for the account of Moore's influences.

2.1 *Nineteenth Century Reform of the University: Religious Tests and the Tripos Examinations*

The introduction of Moral Sciences Tripos at Cambridge came about through the mid-nineteenth century reforms at both Cambridge and Oxford. Sidgwick himself was a prominent figure in the reforms at Cambridge, which most directly affected two things: its connection to the Church of England, and its curriculum.[2] For most of its history the concerns of the University were inseparable from those of the Church of England,[3] and religious tests—declarations of membership in the Church of England—were required at nearly every stage of the university process: to enroll, to sit for examinations, after successfully completing an honours

---

[2] See Schultz (2004).

[3] The reforms of the Church of England itself in the 1830s–1840s inaugurated reform at the Universities (Winstanley 1947). During this period, the holders of office at both institutions tended to think of these as requiring very little, if any, actual work.

degree, and to hold fellowships and other university and college offices.[4] Opposition to this had surfaced as early as the eighteenth century, and once reform of the university began in earnest circa 1850, Tests Bills came thick and fast. In 1869, Sidgwick notably resigned his Trinity fellowship to shake off "dogmatic obligations," (and was described as having performed a "purely voluntary act" about which it is "impossible to exaggerate the moral splendor").[5] He actually had little to lose: by 1871, the majority of religious tests had been abolished at Cambridge by acts of Parliament.[6]

   As for the curriculum, degree candidates were for decades in effect restricted to mathematics until the Classical Tripos was established in 1824; even then, until it was separated from the Mathematical Tripos in 1850, the Classical Tripos could be only entertained if the candidate had previously obtained honours in mathematics. Between 1747 and 1824, the ranking of candidates in the Mathematical Tripos was the single official measure of a graduate's achievement—even the object of intense public interest, with honours lists published in the papers.[7] Those with less aptitude for mathematics obtained the non-honours ordinary (poll) degrees.[8]

   That mathematics in the Cambridge undergraduate curriculum in the eighteenth to mid- nineteenth century was the dominant subject of study is odd, however, since a conspicuous isolationism characterized Cambridge mathematics at that time.[9] The discovery of the infinitesimal calculus inaugurated modern mathematics, and was the subject of an infamous dispute between Newton and Leibniz.[10] Newton's notation was adopted

---

[4] Between 1820 and 1840, roughly 75% of all Cambridge graduates became Anglican clergymen, schoolteachers, or missionaries (Craik (2008)).

[5] Winstanley (1947, 67). See also Rothblatt (1968); Schultz (2004). In fact, Trinity immediately re-hired him.

[6] See Winstanley (1947, 89–90).

[7] The ranks were Wranglers, Senior, and Junior Optimes. Russell was seventh Wrangler in 1893 (Griffin 1991); J. M. Keynes was twelfth, in 1905. From 1881, women were permitted to sit for the Tripos exams; in 1890, Philippa Fawcett became the first woman to obtain the top score in the Mathematical Tripos, but was denied the title of Senior Wrangler (Craik 2008).

[8] "Poll" for *polloi*. Poll degree students, however, still had to show examination skills in mathematics—they merely ranked lower than the honours students (in today's ranking, below third class). Charles Darwin, for one, took a poll degree (Craik 2008).

[9] Rouse Ball (1889).

[10] See, among others, Guicciardini (2003), Becher (1980, 1986), Snyder (2006), Craik (2008), Rouse Ball (1889), and Whewell (1849) for an account of the effect that the discovery of analytic mathematics had on the teaching of mathematics in Cambridge.

in England, while the rest of the mathematical world adopted that of Leibniz and Bernoulli (updated in further work of French mathematicians).[11] This local loyalty however, lead to "a rapid falling off in quality of work produced by mathematicians at Cambridge," who seemed to have regarded any innovation "as a sin against the memory of Newton."[12]

The inauguration of the Moral Sciences Tripos had its basis in the nineteenth century reform controversies and in the attitude of powerful dons towards changes in the mathematics curriculum. From his bully pulpit as Master of Trinity, William Whewell[13] defended Newtonian mathematics as indispensable for the properly educated young man at Cambridge.[14] There was no emphasis on pure mathematics or abstract principles: "rules were to be learnt before reasons" (Whewell 1849). Honours lists were made up of those who in effect could memorize the most theorems and reproduce them fastest; and by those who could then "solve" the greatest number of practical or applied problems.[15] Whewell's reasons for defending the Newtonian against the analytical model turned out to be those at the heart of Russell's description of the dispiriting nature of his mathematical studies at Cambridge, some 40 years later:

> The mathematical teaching at Cambridge when I was an undergraduate was definitely bad … The necessity for nice discrimination between the abilities of different examinees led to an emphasis on 'problems' as opposed to 'bookwork'. The 'proofs' that were offered of mathematical theorems were an insult to the logical intelligence. Indeed, the whole subject of

---

[11] The infinitesimal calculus can be expressed either in the notation of fluxions or in that of differentials. It was also expressed by Newton in geometrical form in his *Principia Mathematica*. Rouse Ball (1889) noted that part of the decline of Cambridge mathematics between 1730 and 1820 was because the mathematicians there continued to employ geometrical proofs: "elegant and ingenious, but processes not nearly so general as those of analysis" (98–99). See Guicciardini (2003).

[12] Rouse Ball (1889, 117).

[13] William Whewell (1794–1866) was Knightbridge Professor of Moral Theology and Casuistical Divinity 1838–1855 (which he converted to the chair of Moral Philosophy), and Master of Trinity: 1841–1866. See Snyder (2006).

[14] Women were admitted to study at Cambridge in 1869 but were not fully recognized as degree holders until 1948.

[15] See Craik (2008) on the private tutors who made a name for themselves for turning out the right kind of Tripos success-oriented students.

mathematics was presented as a set of clever tricks by which to pile up marks in the Tripos. (1959a, 37–8)[16]

What was bad for Cambridge mathematics, however, turns out to have been good for Cambridge philosophy. Whewell introduced the Moral Sciences Tripos in 1848 and it was held for the first time in 1851.[17] Professorships in Moral Science and Natural Science did already exist at Cambridge, so the proposal to add Tripos exams in these subjects was not entirely radical.

In its early years, passing the examination did not entitle a student to a degree, and it attracted few takers. It was even thought of as a soft option (Craik 2008) and "was in particularly evil repute" (Winstanley 1947, 186).[18] By 1870, Sidgwick complained that the Moral Sciences Tripos was the victim of a vicious circle: "standards are low because able and industrious men do not devote themselves to the study, and they don't because it is not rewarded, and it is not rewarded because the standard of a first class is low" (Winstanley (1947, 186)).

One problem was the miscellany of topics represented in the early Moral Sciences Tripos (Winstanley 1947). Sidgwick himself noted that it was inadequate because it was formed on the basis of subjects "in which the University happened to possess Professors" and not the more natural divisions by which philosophy is commonly studied: that is, logic, metaphysics, "or even Psychology" (1876, 242). The original Tripos included moral philosophy, logic, history, political economy, general jurisprudence, and the laws of England.[19] But once the Law

---

[16] Russell went further: "most of what I learnt at Cambridge had to be painfully unlearnt later" (Russell 1961, 16; 23).

[17] Sidgwick was lavish in praising Whewell, to whom "more than any other man that the revival of Philosophy in Cambridge is to be attributed" (1876). Rouse Ball paints a less charitable picture: "His contemporaries seem to have regarded him as the most striking figure of the present century, but his range of knowledge was so wide and discursive it could not be very deep, and his reputation has faded with great rapidity" (1889, 128). See also Winstanley (1947) and Schultz (2004).

[18] Between 1851 and 1859, 66 students had taken moral science honours—just about seven per year.

[19] Now known as economics.

Tripos was itself established, mental philosophy replaced English law in the Moral Sciences Tripos (Winstanley 1947, 188). The newly established Moral Sciences Board made further changes in 1867: the Tripos was now to consist of moral and political philosophy, mental philosophy, logic, and political economy. Between 1870 and 1880, it could be said that the tide was turned in terms of respectability: the numbers of candidates increased, and appointment of College lecturers and granting of other College remunerations began to take philosophical studies into account.[20] By 1876, there were five lecturers spread across various colleges distributing between them the subjects of moral and political philosophy, mental philosophy, logic, and political economy. Commenting on the tenor of philosophical studies at Cambridge in 1876, Sidgwick had this to say (245):

> the preference that the traditional training of Cambridge naturally generates for exactness of method and certainty of results in comparison with breadth and completeness of view is unfavourable to the ambitious constructions of post-Kantian metaphysics … These characteristics appear to some extent in the scheme of the Moral Sciences Tripos: where exceptional stress is laid on Logic (including Methodology) and Political Economy, which are made departments co-ordinate with the larger but vaguer subjects of Mental Philosophy (Psychology and Metaphysics), and Moral and Political Philosophy; and where again the historical study of metaphysics is limited so as to exclude the post-Kantian developments in Germany. But how far these peculiarities are likely to appear in any school of philosophy, that may hereafter be formed at Cambridge, is hard to say.

---

[20] "The student of Moral Sciences in Cambridge will find no difficulty in obtaining teaching. Lectures in its several branches are given by the Professors of Moral Philosophy and Political Economy, and by lecturers in Trinity, St. John's, Caius, Queens' and St Catharine's Colleges …. It is to be hoped that … other foundations in our University will follow the example of Trinity College in announcing their intention of giving systematic encouragement to philosophical study" (Cambridge Student Guide 1863–1876, 198). James Ward and John Neville Keynes both took firsts in the Moral Sciences Tripos during this period and were appointed as Fellows at Trinity College and at Pembroke College, respectively.

It was thus only a few decades after a modern Moral Sciences Tripos had become an established part of Cambridge academic studies that Moore and Russell entered into their study of philosophy at Cambridge, with far-reaching consequences for the century that followed. As we have noted, continental headway in mathematics was ignored in Cambridge for some time.[21] Sidgwick (1876) further added to this that the study of post-Kantian metaphysics was not a feature of Cambridge philosophy.[22] But not every continental development was entirely disdained there.

I have highlighted the circumstances of the founding of the Moral Sciences Tripos here in order to emphasize that nineteenth century mental science—psychology—was a deeply entrenched part of the Cambridge moral sciences curriculum, integrated with other aspects of Moore's philosophical background, and therefore inextricably linked to Moore's early philosophical development. Traditional histories of this period have for the most part stressed the extent of the influence on Moore of idealist metaphysics, whose chief purveyor in England was F. H. Bradley (at Oxford). Instead, I will examine more closely the extent of the influence on Moore of the combination of metaphysics and psychology that was known as mental philosophy or mental science. What I will show throughout the following chapters is that the influence of Moore's exposure to debates in the mental sciences had (among other things) a number of striking consequences for his interpretation of Kantians ethics, Kantian logic, and Kantian psychology, in his 1897 and 1898 Dissertations and beyond.

3   Moore and the Mental Sciences at Cambridge

In June 1894, Moore decided to add the study of Moral Sciences to his Classics Part II Tripos preparation and soon after began attending lectures by J. M. E. McTaggart, Henry Sidgwick, G. F. Stout, and James

---

[21] Babbage and the Analytical Society did manage to establish a more up-to-date notation for the calculus (Guicciardini 2003; Peckhaus 1999, 440).

[22] Unlike at Oxford.

Ward.[23] Broad has described the philosophers who made the greatest impact on the subject at Cambridge between 1860 and 1960 as follows. He divided the field into six groups: the logicians (John Venn, J. N. Keynes and J. M. Keynes, W. E. Johnson, and Frank Ramsey), the psychologist-philosophers (James Ward and G. F. Stout), the pure metaphysicians (J. E. McTaggart, the only one), the ethicists (Henry Sidgwick and W. R. Sorley), Moore (Broad puts him in a class by himself), and the logico-mathematical philosophers (Whitehead, Russell, and Wittgenstein). Broad called Stout "a highly independent thinker," one who participated avidly in the "psychological, epistemological, and metaphysical developments which made that period so exciting" (Mace 1966, 40). As to Ward, Broad noted that an "important part of his mental equipment was a profound knowledge of German philosophical and psychological literature" (Mace 1966, 35).

By the 1890s, the Moral Sciences Tripos had been divided into two parts. Part I consisted of: (I) psychology; (II) logic and methodology; (III) political economy. Among the readings recommended for the Part I.1 (psychology) part of the examination were James Ward's 1886 article "Psychology," a *locus classicus* for decades, and Hermann Lotze's *Microcosmus*, vol. I.[24] The Part II Tripos consisted of a number of complex options.[25] The regulations required that "every candidate shall be examined *either* in Ethical and Metaphysical Philosophy *or* in Ethical and Political Philosophy, also in one or two but not more than two of the four special subjects."[26] The compulsory subject, Ethics and Metaphysics, was divided into two sections. In Metaphysics (I(a)), there were six sections: (I) Knowledge, analysis, and general characteristics; (II) Fundamental

---

[23] Moore to his parents (11 June, 1894/Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/33): "I have decided, so far as I can tell, to take up the second part of the Moral Science Tripos as well as Ancient Philosophy in my fourth year. Drs. Verrall and Jackson consent." Moore had taken first class honours in the Classics Part I Tripos in 1894.

[24] Cambridge University Calendar (CUC 1896, xvii). See Chap. 2.

[25] CUC (1896, xviii–xx). The examination regulations specify that "one paper will be set on each of the subjects included under A, and two papers on each of the subjects included under B. An Essay paper will also be set containing questions on all the above subjects." A is the category of compulsory topics; B is the category of special subjects.

[26] CUC (1896, 54). There is no better evidence that Moore chose the compulsory subject Ethics and Metaphysics in the Part II Tripos than the title of his Trinity Fellowship Dissertation, *The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics*.

forms of the object of knowledge; (III) Certainty; (IV) Criteria applicable to special kinds of knowledge; (V) Sources and limits of knowledge; and (VI) Coordination of knowledge. For the Ethics part, there were four sections: (I) Analysis of the moral consciousness, (II) The end or ends of rational action, (III) Exposition and classification of particular duties and transgressions, and (IV) Relation of Ethics to Metaphysics, Psychology, Sociology, and Politics.[27]

Moore's preparation for the Part II included attending Ward's lectures, and a series of essays on Lotze written for Ward survives. He also attended Stout's lectures on the history of philosophy (see Chap. 2). Moreover, as noted above, the Part II Tripos further included, in the compulsory Ethics segment, a section on the relation of Ethics to Metaphysics, Psychology, Sociology, and Politics. So the initial evidence for Moore's exposure to the psychology of his day is encouraging. Decades later, in recollection, Moore himself noted that when offered a lectureship at Cambridge in 1911, he had to decide whether to lecture on logic or on psychology, as these were the subjects needed to prepare students for the Tripos. Logic was out, he said, and:

> Perhaps I ought to have felt that I was equally incompetent to lecture on Psychology, but here the case seemed to me to be different … it seemed to me that a great part of what was required to be taught, under the name of Psychology … was not an empirical science at all but a part of philosophy—something which might fairly be said to belong to the Philosophy of Mind. The chief books that were recommended for the subject—such books as Ward's article in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Stout's *Manual* and *Analytic Psychology*, and James' *Principles of Psychology*, seemed to me largely to consist of what was strictly philosophy; I had read all these books with a good deal of attention, and a good many of the subjects discussed in them were subjects on which I had thought a great deal and thought as hard as I could. (Moore 1942, 28–9)

Moore's contemporary status as the meta-ethicist's meta-ethicist casts a long shadow over the history of his early philosophical development. So

---

[27] CUC (1894, 54). The special subjects in 1894 and 1896 were History of Philosophy, Advanced Psychology and Psychophysics, Advanced Logic and Methodology, or Advanced Political Economy. Russell and Moore both chose History of Philosophy for their respective special subjects. In 1894, the examination in History of Philosophy was Bacon to Descartes; in 1896, it was The Philosophy of Hegel. Russell did the former; Moore, the latter (CUC 1896).

it may seem like an anomaly that Moore never did teach ethics in his career at Cambridge. In 1911, he took over the lectureship vacated by John Neville Keynes and lectured in psychology from 1911–1925; in 1925, when he was elevated to Ward's Professorship, he began to lecture in metaphysics, which he continued until his retirement in 1939. The *prima facie* anomaly, however, can be seen to disappear in a contextual account of his early philosophical development, though much of the evidence has to be pieced together and derived from the materials that survive from Moore's undergraduate days, and some of it is inevitably indirect. But the indications are promising and even provocative, from the scholarly point of view.

In a letter from Moore to his parents, dated 5 August, 1896—just as he finished his Tripos and was beginning preliminary work on the first (1897) version of his Trinity Prize Fellowship dissertation, he wrote that "my work has been so far reading Metaphysics + Psychology, with no direct bearing on my dissertation."[28] In 1896, of course, Moore (who had planned to write a dissertation on Kant's ethics) was not in a position to appreciate how much in fact this literature—doubtless suggested by his supervisor of studies, Ward—would indeed come to bear on his dissertation. As to what exactly Moore could have been reading in 1896 under the heading of "Metaphysics and Psychology," here the evidence is quite encouraging. We do have direct evidence of what Russell, at least, was reading in the period 1893–1899: a small bound notebook titled "What Shall I Read?" (CPBR, vol. 1, Appendix II: 345–365). The editors state that many of the philosophy books that Russell records will have been for his Part II Moral Sciences Tripos exam in 1894.[29] Since Moore took the same exam just two years later—and there is every reason for us to surmise that he, like Russell, did Ethics and Metaphysics as his compulsory part—they will have read the same materials, as the reading lists did not change in the interim.[30] Russell's record notes his having read: Bradley: *Principles of Logic, Ethical Studies* and *Appearance and Reality* (in September, May, and August, 1894, respectively), 353; Ward: "Psychology," *Encyclopedia Britannica* (in August, 1894), 353; James:

---

[28] Add. Ms. 8830 2/1/65.

[29] Russell's Part I was in Mathematics.

[30] Cambridge University Calendar (1896).

Psychology (in September, 1894), 353; Bosanquet, *Logic* (in June, 1895), 355; James *Psychology, vol. II* (in June 1895), 355; Stout, *Analytical Psychology* (in April, 1896), 357; Herbart, *Synechologie* (May, 1896), 357; and McTaggart, *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic* (May, 1896), 357. Russell read Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* again in June 1897; and Ward's Gifford Lectures I–VI (in February 1898), 360.[31]

Moore himself also kept detailed lists of what he read and how much work he did; these survive.[32] Unhappily, the most detailed of these lists do not begin until (or were not preserved before) 1901–1902; of what do survive, none of them list his reading or working on (say) Stout's *Analytic Psychology* or Ward's "Psychology," not even in the summer before he took up his lectureship at Cambridge in 1911. But this can provide a piece of indirect evidence that he was in fact familiar with these works. Moore (1942, 29) took up the lectureship in Psychology because he was confident that he was soundly conversant with the texts that formed a key element of the Moral Tripos Examinations. It is practically unthinkable that Moore would have been reading these for the very first time in preparation to begin lecturing—to begin preparing students for the psychology component of the Moral Sciences Tripos—just prior to October 1911. His psychology lectures survive, and even the earliest (Michelmas Term 1911)[33] are a detailed and meticulous exposition of the definition of Psychology, General Analysis, Direct Apprehension, and the like, containing liberal references to the work of Stout, James, and Ward (among others). His diaries and lists of this period do not note his reading and working through this literature because he had already done so.

There is thus compelling evidence that Moore was familiar with the mental science dominant in Cambridge (and elsewhere) at this period. We could even say that Moore's early philosophical background looks (from our perspective) like a set of quite incongruent views: Bradley's Absolute Idealism, McTaggart's idiosyncratic Hegelianism, Sidgwick's

---

[31] Russell (CPBR 1, 345–365). Russell also notes having read Moore's revised dissertation in November, 1898 (CPBR 1, 361). He also read Moore's *Lectures on Ethics* in February 1899 (CPBR 1, 361). These were delivered by Moore in 1898–1899 at the London School of Ethics. See Regan (1991); Chap. 4.

[32] Add. Ms. 8830 1/1/1-6.

[33] Add. Ms. 8875 13/2/1-41.

hedonism, Kant's ethics, and the mental science of Stout and Ward. It is anything but obvious how these coalesced into a position so influential that—on Russell's own fulsomely appreciative account—it shook him entirely free from metaphysical entanglements that had badly bogged down his own progress on the foundations of mathematics.[34] An account of the details in play in Moore's early philosophical development will help to explain the progress of his thought, and shed fresh light on the origins of analytic philosophy.

4   Nineteenth Century Psychology, Logic, and Metaphysics: Psychologism and Anti-Psychologism

Something that has received insufficient emphasis in this story is the extent to which the study of philosophy in general, and particularly at Cambridge, was an intermingling of the logic, metaphysics, and psychology of the day. But no contemporary understanding of these subjects will serve to explain how Moore, and his teachers and examiners, will have understood them. The professional journals, just becoming established during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, are important sources of evidence for reconstruction of the intellectual environment at this period. *Mind* was among the first of these for the Anglophone thinker: it was founded in 1876 explicitly as "[T]he first English-language journal devoted to Philosophy and Psychology," and was a vital hub for contemporary thinking in philosophy and psychology on the continent, in Britain, and elsewhere.[35] *Mind* was peppered thickly with debates and inquiries into (among other things) the nature and processes of mind; truth; the subject of thought and object of thought; the act of mind and the object of thought; and the customary divisions of traditional logic

---

[34] See Chap. 4 for discussion. See Preti (2008a, 2019, OHBR); Griffin (forthcoming).

[35] Croom Robertson (1876, 1–16). *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* was established in 1888; *Philosophical Review* in 1892; *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method* (now *Journal of Philosophy*) in 1904; *International Journal of Ethics* (now *Ethics*) in 1890.

(concepts, inference, and judgment).[36] These debates display the attempts on the part of the thinkers of the day to grapple with, among other things, the developing modern conception of the relation between thought and reality.[37] Highly visible during this period were Stout, Ward, Sidgwick, and even McTaggart,[38] all of whom prominently contributed to and participated in spirited debates with each other; with Bradley at Oxford[39]; and with the American and continental psychologists, on concerns that crosscut psychology and logic; logic and metaphysics, and metaphysics and psychology.

   Moore's pioneering philosophical move in "The Nature of Judgment," (NJ) can be positioned squarely within this setting.[40] Throughout his life, Russell credited Moore with—among other things—having provided the crucial missing metaphysical underpinning to Russell's own developing thought in the foundations of mathematics with this work. [41] In NJ, Moore's idea was to explicitly distinguish the act of judgment from its object. The object of judgment was there formulated as a mind-and-language-independent proposition with an explicitly relational structure. Moore entirely rejected an understanding of the nature of judgment in

---

[36] For instance, the very first issue included an account of physiological psychology in Germany (Sully 1876); a review of Brentano (Flint 1876); and within the first year, an account of philosophy at Cambridge (Sidgwick 1876), at Oxford (Pattison 1876); in the Scottish Universities (Veitch 1877); and in Germany (Wundt 1877). Every issue also included detailed short accounts of published books and articles other than in English that appeared in the literature. Moore himself was responsible for some number of these.

[37] Schaar (2013b) emphasizes the prevalence specifically of debate concerning the act/object distinction in the literature at this period.

[38] Moore attended McTaggart's 1902 public lectures, and records McTaggart's comments on the interrelation of metaphysics, mind and science: "Psychology <u>alone</u> deals with mind: it started late and has grown more slowly: and besides a great deal of it deals with matter, being psycho-physics, or science of correlation [of the] two: psychophysics is growing most and has most accuracy. There is little psychology about mind alone, and this is very difficult to deal with without metaphysics, and hence becomes involved in disputes" (Add. Ms. 8875 10/3/4).

[39] Bradley and Ward, for instance, fought it out savagely in consecutive issues of *Mind* about "general psychology." See Chap. 2 for detail.

[40] Moore (1899a).

[41] Note that Ryle (1970, 90) described NJ as "the *De Interpretatione* of early twentieth-century Cambridge logic." Ryle, who himself taught a course at Oxford entitled "Logical Objectivism: Bolzano, Brentano, Husserl, and Meinong," (Vrahimis 2013, xii) may have been in a position to appreciate NJ in a way that has failed to make a sufficient impression so far on the history of this period.

terms of a mental act of judging as too psychologistic: too apt, that is, to implicate an unacceptable mentalism in an account of what the judgment was meant to be a judgment *of*. Moore's central aim was an account of what he called the metaphysical basis of ethics, and his views, as we know, developed subsequently into a resolute objectivism for the object of ethical judgment, the Good. In this way, Moore's NJ represented a moment of decisive discontinuity between nineteenth century mental (and moral) science, and twentieth century analytic philosophy.

It cannot be said, however, that Moore's account is entirely intelligible from our own perspective. The published paper was culled from his 1898 Trinity Prize Fellowship dissertation, the revision of the version he had unsuccessfully submitted for the Prize in 1897. Ward had encouraged the young Moore to examine Kant's philosophy for the 1897 Prize Fellowship attempt (Moore 1942, 20), and Moore began to develop his thought in the context of what he thought was going to be an analysis of Kant's ethics; in particular, Kant's views on freedom. A year later, in 1898, he reconfigured what he had into an examination of Kant on reason, and part of that examination was an account of the nature of judgment. It is worth emphasizing that an account of Kant on freedom and on reason might well be anticipated to include an examination of a variety of elements proprietary to the logic, psychology, and metaphysics of the day. An account of freedom in Kant would need to take on Kant's views concerning the self (the moral agent) and freedom of the self (in order to establish moral responsibility). Further, an account of reason—a source of *a priori* concepts—would need to examine Kant's transcendental arguments concerning what we know and how we know it. For Kant, an account of the self could come only from empirical psychology (as he understood it); but an account of our moral agency needs grounding in freedom, which a scientific psychology cannot (as deterministic) provide.

Kant's own (idiosyncratic) distinction between rational and empirical psychology played a substantive role in his account of freedom, which Moore would be expected to explain in his account of it. But what counted as the study of psychology in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries encompassed investigation into a variety of mental phenomena, with an emphasis on the nature of reason and knowledge. The question as to whether or not thought configured reality—and what kind of

reality—was at the heart of the dispute that Kant bequeathed to the nineteenth century, and it was significantly entangled with the logic, metaphysics, and psychology of the day as areas of inquiry.[42] As noted in Sidgwick (1876)—and as the examination subjects of the late nineteenth century Moral Sciences Tripos confirm—the mental sciences ("mental philosophy") were investigations with any "reference to the phenomena of Mind."[43] What counted as mental science; the role of the empirical development of psychology; how these were intertwined with logic and metaphysics; and the substantive role all of this played at Cambridge is a central part of the story. [44]

Disciplinary turbulence, in other words, was at the heart of the intellectual environment in Moore's *milieu*. A useful theoretical canopy under which we can fit the young Moore's key early ideas, the influences that shaped them, and his absorption of those influences is what is known as the *Psychologismusstreit*, which emphasizes the disciplinary furore of the day. This was a conceptual clash between what became formulated as psychologism and as anti-psychologism, which encompassed logic, metaphysics, epistemology, mathematics, and psychology itself.[45] The *Psychologismusstreit* was a forceful intellectual antagonism during this

---

[42] Even a cursory look through the first 25 years of the issues discussed in *Mind* show how much these concepts intermingled. It also turns up directly via Moore himself, who says this in his 1898 Dissertation: "Some apology is perhaps needed for the smallness of space occupied by directly ethical discussions in a Dissertation which professes to take Ethics for its subject…But I found that everything I had to say presupposed general philosophical conclusions…Reference to any modern ethical treatise will show how much their conclusions depend on the meanings given to such terms as 'rational' 'empirical' 'necessary' and many others." (BP 2011, 118). On the verso side of this page of the 1898 dissertation manuscript, there is a somewhat plaintive note in Moore's hand which records that there are 20 pages devoted to logic; six to ethics. Two surviving student essays of Russell also demonstrate how closely these issues were tracked at this period: an 1894 essay written for Ward's metaphysics called "On the Distinction between the Psychological and Metaphysical Points of View" (CPBR 1, 195–98). and an essay called "Is Ethics a Branch of Empirical Psychology?" (CPBR 1, 99–105).

[43] Veitch (1877, 74).

[44] Digital searches on topics in the philosophy journals shows some evidence of the frequency of discussion on the nature of psychology. A search on "logic *and* psychology *and* metaphysics" narrowed to the years 1876–1900 results in 585 hits: 9 primary sources, 239 research articles, and 128 reviews. A search on "The relation of psychology to metaphysics" turns up 451 hits; and "The relation of metaphysics to logic" turns up 429 hits. "The relation of logic to psychology" turns up 573 hits. Finally, "The relation of logic, metaphysics, and psychology" turns up 1554 hits.

[45] See Kusch (1995) and Jacquette (1991a; 1991b) for substantive analysis and comment.

time, both on the continent and in Britain, fundamental aspects of which conspicuously featured in the work of Moore's teachers at Cambridge (and others). We turn to an account of the *Psychologismusstreit* next, in order to flesh out an account of the intellectual environment in which Moore's early views were shaped.

4.1   Psychologism and Anti-Psychologism: *The Psychologismusstreit*

The nineteenth century psychologism/anti-psychologism dispute cut across nearly every intellectual discipline of the day, but it has received less attention than it could have in a complete account of the origins of analytic philosophy at Cambridge. This could be because even a summary look at the nature of the psychologism/anti-psychologism debate must contend with the fact that "psychologism" has a welter of definitions, not all of them cohesive. Jacquette (1991a, 1) formulates it as follows: "'psychologism' is the watchword of a fundamental antagonism from the nineteenth century to now, particularly in logic, semantics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, and metaphysics and epistemology," also noting that it "has mostly been considered a term of abuse leveled against efforts to explain philosophical concepts or address philosophical problems from the standpoint of subjective psychological experience" (Jacquette 1991b, 245). Vrahimis (2013, 9) adds that the term "psychologism" was also applied against anyone suspected of upholding views that were sympathetic (or thought to be) to the reduction of some aspect of philosophy to facts about human psychology; it is also the case that some formulations of "psychologism" linked it directly to the significance accorded to a scientific stance in the growing discipline of psychology.[46] Kusch (1995), Schaar (2013c), and Vrahimis (2013) locate the source of the antagonism towards psychologistic approaches in the rise of "anti-naturalism" in the nineteenth century: the growing hostility from "pure" philosophy to the idea that foundational logical, epistemological, or metaphysical questions can be answered by the natural or

---

[46] Brentano, for instance, was accused of "psychologism" for claiming that an empirical and scientific discipline of psychology was the basis of philosophy. See below.

even social sciences.[47] The debate on the nature, threat, and risk of psychologism raged across multiple disciplines and sub-disciplines between the mid-nineteenth century and the First World War, distinguishable by way of the fields where the conflict was joined. Kusch identifies (at least) metaphysical, ontological, epistemological, logical, ethical, aesthetic, and mathematical varieties of psychologism (1995, 108). This conflict—and the lack of consensus on just what counted as psychologistic commitments—drew just about everyone into the fray, with accusations of psychologism liberally levelled and counter-levelled amongst the parties to the debates—even those who took themselves to be in opposition.[48] The crisis for philosophy, meanwhile, was particularly acute: if significant traditional spheres of philosophical enquiry—reason, knowledge, mind, judgment, ideas, presentations—were to be absorbed by the new science of psychology, then philosophy itself risked extinction.

The first to be christened a psychologistic philosopher was F. E. Beneke,[49] whose work came in for extensive analysis and criticism from Stout (1889). Beneke's focus on thought (on "psychological knowledge" or "knowledge of the self") as the foundation of all philosophical knowledge had the consequence that he characterized logic as the study of the "mind's own laws"

---

[47] Both Jacquette (1991a) and Kusch (1995), however, argue that an important strand of the *Psychologismusstreit* had its origins in the burgeoning stand-off between neo-Kantian philosophers ("pure" philosophers) and the new psychologist philosophers ("naturalist" philosophers), who for some time in the German universities of the mid-to-late nineteenth century were housed in philosophy departments. On this, see Judd (1895), which lists the large variety of lectures given at the German universities under the title "psychology". The situation grew so tense that in 1913, 100 philosophers signed a petition requesting that experimental psychologists be forbidden from taking up positions in departments of philosophy (Vrahimis 2013, 10). See Kusch (1995) on the distinction between the sociological/institutional features of the *Psychologismusstreit* and the more conceptual features of psychologism, which both he and Vrahimis (2013) see as importantly intertwined.

[48] "This merry-go-round of charge and countercharge was possible only because the criteria for attributing a psychologistic stance to another philosopher were extremely flexible" (Kusch 1995, 115). Anticipating, it may be said, recent digital data mining approaches to scholarship, Kusch further provides a set of tables documenting the number of attributions of "psychologism" between accusers *and* accused—which were either whole schools of thought, or individual thinkers. (Kusch, 97–99). Another complicating factor is that even when authors did not explicitly use the term "psychologism" to assess the work of their rivals, their criticisms were of a piece with those that took psychologism explicitly to task (Kusch 105).

[49] Friedrich Eduard Beneke (1798–1854). See Erdmann (1890); see also Windelband (1926). More recently, see Kusch (1995, 101–103), Schaar (2013c), Vrahimis (2013, xi), and Beiser (2017).

and to be undergirded by psychology. Post-Benekean formulations of "psychologism" varied to some degree, and Kusch has catalogued a set of definitions and criteria of psychologism in the literature of the day that help to give the notion some shape (1995, 119–121).[50] Among the criteria Kusch pinpoints are: any philosophical view that regarded philosophy as applied psychology; advocated subjectivism and relativism; conflated genesis and validity; or which combined psychology and epistemology, all risked the charge of psychologism. Any position on the nature of logic that failed to distinguish the concepts of laws as norms and laws as general facts; grounded logic in psychology or phenomenology; or regarded logical laws as a product of evolution could be called psychologistic. Any view of the nature of judgment that took judgment to be purely psychological; formulated judgment as an act of assent or acceptance; or took psychology to be the criterion of correctness of judgment could be considered psychologistic. Any theoretical stance that failed to separate the subject from the object of knowledge; that called logic a "science of consciousness"; or that assumed that the subject posits objects could be considered psychologistic. Any metaphysics that redefined psychology as a metaphysical science or justified logical principles on metaphysical grounds could be called psychologistic. And any view that regarded separating and uniting as activities of the soul (or mind); attempted to dismiss or justify ideas by explaining their psychological origins; or took seriously the principle that "individuum est ineffabile" could be called psychologistic. In short, there were any number of ways in which a thinker or a school of thought could be ensnared by psychologistic commitments—even while proclaiming precisely the reverse.[51]

It is also true that a firm anti-psychologism featured in the British philosophy of the day, although the emphasis, in accounts of the origins of analytic philosophy at Cambridge has nearly always been on the anti-psychologism in Bradley's idealist metaphysics. But—as it happens—an anti-psychologism featured just as much in the mental philosophy of Stout and Ward. The points of contact between these views need closer

---

[50] The demarcations he identifies are, to be clear, post-1900. But as we noted above, the spectre of psychologistic commitments in the thinking across a variety of disciplines was a dominant theme in the late nineteenth century—whether or not explicitly labelled as such.

[51] See Cavallin (1997) and Cussins (1987), among others, on the taxonomies of psychologism. See also Notturno (1997), Schaar (2013c), and Vrahimis (2013).

examination, as do the important differences between them, incorporating (as they did) a number of formulations of psychologism, antipsychologism, subjectivism, phenomenalism, mentalism, logic, and idealism. But this means that there is reason to think that the antipsychologism specifically developed in Bradley's views did not have the sole hold on Moore's developing thought.[52] An important element in this story is that in his specifically anti-associationist arguments, Bradley is aligned with Stout, Ward and others, in what emerges as an antipsychologism about *prima facie* psychological states like judgment, as well as mental entities like ideas. Stout and Ward, to be sure, did not follow Bradley into the metaphysical terrain that he linked to his position, but an anti-psychologism was at the foundation of a perspective in common between them.[53] Instead, what we might call an anti-psychologism about the nature of psychology (and the consequences of that view for logic and metaphysics), influenced by continental thinking and absorbed by Moore's teachers, can be shown to have played a key role in shaping Moore's early philosophical evolution.

The psychologism/anti-psychologism debate has been typically defined in histories of early analytic philosophy by way of Frege and Husserl's well-known criticisms of psychologism in logic near the turn of the twentieth century. Contemporary analytic philosophers are likely to associate—perhaps even uniquely associate—the psychologism/anti-psychologism debate with the contributions of Frege to the origins of analytic philosophy, so it may be useful here to very briefly remark on the evidence of Frege's influence on the pre-dawn of early analytic philosophy at Cambridge.[54] As I have been arguing, the newly emerging disciplinary stance in psychology began to stake a claim to terrain long thought proprietary to philosophy, and the dispute engulfed stakeholders in the academy of the late nineteenth

---

[52] On Bradley's influence, see Griffin (1991), Hylton (1990), and Baldwin (1990).

[53] Ward (1887, 56) replying to Bradley: "I have never said that psychologists should be idealists as metaphysicians: but they do and must occupy an idealist standpoint in scientifically expounding the facts of mind, just as the physicist does and must occupy a realist standpoint in treating scientifically of the facts of matter. It is the endeavour to transcend this dualism, not the frank recognition of it, that is really an intrusion of speculation into science." See Chap. 2.

[54] There is a large literature here. See the classics: Dummett (1973, 1993), Mohanty (1991), Sluga (1980). More recently, among others: Beaney and Reck (2005a, b), Gabriel (2002) Heis (2012, 2013), Vrahimis (2013).

century quite broadly.[55] The intellectual context in which the *Psychologismusstreit* played out in the nineteenth century, that is, would have incorporated Frege's work, but was broader in nature.[56] Spreading throughout Germanophone intellectual life with gusto, it unsurprisingly included Frege's work.[57] But although the anti-psychologism that featured as a key motif in Frege's new logic was very much a part of the broader tendencies of the time, the role that Frege's work played in the specifically Cantabrigien origins of analytic philosophy is, in effect, nil. It was not discussed in the mental science literature most likely to have been a direct influence on Moore.[58] The mathematical training that Russell received at Cambridge, as we know, did not include any notice of Frege's work or indeed any up-to-date formal models or methods.[59] We might also note that Frege's approach to logic—his "mathematization" of logic—itself was regarded with some suspicion even among his fellow mathematicians.[60]

---

[55] Kusch (1995) outlines how the *Psychologismusstreit* was a far broader phenomenon than a dispute on the nature of logic, consuming nearly everyone working in both Germanophone and Anglophone philosophy (he does also claim that on the *specific* question of the relation of logic to psychology between 1890 and 1914, the debate consumed nearly everyone in the German-speaking philosophical world). The most charitable interpretation of Dummett's metaphorical "in the air" characterisation of the ideas of the day (Dummett 1993, 1), thus, is perhaps best understood via Kusch's extensive historical-contextual work on the pervasiveness of the *Psychologismusstreit*.

[56] Note that "logic" at this period was understood to incorporate the nature of reason and epistemology as well as psychological processes.

[57] Heck (2019, 497-498) notes Stumpf's advice to Frege to make his work more accessible to philosophers as well as to mathematicians. See also Beaney (1997, n. 18) (Carl Stumpf was a philosopher-psychologist, a student of Brentano and Lotze). There are intricate scholarly questions as to what exactly Frege meant by "logic," to say nothing of how the word "philosophy" tended to cover all manner of *a priori* inquiry. See the papers in Beaney and Reck (2005a, b); and in Ebert and Rossberg (2019).

[58] References to Frege in the philosophy journals of the time are few: 14 citations between 1879–1900. None of those include extended discussion. Publication of his *Begriffsschrift* is listed a few times in the literature reviews of the contents of journals (a practice then common). Two of his papers ("On Concept and Object" and "On Sense and Reference," now classics) are given a one-sentence summary in *Mind* in 1892 and noted as having appeared in two German journals. See Pulkkinen (1994). Russell said Ward gave him *Begriffsschrift* "after I became a Fellow," but that he couldn't make anything of it until "I had myself independently discovered most of what it contained" (Auto., 65; 1956b, 21; Griffin 1991, 36–42). There is no evidence that Moore read Frege until after 1911.

[59] See Potter (2020, 172–3).

[60] See Heis (2012, 2013), Vrahimis (2013) and Pulkkinen (1994). See also Dathe (2005). Schroeder (1898) is particularly scathing. On the Schroeder-Peirce-Frege connection, see Putnam (1990) and Griffin (1992, 199, 211). See also Picardi (1987).

Moreover, Frege was quite isolated;[61] his contributions were largely unheeded by his peers;[62] and it cannot be said that his work made an immediate impact on British philosophy even after Russell referred to it in *Mind* (1901b, 312) and included extended comment on it in an appendix to PoM. Russell was in a sense primed to fully grasp the relevance of Frege's views for his work in the foundations of mathematics and mathematical reasoning when he began a study of it after 1900. But what primed Russell to appreciate it, and what dislodged some of the tenacious psychologistic commitments creating obstacles to his work, had been filtered down to Cambridge—and to Moore—not through Frege, but through the developing debates in nineteenth century mental science.[63]

These debates were generated in Germany and Austria when psychology as a discipline began to split off into what was variously (and interchangeably) referred to as a physiological, genetic, and experimental faction and away from its more philosophical or metaphysical tradition. But the non-physiological/non-laboratory view of psychological enquiry—philosophical psychology, as it became known—stood fast against the encroachments of the new scientific methods. Its theoretical presuppositions contributed to further formulations of "psychologism," one of which was to oppose what it took to be an erroneous subjectivism in a properly modern scientific psychology. It is fairly typical to think generally of the late nineteenth century inclination towards anti-psychologism in logic and metaphysics as a resistance to a form of mentalism or psychologism of the rules of inference and even truth-value, as well as in accounts of the nature of reality. Anti-psychologism in psychology itself, however, requires some care in formulation, since the object of psychological study *is* the nature of mind.[64] Part of the story here thus

---

[61] Vrahimis (2013), Griffin (1992, 209) and Russell (1956b, 21).

[62] Frege himself wrote, in the preface to *Grundgesetze*: "the prospects for my book are dim. In any case we must give up on those mathematicians who, encountering logical expressions like 'concept' 'relation' 'judgment' think: *metaphysica sunt, non leguntur!* and also those philosophers who, sighting a formula, cry out: *mathematica sunt, non leguntur* …" See Ebert and Rossberg, eds: 2013: XII.

[63] See Griffin (1991, forthcoming), Hylton (1990), Schaar (2013c), and Preti (2008a, 2019, OHBR).

[64] Schaar (2013c) distinguishes between the continental anti-psychologism and the British variant by identifying five forms of philosophical anti-psychologism, which correspond in her view to three ways of accounting for the objectivity of our judgments. She argues that the unity of the proposition problem is what is central to the British variant. Once judgment is formulated as a mind-and-language independent proposition, the act of judgment can no longer play a role as unifying the elements of a proposition. Moore, as we will see, did not address this directly, at least not at first.

turns on the resistance from influential thinkers to what they thought of as an untoward subjectivization of important aspects of psychical events and states, in the very discipline whose focus is precisely those psychical events and states. I turn now to an account of how all this will have coalesced into influences on Moore. [65]

5   Mental Science and Psychology in Nineteenth Century Germany, Austria, and Great Britain

The mental science that shaped the British intellectual scene came from two different sources: (i) the Germanophone tradition, which, with mid-century discoveries in physiology and allied sciences, began to get out from under the legacy of Kantian and Hegelian metaphysics; and (ii) the British tradition, steeped in but officially rejecting the associationist views of the classical and the nineteenth century empiricists. Kant had bequeathed the approach to the relations between knowing mind and known world that persisted through the eighteenth century and into the early nineteenth century. He also bequeathed some terms of art in which those relations were formulated: (i) a so-called *faculty* psychology, whereby the "soul" is characterized by a variety of innate faculties, which are its capacity to carry out its activities; and (ii) a division of these activities into knowing, feeling, and willing. Also at the foundation of the activities of the mind in this tradition was the notion of *unity*; the mind was active, integrating sensory experiences according to universals. Kant's Categories (for instance) played the role of unifying explanatory principles. Lying outside of any particular experience, they are nevertheless necessary and valid (transcendental); they make experiences possible. The transcendental arguments were meant to provide conciliation between the Cartesian and Lockean models of mind, thinking, thought, and knowledge: we can

---

[65] Schaar (2013c) claims that the British variant of logical realism or anti-psychologism differs from the mainstream on the continent because of the legacy of the classical empiricists. I think there is much to be said in favour of that view, but I will argue that the British and continental views can be assimilated in Chap. 2.

know things with certainty because what we can know is secured by the very structure of the knowing faculty. Kant's arguments were also intended as a testament to a reality beyond the reach of the knowing mind. Hegelian Idealism, however, went further to put its own stamp on the relation between thought (the knowing mind) and reality: it was a mistake to claim, as Kant had, that there was a distinction between being and thinking, or the real and ideal; there was instead an active and self-regarding Reality, engaged in temporal progress to Absolute Self Contemplation through stages of unity and dissolution.

German Idealism of whatever sort thus gave *a priori* reasoning the supremacy in establishing fundamental and incontrovertible truths about the nature of reality, maintaining a fealty, as it were, to consciousness or phenomenal experience. Reflection on reasoning—on measures employed exclusively by the mind—was thought to be the only credible conduit to reality—either because in reflecting *a priori* on reason we can determine its limits (Kant); or because in reflecting on reason we come to the view that only as an object of consciousness can an object be an object (Hegel).[66] One conviction in this tradition was that the true nature of reality could only *be* of the same nature as the method by which it was grasped—some form of supersensible and (for Hegel) self-reflecting reality. *A priori* reasoning was in effect the sole avenue of metaphysical insight and truth—even if, as in Kant's case, the greatest achievement of pure reason was to establish its epistemological limits (indeed, that there were limits).[67]

The classical empiricists, for their part, officially apprehensive of anything that smacked of the innate, focused instead on the sources of knowledge. Concerned to build a credible basis of knowledge from experience (sensation and reflection), the empiricists nevertheless found themselves struggling to avoid scepticism or outright solipsism as a possible consequence of their position on the nature of ideas in the perceiving mind and the process of associating those ideas in reflection (reasoning).[68] Scepticism encroached if the immediate objects of perception were taken to be ideas in the mind, for what (what exactly) links those ideas to extra-mental reality? Moreover, as ideas in the mind were,

---

[66] Beiser (2017).

[67] See Hatfield (1992).

[68] Guyer (2017b).

on this account, both passively received in sensation and then actively associated in reflection, it remained a puzzle how the principles of association were to be justified, as not themselves grounded in experience.

These are the familiar theoretical precursors from which mid-to-late nineteenth century mental science evolved. Debates in the mental sciences through the nineteenth century were, however, not immune from persistent ambiguities in the formulation and deployment of expressions like "idea," "presentation," and "judgment," in those theoretical forerunners. One trajectory along which the nineteenth century discussions concerning reason and mental science developed was an emphasis on a logical/psychological distinction in these expressions. This led to some bizarre convolutedness. For instance, "presentation" was one of the many ways in which the German *Vorstellung* was rendered, but as the term came in for all manner of obscurity during this period, other English translations included "concept," "representation," and "idea" (in the Lockean sense of the elements of sensation and of reflection). *Vorstellung* is indeed usually rendered as "presentation" in English, but it may be that "idea" is more faithful—since, ironically, *Vorstellung* itself was coined to render the Lockean "idea."[69]

The mental sciences in the nineteenth century, however, mainly had to contend with the development of a scientific psychology separate from its philosophical origins. This was part of the general progress of the sciences in the nineteenth century, as discoveries in anatomy, physiology, the study of the brain and the nervous systems gave form to new empirical investigation of the emotions, perception, reflexes, and the senses.[70] It was not a clean break.[71] Wundt—to whom is credited the distinction between the new "physiological" psychology and the old "metaphysical" or "philosophical" psychology—established the first experimental laboratory in Leipzig in 1879; and though that date still stands in psychology textbooks as a pivotal moment in the history of scientific psychology, the

---

[69] See Simons (2004, 47). See also Schaar, who links the ambiguity to an act/object distinction (2013b).

[70] Brett (1921, 91–92). Brett puts this as a movement away from an idea of a "soul" towards an idea of higher functions of the intellect from the point of view of physiology and anatomy—though passing at times through phrenology, and also through various forms of spiritualism.

[71] Psychologists, until well into the twentieth century, were for the most part professors of philosophy, except for the physiologists.

progress of mental science away from its philosophical precursors was unquestionably more roundabout.[72]

Beneke (1798–1854) and J. F. Herbart (1776–1841) are generally credited specifically in the history of psychology for being the first to explicitly reject the tendency in idealist views to speculate on thought and forms of thought in the absence of the examination of any actual mental processes.[73] Beneke's 1832 *Textbook of Psychology as a Natural Science*, for instance, rejected both Kant's faculty psychology and the associationism of the classical empiricists, claiming for psychology a set of laws independent of any other science. Herbart—Kant's immediate successor at Königsberg and who preceded Lotze at Göttingen—was similarly instrumental in marking the transition from a philosophy of the nature of the soul (metaphysics, both in terms of the *a priori* method and in term of the object of inquiry) to a more properly scientific psychology. Herbart took the view that psychology was a science grounded in phenomenal experience, metaphysics, and mathematics: empirical observation was the method, but the goal was to work out the mathematical laws of the mind.[74] Herbart further also rejected the associationism of the classical empiricists: he took the mind to be a unitary entity, not divisible into parts.[75] Herbart's main theoretical opposition, however, was to a faculty psychology—any theory of mind that proposed innate faculties, was in his view, to be rejected in a properly scientific psychology, whose aim was to provide a proper conception of mind as a concrete system.

Moore's teacher G. F. Stout produced a three-part analysis of Herbart's psychology in the late 1880s.[76] Stout noted approvingly that in Herbart

---

[72] Boring (1929, 421). See Cerullo (1988), however, who argues that Boring's history is in fact distortingly partisan, and particularly damaging in his account of Wundt. Wundt, it turns out, was quite circumspect about the legitimate reach of experimental psychology and himself argued that it was only appropriate for the "lower" mental processes. Brett (1921, 162) however calls Wundt "not only a psychologist, but also a logician, a metaphysician, in the widest sense a philosopher."

[73] Leary (1978) carefully argues that Fries, Berneke, and Herbart took their cues from Kant's criticism of psychology and that their own criticisms of the role of developments in physiology spurred their positions on the nature and the philosophical justification of psychology as a natural science.

[74] Herbart claimed that mental events are dynamic; characterized as psychical forces—pressing into the mind and being expelled from it—which can be given mathematical expression (Murphy and Kovach 1949).

[75] Stout noted that this view is what "saves" Herbart from the mistakes of the associationist psychologists in Britain, with whom he had otherwise quite a lot in common (1888b, 324).

[76] Stout (1888b, c, 1889a).

there is no confusion between the notion of a presentation as having qualitative content ("the way that presentations are usually regarded by all who are not students of psychology") as opposed to its Herbartian formulation as a mechanical notion, "a condition of change in the total mental system of which it forms a part."[77] On Stout's telling, Herbart's chief modern move in the dawn of scientific psychology was to have shown that the faculty psychology was based on an error-prone (studded with "vague generalities") view of the role of introspection as a basis for mental science (Stout 1888b, 322). Introspection offers an inevitable starting point, but Herbart offered a theory that would reveal the facts of our "actual mental life." This theory was Herbart's blend of an experiential and mathematical account of the combination and interaction of presentations. Mental science, for Herbart, was not pure physical science, but was grounded in experience; the only way of discovering the mathematical laws governing mental events. One key element, embraced also by Stout, was a distinction between logic and psychology, in order to secure for psychology its own legitimate sphere of inquiry:

> Logic treats not of the process of thinking, but of relations in the object thought of. The logical concept is the presented content considered apart from the psychological conditions and circumstances of its presentation at this or that time to this or that individual mind. Concepts in this sense are the common property of all men and all times, are in no way psychological facts … The psychological problem may be stated thus: how and how far are we able to abstract from the causal conditions under which a presentation from time to time appears in consciousness, so as to consider its presented content in relative detachment? (Stout 1888c, 477)

5.1   Lotze

The interweaving of logic, metaphysics, and psychology characteristic of nineteenth century mental science came to a significant peak in the work of Hermann Lotze (1817–1881), Herbart's successor. Lotze held degrees in medicine as well as philosophy; he was a teacher of Brentano and of

---

[77] Whatever else is true of this distinction, Stout (1889a, 2) drew attention to the fact that confusion on this question is a hallmark of Locke's *Essay*; a view taken also by Bradley. See Chap. 2.

Frege and of Moore's teacher James Ward. [78] Moore himself was tasked by Ward to study Lotze's *Metaphysics* for his Part II Tripos preparation in 1896, and to write essays on set questions. Stout covered Lotze in his own 1896 History of Philosophy lectures which Moore attended. I will examine this material in Chap. 2; for now, we will look to pinpoint critical Lotzean lines of thought as they will have worked their way into the Cambridge curriculum and elsewhere.[79]

Lotze was a greatly influential figure in the continental approaches to mental philosophy that wound their way to Cambridge, though he is nearly entirely neglected now. Lindsay (1876, 363) gave a contemporary account of his impact:

> Lotze's influence has made itself felt most deeply and has spread most widely—so widely that I doubt if there is any German thinker under forty years of age on whom the Göttingen professor has not set his intellectual stamp. Nor is his influence confined to Germany; it is equally great in Holland; it is manifesting itself in France; Lotze is already well known in England … he does not ask those whom he teaches to think to keep within the lines on which his own thoughts run. In this lies his power.

Heidegger was known to insist that students review Lotze before attempting an understanding of his own work, and Passmore (1966, 51) noted, of Lotze, that "few philosophers have been so pillaged"; that is, rarely credited in the works of others.[80] Lotze's near-expurgation from the literature by the early part of the twentieth century could have had something to do with what Eastwood characterized as a philosophy "composed of so many heterogeneous ingredients … that it presents the appearance of administering to every recognized cult in turn, from teleological Idealism to scientific Materialism" (1892, 20).

---

[78] See Dummett (1993, 130) on Frege's posthumously published sequence of comments on Lotze's *Logik*. See Sluga (1980) for Lotze's influence on Frege.

[79] See Santayana (1889/1971).

[80] See also Gabriel (2002, 44): "the absence of names does not imply the absence of influence."

Lotze's work spanned from academic texts to more popular efforts. Best known were his *Logic, in three books: of Thought, of Investigation, and of Knowledge*; *Metaphysics, in three books: Ontology, Cosmology, and Psychology*; and *Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World*, which was meant as a more popular effort, described as "a magnificent poem."[81] Lotze was characterized as a philosopher of the school of *Ideal-Realismus*, which has been viewed as unfairly pejorative.[82] However, a contemporary of Lotze's (Lindsay 1876, 364) explains that the term, coined by the historian F. Ueberweg,[83] is "employed in Germany to denote that school of thought which stands midway between the philosophies of Hegel and Herbart."[84] Idealism and realism were formulated by Ueberweg as, respectively, (i) encompassing Plato, Hegel, and Kant (in their defence of some form of supersensible reality); and (ii) spanning Herbart's atomism, Bain's associationism, and Mill's utilitarianism, in their opposition to the supersensible. These are "two modes of speculation," according to Lindsay, divided by a question which is "one of the oldest in history of philosophy … Do things rule thought, or does thought rule things?" (Lindsay 1876, 366).

This was in fact the central question of nineteenth century mental science. Rudolph Merz—a student of Lotze's and a historian of the period—described Lotze's work as belonging to "a period of transition and uncertainty; much of the light which the preceding age thought it possessed has vanished, and the new light has not yet dawned" (Merz 1906, 493).[85] C.A. Mace, as it happens, levelled more or less the same charges

---

[81] The work appeared as follows: *Metaphysic* (1841 in German; 1879 in English); *Logic* (1843 in German; 1874 in English); *Microcosmus* (3 vols., 1856–1864 in German; 1 vol., 1885 in English.). Lotze began to recast his earlier work in metaphysics and logic after the appearance of *Microcosmus* in the hope of completing a System of Philosophy. He did not live to complete the project.

[82] Sullivan (2018).

[83] Friedrich Ueberweg (1826–1871).

[84] Eastwood (1892, 21) claimed that Lotze conceived of his views as a dialectical resolution of the antithesis between Hegel and Herbart. Lotze's reconciliation of idealism and realism was his teleological view that the ideal is the purpose of the mechanical. The phenomena of the sensible world are the way in which the teleological process is revealed to the mind. See also Lindsay (1876).

[85] See Santayana (1889/1971, 48–68) for discussion of Lotze's influence on Anglophone philosophy.

of eclecticism and of transitional influence—as gallantly as he could—at Stout, in a series of remembrances after Stout's death (Mace 1945, 1946, 1954).[86] This again underscores how much what we would now formulate as quite separate disciplines (logic, psychology, metaphysics) ran together for thinkers at this period; and, importantly, how they struggled to find ways of distinguishing them. During Moore's formative period at the end of the nineteenth century, plentiful cross-pollination was the norm.

Lotze's foremost contribution was his critique of both transcendental idealism and reductive materialism in favour of a view that gave precedence to empirical observation and scientific laws with respect to the physical and the mental realms. Lotze resisted the incipient materialism that threatened to dominate models and formulations of thinking and the nature of thought in the wake of Hegel, but he was also clear on the futility of trying to find mental processes that were not related to physical ones. He took it that psychology must deal with the organism as a whole, but he did not claim that the mere existence of a physical process was sufficient to explain mind or mentality; and he also rejected an epiphenomenal view that posits mental events as events in the brain with no causally efficacious properties. That there *was* a process by which an "outer" stimulus transformed itself into a neural event and then to a sensation (say) was empirically beyond doubt for Lotze (he stalwartly resisted Hegel's identification of thought and reality), but he maintained what today would be called a non-reductive position on the nature of the mental event thus produced. A sensation is a mental event; the neural events that produce it are physical events, but sensations of colour do not share the physical properties of the stimuli that produce them, nor the properties of the physical events in the brain that play a role in the causal chain (1885). Likewise, with respect to (say) a sensation of colour, light waves (physical stimuli) do not change the colour of the optic nerve; nor do other sensations share the properties of the physical stimuli that presumably cause them (1885). In this way, Lotze formulates his position that sensations, perceptions, and ideas are not copies of their external stimuli. The view that ideas in the mind are copies is of course familiar as the view of the classical empiricists, who claimed that ideas were copies of

---

[86] See Valentine (2001).

impressions, which were the effects of external stimuli. Part of Lotze's objection to this model was his pronounced biological bent for theories of mind and mental contents. For Lotze, it was the organism as whole that was the object of concern. By contrast, for the classical empiricists, contents of mind were atomic simples, assembled and reassembled by associationist principles. This emergent Lotzean anti-associationism was very much a governing part of Bradley's own,[87] as we will see; Lotzean influence was claimed not only by the philosopher-psychologists at Cambridge, but also by the neo-Hegelians at Oxford.[88]

Lotze's most important insight, however, was in his emphasis on a distinction between the mechanistic description of psychological states and their non-psychical, normative properties (such as validity).[89] In this, he is credited with anticipating the anti-psychologistic direction of efforts on thought, thinking, and the mind that began to flourish in earnest at about the time of his death in 1881. Lotze took a significant interest in the "natural history of the mental life"[90]—that is, in what he thought of as psychology—but he denied that what he took to be the essence of thought could be derived from this natural history and took explicit exception to fundamental views of his predecessors on this issue.[91] Most crucially, for Lotze, objective reference was essential to thought. He argued (as against Hegel's conception of logic), that thought and reality were not to be identified, and that the nature of thought was not derivable from descriptions of the mechanisms of thinking. In addition, he also opposed the Kantian conception of logic and knowledge, arguing instead that the fact that things should present themselves as knowable by us is not something conditioned by thought itself. As for Herbart, Lotze's main dispute with his immediate predecessor was that, although he

---

[87] It's not that Lotze did not take association between ideas seriously; he did, but he was clear that we could never actually come to know the ways in which it worked (Lindsay 1876).

[88] Adamson noted that Lotze's own views were absorbed and disseminated in England by his translators, A. C. Bradley (brother of F. H Bradley) and Bosanquet, through their own work as well as via their translations (Adamson 1885a, 107). A confusion between "idea" taken to be the act of representation and "idea" taken to mean the object represented plagued Lotze as well (Eastwood 1892, 309).

[89] Adamson (1885b).

[90] Adamson (1885a, 103).

[91] One criticism was that Kant, Hegel, and Herbart employed terms like "psychological mechanism" and "organism" in dissimilar ways, none of which were adequate to a proper natural science.

agreed that logical forms are to be assigned to the activity of thought, he did not claim, as Herbart did, that logical forms had no significance other than expressions of associative psychological mechanisms—ways in which consistent ideas were put together, or inconsistent ones held apart. Thought—or thinking—did not for Lotze merely consist of the joining or separating of ideas in the mind according to some kind of mechanistic process, even mathematically formulated. The most significant aspect of thought according to Lotze, is judgment: "The aim of thought is not to be or to copy reality, but to be valid of it."[92]

For Lotze, to judge is to bring elements together in thought that are meant (somehow) to adequately represent the truth (or the real), and which ground and justify knowledge. In the processes of thinking, we come to apprehend contents, which take the (traditional) logical forms of concepts, judgments, and relations. Lotze did have to explain how these forms *are* representative of the real; one obstacle is that although he was sensitive to it, he did not always clearly distinguish between a formulation of *thought* as a subjective process (expressed in logical relations) and the objective content of thought (which is meant to represent existence or reality).[93] His solution was in part to claim that the formulation of *a priori* truths is the essence of the thinking mind. But though these are only discovered via experience (which he understood as apprehension, feeling, and acting), their characteristics—necessity, universality, and self-evidence—cannot result from isolated or atomistic psychological events. In order to explain this, Lotze claimed that validity is real, though it does not exist; that the only way to explain the notion of validity is to detach it from the realm of the existent (1856–64/1885, §339–341). Only in experience that is *other* than pure logical thought can thought–relations (judgments) be realized, according to Lotze, but this experience will have to contain an account of the "apparently irreconcilable difference between the objective content and the subjective existence of thinking."[94]

What can be said to have persisted—even parenthetically—of Lotze's influence in the early history of analytic philosophy is his distinction

---

[92] Lotze (1856–64/1885).

[93] Adamson (1885b, 576), Eastwood (1892, 312) and Thomas (1915a,b,c).

[94] §340–341. See also Adamson (1885b, 577).

between the material processes of mind and what we today would call their intentional and normative properties. Lotze explicitly rejected the view that what normative properties attach to thoughts (truth-value, say, or meaning) can be attributed to processes of thinking. Thought, in short, is not a psychological entity—it is a logical one, and it has an objective, or non-psychical, component (1856–64/1885, §341). This position has, of course, infused histories of analytic philosophy by way of its association with Frege, but it was in fact widely dispersed throughout the intellectual scene of this period.[95] Certainly, for Kant, and for the post-Kantian philosophers initially steering towards the mental science of the early nineteenth century, the material processes of mind, thought, and knowledge were not as important as their ground or justification was. But with the mid-century rise of physiologically inclined investigations into the mind, an object of sustained inquiry became the nature of mental processes and mental states in and of themselves, quite separate from any systems of reality (or of grounds for knowledge) held to be conditioned by or follow from their nature. This had the result that their hybrid nature as physiological, psychological, *and* logical entities came to the fore as the focus of wide-ranging discussion: that of mental science. Lotze himself, discussing the previous 40 years of philosophy in Germany, noted that:

> It has become usual to speak of a *theory of knowledge* as the most important instrument, upon whose completion the progress of philosophy depends, and more especially, it has been hoped that firm foundations for its fruitful application to the acquisition of truth will be at last be found in a complete exposition of the history of the psychological development of our thought. In opposition to this latter belief I express the conviction … that one can only decide as to the validity of a representation on the ground of its psychological origin, when one already knows the true bearings of the object to which it refers; for only the knowledge of this, which is the end and aim of the representation, can enable us to judge whether it will really reach or miss that aim by the particular way of representing the reality it has actually taken … We should, therefore, count psychology as the last and most difficult product of philosophical investigation, or of scientific investigation in general.[96]

---

[95] See Gabriel (2002).

[96] Lotze (1880).

The Lotzean position on the nature of states of mind—that mentality could bear both objective and subjective properties, and that accounting for the objective properties was crucial in a properly scientific investigation of mind—was central in the progress of late nineteenth century mental philosophy. It was a direct influence on the philosophical psychology at Cambridge during Moore's undergraduate days via Ward and Stout, as we will examine in more detail in Chap. 2.

Lotze's influence has faded from contemporary understanding of this period. That of Lotze's student Franz Brentano, however, has not. Brentano is an important element in the account of Moore's intellectual *milieu*, specifically as a decisive influence on Stout.[97] As editor of *Mind*, and as an active participant at the Aristotelian Society meetings, Stout was almost single-handedly responsible for the dissemination at Cambridge (and in Britain) of the prevailing issues in continental mental science during this period. One these was Brentano's conception of psychology: Stout was the first to introduce the Brentanian psychology to British mental science through his own book *Analytic Psychology* (1896). Now, there are no substantive citations or references to Brentano in any of Moore's pre-Fellowship papers, save for some remarks of Stout's that Moore records in his notes on Stout's 1894 History of Philosophy lectures.[98] But we know Moore read Stout's *Analytic Psychology* in preparation for his Moral Sciences Tripos Part II, and took himself to be more than ready to teach it to undergraduates preparing for their own exams when he took up his lectureship in 1911. Accordingly, we turn next to an examination of Brentanian psychology.

---

[97] See Schaar for a thorough exposition of Stout's theories, and his influence on Cambridge (2013b, c). Schaar, among other things, makes it plain that Stout did not (*contra* Bell (1999) and Milkov (2000, 2008a) simply absorb and redeploy (in English) Brentano's views wholesale. Schaar shows that Stout added nuanced modifications of his own, many of which she argues refer to and incorporate influence from the work of Brentano's student Kasimirz Twardowski. See also Nasim (2008), who also gives a closely argued position of the Stoutian influence on Cambridge, and on Russell.

[98] Add. Ms. 8875 10/1/1.

5.2 Brentano

The final stage of the trajectory from mental science to full disciplinary independence as scientific psychology began with the publication, in 1874, of both Wundt's *Principles of Physiological Psychology* and Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, which represented the two dominant conceptions of the "new" psychology of the late nineteenth century.[99] Brentano stands out in the continental development of scientific psychology as having resisted the physiological/experimental psychology that was gathering steam in favour of his own understanding of a properly empirical psychology. In the history of philosophy of mind, of course, he is known for having bequeathed a notion of the intentionality of the mental. Wundt emphasized experiment and physiology; Brentano's conception of psychology instead defended the view that the most important task for a psychologist is that of rooting out conceptual confusions[100] by way of a methodical examination of the psychical bases of knowledge and inference. The scientific psychologist (a rigorous philosopher of mind, in effect) was meant first to uncover the conceptual truths and exceptionless laws to which psychic phenomena are subject, by way of an exhaustive empirical classification of fundamental types of psychic phenomena; and then to go on to give the material (physiological, chemical, anatomical, etc.) conditions with which mentality is necessarily intertwined.[101] The former—Brentano called it "descriptive" psychology—was the comprehensive taxonomy of the elements of consciousness as well as their relations to one another. Brentano did not dispute the relevance or significance of physiological approaches (he called these "genetic"

---

[99] One startling characterization of the split here is in Boring (1929) who called Brentano and his school examples of the more "tender-hearted" approach of Austria and southwestern Germany of the period.

[100] Jacquette (2004a, 5).

[101] Stout himself took this strategy seriously, publishing *Analytic Psychology* first in 1896, and then, in 1898, his *Manual of Psychology*, which for decades was the dominant psychology text (going to five editions) in British psychology and philosophy. Moore's own earliest psychology lecture at Cambridge (Add. Ms. 8875 13/2/1-21) has this on the verso side of the surviving manuscript, in Moore's hand: "…I don't know that [Stout's *Manual*] is the best of books, but best for purpose, partly because considers subject rather more completely than others…partly because more easily accessible…James long and inferior; Ward very difficult and not easy to get; …I shall largely be making commentary of Stout's *Manual*."

psychology), which were also concerned with an exhaustive taxonomy of consciousness from a physiological point of view, nor of experimentalism; but he argued that descriptive psychology was the essential foundation for the genetic approach.[102]

For Brentano, psychology is the science of mental phenomena; natural science the science of physical phenomena. Physical phenomena, as construed by Brentano, are presumed to have been caused by objects in the natural world and are presumed to be properties of those. But we have only indirect access to the natural world that causes physical phenomena, in what he calls "outer perception," via our sensory experiences. The natural world as it is in itself is not accessible to us directly, but only via its appearances. Psychology, by contrast, is the study of mental phenomena, and we *do* have direct access to these in what Brentano calls "inner perception." Brentano's understanding of psychology practiced from an empirical standpoint turns on his construal of "empirical": all science (all knowledge) begins in direct experience; all proper psychology—and Brentano's taxonomy of mental phenomena—begins in what he calls "inner perception," a description of what one directly experiences. "Inner perception" for Brentano is not observation—which would be closer to Wundt's conception of introspection as an experimental datum—but is more akin to a first-person awareness of our own mental phenomena—a "taking in," or a form of acknowledgement—which is infallible and immediate (Smith 1994, 30).

All mental phenomena for Brentano were acts, and inner perception was no less an act—an act of judgment, in fact. Brentano's theory of mind classified conscious experiences into three groups: acts of sensing (presentations/ideations; imagining); acts of judging (acknowledging, rejecting); and acts of feeling (wishing, desiring).[103] And although he took the view that acts are complexes or composites, Brentano took consciousness to be a unity: his distinctions between presentations, judgments, and feelings amount to the claim that there are different ways that we can be directed

---

[102] See Titchener (1921) for a review that emphasizes the similarities as well as the differences in Brentano's and Wundt's signature 1874 works. Both, not surprisingly, took introspection as part of a genuinely scientific method.

[103] Brentano rejects Kant's taxonomy: knowing, for Brentano, splits into presentation and judgment; and feeling and willing collapse into feeling. See Jacquette (2004a).

towards one and the same object.[104] These elements are metaphysically distinguishable in Brentano's terminology, but his view on the unity of consciousness required him to claim that they are not distinct. In Brentano's taxonomy, an act of presentation was the most fundamental: judgment and feeling are based on presentations. But judgments were not associative complexes built up of presentations in the way familiar from the tradition belonging both to Kant and to the classical empiricists. For Brentano, to judge is to render a verdict on—or to acquiesce to, so to speak—the presented object; specifically, that it is (in some way) as it is presented.[105] Judgment is thus in effect a presentation we either accept or acknowledge or that we deny.[106] Judgments are indeed truth-evaluable, but not via any form of correspondence. Instead, for Brentano, a judgment is true when one directly (immediately and infallibly) apprehends the evidence for the judgment in inner perception, or when one draws an inference (indirect evidence for the judgment).[107] The constituent of a judgment is a presentation. A simple or a complex idea is presented to the mind, which then comes to some verdict about it. Presentations are neutral—they are what they are—and a judgment is not normative (not even in Lotze's sense); rather it was for Brentano, a preference or an antipathy towards what is presented.[108] Simple apprehension and judgment were two ways (among others) in which consciousness is directed onto an object.

In this, Brentano offered a significant criticism to the traditional Aristotelian (and Kantian) position that there are multiple presentations involved in judgment. He denied moreover that the logical form of a judgment is that of subject/predicate: that of something being attributed or denied of something else. Brentano gave the logical form of judgment

---

[104] See Jacquette (2004a), for an objection to Brentano's formulation of intentionality that can arise here on this basis—that no state of mind, in effect, can ever be directed onto the same object.

[105] Huemer (2019).

[106] For the arguments that Brentano's view of judgment is mereological rather than propositional, see Schaar (2013b, c).

[107] Which suggests that for Brentano all judgments are *a priori*.

[108] Textor (2013, 1–8) notes that Brentano did not make it particularly clear what "acknowledgment" or "rejection" of a presentation was, leaving the field open for a variety of formulations that would include: approving/disapproving; assent/concur or not; assert/posit or deny (the German expressions are "Anerkennen" and "Verwerfen"). See Kunne (1997) and Mulligan (2013) for detailed discussion.

thus, not as *S is P* but as *A+* (A exists) or *A-* (A does not exist) and claimed that judgment can arise from a single presentation. Although Brentano's views seem to be consistent with the traditional Germanophone position that preceded him, that judgment (an act of mind) provides the necessary unification that turns presentations into judgments, Brentano significantly rejected the predicative logical form of judgment of the Aristotelian and Kantian views as involving a suspect associationism that he took to distort the nature of judgment. To claim that putting two ideas together (or separating them) is the nature of judgment leaves out the role of the mind in actively acknowledging (or rejecting) the presentation.[109] For Brentano, the object presented can be accepted or rejected independent of predicating properties of it.

This rough summary of some of the principal aspects of Brentano's theory of mind, however, does suggest—his own protestations aside—that his view of logic and psychology could appear, on the face of it, wholly psychologistic in a subjectivist sense.[110] Brentano's notion of the intentionality of the mental, however, has long been taken to characterize his account of psychic phenomena as not wholly subjective, with its insistence that all psychic phenomena have or are directed onto an object. Brentanian mental phenomena, that is, are distinct from physical phenomena in at least three ways: they are the object of inner perception; they form a unity; and, most significantly, they have intentionality. This was construed as the claim that every act of mind, and only an act of mind, is directed both towards an object, and, for Brentano, also (though secondarily) directed towards itself, in inner perception.

It is by now a commonplace in contemporary analytic philosophy that Brentano's conception of intentionality represents one way in which a fundamental anti-psychologism—construed in time as a form of logical realism—began to characterize the new philosophy at the turn of the twentieth century. Dummett (1993), for example, specifically rendered

---

[109] This feature of the mind—that it associates the objects of consciousness (ideas)—was a hallmark of the classical empiricists and equally rejected by Brentano, Stout, Bradley, and Ward. For a discussion of the connection between associationism and problems concerning the unity of the proposition, see, among others, Schaar (2013a), Candlish (1996), and Hylton (1984).

[110] See Jacquette (2004b). Brentano himself was happy to accept the characterization of "psychologism" if that meant that psychology was the foundation of other disciplines. He rejected, however, any characterization of his account of mental phenomena as psychologistic when taken to mean subjectivist or anthropological.

Brentano's intentionality thesis as positing the object of a mental act as "external in the full sense of being part of the objective world independent of the subject." Brentano posited all and only mental phenomena as intentional; they featured what he called an "intentional inexistence"' or an "immanent objectivity." In contemporary philosophy, this is understood as the thesis that states of mind are representational or *about* their objects; and what is known in contemporary philosophy as "Brentano's problem" is the problem of accounting for representational features of thought when there is no object of representation.

On closer inspection, however, Brentano's intentionality thesis looks to be another example of the way in which distortions may have crept into the history of analytic philosophy. Brentano scholars have long noted that Brentano's work was mostly not published; much of it was destroyed, lost, or questionably annotated and altered by his editor Oscar Kraus; was often scattered; and was disseminated to history, with unsurprisingly thorny interpretative consequences, via the work of his students (on intentionality, in particular, by Twardowski and Meinong).[111] And though Brentano appears to have changed his view on the nature of intentionality in the second edition of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*,[112] this contains revisions by Kraus (as did the first edition) that raise scholarly queries about the text.[113]

There are thus a number of objections to the construal of Brentano's original intentionality claim as involving a directedness or aboutness to a specifically non-phenomenal or extra-mental object. Crane (2014), for instance, has argued that on Brentano's own understanding of psychology and scientific knowledge there is no compelling reason to claim that the intentionality thesis is one that is framed in terms of, or raises concerns about, the *non*-existence of objects of thought. Rather, as Crane has made the case, for Brentano, *all* objects of thought are phenomenal because they are objects of

---

[111] See Schaar (2013c) and Nasim (2008) for details.

[112] Titled "The Classification of Mental Phenomena" (which appeared as an appendix). See Crane (2014).

[113] See Crane (2014) and Betti (in Textor (2013, 74–96)). Crane has argued that Kraus construed the intentionality thesis as a realist thesis in the new version of Brentano (1995a) in his zeal to prevent the attribution of phenomenalism to Brentano. The suspect text, uncritically translated, appeared in 1973 (tr. McAllister); it has since been reissued with an extensive introduction by Simons (Brentano 1995a, xiii–xx).

thought. The phenomena of inner perception are as they appear; the phenomena of outer perception, by contrast, are not.[114] Psychic phenomena are mental through and through; physical phenomena, (at best), are signs of an unknowable and possibly non-mental reality (Crane 2014, 31). But for Brentano, both are phenomena, and as such belong to the "data of consciousness" (2014, 31), the proper sphere of empirical psychology.

The issue thus turns on what Brentano could have meant by his attribution of "intentional inexistence" to psychic phenomena.[115] Smith (1989, 8–11; 1994, 40), for instance, has argued that Dummett's rendering of the intentionality claim (as in effect introducing a realism about objects of thought to analytic philosophy) is in fact not compatible with Brentano's text and that the claim was revised out of the 1993 published monograph text of Dummett's lectures on the origins of analytical philosophy.[116] Crane (2014), and Jacquette (2004b), among others, also offer extensive contextual interpretations of the intentionality claim; honing in on Brentano's formulation (Brentano 1995a):

> Every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation, something is presented; in judgment, something is affirmed or denied; in love, loved; in hate, hated; in desire desired; and so on.

It must be said that it is not obvious here that Brentano *must* have meant "non-existence" by "intentional inexistence."[117] Our own contemporary

---

[114] On Brentano's influence on Husserl and on phenomenology; see Huemer (2004, 2019), among others.

[115] See Smith (1994), Jacquette (2004a), Crane (2014), among others.

[116] Nasim (2008) has argued that Stout can be understood as a proto-realist in his absorption of Brentanian psychology, in that "realism" is understood to mean "the doctrine that reality exists apart from its presentation to, or conception by, consciousness." Nasim here cites the entry in the 1901–03 Baldwin dictionary for "realism" (Nasim 2008, 421). It is authored by James Mark Baldwin, the editor.

[117] His use of "immanent," however, does seem to contrast with "transcendent," and in keeping with that traditional Germanophone distinction, appears to highlight the phenomenal nature of experience—both "inner" and "outer."

"Brentano problem" of non-referential thought is a problem—how can thought represent when there is nothing represented?—but there seems to be little contextual reason to believe it was *Brentano's* problem, at least in 1874. Thus, Smith (1994, 1989) and others (Jacquette 2004a) render "intentional inexistence" with an emphasis on *in*, as more faithful to Brentano's text: objects of thought are components of thought—they are "in" the thought; as what the thought concerns. But there is no obvious entailment from being an object of thought to being an extra-mental object in this sense. The ontology of intentional objects is precisely what Brentano is not held to have provided, and disputes on this issue led to a variety of breaks with his students Twardowski and Meinong.[118] In short: if Brentano's scientific psychological taxonomy is a taxonomy of the mind, and the issue is consciousness and its objects, it might not have been even open to him to claim—or at least he would not have been compelled to deny—that the objects of thought weren't psychical phenomena themselves.[119]

Brentano's intentionality thesis was a key element of Dummett's (1993) account of the origins of analytic philosophy in Germanophone intellectual life. Dummett's signature claim was that analytic philosophy was born in the "extrusion of thought from the mind" (1993, 1). But we have seen that Brentano's intentionality thesis is not necessarily one of straightforward extrusion of thought from the mind. That Dummett's account of Brentano dominated in histories of analytic philosophy for some time is perhaps one way to explain why Brentano's intentionality thesis makes it into many contemporary philosophy of language and mind textbooks as a foundational element. But even a rough look at that thesis, as above, makes it somewhat puzzling how it was taken to be the bellwether of the anti-psychologism that is held to have spawned analytic philosophy.[120] Taking it as another component of the sweeping *Psychologismusstreit* of the period renders it more explicable, however. Whatever the ontological

---

[118] See Jacquette (2004a), Schaar (2013a), and Betti (2013). Betti disputes Jacquette's claim that Twardowski was motivated to fill in the ontology of Brentano's formulation of intentionality (by making a distinction between content and object) in order to thwart any incipient idealism. She argues that Twardowski was concerned mostly to make Brentano coherent.

[119] As we noted above, Crane argues, citing Brentano, that Brentano didn't even think that natural science was the study of things in themselves: "We have no experience of that which truly exists, in and of itself, and that which we do experience is not true" (Crane 2014, 28).

[120] Smith (1994) has been noting this for some time; I think it needs some emphasis.

interpretation of the intentionality thesis comes to, Brentano at least took himself to be avoiding the act/object ambiguity that plagued both continental accounts of presentation and judgment, and the associationist theses of the classical empiricists, in his own empirical account of the mind.[121]

With respect to the story of Moore's influences, we know that Brentano's influence in British mental science passed through Stout. As Schaar (2013b, c) has argued, Stout, though greatly sympathetic to Brentanian formulations, nevertheless modified the Brentanian line of argument fairly significantly. The influence of Brentano's views on Cambridge thus needs to take into consideration the modifications of Brentano's theses made by his students and interpreters, who were in a variety of ways unsatisfied with his own formulation of intentional inexistence. Schaar (2013b, c) has made the case that Stout's modifications of Brentano's theses came via those of Brentano's student Twardowski and were significantly influential on what she calls the specifically British logical realism of Moore's (and Russell's) own approach to the nature of judgment. In particular, she argues that Stout's account of the nature of judgment, which makes use of a tripartite scheme of act, object, and content, was one that was a significant feature of the criticisms of Twardowski on Brentano's account of mind and thought.[122] Nasim (2008, 20–21), in addition, has made it plain that, in Stout's own words, his own position is to be understood in light of "the most important recent development of philosophical thought in Germany," namely the use of the terms "Akt," "Inhalt," and "Gegenstand," on the part of Brentano's critics, like Twardowski, Meinong, and Lipps. These terms, Stout claimed, represent a way of understanding "mental life and mental development"—one that he goes on to claim that he "had independently developed in [my] book on *Analytic Psychology*" (1930, 355).[123]

This tripartite division did not feature in Moore's account of judgment, and there is, in any case, no evidence that Moore read Twardowski

---

[121] Schaar (2013b, c).

[122] Schaar (2013b, c), Smith (1994), and Nasim (2008).

[123] Stout's paper was originally published in 1911. In a footnote (1930, 355), Stout pointed out that he was not claiming priority for these terminological distinctions but did insist on what he called "independence." He did concede priority of *publication* to Twardowski. See Nasim (2008).

before 1897, if at all. So it should be clear at this point that an unadulterated Brentanian mental science could not have been imported wholesale into Moore's thinking about the nature of judgment. Brentano's qualitative theory of judgment differs fundamentally from Moore's of 1898, and Moore certainly does not give a well-worked-out theory of the nature of mind—let alone intentionality—in his early work (in 1897 and 1898, in particular). Thus, Brentano's theory of mind presents a scholarly challenge here in the context of our discussion. Moore's formulation of the nature of judgment was, as we would put it today, a prototype Fregean-Russellian one, which he produced with no knowledge of Frege *and* drawing logico-metaphysical conclusions that surprised even Russell. This does raise a few questions as to how he came to it. I will examine the specific detail of Stout's impact on Moore's thinking in the next chapter, in the discussion of Moore's undergraduate papers and his evolving thought. Here, however, in order to bring this chapter on Moore's intellectual context to a close, I want to shift from the continental tributaries of the mental science influences on Moore to an aspect of mental science in the British tradition that has received less attention, as such, in accounts of the origins of analytic philosophy.

We know that Moore read Bradley's *Principles of Logic* (PL) and *Appearance and Reality* (AR) in preparation for his Part II Moral Sciences Tripos. We also know that among the few explicit positive acknowledgements he makes with respect to influence in the 1897 Fellowship Dissertation is one to Bradley. The 1897 acknowledgement comes in the context of Moore's explanation that, in his examination of Kant's *Ding an Sich*, he was "no doubt" indebted to Caird's Kantian scholarship, but:[124]

> with Dr Caird's consistent use of 'the unity of consciousness,' as a principle of explanation and criticism, I am prevented from sympathizing very much by my far greater agreement with Mr. F. H. Bradley's general philosophical attitude. It is to Mr. Bradley's 'Principles of Logic' and 'Appearance and Reality' (2nd edn. 1897) that I chiefly owe my conception of the fundamental problem of Metaphysics. (BP 2011, 3–4)

---

[124] Caird (1889). See also BP (2011, xlvii–lxxi).

A year later, however, Moore disavows Bradley's influence:

> For my own metaphysical views, I am no doubt chiefly indebted to Bradley. But I have come to disagree with him on so many points, and those points of importance, that I doubt if I can name any special obligations. (BP 2011, 117)

The anti-psychologism about the nature of mind, thought, and its objects winding its way through continental mental science and to Cambridge through the latter part of the nineteenth century provides the way to explain Moore's change of heart. What we see in Moore's 1897 preface, I would argue, is that Moore has already begun to show here signs of his pre-dissertation reading in "Metaphysics and Psychology,"[125] in his rejection of Caird's conception of unity of consciousness—a conception that, in the "modern" mental science of the day, was associated pejoratively and specifically with the non-scientific approach to the nature of mind, judgment, and thought.[126] In his 1897 dissertation (BP 2011, 4), Moore acknowledged Bradley's formulation of the "fundamental problem of Metaphysics" as an influential welcome antidote to Caird's views.[127] The fundamental problem of Metaphysics, as we have seen, was the relation of thought to reality, an issue at the core of late nineteenth-century mental science. Moore's thinking through this issue was at the heart of his early work, and the most contextually faithful way to chart the evolution of Moore's thinking is to see it as of a piece with the mental science that made up his *milieu*. What I want to emphasize now is that one of those mental scientists was Bradley.

---

[125] Letter to parents (Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/64 (28 May, 1896).).

[126] See Chap. 2.

[127] But even in 1897, Moore alludes to a critical position: "though I would be far from claiming to have understood him rightly, especially, as I have used what I imaged to be his own principles, I order to attack ethical doctrines which he himself appears to hold" (BP 2011, 4).

5.3   Bradley

Bradley's Absolute Idealism tends to come in for the most attention in investigations of his role in Moore's early developing thought; his arguments for the Absolute were influential on the young Moore and were based on his considerable though idiosyncratic anti-psychologism. That Bradley's *Principles of Logic* (PL) was part of Moore's pre-dissertation reading is not at issue, but there may be some resistance to thinking of it as part of the psychology or mental science literature that was having an impact on Moore. I do think that the "psychology" influencing Moore when he began his Fellowship work reflected the more scientific and up-to-date analyses of his teachers rather than Bradley's more traditional Kantian/Hegelian considerations concerning knowledge, justification, and reality. But Bradley's anti-psychologism, no less than that of Stout and Ward, was itself influenced by the continental mental scientists who had begun to examine distinctions as to psychological and logical questions—Lotze in particular—and PL was Bradley's foundational attempt at grappling with that distinction. Stout, Ward, and Bradley thus can all be seen as integrating the logic, psychology, and metaphysics characteristic of the continental mental scientists into their own views, which, in their turn, were fundamental in the progression of British mental science (and Moore's developing thought) at this period.[128] Moore's 1898 rejection of Bradley's metaphysics was, given his influences, just the progression that his pre-dissertation reading in "Metaphysics and Psychology," properly understood, would foretell.

Bradley's PL was published in 1883 (significantly revised and reissued in 1922).[129] Bradley's views took their starting point from Kant—logical structure was the way to explicate the nature of mind and justify knowledge—but he was also influenced by the criticisms of his idealist

---

[128] See, for instance, Dyde's review of PL (1884a, b, 1885); also Adamson (1884). Dyde puts it this way (1884a, 289): "First of all it must be made particularly prominent that no treatment of the principles of Logic is worthy of consideration that does not attempt to explain the connection between consciousness on the one hand and the world on the other. The failure to recognize the urgency of this need has led to the tremendous amount of almost useless writing commonly known as formal logic."

[129] Moore and Russell will only have had the first edition for their Triposes.

predecessor T. H. Green, who had challenged the views of the classical empiricists on the nature of mental phenomena and knowledge.[130] As we saw above, Kant's investigations (especially in the first Critique) evolved, through the work of Herbart and Lotze in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, into the debate over the distinction between psychological and logical investigations of mental phenomena. Bradley was fully familiar with these, acknowledging Lotze in the Preface to PL—along with Sigwart—as "among decent writers" (1883, 3).[131] These views—as did Kant's transcendental logic—took traditional logic and its categories of concepts, judgments, and inferences as foundational for an analysis of genuine knowledge. But Kant's examination of reason and knowledge led to some tensions in the work of his successors, particularly on the nature of the relation between thought and reason and knowable reality, tensions that Bradley in effect inherited.[132]

What Kant formulated as "faculties" of understanding and of reason for their contributions to knowledge included accounts of: the source of knowledge (experience), the objects of knowledge (the given), the system of knowledge (ideas, judgments, and inferences), and, importantly, its justification (the *a priori* conditions). For empirical knowledge, the faculty of reason provided the *a priori* foundation of a system of knowledge via sensibility—the *a priori* concepts that makes intuition possible. The *form* of intuition determined knowable objects *a priori* via space and time; whereas the material of intuition (in the sensibility) was supplied by the relation between the world as it is in itself (*Ding an Sich*) and the mind. Intuitions (sensibility) were not the only component of empirical knowledge, however: there are also concepts. We generalize from the material of the sensibility by applying concepts. So Kant had to also provide a way of accounting for knowledge that extended beyond the directly

---

[130] See Allard (2005); see Hylton (1990) for a close examination of the influence of Green on early analytic philosophy. Moore himself meant to include discussion of Green in his 1897 dissertation, but was unable to complete it (BP 2011, 4).

[131] See Betti (2013) on Sigwart.

[132] Allard (2005) argues that Lotze's influence turned the British idealists away from a full-throated defence of Hegelian metaphysics; Manser (1983) notes that the British idealists were far more Kantian than Hegelian. If, as Allard claims, Bradley was the first British philosopher to base a metaphysics upon logic—and an analysis of psychic phenomena like judgment and ideas—we can situate Bradley squarely in the mental science tradition in Great Britain.

observable. The result was a complex representation that Kant called "judgment." Making a judgment required the categories, *a priori* forms of experience. And although Kant allowed that this was possible, part of the project of the first Critique was to warn against some of the ways in which mind tries to extend the reach of knowledge to beyond the bounds of possible experience. Although we can *generalize* from objects of experience, and thus have general knowledge, we cannot acquire knowledge of anything not given in experience. But we think that we can, and in the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant's project was to identify, isolate, and undermine what he called the illusions of reason. It is not, however, an illusion of reason to claim that our knowledge can go beyond experience to generalizations *of* experience, and Kant mounted a defence of universals that are meant to provide the *a priori* foundation of the judgments derived from experience—the "unconditioned" condition that grounds our knowledge.[133] The source is pure reason itself, and the so-called ideas of pure reason allow our knowledge to be organized as a system of properly scientific knowledge: the principles from which knowledge of the given can be deduced.

Kant's formulations as to the nature of reason led to debate on the part of his successors, however. Allard (2005) identifies the tension as that between an "objective" and a "regulative" conception of the nature of reason. On the one hand, Kant seems to have construed reason as (merely) regulative: its role was to organize and systematize the knowledge provided by the sensibility and the understanding. On the other hand, another conception of reason—an objective or constitutive one—seems to creep into Kant's examination. On this conception, reason *constructs* the objects of knowledge, independent of any other faculties (like that of sensibility, for instance). The tensions were represented in the views of Kant's successors: Hegel defended the constitutive nature of reason; Lotze defended the regulative conception (Allard 2005). Hegel identified thought with reality via his logic: "Logic in our sense coincides with metaphysics, the science of things in the setting of thoughts" (Manser 1983). For Hegel, and for Bradley (and also for Kant), logic in effect amounted to how the mind functions in the acquisition of knowledge,

---

[133] Kant (1998) and Ameriks (2017).

and, in particular, how logical necessity can arise and be justified. In contrast, as we saw above, Lotze had begun to identify the tensions in these conceptions. As psychology began to grope its way towards its status as empirical science, Lotze's sensitivity to the new approach led him to give an account of concepts, judgments, inferences, and taxonomies of classification that emphasized the anti-psychical nature of the validity of any system of knowledge into which the materials of experience can be fitted (Lotze 1843/1874), Chaps. I–III).

For all their differences, however, neither Kant nor Hegel nor Lotze denied that the mind or reason played an active role in (somehow) unifying psychic phenomena, so as to deliver truth and knowledge—something that we saw above was characteristic of continental accounts of judgment. There were some dissimilarities between them: Hegel, in particular, rejected the Aristotelian model of judgment, which had resurfaced in Kant, that invested a grammatical element—the copula—with the unifying property for the elements in the proposition (Manser 1983; Lotze (1843/1874, Chap. II)). The Kantian model, in emphasizing the ascription of a predicate to a subject, underscored a distinction between form and matter—between the conditions for knowledge and the material those conditions operate on. The latter, on Kant's formulation, could never be things as they are in themselves. Given his presuppositions, Hegel found this counterintuitive, not least because it left a gap between knowledge and reality as it is in itself. So Hegel rejected what he thought of as "formal"[134] logic on a variety of fronts: for him, logic was the explication of the activity of coming to grasp the essential nature of reality as it is in itself. This occurs via judgment—the currency of knowledge. Hegel thus reasserted judgment as an activity of unification, rejecting predication as the structure of judgment, and explicating the knowing subject as the essential determining of reality itself.

The nineteenth century British idealists inherited this model as to the role of the unifying, knowing, judgment-forming mind and the nature of reality. But they also looked to Lotze for assistance in thwarting the kinds of theories of reasoning and knowledge in specifically British accounts of logic and psychology of this time. In mid-nineteenth century Great

---

[134] Manser (1983).

Britain, these had come to be represented widely throughout a variety of positions in mental science, such as the views of Sir William Hamilton and John Stuart Mill on the nature of logic (Mill 1843); James Mill on the human mind;[135] and the views of Alexander Bain, investor in and founder of the journal *Mind*, on the nature of psychology itself.[136] What these had in common was associationism.[137] T. H. Green (1836–1882) had already provided some of the ammunition against associationist views by attacking the Lockean view that knowledge requires the "perception" of relations between ideas.[138] Green's question was: given that the mind passively acquires ideas (impressions) from sensation, and the origin of all knowledge is experience, where does the mind acquire the ability to "perceive" relations between ideas? The Lockean answer—that reflecting on the ideas passively received in sensation provides a unification of them into stable objects of knowledge—was dismissed by Green as in effect begging the question. What Locke called a simple idea, Green argued, is already a judgment; one that is not acquired in experience, akin to: "I have an idea different from other ideas, which I did not make for myself."[139] That is, in order to have an idea at all, even to recognize an idea *as* an idea, I will have had to have *other ideas*—like those of substance, and relation.[140] Moreover, in order that "simple" ideas can be the foundation of knowledge—say about an object of perception—they must have been united, or somehow converted into, standing for a

---

[135] Mill (1829). See Skorupski (1989, 2006) for the furore between John Stuart Mill and Hamilton, which dominated the British intellectual scene of the time.

[136] See Bain (1886), who evinces disappointment at the state of British psychology.

[137] See Stout and Baldwin in Baldwin (1901–1903, 80): "The theory which, starting with certain simple and ultimate constituents of consciousness, makes mental development consist solely or mainly in the combination of these elements according to certain laws of Association…all genesis of new products is due to the combination of pre-existing elements."

[138] See Metz (1938), who noted that Green "read Kant with Hegelian spectacles" (272–3); in particular, in the interpretation he gave to Kant, which was meant to oppose that given by the naturalists. Hylton (1990) has given a comprehensive discussion of Green's role in the origins of analytic philosophy.

[139] Green (1885, 19). See also BP (2011, xxiv–xxix).

[140] Kant also claimed that impressions—pure sensation—could not play a role in knowledge unless they were brought under concepts. This is echoed in Bradley's own view about ideal content, the content of judgment (1883).

continuous object. But this cannot happen without the activity of the mind that relates and unifies ideas.

Thus, according to the British idealists of this period, there were a number of problematic elements to empiricist accounts of the mind, reasoning, and knowledge: (i) not only is it mysterious how the passive acquisition of atomic elements of sensation be combined into objects of judgment; (ii) it is not even clear that the notion of an idea itself is coherent. On the one hand, an idea is the effect of an object upon the senses (so it is a psychic phenomenon); on the other, it stands for the object of knowledge itself (which, unless it is not a psychic phenomenon, does not support genuine knowledge). So there are two things (at least) that need further examination: the nature of ideas and the nature of judgment.

Bradley accordingly begins PL with an account of these. Bradley does assert that he is "not sure where Logic begins or ends" and that "in England and in Germany that subject is in motion," but he takes his investigation to be "a sceptical study of first principles" (1883, 3).[141] Bradley took from Kant the notion that an account of first principles will require an examination of judgment and inference (reason and reasoning); from Hegel (or a form of Hegelianism) that judgment is not atomic or compositional in structure but a unifying activity, and added a uniquely British element, in his criticism of the psychologism endemic in associationist accounts of knowledge. The nature of judgment is the starting point (1883, 4–6):

> Judgment presents problems of a serious nature to both psychology and metaphysics. Its relation to other psychical phenomena, their entangled development from the primary basis of soul-life, and the implication of the volitional with the intellectual side of our nature on the one hand, and on the other hand the difference of subject and object, and the question as to the existence of any mental activity, may be indicated as we pass … We do not mainly want to ask, How does judgment stand to other psychical states, and in ultimate reality what must be said of it. Our desire is to take it, so far as we can, as a given mental function: to discover the general character which it bears … Judgment, in the strict sense, does not exist where there exists no knowledge of truth and falsehood; and, since truth and

---

[141] PL has three parts: Book I is an account of judgment; Books II and III an account of inference.

falsehood depend on the relation of our ideas to reality, you cannot have judgment proper without ideas. But the point I am going on to, is not obvious. Not only are we unable to judge before we use ideas, but, strictly speaking, we cannot judge till we use them *as* ideas. We must have become aware that they are not realities, they are *mere* ideas, signs of an existence other than themselves. Ideas are not ideas until they are symbols, and, before we use symbols, we cannot judge.

In this, Bradley gestured towards the metaphysical conclusions he was ultimately compelled towards—that judgment is pointless without an account of truth or falsity and that judgment must refer to Reality.[142] Bradley himself did note, in anticipation of possible criticisms, that "one reader will lament that he is overdone with metaphysics, while another will stand on his right to have far more" (1883, 4), but the metaphysical implications of his logic do not appear until late in PL, and they are only further developed in AR. But Bradley's effort to use logic as a basis for metaphysics was innovative in British philosophy (Allard 2005).

In PL, Bradley took it that the mind or reason is a unity that exemplified different stages of mental or psychic progression (Book I, Chaps. II, III, and IV): logic introduced that stage of psychic development where we become aware that ideas are meant to represent reality (Book I, Chaps. V and VI). In Book II and Book III, he examined the nature of inference, going on to attack the inductive inference of the empiricists and arguing that deductive inference is genuinely valid. Only in the late stages of Book III (Chap. IV, §13) did Bradley commit himself to the metaphysics he would ultimately develop: "To sum up the result—if reality consists in an actual sequence of sensuous phenomena, then our reasonings are all false, because none of them are sensuous." Bradley begins by defending the traditional position that the investigation of nature of judgment and inference is the main business of logic (so as to determine the nature of knowledge and its character as a deductive (and hierarchical) system

---

[142] The question of whether or not thought is identical to reality does not appear until Book III, part II. Allard (2005) has noted that PL is poorly organized, chaotic, and more polemical than soberly critical, which may partly explain how Bradley developed his principles of logic first, only attending to their metaphysical implications in the latter part of the book. Adamson (1884), in his review, was more charitable.

(Book I, Chaps. V and VI)), but collapses the traditional tripartite division between concepts, judgment, and inference into two: judgment and inference.[143] Along the way, Bradley was concerned to block the conflation between sensation and judgment, highlighted by Green as an indefensible feature of empiricist epistemology (Book II, Part II, Chap. 1), and was also concerned to defend *a priori* reasoning—deductive inference—against the criticisms of J. S. Mill (1843), who had argued that, since logic is the reasoning process that supports the sciences, reasoning is at best inductive (Book II, Part I; Book III, Part I).[144]

Bradley's logic includes an account of the nature of ideas, the nature of a mental act, the content of a judgment, and the reference to reality that he emphasizes every judgment must exhibit. Critical to his position is his claim that "ideas are not ideas until they are symbols, and before we use symbols, we cannot judge" A symbol is three-sided: "we perceive *that* it is and *what* it is … [and] its signification, or that which it *means*"(1883, 6–7).[145] *That* it is, with respect to ideas, is for Bradley a psychical phenomenon; *what* it is, its content ("what makes it distinguishable from other 'facts,'" which include other psychic phenomena). Nothing that means, however—nothing that is a symbol or a sign—can "*be* what it *means*" (7). Following Lotze, Bradley distinguished the notion of an idea as a psychical image, and its notion as a logical symbol. For Bradley, the logical features of ideas rendered them universal—shareable and general; in contrast to their *that*ness, which rendered them (as individual psychical states) subject to space and time ("existence").[146] Bradley formulated the logical aspect of an idea by describing a process of abstraction: "meaning consists of a part of the content (original or acquired), cut off, fixed

---

[143] The latter comes in for most of the attention in PL.

[144] Allard (2005).

[145] Bradley's first shot across the bow of the empiricist position was in his assertion that "In England…we have lived too long in the psychological attitude. We take for granted that…ideas are phenomena. But, intent on this, we have as good as forgotten the way in which logic uses ideas…we never assert the fact in our heads, but something else which that fact stands for…if an idea *were* treated as a psychical reality, if it were taken by itself as an actual phenomenon, then it would represent either truth or falsehood. When we use it in judgment, it must be referred away from itself."

[146] Bradley claims the distinction is well known but that it is disregarded too often (10). He explains that by noting the ambiguity of the expression "idea," giving it a semi-Hegelian dialectical formulation.

by the mind, and considered apart from the existence of the sign" (1883, 8).[147] This was his logical sense of "idea": an idea is "nothing but the symbolized."

A judgment, as Bradley formulated it,[148] has an "ideal" content—that is, to judge is to attribute ideas to an object, and that attribution is the content of the judgment. There is nothing in the assertion that a judgment has a content that compels Bradley to any kind of realist account of that content, of course—but his position on this does direct his view away from a subjective psychologism, in his emphasis on the idea, and the content of a judgment, as not identical with the (inevitable) psychological state of possessing and entertaining them. In fact, an essential feature of reason is that it can distinguish appearance from reality—distinguish what is the case from what seems to be the case. That distinction *is* an act of judgment. Reason or the mind recognizes that an idea is an appearance—it cannot "*be* what it *means*"—but in judgment, it attributes it to reality (predicates it of reality).

Bradley's conception of an "ideal content," however, is not itself free of ambiguity: "ideal" is adjectival—its nature depends on what it qualifies. So an "ideal content" is the qualification or characterization of reality in or by our ideas of it. In this, Bradley's conception does not overcome the ambiguity that affects the notion of "idea"; an "ideal" content could, like an idea, stand for either a psychical entity or what he calls a meaning. Bradley took it that a judgment must be something other than an event in space and time if it is to genuinely (universally) characterize reality; psychical events exist in space and time.[149] Bradley wanted an account of judgment to avoid the risk of that kind of subjective psychologism, which was at the heart of associationism. Associationism depended on a

---

[147] Moore's new formulation of judgment (1899a) took criticism of this passage as the starting point.

[148] In the first edition of PL, Bradley took it that the act of judgment was essential, because he argued that some of the ideas that play a role in judgment need not themselves be judged ("floating ideas")—considered, but not judged. This entailed a distinction between the ideas that form the content of a judgment and the judgment itself, which seemed to introduce an unwelcome compositional feature to judgment (which Bradley took to be a unity). Bradley amended this in the second edition of PL, defending instead the view that all ideas refer to reality, in that they must, like a judgment, refer to reality or symbolize (Allard 2005).

[149] And these, in themselves, are ideas, that for Bradley only partly, and distortedly, characterized reality.

conception of isolated elements of judgment, so Bradley's account of judgment characterized it as not only as inherently referring to reality, but also as a unity. The elements of judgment were not a number of discrete and ambiguously formulated psychological elements, joined together in a psychical act, which, as psychical, is of dubious universality. For reason to operate to genuinely deliver knowledge of reality, judgment must be a unity.[150]

The problem—even the very formulation—of the unity of judgment plagued nineteenth century mental science—and spilled over into the early part of the twentieth century as well.[151] The issue, roughly, is that a judgment must be articulate[152] or expressive. It cannot be the mere presence, juxtaposition, or concatenation of elements; they must be unified *as* or *in* judgment. The nineteenth century continental mental scientists—like Lotze, for instance, and Brentano—took judgment to be a unity in that the act of judgment unified—related—its elements. Brentano, however, rejected the view that the elements of judgment, as in traditional logic, took a subject/predicate form; others, like Sigwart, Herbart, and Lotze, did not. So the question of how a judgment *is* a judgment arises; as does the question as to what unity consists in. Whether or not judgment is conceived of as predicating ideas of reality; or being constituted of discrete elements, the question what brings the components of judgment together *as a judgment* is a singular difficulty in all approaches to the nature of judgment.[153] The variety of ways in which thinkers (from Hegel to Lotze and Brentano and beyond) posited a mental activity of unification did nothing much to render the nature of that unity any more perspicuous, however. What Bradley adopted instead as a strategy was to

---

[150] This in itself will not entail that the nature of reality is the Absolute; but it is an essential step in Bradley's subsequent argument for the Absolute nature of reality. To say that it begs the question might be uncharitable.

[151] As the problem of the unity of the proposition. See, among others, Palmer (1988) where he calls it "Bradley's problem" and argues that following the trajectory of this issue in twentieth century philosophy is a useful angle from which to systematize the history of analytic philosophy. See also Candlish (1996), Hylton (1984), and Griffin (1985, 1986).

[152] See Potter (2009).

[153] Moore, as we will see, took it that the concepts of which a proposition were composed bore necessary relations to one another that we grasp by some kind of acquaintance.

deny that there were separate elements of judgment, and that it was an outright paradox to claim that a judgment is a *relation* of ideas.

Bradley's main argument against the atomistic construal of ideas in a judgment did however assume a metaphysics that he did not argue for until late in PL—namely that "the real, which appears within the given, cannot possibly be confined to it" (PL 96).[154] This stance allowed Bradley to claim that any attempt to individuate ideas leads to regress. Any idea was composed, on his account, of further clusters of ideas—which are clusters themselves. There is, that is, no non-arbitrary way of individuating or determining the ideas in a judgment:

> on what principle do you claim the right of selecting what you please from the presented whole and treating that fragment as an actual quality? It certainly *does* not exist by itself, and how do you know that, when put by itself, it *could* be a quality of *this* reality? (PL 96–7)

Having thus disposed of ideas as properly individuated representational selections of reality, Bradley further denied their in-principle combinability: that even if there could be genuinely separate ideas, they could not be combined to form judgments. This is familiar in the literature as Bradley's regress argument, indeed exploited later by Moore (1899a, 181) to show that Bradley's own putative anti-psychologistic distinction between an idea and its ideal content was itself subject to regress.[155] The issue is this: relations relate. But in virtue of what do they relate? Only in virtue of another relation, to relate the relation to the elements related. But then what relates *that* relation to the elements related? Only another relation, to relate that relation to the relation of the elements related. And so on. Bradley's argument against relations was of a piece with his argument against the individuation of ideas: relations are another way in which

---

[154] This prohibition goes far for Bradley: any representation—a fragment of reality—in order to be treated as self-subsistent, would have to capture the present and the past. "No possible mind could represent to itself the completed series of space and time…it is not merely inconceivable psychologically; it is metaphysically impossible."

[155] One question is how much of Moore's criticism can be traced to Green's view that you can't have ideas without having *other ideas*…from which, ironically, Bradley developed his own view.

"selecting what you please from the presented whole" is effected by the mind—in this case, that elements bear a relation to one another (PL, 11):

> It is not true that every judgment has two ideas. We may say on the contrary that all have but one. We take an ideal content, a complex totality of qualities and relations, and we then introduce divisions and distinctions and we call these products separate ideas with relations between them. And this is quite unobjectionable. But what is objectionable, is our then proceeding to deny that the whole before our mind is a single idea; and it involves a serious error in principle. The relations between the ideas are themselves ideal. They are not the psychical relations of mental facts. They do not exist between the symbols, but hold in the symbolized. They are part of the meaning and not of the existence. And the whole in which they subsist is ideal, and so one idea.

Of course it is less than clear how Bradley derived the claim that "the whole" from which "relations between ideas" "subsist" is "ideal, and so one idea," unless we take him to be assuming or at least claiming that there is just one reality, which our ideas and judgments are genuinely about, or genuinely concern—while at the same time distorting it, in the attempt to predicate things of the corner of it that makes its way in appearance to our notice. This was in fact his position: "it is therefore not likely that the *differentia* of judgment will be found in what exists apart from all judgment...in every judgment there is a subject of which the ideal content is asserted. But this subject of course cannot belong to the content or fall within it … the subject, is, in the end, no idea but always reality" (PL, 16). Not only is there only one subject of any judgment; no attributions to it capture anything but "groups and joinings of qualities and relations, such as answer to nouns and verbs and prepositions. But these various elements, though you are right to distinguish them, have no validity outside the whole content. That is one idea, which contains all ideas which you are led to make in it" (PL, 17).

This was, roughly, how Bradley cleared the ground via his logic for establishing the monism from which, on Russell's telling, he and Moore were liberated. And in spite of Bradley's own protestations otherwise—his disavowal of Hegel's identification of thought with reality—it cannot be said that Bradley's own account of the structure of mind entirely succeeds in distinguishing thought from reality. The Bradleyan monism that

Russell was so relieved to have shed was suffocating in more than one way: it was both logical, in that Bradley's conception of the nature of thought prohibited any genuine distinctions; and metaphysical, in that his conception of the nature of reality was unproblematically assimilated to a distinctionless entity. Bradley calls this the "unconditioned," a necessary condition of any Reality—outside of space and time, but all the same, rational in nature. Thus, we can understand Bradley's contribution to mental science in PL—his account of how the mind is structured such that knowledge is possible—as requiring him to defend a monistic structure of thought itself: the undifferentiated whole that is reality is what makes our thought rational and our knowledge genuine. That Bradley was in effect pulling a rabbit out of a hat is perhaps an understatement.[156]

Conflations like these, however, were very much a part of the evolution of nineteenth century mental science; certainly, as we saw above, in Lotze, who struggled to carve out a compromise between the new physiological psychology and an account of reason that could justify knowledge. Bradley was firmly entrenched in that tradition, as his contributions show. But it must be said that in his contributions to the mental science literature, he did not particularly impress his critics at Cambridge. Both Ward and Stout were better-versed in the advances on the continent into the nature of mind, and more committed to contemporaneous positions in the mental science literature, especially with respect to "empirical" psychology, and they did not hesitate to attack Bradley's psychology—and thus his metaphysics—with gusto, as we will see in Chap. 2. In this chapter, I have examined in some detail the logical, psychological, and metaphysical context of the philosophical views that characterized Moore's early philosophical grounding in order to make the case that Moore's absorption of these was a key factor in his early work: in his critical assessment of Kant's own logic, psychology, and metaphysics, and in his subsequent rejection of Bradley's metaphysics. In the next chapter, we turn to Moore's undergraduate papers in order to examine the progression of his thought, and to begin to extract the evidence of the influences that I have been arguing for here.

---

[156] See Ward (1894).

References

Adamson, R. 1884. Review of Bradley's *Principles of Logic. Mind* 9 (3): 122–135.
———. 1885a. Review of Lotze, *Logic, in Three Books. Mind* 10 (37): 100–115.
———. 1885b. Review of Lotze, *Metaphysic. Mind* 10 (40): 573–588.
Albertazzi, L. ed. 2001. *The Dawn of Cognitive Science: Early European Contributions.* Dordrecht, Kluwer.
Ambrose, A., and M. Lazerowitz, eds. 1970. *G.E. Moore: Essays in Retrospect.* London: Routledge.
Ameriks, K., ed. 2017. *Cambridge Companion to German Idealism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bain, A. 1886. Mr. James Ward's 'Psychology'. *Mind* 11 (44): 457–477.
Baldwin, J.M. 1901–1903. *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (3 vols.). New York and London: Macmillan.
Baldwin, T. 1990. *G.E. Moore.* London: Routledge.
Baldwin, T., and C. Preti, eds. 2011. *G.E. Moore: Early Philosophical Writings.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [BP].
Beaney, M. 1997. *The Frege Reader.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Beaney, M., ed. 2007a. *The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology.* London: Routledge.
Beaney, M., ed. 2013. *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beaney, M., and E. Reck, eds. 2005a. *Gottlob Frege: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers (Volume I: Frege's Philosophy in Context).* London and New York: Routledge.
———. 2005b. *Gottlob Frege: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers (Vol. II: Frege's Philosophy of Logic).* London and New York: Routledge.
Becher, H.W. 1980. William Whewell and Cambridge Mathematics. *Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences* 2: 1–48.
———. 1986. Voluntary Science in Nineteenth-Century Cambridge. *British Journal of the History of Science* 19: 57–87.
Beiser, F. 2017. The Enlightenment and Idealism. Chapter 2 in Ameriks, ed. 2017: 21–42.
Bell, D. 1999. The Revolution of Moore and Russell: A Very British Coup? In O'Hear, ed. 1999: 193–208.
Betti, A. 2013. We Owe It to Sigwart! A New Look at the Content/Object Distinction in Early Phenomenological Theories of Judgment from Brentano to Twardowski. In Textor, ed. 2013: 74–96.
Boring, E. 1929. *A History of Experimental Psychology.* New York: Century Press.

Bradley, F.H. 1883. *Principles of Logic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [PL].

Brentano, F. 1995a, ed. P. Simons. *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. Edited by O. Kraus and L. McAlister and Translated by A. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, and L. McAlister. London and New York: Routledge.

Brett, G.S. 1921. *A History of Psychology, Vol. 3: Modern Psychology*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Broad, C.D. 1966. The Local Historical Background of Contemporary British Philosophy. In Mace, ed. 1966: 11–62.

Caird, E. 1889. *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant* (2 vols.) Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons.

Cambridge University Calendar. 1894–1896.

Cambridge University Reporter. 1894–1898.

Candlish, S. 1996. The Unity of the Proposition and Russell's Theories of Judgment. In R. Monk and A. Palmer, eds., 1996: 103–135.

Cavallin, J. 1997. *Content and Object: Husserl, Twardowski, and Psychologism*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Cerullo, J. 1988. E.G. Boring: Reflections on a Discipline Builder. *The American Journal of Psychology* 101 (4): 561–575.

Chrudzimski, A. and W. Huemer, eds. 2004. *Phenomenolgy and Analysis. Essays on Central European Philosophy*. Frankfurt: Ontos.

Craik, A.D.D. 2008. *Mr. Hopkins' Men: Cambridge Reform and British Mathematics in the 19th Century*. London: Springer.

Crane, T. 2014. *Aspects of Psychologism*. Harvard University Press.

Croom Robertson, G. 1876. Prefatory Words. *Mind* 1 (1): 1–6.

Cussins, A. 1987. Varieties of Psychologism. *Synthese* 70: 123–154.

Dathe, U. 2005. Frege in Jena. In M. Beaney and E. Reck, eds. 2005a: 40–53.

Dummett, M. 1973. *Frege: Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

———. 1993. *Origins of Analytical Philosophy*. London: Duckworth.

Dyde, S. 1884a. Bradley's Principles of Logic (I). *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 18 (3): 287–299.

———. 1884b. Bradley's Principles of Logic (II). *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 18 (4): 399–424.

———. 1885. Bradley's Principles of Logic (III). *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 19 (1): 1–32.

Eastwood, A. 1892. Lotze's Antithesis Between Thought and Things (I). *Mind*, n.s. 1 (3): 305–324.

Ebert, P., and M. Rossberg, tr. 2013. *Gottlob Frege: Basic Laws of Arithmetic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———., eds. 2019. *Essays on Frege's Basic Laws of Arithmetic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Erdmann, J.E. 1890. *German Philosophy Since Hegel*. Sonnenschein.

Flint, R. 1876. Review of Brentano, *Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte*. *Mind* 1 (1): 116–122.

Gabriel, G. 2002. Frege, Lotze, and the Continental Roots of Early Analytic Philosophy. In E. Reck, ed. 2002: 39–51.

Green, T.H. 1885. *The Works of Thomas Hill Green*. Edited by R. Nettleship, 3 vols. London: Longmans.

Griffin, N. 1985. Russell's Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment. *Philosophical Studies* 47 (2): 213–247.

———. 1986. Wittgenstein's Criticism of Russell's Theory of Judgment. *Russell* (Winter 1985–86): 132–145.

———. 1991. *Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

———. 1992. *The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, vol. 1: The Private Years (1884–1914)*. London: Penguin.

———. forthcoming. Russell on Relations, 1898: A Reconsideration.

Guicciardini, N. 2003. *Reading the Principia: The Debate on Newton's Mathematical Methods for Natural Philosophy from 1687–1736*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Guyer, P. 2017b. Absolute Idealism and the Rejection of Kantian Dualism. Chapter 2 in Ameriks, ed., 43–64.

Hatfield, G. 1992. Empirical, Rational, and Transcendental Psychology: Psychology as Science and as Philosophy. In Guyer, ed. 1992: 200–227.

Heck, R. 2019. Formal Arithmetic before Grundgesetze. In Ebert and Rossberg, eds. 2019: 497–537.

Heis, J. 2012. Attempts to Rethink Logic. In A. Wood and S. Songsuk, eds. 2012: 95–132.

———. 2013. Frege, Lotze, and Boole. In Reck, ed. 2013: 113–138.

Huemer, W. 2004. Husserl's Critique of Psychologism and his Relation to the Brentano School. In A. Chrudzimski and Wolfgang Huemer, eds. 2004: 199–214.

———. 2019. Franz Brentano. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, (Spring Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr(2019)/entries/brentano/.

Hylton, P. 1984. The Nature of the Proposition and the Revolt Against Idealism. In R. Rorty, J. Scheewind, and Q. Skinner, eds. 1984: 375–398.

———. 1990. *Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jacquette, D., ed. 1991a. *Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychologism: Critical and Historical Readings on the Psychological Turn in Philosophy*. Dordrecht: Springer.

———. 1991b. Psychologism Revisited in Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology. In Jacquette, ed., 245–262.

———. 2004a. Brentano's Concept of Intentionality. In Jacquette, ed. 2004b: 98–130.

———, ed. 2004b. *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Judd, C.H. 1895. Philosophy in the German Universities. *Science* 2 (31): 126–128.

Kant, I. 1998. *Critique of Pure Reason* (*The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*). P Guyer and A. Wood, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [CPR]

Kunne, W., M. Textor, and M. Siebel, eds. 1997. *Bolzano and Analytic Philosophy*. Rodopi: Grazer Philosophische Studien.

Kusch, M. 1995. *Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge*. London and New York: Routledge.

LaPointe, S., ed. 2019. *Logic From Kant to Russell: Laying the Foundations for Analytic Philosophy*. London: Routledge.

Leary, D. 1978. The Philosophical Development of the Conception of Psychology in Germany, 1780–1850. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 14 (2): 113–121.

Lindsay, T. 1876. Hermann Lotze. *Mind* 1 (3): 363–382.

Lotze, H. 1843/1874. *Logic*. Edited and Translated by B. Bosanquet. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Lotze, H. 1880. Philosophy in the Last Forty Years. *Contemporary Review* 37: 134–155.

———. 1856–1864/1885. *Microcosmus*. Translated by E. Hamilton and E.E.C. Jones. Edinburgh: T & T Clark.

Mace, C.A. 1945. Obituary of George Frederick Stout (1860–(1944)). *Proceedings of the British Academy* 31: 307–316.

———. 1946. G. F. Stout (1860–1944). *British Journal of Psychology* xxxvi: 51–54.

———. 1954. The Permanent Contribution to Psychology of G.F. Stout. *British Journal of Educational Psychology* 24 (2): 64–75.

———, ed. 1966. *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Manser, A. 1983. *Bradley's Logic*. New Jersey: Barnes and Noble.

Merz, J. 1906. *On the Development of Mathematical Thought During the Nineteenth Century (Vol. 2 of A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century)*. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and sons.

Metz, R. 1938. *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Milkov, N. 2000. Lotze and the Early Cambridge Analytic Philosophy. *Prima Philosophia* 13: 133–153.

———. 2008a. Russell's Debt to Lotze. *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Part A* 39 (2): 186–193.

Mill, J. 1829. *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*, 2 vols., London: Baldwin and Cradock.

Mill, J.S. 1843. *A System of Logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mohanty, H. 1991. The Concept of Psychologism in Frege and Husserl. In Jacquette, ed. 1991: 113–130.

Moore, G.E. 1897. In What Sense, If Any, Do Past and Future Time Exist? *Mind*, n.s. 6 (22): 228–240. [PFT]

———. 1899a. The Nature of Judgment. *Mind*, n.s. 8 (30): 176–193. [NJ].

———. 1925. Death of Dr. McTaggart. *Mind*, n.s. 34 (134): 269–271.

———. 1942. Autobiography. In Schilpp, ed., 3–39.

Mulligan, K. 2013. Acceptance, Acknowledgment, Affirmation, Agreement, Assertion, Belief, Certainty, Conviction, Denial, Judgment, Refusal and Rejection. In Textor, ed. 2013: 97–136.

Murphy, G., and J. Kovach. 1949. *An Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Nasim, O. 2008. *Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers: Constructing the World*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Notturno, M.A. 1997. *Perspectives on Psychologism*. Leiden: Brill.

O'Hear, A., ed. 1999. *German Philosophy Since Kant*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Palmer, A. 1988. *Concept and Object: The Unity of the Proposition in Logic and Psychology*. London: Routledge.

Palmer, A. and R. Monk. 1996. *Bertrand Russell and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy*. London: Thoemmes.

Passmore, J. 1966. *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*. London: Penguin.

Pattison, M. 1876. Philosophy at Oxford. *Mind* 1 (1): 82–97.

Peckhaus, V. 1999. 19th Century Logic between Philosophy and Mathematics. *Bulletin of Symbolic Logic* 5 (4): 433–450.

Philosophical Studies. 2006. Book Symposium on Soames 129 (3): 605–665.

Picardi, E. 1987. *The Logic of Frege's Contemporaries*. In Ferriani and Buzzetti, ed., 173–204.

Potter, M. 2009. *Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2020. *The Rise of Analytic Philosophy, 1879–1930*. London: Routledge.

Preti, C. 2008a. He Was In Those Days Beautiful and Slim: Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore, 1894–1901. *Russell* 28 (2): 97–192.

———. 2017. Some Main Problems of Moore Interpretation. In Preston, ed. 2017: Chapter 5.

———. 2019. What Russell Meant When He Called Moore A Logician. In LaPointe, ed. 2019: 189–205.

Preston, A. 2017. *Analytic Philosophy: An Interpretive History*. London: Routledge.

Pulkkinen, J. 1994. *The Threat of Logical Mathematism: A Study on the Critique of Mathematical Logic in German at the Turn of the 20th Century*. Frankfurt: Peter Wein.

Putnam, H. 1990. *Realism with a Human Face*. Ed. J. Conant. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Reck, E., ed. 2002. *From Frege to Wittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Reck. E. 2013. *The Historical Turn in Analytic Philosophy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.

Regan, T. 1991. *G. E. Moore: The Elements of Ethics*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Rorty, R., J. Schneewind, Q. Skinner, eds. 1984. *Philosophy in History: Essays in the Historiography of Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rothblatt, S. 1968. *The Revolution of the Dons*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rouse Ball, W.W. 1889. *A History of Mathematics at Cambridge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Russell, B. 1901b. Is Position in Time and Space Absolute or Relative. *Mind*, n.s. 10 (39): 293–317.

———. 1956b. *Portraits from Memory and Other Essays*, London–Allen and Unwin. [PFM].

———. 1959a. *My Philosophical Development*. New York: Simon and Schuster. [MPD].

———. 1961. My Religious Reminiscences. In Slater, ed., 3–8. [MRR].

Ryle, G. 1970. G.E. Moore's 'The Nature of Judgment'. In Ambrose and Lazerowitz, eds., 1970: 89–101.

Santayana, G. 1889/1971. *Lotze's System of Philosophy*. Ed. P. Kunz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Schaar, M. van der. 2013a. *Judgement and the Epistemic Foundation of Logic*. Dordrecht: Springer.

———. 2013b. G.F. Stout and Russell's Earliest Account of Judgement. In Textor, ed. 2013: 137–156.

———. 2013c. *G.F. Stout and the Psychological Origins of Analytic Philosophy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Schroeder, E. 1898. On Pasigraphy. *Monist* 9 (1): 44–62.

Schultz. 2004. *Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sidgwick, H. 1876. Philosophy at Cambridge. *Mind* 1 (2): 235–246.

———. 1889. Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies. *Mind 14* (56): 473–487.

Simons, P. 2004. Judging Correctly. In Jacquette, ed. 2004a: 45–65.

Skorupski, J. 1989. *John Stuart Mill*. London: Routledge.

———. 2006. *Why Read Mill Today?* London: Routledge.

Slater, R. 1961. *Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell*. New York and London: Routledge.

Sluga, H. 1980. *Gottlob Frege*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Smith, B. 1989. On the Origins of Analytic Philosophy. Grazer Philosophische Studien (35, 1): 153–73.

———. 1994. *Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano*. Chicago: Open Court.

Snyder, L. 2006. *Reforming Philosophy: A Victorian Debate on Science and Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Soames, S. 2003. *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century: Volume 1: The Dawn of Analysis* and *Vol. 2: The Age of Meaning*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sorrell, T., and G.A.J. Rogers, eds. 2005. *Analytic Philosophy and History of Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stang, N. 2019. Platonism in Lotze and Frege. In LaPointe, ed.: 138–159.

Stout, G.F. 1888a. The Scope and Method of Psychology. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 1 (1): 33–54.

———. 1888b. The Herbartian Psychology (I). *Mind* 13 (51): 321–338.

———. 1888c. The Herbartian Psychology (II). *Mind* 13 (52): 473–498.

———. 1889a. Herbart Compared with English Psychologists and with Benecke. *Mind* 14 (53): 1–26.

———. 1889b. The Psychological Work of Herbart's Disciples. *Mind* 14 (55): 353–368.

———. 1896. *Analytic Psychology* (2 vols.) London: Allen and Unwin. [AP].

———. 1930. *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*. London: Macmillan.

Sullivan, D. 2018. Hermann Lotze. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win(2018)/entries/hermann-lotze/.

Sully, J. 1876. Physiological Psychology in Germany. *Mind* 1 (1): 20–43.

Textor, M., ed. 2006. *The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy*. London: Routledge.

———., ed. 2013. *Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Thomas, E.E. 1915a. Lotze's Relation to Idealism (I). *Mind*, n.s. 24 (94): 186–206.

———. 1915b. Lotze's Relation to Idealism (II). *Mind*, n.s. 24 (95): 367–385.

———. 1915c. Lotze's Relation to Idealism (III). *Mind*, n.s. 24 (96): 481–497.

Titchener, E.B. 1921. Brentano and Wundt: Empirical and Experimental Psychology. *American Journal of Psychology* 32: 108–120.

Valentine, E. 2001. G.F. Stout's Philosophical Psychology. In L. Albertazzi, ed. 2001: 209–233.

Veitch, J. 1877. Philosophy in the Scottish Universities I. *Mind* 2 (5): 74–91.

Vrahimis, A. 2013. *Encounters between Analytic and Continental Philosophy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ward, J. 1886. Psychology. In *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 9th ed. Edinburgh: Black, 37–85.

———. 1887a. Psychological Principles (III). *Mind* 12 (45): 45–67.

———. 1894. Review of Bradley. *Appearance and Reality* 3 (9): 109–125.

Whewell, W. 1849. *Of Induction, With Especial Reference to Mr. J. Stuart Mill's System of Logic*. London: John W. Parker.

Windelband, W. 1926. *A History of Philosophy*. Translated by James H. Tufts. London: Macmillan.

Winstanley, D.A. 1940. *Early Victorian Cambridge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1947. *Later Victorian Cambridge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wood, A. and S. Songsuk, eds. 2012. *The Cambridge History of Philosophy in the nineteenth century (1790–1870)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wundt, W. 1877. Philosophy in Germany. *Mind* 2 (8): 493–518.

2

Moore's Early Philosophical Development: 1894–1896

1   Introduction: Moore at Cambridge

Moore began his undergraduate studies at Trinity College Cambridge in 1892, where he spent two years reading and preparing for Part I of the Classical Studies Tripos.[1] Moore's election to the Cambridge Conversazione Society (the Apostles) in February 1894 doubtless cemented his decision to add the Part II Moral Sciences Tripos to his Classics Part II Tripos preparation, and he began attending lectures by McTaggart, Sidgwick, Stout, and Ward.[2] The 1896 Cambridge University Calendar (CUC)

---

[1] Moore and Russell were not particularly close when they first met. Though there was a good deal of overlap in their studies, their very early years at Cambridge did not include the intimate intellectual bonding that we might expect from the kind of later acclamatory acknowledgments Russell gave of Moore (see below; see also Preti 2008a; 2019; and OHBR for more detail). Moore made note of his acquaintance with Russell for the first time in a list entitled "People I See," (Add. Ms. 8330 1/1/2): writing that in the Long Vacation, 1893, he gets to know "Russell, Crompton, Mayor, Wedgwood." On 6 August 1893, he wrote to his parents that he would be lunching with Russell that day (Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/20). There are only four other mentions of Russell to his parents in letters after that: 30 June 1897 (Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/71); 12 December 1898 (Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/77); 18 March 1899 (Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/78); and 20 June 1899 (Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/79).

[2] See Preti (2008a; 2019; OHBR) for details of Moore's and Russell's relationship. See Levy (1979) for an account of the Cambridge Apostles.

contains tables of examination results from previous years, including the tables of Russell and Moore's results (338; 339). Russell appears on the 1894 examination First Class list for his performance on the compulsory part of the examination, noted as a_1 (Ethics and Metaphysics) as well as his performance on b, the History of Philosophy special subject.[3] In addition, Russell's performance on b, and his performance overall, is marked with an asterisk, indicating special distinction.[4] Moore appears on the 1896 examination First Class list for his performance on b, the History of Philosophy special subject.[5]

In what follows, I will construct a picture of the Cambridge philosophical setting that influenced Moore's developing thought. Important sources are Moore's undergraduate materials that date between 1894 and 1896.[6] What survive are: (1) a set of notebooks containing Moore's notes of lectures given by Stout, Sidgwick, and McTaggart; (2) essays Moore wrote between 1894–1896 for his Moral Sciences Tripos Part II preparation for Ward, McTaggart, and Sidgwick; and (3) a number of papers he presented for the various Cambridge societies of which he was a member: the Apostles Society, the Moral Sciences Club, the Trinity Sunday Essay Society, and the Natural Sciences Club. There are, in addition, a selection of letters from Russell (and others) from which various hints as to the direction of Moore's development at this period can be gleaned, along with a variety of lists that it was his habit to make, and diary entries.[7] In

---

[3] In 1893 and 1894, the history of philosophy special subject was European Philosophy (1600–1660) with special reference to Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes (CUC 1894, xix).

[4] CUC, 1896 (54).

[5] In 1895 and 1896 the history of philosophy special subject was the philosophy of Hegel (CUC 1896, xix).

[6] All of this material is unpublished. There survive, in addition, a number of notebooks of lectures by Russell and Wittgenstein that Moore attended. This material is also mostly unpublished. Moore attended Russell's lectures on Leibniz (1898; Add. Ms. 8875 10/4/1–2); on Philosophy of Mathematics (1911–1912; Add. Ms. 8875 10/4/3); on Knowledge of the External World (1914; Add. Ms. 8875 10/4/4); and on the Analysis of Mathematics (1926; Add. Ms. 8875 16/1/2). Moore attended most of Wittgenstein's lectures (1930–1933; Add. Ms. 8875 10/7/4–9) and published three articles in *Mind* in 1954–1955 on these lectures. See Stern, Rogers and Citron (2016) for discussion. Moore's notes on Wittgenstein's logical work (Add. Ms. 8875 10/7/1–3), dictated by Wittgenstein to him in Norway in April 1914, was published as Appendix II of Anscombe and von Wright (1961, 108–19). See Potter (2009); Preti (OHBR).

[7] Moore's letters to Russell are held at the Russell Archive at McMaster University (but see McGuinness 2008; Griffin, 1992). Moore's letters to Wittgenstein, except for a few, are lost (McGuinness 2008).

this chapter, I will examine some of the earliest of these materials, fitting them into an account of the influences at work on Moore from his teachers.[8]

Moore's early surviving philosophical material does not contain many obvious or explicit hints of what became trailblazing outcomes, and untangling the intellectual stimuli on Moore's work is made somewhat more difficult by the then-practice of rarely if ever citing sources of influence, especially proximal ones. We will work backwards, but not entirely in the dark. We know that Moore's 1898 novel formulation of the nature of judgment grew over the two years that he laboured over an account of Kant on freedom and reason. The philosophical setting in which Moore's analysis of Kant ultimately developed began with his Tripos examinations preparation, where he was for the first time exposed to the philosophical thinking of the day. The clearest example of the fusing of mental science and moral science at Cambridge, I believe, was focused on the central philosophical question of this period: the relation between appearance and reality; or, as the mental scientist would put it, the relation between thought and its objects. I discuss these elements in turn below.

2   Reading Kant in Nineteenth Century Cambridge

We saw in Chap. 1 that a deepening awareness of a gap between the logical and metaphysical properties of mental states and their purely psychological ones had taken hold across a variety of disciplines. For the mental scientist, however, this involved a careful juggling between metaphysics and a proper scientific psychology. There is reliable evidence of the effects of the continental *Psychologismusstreit* in Moore's introduction to Kantian (and post-Kantian) thought via his teachers; and that Moore's approach to Kant (and post-Kantian accounts of the relation between thought and reality) was formulated in the context of his teachers' views of it.[9] All of

---

[8] I will examine Moore's essays for Sidgwick in Chap. 3.

[9] By Moore's teachers, I mean Stout, Ward, Sidgwick, and McTaggart. Moore attended lectures by all of them in preparation for his Tripos. McTaggart examined the Moral Sciences Tripos in 1896

them were not only entirely familiar with the context of both German and British criticism of Kant's views, but also made their own significant contributions to that literature. During this period, this included, in particular, a variety of psychologisms imputed to Kant in a number of damning ways.[10] A brief summary of Kant commentary in the nineteenth century will set the stage.

The way Kant was read at Cambridge in the late 1890s was of a piece with what Kitcher (1990) has called the psychological readings of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (CPR).[11] Kant's CPR, she has argued, was early on condemned as psychologistic in a variety of senses. One was that it was an attempt to derive normative conclusions from factual premises; another was that Kant tried to ground necessary conclusions from psychological premises. Kitcher has argued that such criticisms dogged its interpretation for 100 years after its publication (thus featuring in the literature of the *Psychologismusstreit*).[12] Early continental readers, according to Kitcher, took it that Kant failed to distinguish between questions concerning the logical conditions of knowledge with questions about the subject of knowledge, more properly the realm of metaphysics.[13] Fries,[14]

---

[10] Stout and Ward both published their own extended accounts of Kantian thought. Stout's Gifford lectures contain detailed analyses of Kant (1931, 1952). Ward's study of Kant appeared in 1922. Both of these had their basis in the lectures they gave at Cambridge. Moore spent part of the summer of 1895, on Ward's advice, in Tübingen, attending Sigwart's lectures on Kant (Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/50, (5 July, 1895)). Sidgwick also was entirely *au courant* with the streams of mental science-influenced philosophy at Cambridge, and moreover explicitly distanced himself from the metaphysics of the day (BP 2011, xxxvi). Sidgwick also published plenty of critical accounts of Kant; notably, in this context, disputing Kant's idealism/transcendentalism with Caird (see Chap. 3). His Ethics lectures, which Moore attended in preparation for his Tripos, moreover contained sustained criticisms of Kant's ethical views. So it turns out that three of four of Moore's teachers in philosophy were not entirely supportive, and indeed quite critical of, the idealist metaphysics influential at that time.

(CUC 1896, 339) and prepared Moore for the Hegel history of philosophy special subject. That the general tenor of philosophical discourse was not Absolutist at Cambridge might help to explain why the outside examiners (outside of Cambridge, that is) on both of Moore's dissertations (Caird and Bosanquet) seem to be entirely at a loss to cope with the perspective that Moore has brought to his study of Kant. See BP, 2011 (97, 116, 245, 249), and Chap. 4, below.

[11] See also Hatfield (1992), Walsh (1966, 1981).

[12] See Kusch (1995) and Köhnke (1991).

[13] Leary (1978, 1982a, b) has argued that there is a connection to be made between the criticisms of Kant on the part of Fries, Herbart, and Beneke and the onset of what he calls "the philosophical justification of psychology as a natural science." See below for Stout's familiarity with these discussions.

[14] Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–1843).

for example, held that the first Critique was a futile exercise in presenting a variety of arguments that attempted to derive *a priori* formal conditions of the mind from empirical or *a posteriori* mental facts instead of presenting a thorough account of the latter. Reinhold[15] tried to insert a Cartesian ego as a first principle on Kant's behalf from which to derive the nature of psychological concepts like the pervasive but ambiguous *Vorstellung*. Herbart, in particular, attributed to Kant the failure of trying to ground philosophy on psychology; in the language of the day this will have meant grounding metaphysics on epistemology.[16] Kuno Fischer put it even more strongly: "The question of whether the critique of reason is supposed to be metaphysical or anthropological is a real problem, unavoidable in the history of the development of German philosophy since Kant" (Walsh 1981, 727).[17]

T. H. Green, Sir William Hamilton, J. H. Stirling, Edward Caird, and Sidgwick also took exception to Kant's psychologism (Walsh 1981, 723–29). These critics imputed to Kant a variety of psychologisms: from (1) accounts of his views refashioned according to the kind of Hegelian he ought to have been; to (2) more sober criticisms of his account of the mind and its objects. Hamilton stressed the apparent divide between phenomena (knowable) and noumena (unknowable) and the tension between these and Kant's conception of the ego, which is (somehow) both source and ground both for knowability of objects and objects themselves; and also (somehow) a moral agent. Green took the view that everyone misunderstood Kant (except presumably himself), arguing that Kant ought to have realized that without "the unifying principle the manifold world would be nothing at all" (Green 1885, 75). Edward Caird,[18] an eminent Kant scholar of the day, tried to rehabilitate Kant in the face of what he took to be a variety of incoherent and incompatible

---

[15] Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757–1823).

[16] Kitcher (1990) proposed to rehabilitate Kant's Transcendental Psychology as legitimate, worthy of study, and true to Kant, and explicitly contrasts her position with an ahistorical reading of Kant that became the vogue in the mid-twentieth century: Strawson's. She claims that Strawson and others set the tone for Kant scholarship in the mid-century by claiming to "disentangle" the psychological from the analytical side of the first Critique, but mostly succeeded rather in dismissing anything that smacked of the psychological with contempt (1990, 3–5). See also Guyer (2017b).

[17] "Anthropological," at this time, referred to any account of human processes, like that of mind.

[18] See Lindsay (1877).

claims, such as the claim that perception and thought were to be strictly distinguished but were nevertheless inseparable elements of phenomenal knowledge. The Cairdean Kant, however, rendered Kant as defending the dialectical nature of human thought, proceeding in stages of self-transcendence to a purer grasp of reality, which was ultimately indistinguishable from the nature of Thought itself. Caird, that is, apparently read into Kant what idealist views he took seriously himself (Walsh 1981, 724–5).[19] Stirling was opposed to the idealist/Hegelian reading of Kant, instead interpreting Kant charitably as having desired to make good the claim that the subjective elements of mind could nonetheless supply necessity and objectivity, and argued ultimately that Kant failed to succeed (Walsh 1981, 727). And Sidgwick, as we noted above, published a number of critical commentaries on Kant, including an important one in 1883 on the critical philosophy.[20]

Walsh characterizes Sidgwick's reading of Kant as containing the essentials of an attack on "transcendental psychology," and even of an attack on the possibility of a critical philosophy itself. Sidgwick, for instance, made a reproach that (as we will see later) also turned up in Stout's Kant lectures: that "if we are unable to penetrate to things *beyond* experience, why would we be any more able to discover the conditions which lie—if I may say so—behind it?" (1883a, 320). Sidgwick also raised the objection, among other things, that Kant failed entirely to account for what he called the "objectivity of our empirical cognitions." This led Sidgwick to a crucial criticism of Kant's transcendentalism. Sidgwick contended that Kant's view imported a contradiction into his conception of "object": "that I can know objects to be merely modifications of my sensibility, combined in certain ways by my understanding; while at the same time I also conceive them as different from the modifications of my sensibility

---

[19] Walsh claims (1981, 724) that for Caird, "the important question to ask about Kant was not what he believed but what he got right." See also Watson (1909). In the light of Caird's nonplussed reaction to Moore's 1897 Kant commentary (BP 2011, 99–116), it is ironic that, in a slightly mysterious notation on the 1898 dissertation, Moore wrote (or was reporting the advice of another) this: "you should not merely find your own views in Kant, but unless you carefully compare him with what you yourself can really understand and think to be true you are in great danger of never finding what he meant at all" (BP 2001, li).

[20] See Chap. 3.

and as perduring when the latter cease" (1883a, 318).[21] This persistent conflation, Sidgwick argued, was due to Kant's apparent insouciance with respect to his own distinction between *phenomenal* and *noumenal*—"Kant always regards the one object as phenomenal of the other, but often identifies the two so completely that he speaks of both indifferently by the same name in the same passage, even in the very transcendental discussions in which the distinction between the two is of fundamental importance" (1883a, 318).

That "psychological" readings dominated Kant scholarship during this period, as Kitcher and others[22] have noted, was perhaps ironically in part due to Kant himself. Kant took the project in the CPR to be an examination of the faculties of sensation, understanding, imagination, and reason—*prima facie* psychological ('anthropological') if anything is—in order to determine the nature of genuine knowledge. In order to avoid a collapse into subjectivism, Kant sought to tie some aspects of knowledge to *a priori* conditions of the nature of our psychological (knowing) faculties: in specific, what they had to be like in order for knowledge to be possible. In this way, Kant did address psychological elements directly, criticizing the rational psychology of his predecessors who tried to derive a substantive claim about the soul from "I think"; criticizing empirical psychology for lacking the pure or non-empirical grounding that a genuine science must have; and all but explicitly defending a transcendental psychology via the paralogisms concerning the self. The project of establishing the *a priori* conditions of our cognitive faculties just is, as Kitcher notes, Kant's transcendentalism. What she has emphasized is how much it is centred on what is, implicitly, a transcendental psychology (1990, 16–19).[23]

A few key elements stand out in this rough glance at some of the Kant interpretation in the nineteenth century: (1) that a variety of psychologistic readings of Kant then held sway, consistent with the disputes of the

---

[21] Lindsay (1877, 483) explained that the "Hegelian Contributions to English Philosophy," especially those of Caird and Green, emphasize the failure of psychological formulations as atomistic or "isolated" to one mind, but nevertheless try give an account of *mind*.

[22] Guyer (1992), Walsh (1966, 1981).

[23] Kant never explicitly defended a transcendental psychology. But his critics did not hesitate to attribute it to him from the start. See Kitcher (1990), Guyer (2017b), Walsh (1981).

Psychologismusstreit across (what we would call) epistemology, psychology, metaphysics, and logic; and (2) that a clue to Moore's developing anti-transcendentalism can be located in the attacks on Kant's transcendental psychology; and (3) that this latter was a notable component of the Kant criticism of Moore's *milieu*. Kant was criticised either for failing to commit to a full-dress idealism (by his Idealist critics) or of bad psychology (by the mental scientists). But in both of these lines of attack, there is a similar perspective: that Kant failed to show how the *a priori* conditions that (allegedly) grounded our cognitive faculties resulted in anything but some kind of mentalism: in either a metaphysical idealism or an epistemological subjectivism. For the Idealists, it was obvious that they could not but do so, in spite of Kant's protestations; for the mental scientists, such a claim was just bad psychology with respect to modern standards. We turn next to the mental scientists in Cambridge, in order to more directly address the reconstruction of Moore's early exposure, and to tie up some important loose ends.

3   Stout on Kant, Psychology, and the Nature of Judgment

There is little doubt that Stout played a role in the development of Moore's early views, but there are a few difficulties in reconstructing exactly how.[24] Neither Brentano nor Stout had an account of the nature of judgment that is a plainly direct forerunner to Moore's. Brentano's account of judgment emphasized what would have been for Moore a far too subjective analysis of judgment in terms of assent, as we saw in Chap. 1, and there is no straightforward sense in which his attribution of intentional inexistence to states of mind is metaphysically realist in the relevant way.[25] Stout's account of judgment was itself an adaptation of Brentano's, but it differed from Brentano's in a number of ways. What I want to show in what follows is that Stout's mental science was a significant element in

---

[24] See Chap. 1.
[25] See Chap. 1.

his teaching of Kant, which can help to explain how Stout's conception of the nature of judgment could have had an influence on Moore's.

Stout's immersion in mental science was professional and expert, beginning with his *Analytic Psychology* (AP) which appeared in 1896. AP was an adaptation of the Brentanian approach to the landscape of the newly developing science of psychology, and in particular, an account of the elements of mind of interest to the psychologist. The case for Stout's influence on Moore's conception of judgment turns on the view that Stout was not uncritical of the Brentanian taxonomy in his A*P*. The question we want to clear up is whether or not his criticism could have supplied the realism—even in part—that inspired Moore's account of the object of judgment.

There is no easy answer to this, as there is no straightforward way to characterise Stout's philosophical identity. Russell (MPD, 38) himself dismissed Stout as a Hegelian. Metz (1938), along with other historians—and Stout eulogists—described Stout as what could be most charitably called "wide-ranging" in his embrace of nearly every philosophical thesis then available.[26] Passmore wrote that "he found nothing philosophical alien to him," and noted that in Stout's work "the ideal of Reconciliation finds its most philosophical expression (1952, xxxix). Mace (1945, 1946) also remarked that "he had an extraordinary capacity for assimilation" and that "Stout was distinctive in the surprising range of his affirmations … he devoted his life in effect to a synthesis of all philosophies." In spite of the heterogeneity of his *philosophical* commitments, however, Stout was an uncompromisingly common-sense *psychologist*: "psychology investigates the history of individual consciousness, and this coincides with the history of the process through which the world comes to be presented in consciousness … when on the other hand the nature of knowledge is considered apart from its genesis, it becomes the subject matter, not of psychology, but of metaphysics" (1896, 7).[27]

---

[26] Passmore (1944, 1952), Mace (1945, 1946, 1954).

[27] Passmore (1952, xlix): "the convictions of common sense are preserved, but without disrespect to either science or philosophy."

This line of thought is the best way to make the case for the influence that Stout had upon the young Moore.[28] Stout was not, from the philosophical point of view, a system-building metaphysician (especially not early on). He approached the question of the relation of mind or thought to reality as a psychologist, developing his views steadily in criticism of the philosophical/psychological elements in the work of his predecessors (the classical empiricists, Kant, Herbart, and Lotze) as well as his contemporaries (Bradley, Ward, James, and others).[29] Both Mace and Passmore[30] have noted that while it is only in his later work (1930, 1931, 1952, later editions of MP) that Stout turned his attention deliberately to supplying a metaphysics to complement his earlier descriptive accounts of mentality, his general approach even early on was never that of a metaphysical idealist. Mace called it a "phenomenal physics": "psychology deals with objects, but with the properties of those objects which physics ignores" (1954, 66). Passmore has noted that Stout steered a course between absolute idealism and realism: on the one hand (for instance), making common cause with the idealists who rejected the notion that our knowledge of reality was an inference from atoms of sensation associated in mystifying ways; but siding with the empirical sciences on the issue of the existence of physical objects (1952, xl–xlii). In addition, Stout defended the Brentanian view that the data of experience was not appearances of objects, but the objects themselves "as they appear."

As for Stout's analysis of judgment in AP, it was circumspectly that of a proper contemporary mental scientist: avoiding any commitment, that is, to an ontology of the content or objects of judgment.[31] But it is precisely Moore's ontological account of the nature of the object of judgment that was the innovative step. In this context, Schaar (2013b) has argued that Twardowski was among the first of Brentano's students to

---

[28] This also applies to Ward, who Ward had also been Stout's teacher.

[29] Ward was explicit that an "individualistic standpoint" as a psychologist did not entail "any philosophical conclusions" (1886, 182, 184), in the course of arguing that the classical empiricists made just the mistake of conflating psychology and epistemology.

[30] Mace (1945, 1946, 1954), Passmore (1944, 1952, 1976).

[31] See Chap. 1.

have offered an ontological interpretation of the object of judgment as entirely independent of the act and the content of judgment, and she makes the case that Stout knew of Twardowski's work, that an anonymous review of it in *Mind* is Stout's, and that Stout's tripartite distinction between act, content, and object in AP is an adaptation more directly of Twardowski than of Brentano.[32] And as we saw in Chap. 1, Nasim (2008) pointed out that Stout claimed to have criticised, in AP, Brentano's failure to be more precise in distinguishing the act of mind from both its content—(the German is *Inhalt*) and from the object of thought. The thorny issue here, however, is just how much ontological mind-independence Stout attributed to the object of thought, having distinguished it from content.

I agree with Schaar that we cannot attribute to the early Stout the logical realism that turned up in Moore's formulation of judgment (2013b, 73). Nasim, however, characterizes the early Stout as a "proto-realist," defining realism as the view that "reality exists apart from its presentation to, or conception by consciousness" (2008, 19). Schaar and Nasim both acknowledge that Stout does not give a well-worked-out ontology for objects of judgment in AP.[33] So it is plausible that (notably during the period where he will have had the most direct influence on Moore's thinking) the realism in Stout can be understood as that of the common-sense psychologist of the time, not the metaphysician: the common-sense psychologist of the time could and did take an anti-subjectivist stance about the individuation of a variety of mental states.[34]

The way to make sense of this is that in AP, Stout took himself to be attributing plenty of legitimate objectivity to objects of thought in the sense that there must be something that we think of when we think, while also making it plain that he took the ontological nature of that

---

[32] Schaar (1996, 2013c).

[33] Schaar (2013c, 48–52; 60–63; 68–73); Nasim (2008, 17–49).

[34] That we can attribute a generally relevant kind of realism (better: *anti-psychologism*) to Stout is a far cry from attributing the propositional structure of Moore's objects of judgment to Stout's direct influence, however. Schaar discusses the textual evidence in detail (2013a, 69–73). See also Nasim (2008).

objectivity as irrelevant (Stout 1896, 44–6).[35] That is: he seems willing to make enough of a commitment as a *philosophical* psychologist to acknowledge that "the whole object of thought is never merely a content of our finite consciousness," and that "[i]f the object exists at all in the sense in which the thinker means or intends it, it has being independently of this consciousness …" but as a *scientific* psychologist he wanted to underscore that "the actual existence or non-existence [of an object of thought] is a matter of indifference," and that "the distinction here maintained would hold good as much for an uncompromising adherent of solipsism as for an advocate of natural realism." This is because, *qua* mental science, the focus of inquiry is "the object as we mean or intend it" (1896, 46). In short, what we see here in Stout is just the diligent balance of metaphysics and psychology that characterised mental science at Cambridge.[36] We turn next to Stout's undergraduate lectures on Kant, one of the few pieces of evidence that we have of Stout's direct influence on Moore.

3.1   Stout's History of Philosophy Lectures, 1894

In October 1894, Moore began to attend Stout's lectures on History of Modern Philosophy.[37] Moore's notebook on these lectures shows Stout setting Kant's critical period in context, then includes a series of lectures on what Moore notes as "Kritik in detail."[38] A few of Stout's main contentions (as noted by Moore) were that Kant's distinction between the

---

[35] In these passages, for instance, Stout distinguishes carefully between Kant's and Brentano's formulation of "object": for Brentano, the world of science is not phenomenal; for Kant, however, the world of phenomena in space "exists only as it appears to us."

[36] See Hodgson (1887, 424): "The psychological view of the Subject, when not corrected by the philosophical distinction of Subject and Object, thus leads directly to a conception which is essentially the same as that of the Transcendental Idealism which sprang from Kant, and which has ever since deluged Germany."

[37] Spadoni (1976) argues that that Stout's history of philosophy lectures were directly influential on Russell's embrace, in 1894, of the ontological argument (as establishing the Absolute, however, rather than God).

[38] Add. Ms. 8875 10/1/1. Stout's lectures start with Descartes, Bacon, Spinoza, Hobbes, and Leibniz; then move on to what Moore notes as the "English line" where Stout covered Locke, "Berkeleian Idealism," and Hume, before continuing on to Kant.

analytic and synthetic is a "bad survival of the view that there was such a thing as a purely logical use of the understanding," and most problematically, as Stout saw it, that "Kant seems to confuse the logical a priori with [the] psychological subjective"—that the logical conditions of objective experience are explained (all the same) as characteristics of the mind. Moreover, Kant's distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* is awkward in itself, as "the apriority of concepts or intuitions differs from that of judgments; for concepts or intuitions: it means we cannot think it away; it is persistent and omnipresent in all our experiences; for judgment, it means inability to think the opposite."[39] The "apriority of concepts or intuitions" of course is the foundation of Kant's view (in the Transcendental Aesthetic) that qualities, relations in space and time, and space and time themselves are not things-in-themselves, but "psychological forms." As Stout formulated it, Kant's conception of pure concepts (like possibility, cause, and existence) are that they are abstracted from the law and behaviour of the understanding—Stout says "mind"—on the occasion of experience. Time and Space, similarly, are the result of an innate law of mind, coordinating experiences. This does raise the question as to why (and how) concepts and intuitions should correspond to objects, and more pressingly, the legitimacy or validity of our knowledge by experience, "so far as the knowledge is not given by objects." Though Kant concludes, according to Stout, that "our concepts do not correspond to objects but are modified by our forms of thought," he was critical of the *a priori* validation that Kant thinks the categories supply.

Moore's notes show that Stout discussed the 1781 (A) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (CPR) in detail, which Stout described as containing "psychological" matter that, in the end, was "more than was necessary for his purpose" (and, as "nobody could pretend to understand" it, it was omitted in the 1787 second edition).[40] The basis of this material was Kant's attempt to establish, according to Stout, that the conceptions of "subject" and "object" are inter-determined. That is: the manifold, or unorganized sensuous material, has to be organized into unities in order

---

[39] Kitcher notes these ambiguities as well (1990, 19).

[40] Stout claimed that the B edition, in contrast to the A edition, took no account of the relation of knowledge to its object, ignoring the content of knowledge. See also Kitcher (1990, 11–12).

to be known. Kant argued, according to Stout, that there must be an "order determining the order of my experience" which has to be independent of my experience. But it is also the case that the psychological subject is an example of an order; in fact, an *ordering*: "the self has an experience of itself and thus unifies itself—as an empirical phenomenon. Yet this permanent unity has no existence apart from the manifold which it unifies; it consists in interconnection of our states." But, Stout claimed, Kant never made good on his position that "the phenomenal existence of matter corresponds to [an] object"; that the unity of objects is supplied by another unity, that of consciousness itself.[41] As Stout put it, "Kant held the empirical 'I' to grow up only through the process of experience," which only led to a further problem. The unity of consciousness that only develops in experience "therefore cannot be the primary object of it." This, according to Stout, led to Kant's formulation of the transcendental unity of apperception, which is the *a priori* condition that establishes the (genuinely) knowing subject. Genuine knowledge is only possible on the Kantian view if there is a unified "I" which is the know*er*. The alternative is a transient succession of phenomenal states, which cannot be a unified subject possessing states of knowledge. The empirical self however *is* just a set of successive but unified states; and is moreover something known; so Kant must posit a *Transcendental* Self. The Transcendental Self cannot be known through experience; so, it cannot be known at all. It is an *a priori* condition of knowledge, but not itself known—it performs an indispensable condition for knowledge by way of what Kant calls its "a priori synthetic activity." And this is only tenable, Stout claimed, if we take the Transcendental Synthesis to fall within the realm of the *Ding an Sich*.

Stout found this to be "untenable in principle" later on (Stout 1931, 1952).[42] The way he put it there was: "Does Kant really mean that there are two selves, or only the same self, considered from two points of view?" Somehow, Stout argued, Kant claims that the self can both "comprehend

---

[41] Sidgwick fought this out with Caird over successive issues of *Mind* (1877, 1879, 1880, 1883a, b). See Chap. 3.

[42] And in 1896 (38–40). Sidgwick took exception to this as well (see Chap. 3).

the boundless immensity of the spatial universe while being only a transitory episode in it"; and though limited and transient, this self "can find reasons for denying or doubting that the space-time universe is not the whole of reality." Moreover, this self also appears to be able to "pursue ends which far transcend the limits of his own existence." That is, this same analysis must hold for the so-called Willing Self, but in that it does, Stout asserted this as "startling": "the self which wills and is capable of willing freely is just the same self which strives towards ends and ideals." As Stout noted, an ideal imposes an obligation: "one who seriously pursues an ideal good recognizes that he ought to, which is unintelligible if taken to stand by itself as merely an ideal; a figment of his own imagination. It can have the supreme practical worth which he ascribes to it, only if the obligation to follow it is founded on the nature of what really exists" (Stout 1931).

The problem, according to Stout, was this: if the empirical self (knowing or willing) is real, then it is real only in the context of real phenomena of which it forms a part; it cannot be isolated and known in and of itself. But for Kant's view that the Transcendental Self generates the world of experience as well as our knowledge of it to be defensible, according to Stout, the Transcendental Self and its synthesis must be taken to be a thing-in-itself. Thus, the transcendental Self *is* isolated; it is timeless and certainly not spatial; its purpose is to "render possible any sort of complex unity; synthesis of 'mere' diversity with 'mere' unity." But then there is "no possibility of tracing its presence within our mental life … this being so, why assume it at all" (Stout 1931).

Stout's questioning of the nature of the *Ding an Sich*, especially with respect to the nature of the empirical and/or transcendental self, was readily apparent in his 1894 lectures. There, as noted by Moore, Stout claimed there was "no suggestion that Kant doubts the existence of a thing in itself as a reality separate and distinct," but that, all the same, his views on the nature of the *Ding an Sich* were subject to some tension with respect to what Kant formulated as "real". To be a phenomenon is to be known (or knowable) via experience—which is to say, on Kant's view, *known*. The thing in itself cannot be known—it is the conception of the

limit to phenomenal knowledge. But what is known via experience is real, not a mere seeming; as for Kant, Stout claimed, "appearance implies for Kant something which appears … Thus Kant thinks we cannot know the thing in itself and yet can know nothing but the thing in itself—phenomenally. The noumenon is the phenomenon; the transcendental object is the thing itself, which cannot be properly known but barely thought of. Nowhere … is Kant sceptical of the existence of the transcendental object, though entirely sceptical of its cognisability."

But, as Stout formulated the problematic issue, "how can the things themselves be causes of our perceptions, if causality only applies to sensual knowns?" This problem would affect free will as well, in a variety of ways. For one thing, its purported freedom would seem to depend on "timeless origination of an event in time"; for another, "our imperatives are thought proclaiming itself as a causal agent and unless this is an illusion, we are free."[43] The causal point was that: "Man is bound to act as he does by his 'intelligible character' … if we are free we are [the] thing in itself." But this according to Stout confused the thing in itself with the transcendental object; the absolute reality. The problem is that the thing in itself has no causal properties, and the mistake that Kant made was to conflate cause and reason. This, according to Stout, was particularly visible in the formulation of volition; volition "helps to form the idea of causality; desire is felt to be necessarily connected with the movement that we experience."

The basis of Moore's criticism of Kant turned on Moore's dissatisfaction with aspects of a transcendental psychology; and we will return to a more thorough examination of Moore's engagement with Kant in his Trinity dissertations in the Chap. 4. So far, however, given the evidence, we can begin to see how Moore's interpretation of Kant could have been influenced by Stout's account, which unapologetically deployed the language and conception of mind from contemporary mental science to attack Kant's transcendentalism. There are, in addition, other intellectual stimuli that came to Moore from the perspective of mental science. We turn to Ward's impact next.

---

[43] Stout's point is that a causal self is a determined self.

4   Ward's Mental Science[44]

James Ward (1843–1925)—who had also taught Stout— was a central figure in Moore's undergraduate life.[45] Ward himself had had a non-standard academic career. After abandoning an attempt to become a Calvinist minister (he had unorthodox views), he travelled to Göttingen in the early 1870s, where he studied with Lotze and was subsequently encouraged by Sidgwick to study at Cambridge. Ward was ultimately awarded a first-class degree in moral sciences in 1873 and a Trinity Prize Fellowship in 1875 with a dissertation on "the relation of physiology to psychology."[46]

After deciding to prepare for the Moral Sciences Part II Tripos, Moore wrote to his parents that "Dr. Ward thought my work in moral science last term had not been sufficiently looked after; so this term he has set me Lotze's Metaphysic to read (which I do aloud with Sanger),[47] and I give him a paper of points, which I find difficult, every week, which he looks over and discusses with me at his house on Saturday afternoons" (Add.

---

[44] "… What I owe to others I owe entirely to previous writers … besides our English psychologists, I may mention Herbart and some of the Herbartians, Lotze, Wundt, Brentano, and his Austrian connections." (Ward 1918, v). Ward described Herbart's model of the "statics and dynamics" of presentations to have shown the "large amount of independence there is between the subject of consciousness and its objects" even though the model itself was "a wild dream" (1918, 56).

[45] Ward was a lecturer at Trinity when Moore first began to study Moral Sciences. He was promoted to a "new professorship" on 16 January 1897 (outpacing Stout, who was one candidate): Professor of Mental Philosophy and Logic (Moore to Desmond McCarthy, Add. Ms. 8330 2/5/4). Moore, as it happens, succeeded Ward to that Professorship in 1925; during Moore's tenure, the name was changed to Professor of Philosophy. After Moore, the Professorship was held by Wittgenstein.

[46] Ward (1876). In 1878, Ward became lecturer in psychology at Cambridge, working "systematically" at psychology until 1894, after which his interests turned towards "other subjects" (1918, v–vi). He produced a sequence of publications between 1882 and 1896 on psychology, its account of mind, and its principles. Ward's early reputation as a mental scientist, however, was based on his entry for "Psychology," produced for the 1886 edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. He shifted direction in 1896 towards metaphysics with his 1896–1898 Gifford lectures, titled *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, and deeper into metaphysical waters in his later Gifford lectures titled *The Realm of Ends; or Pluralism and Theism* (1907–1910). His 1918 monograph "Psychological Principles" was the culmination of his work in psychology and mental science; in 1922, he published an account of Kant.

[47] Charles Percy Sanger (1871–1930) was a friend of Russell's while they were students. He was not an Apostle. See Griffin (1992, 9).

Ms. 8330 2/1/35).[48] Ward was an examiner for Moore's 1898 dissertation, and they were colleagues between 1911 and 1925.[49]

As I argued in Chap. 1, an underlying issue at the heart of the *Psychologismusstreit*—which only grew more acute during the 1880s and '90s with the rise of laboratory psychology—was the nascent threat to philosophy coming from empirical science. A variety of demands from this kind of disciplinary turmoil characterized Stout's work at the interconnection of mental and moral science, as we saw above; and no less can be said of Ward. Ward was described for instance as "speaking with the sounds of idealism but the meanings of naturalism" in his work; something, as we have noted, that was similarly said of both Stout and Lotze in the light of their accommodating absorption of the intellectual filaments of the day.[50] Stout and Ward both began their careers with formulations of the scope and nature of psychology; going on only later to develop a metaphysics to add to their earlier views. As far as psychology was concerned, however, the priorities for both thinkers were: (1) to defend a conception of philosophical psychology against the encroaching physiological methods that were transforming psychology into a lab science on the continent; and (2) to (at the same time) formulate a properly systematic, scientific psychology, independent of the metaphysical and epistemological considerations particular to philosophy.[51]

I argued in Chap. 1 that this approach can be understood as an expanding anti-psychologism about psychology itself. Ward and Stout had

---

[48] This material survives (Add. Ms. 8875 11/2/8–14). Moore wrote to his parents on 23 April, 1895, that his work in Lent term of 1895 would proceed much as it did in Michelmas Term 1894: attending Stout's History of Philosophy lectures and with Ward "looking over his abstracts of Lotze" (Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/45). Ward lectured in Psychology and Metaphysics in the three terms that comprised the academic year 1894–1895 (CUR). Moore noted that he attended the Metaphysics lectures ("in Cambridge … a subject which includes the whole of philosophy except Moral Philosophy" (1942, 19)). Ward, as his director of studies, decided to intensify Moore's preparation for the Tripos part II, as he had not sat for the Moral Sciences Tripos Part I ("he set me to read pieces of Lotze's Metaphysics and to write essays on those pieces, which essays he then discussed privately with me" (1942, 17).

[49] His examiners' report is lost (BP 2011, lxvii–lxxi).

[50] Murray (1937, vii).

[51] Stout, eulogizing Ward, put it this way: "The psychologist is not bound to have a theory of knowledge which will at all points stand the test of philosophical criticism … the psychologist … sets out to trace the development of the knowledge of the world as it is now for common sense and science" (Stout 1926, 28–9).

inherited a longstanding philosophical issue: how to account for genuine knowledge, when, inevitably, it is tied to subjective processes of mind. They also, however, had to contend with another inherited picture of the mind: one based on a traditional opposition of the sensible faculties and the reasoning faculties. This was thought to entail a number of attendant epistemological and metaphysical conclusions. One of those was that reason or thought had special powers of transcendence, synthesis, and unification, all of which permitted its penetration to the ultimate nature of reality, which was logical (necessary; universal). For the nineteenth-century mental scientist at Cambridge, the pressure was on to give a legitimately scientific formulation of mind and thought—one that was independent of any particular traditional metaphysical entailments that could be drawn from it.[52]

Terminological obscurities make an account of this period difficult, as we have seen, so we need to disambiguate some of its central expressions. The Cambridge mental/moral scientists were very exercised about the associationism of the empiricists (both classical and contemporary) and called them "psychologists," meaning "bad epistemologists," in that their theory of knowledge depended on their analysis of ideas and the association of these ideas in the mind.[53] Kant's examination of reason and attendant notions was read either metaphysically (when it was being embraced) or psychologically.[54] When the Cambridge mental scientists called Kant a "psychologist," they meant a *really* bad epistemologist, precisely on grounds that the Copernican insight did nothing much more than elevate the mind's own principles of organization into a justification of knowledge; one that ran egregiously—that is, subjectively—aground. But they also called him a *really* bad psychologist in their more modern sense, in that he wasn't even right on the mind's own principles of organization.[55]

---

[52] It didn't help that the conception of "reality" was itself subject to ambiguity: Bradley, for instance, took it as logical; Ward took it as that of common sense. This affected their accounts of psychology, of course.

[53] Ward (1886).

[54] See Chap. 1.

[55] Ward (1894); Stout (1896, vol. 1, 188–192).

Bradley fared little better in Cambridge[56]: for Bradley, "psychology" meant "logic" because "logic" meant "thought"; but both "logic" and "thought" meant "reality," and "reality" meant the Absolute, which was a universal, necessary, perhaps logical (in our sense) entity. All of this was derided by Ward as the worst psychology ever,[57] and dismissed by Stout (AP). In Chap. 1, I made the case for situating Bradley as a mental scientist, in order to underscore the way in which these disciplinary categories blended together just at this time, and also, it must be said, how they were beginning to come apart. It is instructive that Bradley took himself to be discussing what he calls "psychology," but this was neither the psychology of the classical empiricists nor that of the Cambridge mental scientists.[58]

Stout and Ward were happy to call themselves "psychologists" but not in the sense that they would attribute to Kant, Bradley, or any empiricist. Their "psychology," however, was also not "modern" psychology, which to them meant "physiological" psychology.[59] Theirs was an *empirical* psychology, like that of Brentano's, in that it proceeded by scientific method: analysis of the contents of mind via a set of systematic necessary and sufficient conditions. A "scientific" psychology did not necessarily mean empirical in the sense of physiological: Brentano's was empirical, and it was scientific, but it was not physiological. Thus, we can say that Stout and Ward were anti-psychologistic psychologists in a specifically (and short-lived) late nineteenth century sense: anti-subjective, systematically common sense taxonomers of consciousness, its properties, and its objects.

Stout's and Ward's understanding of psychology was one that took the realm of subjectivity as a proper concern of scientific enquiry but was employed to give an account of the features of subjectivity in *common* to all subjects.[60] Late 19th century Cambridge mental science was

---

[56] Except of course for McTaggart.

[57] I discuss their dispute in detail below.

[58] Bradley (1883, 1887a, b).

[59] Ward (1893).

[60] Moreover: the psychologist can make a distinction between, for instance, subject and object "which is not necessarily something the psychological subject can apprehend for himself "(Stout 1926, 28).

characterized by disciplinary attention to the distinction between the nature of subjectivity treated scientifically and as a source of objective knowledge about the mind. This was in significant contrast both to the associative and the synthesizing role of the thinking subject with respect to reality and truth in pre-nineteenth century epistemology and metaphysics.[61] The post-Kantian picture of reason and thought that hung over this period had been conceived to be that of a faculty of a higher order than the baser sensory faculties, deeply and fundamentally suited for the task of uncovering, via its superior nature, necessary universal truth. Ward instead was dedicated to the task of formulating the nature of consciousness so as to avoid obscure descriptions of the nature of the psychical as "processes, products, events, states, modes, affections, and so on … discussed in separation as the 'energies' or 'functions' of corresponding faculties" (1883a, 471). Moreover, and in contrast to the traditional submission of sensation or experience to the alleged transcendental, unifying, or synthesizing powers of reason, Ward's focus was the project of formulating the nature of experience.

Ward's 1886 précis of psychology was long considered the definitive up-to-date statement of the field in the British literature.[62] But Ward's *corpus* contains a number of additional significant contributions.[63] Ward carved out the purview of psychology as the study of the subject of an experience, strongly resisting any entailment to metaphysics in the form of either idealism or subjectivism. He also defended the project of "finding some truth in the naïve realism of common sense," consistent with a genuinely scientific perspective (1918, 29).[64] Ward took "scientific"

---

[61] Stout (1926, 32): "psychology no less than common sense and the physical sciences is bound to take account of the objective world. But it considers this world from a standpoint of its own."

[62] Ward (1886).

[63] Ward's (1886) had been preceded by a two-part introduction to the principles of psychology in 1883 (1883a, b; the third part is his 1887a) and was succeeded by a withering attack on physiological psychology (1893).

[64] Ward recycled his work frequently. For instance, his three-part *Mind* article, "Psychological Principles," which appeared across two issues in April and October 1883, and concluded in January 1887, was repurposed in his 1918 book of the same name with little to no change. His 1922 study of Kant is a useful source for his "psychological" reading of Kant; as Ward explained, it was a selection from notes that he had intended for more systematic treatment. We can presume that some of those notes were those for his lectures in Metaphysics, Psychology and History of Philosophy. Moreover, Griffin (1991, 36–42) has suggested that Russell got *his* psychological reading of Kant

psychology to be the formulation of a clear, distinct, orderly, and complete account of the facts and relations of experience (1883a, 154–5, b, 471); the "standpoint" of psychology was the concrete experience of the individual subject (1918, 27).

Provocatively, Ward claimed that its standpoint was Berkeleyan: *esse* is *percipi* for the psychologist (1918, 27). Ward conceded that this standpoint may appear "rash these days" to defend.[65] Resistance to it, according to Ward, was only due to the conflation of psychology with epistemology—that is, with the assumption that all psychological approaches yield nothing but subjectivity. Instead, Ward argued, the mental scientist must walk a fine line between the demands of his science *qua* science and any specifically philosophical consequences that may impinge. The standpoint of psychology may be individualistic, but it is not bound to any particular methodology (like introspection); and the psychologist is in particular "not bound to accept philosophical conclusions that may have been reached from it" (1883a, 162–4). Although philosophy and psychology were closely connected, "philosophers, as such, made bad psychologists; and … mere psychologists, bad philosophers" (1918, 153). This, Ward claimed, was particularly notable in the philosophy of the classical empiricists, inherited by Kant, and promulgated again in the empiricist views of the nineteenth century. This theory of knowledge—what was known as the "psychology" (read: epistemology) of that time—made (at least) two mistakes: (1) it conflated the demands of objectivity (genuine knowledge) and subjectivity (the process of knowing), while at the same time (2) it upheld a contradictory distinction between what Ward called "internal" and "external" experience.

These errors are avoided in the individualistic "standpoint" of psychology. The confusion, as formulated by Ward, was a clear example of his reading his predecessors like an up-to-date mental scientist. The picture of mind inherited from the classical empiricists as passive at the level of sensations or impressions (the sensible intuition, for Kant), but active at

---

from Ward. There is little to no change between Ward's formulations of Kant's views in his 1883a and b, 1887a, and 1922. Using the later iterations to reconstruct and explicate his views of the 1880s and 90s does not therefore risk historical distortion.

[65] Stout, in his account of Ward's psychology, hastened to add that "Ward does not mean to say [by this] that the esse of *things* is percipi" (Stout 1926).

the level of thought (or the relation of ideas), leads to ambiguity, according to Ward, in terms like "idea" or "presentation" and "experience."[66] Ward saw his predecessors using the term "experience" in two senses: that is, failing "steadily to distinguish between the psychologically and the epistemologically objective" (1922, 52). Too much preoccupation with "epistemologically objective" presentations which are "common property" to all experients (like the green colour of a meadow), is misleading; it risks taking what Ward called "objective presentations that are private property" (or sensations) as *subjective* (1922, 52–3). This gives rise to an incoherent distinction between what Ward called "internal" and "external" experience (Ward 1883a, 158, 1893, 59).[67] The problem involved regarding "presentations" or "ideas" as merely "subjective modifications."[68] This rendered them as isolated; and "all the hopeless difficulties of subjective idealism" are the result. Instead, he argued, "subjective modifications" are only one constituent of individual experience—the other is what he calls the 'objective continuum,' to which the subjective modifications are always correlative" (1883b, 157–8). A proper psychology thus cannot take experience to be wholly subjective; which would in any case render "subjective" meaningless.[69]

---

[66] To say nothing of associationism: "… we cannot help asking how presentations, supposed to be originally distinct and isolated, became eventually linked together … do objects really stick or fuse together when they are simultaneously presented often enough and at the requisite intensity?" (Ward (1883b, 478)). Ward took Bradley's psychology to be particularly heinous in that it paid mere lip service to anti-associationism yet embraced a version of associationism all the same (Ward 1894).

[67] This distinction was formulated by Ward as that between "internal" meaning presented in the subjective sense and "external" meaning "not presented" or corporeal (for us this may sound confusing because we do not take so-called secondary (perceptual) properties as corporeal the way that the classical empiricists did). This distinction led to epistemological trouble, as he pointed out. For the psychologist, *all* mental states were composed of presentations; the only issue is whether or not this committed the psychologist to any form of idealism. Ward denied that it did.

[68] We have noted that the term "presentation" was ambiguous. Ward championed using the word to cover both perceptual presentations *and* ideas (Baldwin 1901–03, 333), which were themselves sometimes called "representations"; and defended the view that all mental states are intentional, in some sense (like Brentano).

[69] The longstanding conflation between psychology and epistemology; psychology and logic; and epistemology and logic, is the result of this misapprehension, according to Ward (1918, 29), who thus succinctly sums up the nature of the *Psychologismusstreit* in the intellectual atmosphere at this time.

Ward's formulation of experience was thus not subjective in any traditional sense: the subject was "not the only factor implicated when we occupy the subjective standpoint" (1883a, 157–8). Instead, it was explicitly a relational one: to experience is to be aware, and "to be aware of" expresses a relation to that of which we are aware. For Ward, psychological statements must take the form: "the subject has such and such presentations, feels thus and thus, acts in this or that way" (1883a, 157–8). This was what Ward called the "double correspondence" between the psychological subject and the "continuously changing objective continuum," whose formulation allows the mental scientist to do two things: (1) "see still more clearly the error of regarding individual experience as wholly subjective"; (2) "helps us to find some measure of truth in the naïve realism of Common Sense" (1918, 29). Psychology was meant to "deal with the whole" of experience, and this cannot be achieved by hypostatizing some (alleged) state of self-consciousness that arises involuntarily in perception and observation.[70] Ward's position was that "what knows [or is conscious] can no more be identical with what is known [or is conscious] than a weight with what it weighs" (1883b, 468). The traditional "psychologists" (the classical epistemologists) erred by taking it as obvious that ideas or presentations are (somehow) their objects when instead (at best) ideas are *of* their objects (1883a, 158). For Ward, to be an object was to be *presented to* a subject—but this did not entail that objects are subjective. Ward's formulation of experience thus ruled out (1) a series of feelings/mental phenomena alone; and (2) the subject of the feelings/phenomena *for whom they are* feelings/phenomena; and defends instead (3) the subject and the series *together*, "the two being in that relation to each other in which … one is subject and the other … objects."[71]

---

[70] Ward firmly dismissed the Kantian and post-Kantian problem of how to account for knowledge of the subject ("since in becoming known, it must become an object and so cease to be a pure subject"), thereby also dismissing the role of Kant's transcendental Ego or the unity of apperception. Ward took the alleged problem to arise in a fundamentally mistaken picture of the mind propagated by a faulty psychology, which arose from Kant's mistaken notion that the soul was a substance with modes; and solved it by giving a more scientific formulation of "conscious subject." Ward predictably also denied any identity between the psychological conception of self or subject and the metaphysical conception of the soul (1883b, 470).

[71] A relation that he suggests be "represented graphically" as "SPO" or "OPS"; that is, "subject perceives object" or "object is perceived by subject" (1883b, 468–70).

Ward did not limit his attacks to the bad psychology of his departed predecessors, however. Between 1883 and 1888, he engaged forcefully (through many successive issues of *Mind*) with Bradley and Bain—Britain's foremost idealist and associationist, respectively—in order to criticise the confusions pervasive in what he took to be their improper understanding and formulation of psychological concepts and terminology.[72] This material is instructive for the reconstruction of Ward's influence on Moore: I think we can link Moore's 1898 repudiation of Bradley to Ward's "psychologizing"[73] reading of his predecessors and contemporaries.

We noted above that Ward defined "presentation" relationally: presentation*s* are objects,[74] and the relation of objects to subjects is presentation.[75] A presentation bears a relation to the subject and to other presentations. As presented, a presentation can be called an "object," or "psychical object." Ward wanted to replace the "old bi-partite" psychological distinction between sensation and thought, and even the tripartite then-contemporary understanding of cognition, feeling, and

---

[72] The dispute became increasingly vituperative as it went on and ended in a permanent estrangement between Bradley and Ward.

[73] Murray (1937, 182–3) called Ward's study of Kant one "where he psychologizes from beginning to end" rendering it thus "philosophically useless." Murray is typical of the idealist interpreters of Kant, taking a line on Kant's behalf against Ward that we will see later reappear in Caird's hostile attitude towards Moore's Kant criticism. Murray contended that Ward "ignores the transcending and universal power of mind" and that he did not give Kant the more charitable (i.e. idealist) reading which would entail that "the individual mind can by studying itself and allowing its power of transcendence of the immediate and the particular some play, lay open hidden depths in which it discovers itself." Murray, however, conceded that "even if Kant uses anthropomorphic (read: psychological) expressions and occasionally reveals the undeniable anthropomorphic factors involved in any understanding of experience … the most that can be said of Kant at this point … is that he occasionally talked psychology when he ought to have talked philosophy" and that "Ward curtailed the mind to so great an extent that he created for himself the continual danger of slipping back into a 'philosophy of the sciences'" (186). Murray (and Caird) seem to have been slow to see the accelerating shift of perspective of this period.

[74] Ward was willing to make the distinction he took to be fundamental in terms of "the old scholastic distinction" of *esse reale* (how the psychologist conceives of the subject as something that lives, thinks, feels, and acts); and *esse intentionale* (the object of the thinking, feeling and acting).

[75] Stout formulated 'object' on Ward's behalf as follows: "Ward means by object what common sense does … but the object has two aspects: (1) real and really distinct from the self; but in order to be an object it must (2) appear or be presented to a knowing, willing and feeling subject (1926, 20–55). Moreover, Ward's "'presentation' comprises sensations, movements, percepts, images, intuitions, concepts, notions: they can be attended to and variously combined together."

conation, and had proposed instead a distinction between "subject as acting [attention] and feeling; and the objects [presentations] of this activity." "Attention" or "attending" thus is Ward's foundational taxonomical category of mind (1887a, 570). However it is formulated (Ward proposed "thought," "sentience," or "consciousness"), what is fundamental is that it is distinct from its objects, the presentations attended to.[76] Bradley rejected this conception, countering with his own analysis of "activity"; a view that Ward described as "so far from clear to me that I am driven to suspect some clerical error" (1887a, 37–8).

"Activity" was for Bradley metaphysically incoherent precisely with respect to what Ward took as foundational: that in attention the conscious subject actively attended to the objects of its consciousness. Bradley formulated the nature of "activity" instead as "an alteration of A not taken as belonging to anything outside, but a change of something beyond A which realizes something in which A was ideal" (1887b, 371). From this, Bradley extracted a negative formulation of specifically psychical activity—namely, according to Ward, the "old aimless content" that psychical activity cannot begin in reflection. The dispute here concerned the problem, as the idealists saw it (and before them, Kant), in characterizing "pure" subjectivity from a psychological or epistemological point of view. Pure subjectivity cannot be known, for in being known, it becomes an object; a situation fundamentally one of contradiction (or antinomy). Ward, however, was not impressed in the least with this issue, quite forcefully defending consciousness as ultimately relational. For Bradley, by contrast, the fundamental psychical state was that of "feeling" or "immediate experience," for Bradley the most wide-ranging expression for psychical life. "Feeling" is a basic, pre-conceptual state in which reality is given or encountered and is *prior* to a distinction between self and not-self; knowing and being in one (PL, 44–46). Feeling is non-relational in character; conceived as an undifferentiated unity. Bradley expressly denied that "what is given is necessarily given as an object for a subject."[77] In this, we see a recognizable Bradleyan trifecta: the understanding of

---

[76] Ward (1918).

[77] Bradley (1887). In AR, Bradley resolutely claims that he "repudiates separation of feeling from felt; desired from desire; what is thought from thinking" (129).

relations as internal;[78] the concept of reality as an undifferentiated whole; the concept of reality as fully realized (and thus intelligible).[79] All relations—including, with respect specifically to those involved in psychical activity, the psychological subject and its putative objects of judgment and will—were, for Bradley, unintelligible independent of a whole that "embraces" them. At best, this whole "consents to wear the form of a relation" (AR, 19). But genuine relata are not independent; one relatum is not separable from the being of another one (AR, 18). Without the unity into which these putative relata fit, they are unintelligible *as* relata, according to Bradley.

Ward's harshest criticism of Bradley was (unsurprisingly) that he was too apt to assume and import a metaphysics into his psychology which flew in the face of solid empirical and scientific evidence.[80] A main line of Ward's attack on Bradley was that no speculative conception of an intelligible logical unity was supported by the empirical psychological evidence, partly because, as Ward pointed out, "intelligibility" was not a scientific concept.[81] Ward also excoriated, as an example of appalling psychology (in his sense), Bradley's supposition of an individual mind itself alone capable of the kind of effort of synthesis by which it could transcend the realm of appearance (particulars) in an act of unifying intelligibility. For Ward, it was not open to the true mental scientist to simply assume that the alleged contradictions of a discrete chaotic plurality of the empirical could be speculatively resolved by an immersive Absolute.[82] Ward fundamentally rejected both the notion that a synthesis of experience will reveal the nonrelative and unconditional nature of Absolute reality and that the experiences we do have implies this. Ward's objection, based in his own account of experience, was that relative implies correlative; and unconditional its condition (1887a)—there is no such state as mere experience. Bradley's adoption of "feeling" as the taxonomical basis

---

[78] Or holistic. There is a dispute (Candlish 2007).

[79] Our only point of contact with reality, according to Bradley, is not real or consistent, but subject to what he claimed was internal incoherence.

[80] Ward (1887b).

[81] Our advancing scientific knowledge, he claimed, shows no sign of reducing thought or reality to mere adjectival properties of the Absolute (Murray, 27)

[82] In his later metaphysics, Ward favoured a panpsychic monadism (1911). See Griffin (1991, 36–42).

of psychology was vague, at best. Experience is always experience *of*: it is a relation.

Ward was particularly severe on Bradley on "phenomena" and "relations," calling his procedure "slovenly and confusing" (1887b, 565) and his views "much like bleeding yourself to death to guard against blood-poisoning" (1887b, 564). "Presentationism,"[83] as Ward called Bradley's view, implied no relation of a presentation to a subject, but formulated a presentation as "that which is simply and comes as it is." Ward found this incoherent: a presentation is a presentation *to* a subject or for a subject, and it is only intelligible as a presentation *of* its object; whereas Bradley went so far as to deny that there is a subject of an experience. There was for him no self or subject (the thing that experiences) except where there is and as long as there is self-consciousness. But then this commits Bradley to a relation—that of self as knowing to self as known, which Ward found confounding, on Bradley's own views.

In his review of Bradley's AR (Ward 1894), Ward was particularly dismissive of Bradley's tendency to beg psychological questions with respect to the truth of anything he claimed for experience and reality. Since experience was a conception "quite outside the purview of formal logic," how could Bradley take his statement that reality is experience to be "absolutely and unconditionally true?" (1894, 113). Ward here circles back to an earlier criticism: that Bradley was misled by the ambiguity and vagueness of his terms ("reality and experience are treacherous words" (1894, 114)), and in effect, helped himself to incoherent conceptions of psychological terms in order to prop up his metaphysics. Ward argued that these conceptions ran aground almost immediately. He noted that in Bradley's chapter concerning the Absolute and its appearances, "all the leading phases of psychical life and their mutual implications are … fully discussed," leading the reader to "expect that he is going to be shown how finite experience is related to the absolute experience" (1894, 116). But Bradley's foundational notion of "feeling," and in particular, its bearing on the Absolute, seemed to Ward to defy coherence: how it is that this

---

[83] Ward did defend a conception of what he calls presentationism, but he distinguished it from Bradley's (Baldwin 1901–03 (vol. 1, 188)).

"indiscriminate totality, inconsistent and unstable" is one with the Absolute is "past my comprehension," since it suggests nothing but "continuous change" (1894, 116). Moreover, Ward wondered, how can the Absolute be "perfect, harmonious and complete" when "every constituent is not only partial but defective?" According to Bradley, the unity of the Absolute is "unintelligible" from the psychical side—but then, Ward asks, how is it possible that "the unity of feeling" is our avenue to "gain the knowledge of a unity which transcends and yet contains every manifold appearance" (1894, 117). Finally—and most fatal, according to Ward—Bradley did not fully appreciate that unity and identity are *relations*. "On the whole," he concludes, "the reader of this book must expect to have some trouble in finding a clear or coherent view as to the mutual relations of the universe and the Absolute, finite spirits, and phenomena" (1894, 122).

I argued in Chap. 1 that an important way to understand Bradley as part of the cluster of influences on Moore was to view his contributions as complements to the mental science flourishing at this time. Bradley, Stout, and Ward were all at least in principle united in their rejection of the associationism of empiricism, classical and contemporary, which had its source in the conflation of psychology and epistemology so ridiculed by Ward.[84] Ward's criticism of Bradley's metaphysics, however, was motivated by his refusal to accept Bradley's formulations of the scientifically defined concepts in the new psychology. In this, however, Ward took Bradley on as a genuine combatant on the formulation and understanding of psychology *and* metaphysics. There is every reason to think that Ward's "psychologizing" reading of Bradley was the foundation for Moore's own.

---

[84] Bradley's anti-associationism did not entirely pass muster with Ward. Ward's student Dawes-Hicks noted that "Ward's breach with associationism or 'presentationism' was more complete than Bradley's turned out to be" (1925, 283). Bradley was certainly anti-atomistic, criticizing the classical empiricists for attempting to construct an epistemology from isolated atoms of sense experience. But he was not entirely anti-associationist, according to Ward, relying on a mysterious process to "unify" the "felt mass."

5   Interlude: Moore, Russell, and the Moral Sciences Tripos Part II Examination

Before turning to Moore's exposure to Lotze—his essays for Ward are the only undergraduate materials that survive of his work for Ward—I want to pause here to comment on an important part of this story that has so far been left unexamined in extensive detail. Both Russell and Moore pursued the same course of study for the Moral Sciences Part II Tripos, with the same teachers. Griffin's account of Russell at Cambridge gives Ward very great weight among Russell's influences and less to Stout (Griffin 1991). Griffin does claim that Stout's own views "did not intrude into his lectures in the history of philosophy," which may have left Russell's impression of him as a Hegelian "uncorrected" (Griffin 1991, 40).[85] I argued above that Stout's views *did* indeed intrude in his lectures, were not particularly Hegelian, and were significantly influential on Moore. But as to Ward, I think Griffin provides support for my own view here in his own account of the impact of Ward's psychology on Russell.

No notebooks of Ward's Metaphysics lectures survive in the Moore papers, but we can surmise that Moore's own work for Ward will have proceeded along similar lines as Russell's. There are four essays of Russell's that survive for Ward's Metaphysics course (CPBR 1, essays 18, 19, 22, 29).[86] Russell wrote on a variety of questions, including "On the Distinction between the Psychological and Metaphysical Points of View."

---

[85] Six of Russell essays for Stout's history of philosophy course are published (CPBR 1, essays 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28). There is also an Apostolic essay titled "Is Ethics a Branch of Empirical Psychology?" (CPBR 1, essay 15). The two subsequent Apostles papers touched on elements of ethics and on Moore's views in particular; essay 17 may have annoyed Moore (see Griffin (1991), Levy (1979), Preti (2008a; OHBR)).

[86] One puzzle: there is a notebook in the Russell archives with a section labelled 'Ward's History of Philosophy Lent 1894'. But it is not clear that Ward did lecture on History of Philosophy in Lent term 1894 (Cambridge University Reporter, 1894). His lectures in Lent term 1894 were continuations of his Michelmas 1893 term lectures in Metaphysics and in Psychology. It is possible that Ward gave lectures to students at Trinity alone rather than university lectures, and that Russell attended the Trinity ones. They might also have been private; or perhaps he decided to lecture at the last minute, which would have been too late for the announcement in the CUR. What makes that supposition unlikely, however, is that *Stout* was lecturing on History of Philosophy in Lent 1894 (thus making a second set of university lectures on the same topic unnecessary). Ward did give a set of university lectures in Easter term 1893 titled 'History of Philosophy: revision' (CUR 1893).

Griffin notes that this essay shows Russell distinguishing between mental states (the province of psychology) and their "meaning" or "objective reference" and includes a criticism of subjective idealism for claiming that mental states are known more directly than their objective references.[87] In addition, according to Griffin, the influence of Kant was a "prominent feature" of the essays that Russell wrote for Ward (Griffin 1991, 43). Three elements were treated in particular: the problem of the external world; an account of change; and an account of causality. All of these in fact feature not only in Moore's own notes from Ward's metaphysics lectures, but also in his dissertations, as we will see in Chap. 4.[88]

What could use some explanation is how the influence of Moore's teachers sparked in him, but not in Russell, the new direction in the formulation of the nature of judgment. I will discuss this in detail in Chap. 4, but for now, we can sketch an answer in these terms: it may not be so surprising, given the entrenched disparagement in Cambridge towards continental advances in mathematics. Russell's 1894 Fellowship dissertation, on the metaphysical basis of geometry, sat squarely in the Kantian/

---

[87] Griffin does argue that "Russell was inclined to modify Ward's basic position by the incorporation of elements derived from Bradley" (1991, 42) which might also stand in for an account of Moore, at least on the face of it.

[88] Griffin also has claimed, with respect to McTaggart, that his influence on Russell was more tenuous than Russell made it seem in recollection (1991, 50). The very same thing could be said of Moore. I think the reason for this is that McTaggart was a lively Apostle and the youngest moral science lecturer (he was still a Fellow when Russell and Moore began at Cambridge). Both Moore and Russell seem to have revelled in McTaggart's version of Bradley and Hegel at Apostles meetings, something confirmed by Moore (1942, 18–9), who says that of his teachers he got the most of out of McTaggart "partly due to the fact that I saw a good deal more of him outside the lecture room." When both, in recollection, said they were very much influenced by McTaggart, they were referring to the context in which they were exposed to it (the Apostles) rather than any great commitment to the actual particulars of his views. Some of this is evident in the contemporaneous remarks that survive, which fill in some important detail. In a letter to his wife Alys (24 Feb. 1894 (Griffin 1992, 61)), Russell wrote mischievously that in a discussion at the latest Apostles meeting, "McTaggart ran his Absolute, as usual, and we protested it was useless … the odd thing about the Absolute is that it always goes against the *Chronicle* …. Also that when anybody else uses it, McTaggart says it can't be used." Moore was never particularly convinced by, say, McTaggart's position on the unreality of time (Moore (1942, 14; Preti (2008a, b)). Moore stated that once he'd finished reading Hegel with McTaggart for his Part II Tripos, he "never thought it worthwhile to read him again" (Moore 1942, 19). What Moore does say is that McTaggart's "consistent emphasis on clearness—on trying to give a precise meaning to philosophical expressions" was what chiefly influenced him (1942, 18). Moore did comment and review McTaggart's work (Moore 1901, 1902, 1903), and celebrated him (1942, 18–9) for "how clear he was, as compared to the majority of philosophers! And what immense pains he took to get clear, even though he did not always succeed!"

idealist tradition of accounting for the synthetic *a priori* from the 'Copernican" perspective of "a priori," and his 1895 "Tiergarten" programme—a *dialectical* account of the sciences with which Russell grappled for some time—did not easily stretch to fit a perspective from the developing mental science.[89] Moore, who did not have those programmatic burdens, was in a better position to get to his revolutionary blend of logic, metaphysics, and the nature of judgment with the completion of his Tripos Part II, as we will see.

We know that Moore read Ward's *Psychology* (Moore (1942, 16)) and attended his Metaphysics lectures. We can't be sure that Moore did *not* attend Ward's lectures in psychology, which were given in the academic year 1894–1895, although no notebooks or similar material survives of these lectures. What we do have is a set of essays Moore wrote for Ward on Lotze.[90] We turn to a brief examination of this material below.

6   Moore's Essays for Ward on Lotze

What survives of Moore's essays is a set of summary expositions of a series of chapters in Lotze's *Metaphysics*, along with his own parenthetical queries, sometimes answered by Ward in the margins. In all, Moore seems to have covered (at least) the Introduction (including "In What Sense the Essence of Things is Unknowable" and "Idea of Law and Plan: Metaphysics Must Start From the Former"); Ontology, Book 1: Chap. I (Definition of Reality); IV (Becoming and Change); V (Of the Nature of Physical Action); VI (The Unity of Things); and VII (Conclusion). Only a summary of Moore's work on the first chapter of Cosmology (Book II) survives. Lotze's metaphysics, as we have discussed, was in part a criticism of the German tradition before him: of Hegel's conception of idealism (that Thought is identical to Reality) and Kant's metaphysics (which Lotze

---

[89] Griffin (1991, 79–85).

[90] Moore also attended McTaggart's lectures on Leibniz and Lotze in 1898 (Add Ms. 8875 10/3/2 and 10/3/3), and Lotze also featured in Stout's History of Philosophy lectures. McTaggart's Lotze lectures featured (as noted by Moore) were mostly an exposition of Lotze's views on Psychology (the emphasis was on unity); God, and Religion. Moore's notebook is mostly dedicated to a draft of a paper on Hume, so it is difficult to tell how many of McTaggart's Lotze lectures he attended.

took as derived from psychological processes and thus destined to fail). Lotze's own general project was that of reconciling the essential elements significant to human life: science, religion, reason, feeling, knowledge, and value. As we have discussed, his views grappled with the then-developing pressure from empirical science on metaphysics. The growing embrace of distinction between contemporary scientific mechanistic views of nature and purposeful or teleological accounts of the nature of reality was for Lotze a distinction in need of fusion. Like Herbart and other transitional figures on the cusp of nineteenth century naturalistic progress, Lotze's specifically philosophical project was to give an account of how the essential intelligibility of reality could be compatible with its scientific nature.

One puzzle concerned causation. The initial problem had been bequeathed by Kant, who directly linked his account of the nature and status of metaphysics and the synthetic *a priori* to the Humean formulation of causation.[91] Causality, accounted for naturalistically, threatened an unacceptable determinism. Kant thus argued that causation was a(nother)category of the understanding: an *a priori* condition of our own thought, imposed on experience as a condition for its possibility; and for the possibility of our knowledge (limited, in any case, to the phenomenal). Causation also played a fundamental role in Kant's conception of freedom of the will, since determinism is incompatible with a genuinely free will (which Kant took as non-negotiable). Free will was thus conceived by Kant as a free cause. Kant deployed his distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal to reconcile the seeming contradiction in this conception: our freedom is captured in the condition for the possibility of there being moral obligations we make to ourselves. Kant concluded thus that there is an aspect of human will that is *transcendentally* free. At the same time, however, the *effects* of this transcendental will are (inevitably) causal; they take place in our minds and in our actions, ordinary naturalistic denizens of temporal and spatial phenomenal reality. Kant's account of freedom thus claims that human will is *transcendentally free* but *naturalistically causal*. There is no contradiction, so long as we

---

[91] See the discussion in, among others, Allison (1990).

respect the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal.[92] Moore, as we will see, found Kant's formulation of "freedom" nearly incoherent, and it became an important touchstone in his criticism of Kant's transcendentalism (see Chap. 4). An important aspect of his criticism was forged in his exposure to Lotze, via his teachers.

Causation and inference were linked in the nineteenth century mind with respect to the nature of knowledge, particularly with respect to the nature of our knowledge understood as a conduit to the nature of reality. For Lotze, reason ("Grunde") is formulated as what gives grounds for, or conditions for, phenomena (in Kantian terms). Reasons or grounds were also taken to share some essential structure with causes, so as to link knowledge of the phenomenal world with the noumenal, as its ground. For the mid-nineteenth century metaphysician—and the monistic idealist in particular—the underlying problem was the nature of change. Bradley, for one, considered this to be the essential metaphysical puzzle: "How anything can possibly be anything else is the question" because it "points back to the dilemma of the one and the many, the differences and the identity, the adjectives and the thing, the qualities and the relations" (AR, 45). For Bradley, the concept of causation "was the attempt to account rationally for change" (AR, 55), which in any case was bound to fail, given the intrinsic contradictory nature of the world of appearance.

For Lotze, as for Bradley, the problem began in the metaphysical requirement that reality be intelligible. Lotze framed the puzzle by asking "what process it is in the thing that in reality compels the conditioned to issue from that which conditions it, as necessarily as in our thought" (1887b §42); "The explanation of any effect would require us, besides assigning the causes, to show the reason which entitles the causes to be causes of just this effect and no other" (1887b, §51). The problem is that *in that* reality is intelligible (logical, universal, necessary), and in that it is a whole, then it must conform to conditions that supply its ground or justification. This makes change (or "becoming") a problem for the intelligibility of a unified reality (or one that is characterized by, in Bradley's

---

[92] See Chap. 3 for more detailed discussion, in Sidgwick's criticism of Kant.

familiar account, internal relations).[93] For the nineteenth century monist, in particular, since everything in the world was directly or indirectly related to everything else, the world was to a large degree a logically intelligible whole. But there was also at this period no denying that causation could be accounted for naturalistically, with all the (to the metaphysician) negative consequences of determinism. Causation ("all those real things of which the connexion with each other … leads to the occurrence of facts that were not previously present") was thus palpably in need of a philosophical account, because "only thus could it become intelligible that effects, which in a world of ideas are consequences that follow eternally from their premises … should … sometimes occur, sometimes not" (1887b, §95). One approach was to make the connection between cause and effect that of logical ground and consequent. On this sort of view, causation itself was held to show that different things essentially (somehow) belong together, or are a part of a greater encompassing whole, since otherwise no event could imply another.[94] Intelligibility is the key: for Lotze, "the 'reason' … is neither a thing nor a single fact but the complex of all relations obtaining between things and their natures; relations from which the character of the … effect is deducible as a logically necessary consequence" (1887b, §96). Moore's criticism of Kant on Kant's concept of "free cause" was instrumental in what became his wider criticism of Kant's transcendental psychology (and of Kant's transcendentalism in general), in particular with respect to the putative *causal* properties of ethical judgment, as we will see in Chaps. 3 and 4. The seeds of this, I believe, can be linked to Moore's exposure to Lotze and to Bradley on causation.[95]

---

[93] Ewing (1934, 134) has explained it this way: "all relations have to be regarded as following logically from their terms or from a whole in which their terms were included. Which seems to assume that the connection of different things and different events is capable of a rational explanation deducible a priori from their nature."

[94] Ewing (1934, 136) underscored the centrality of the issue for the mid-nineteenth century idealists, stating that differing views on the formulation of causation spawned the disputes between monism and pluralism and internal vs. external views of relations. See Candlish (2007) for an account of how Russell and Bradley fought this out between 1900 and 1924.

[95] What survive of Moore's essays on Lotze's *Metaphysics* for Ward are catalogued as Add. Ms. 8875 11/2/8–14 and cover the Introduction and Book I (Chaps. I, IV, V, VI VII) and Book II (Chap. I). Moore's remarks are presented in numbered sections indexed to Lotze's: this one appears as §62.

Moore's essays show him grappling with such fundamentals of these sorts of formulations of metaphysical issues: "questions of the origin and nature of reality"; "being apart from relations meaningless"; and, importantly, the nature of the interconnections between becoming, change, causation, and consequence, and effect.[96] Moore noted (§42): "it is with cause and effect as with our thoughts of reason and consequence. There must be something, besides the Things which we recognize as causes to produce the effect; just as in our thoughts, though the consequence is implicit in the reason, yet our deduction of it in any instance depends upon our temporary psychological state." On Lotze's view, as Moore summarized it, "transparent" action—the "interconnection of one series of states with another"—is unexplained: "transparent" action "brings out the difference between logic and reality—between reason and cause. The difficulty is "how the reality of the reason brings about the reality of the effect."[97] Moore's question was: "What is the distinction which Lotze draws between the connexion of consequent with the antecedent, and of cause with effect?"[98] The precursor to this was Herbart: "causes are to be understood as real things, particular relations of which are the logical 'reason' for particular effects. For the production of any effect, therefore, we must have particular 'causes' in particular relations to one another; and these relations must not only be such, as are always the same … but must include a variable relation, C … which may or may not be regarded as part of the 'reason' of the effect."[99] This "variable relation," as Moore noted, was what Lotze took as a central question of metaphysics, which is to "determine the nature of C" (§54); or "how the reality of the reason brings about the reality of the effect" (§62). The alternative to not

---

Kant on space, contrast with Lotze's own view of space, is the subject of Moore's numbered sections 99–117.

[96] Bradley (PL, Book III), stated that "the conclusion [of an inference] comes because of the process" [italics Bradley's]. It is not natural to the contemporary eye, however, how this attempt at reconciliation between reasons and causes can end up as anything but a conflation, at least on the face of it.

[97] Add. Ms. 8875 11/2/8–14, §62.

[98] §69.

[99] §51.

accounting for the parallel nature of reasons and causes, as Lotze sees it, and as Moore notes, is to accept a complete determinism (§68). Moore, however, did not seem convinced by Lotze's position, which he summarized as (§82): "Things are real, insofar as they stand in relation to other things; and to stand in relation means merely to act upon and be acted upon by, the term 'relation' merely denoting the mental act by which the interaction compels us to connect things … everything is constantly in relation to every other thing, in virtue of the immanence of all in the universe." Moore's question on this passage reads: "Does this not rather neglect the really difficult question of the particular relation between two things, which is necessary for the production of any particular effect? If two things formerly indifferent to one another can never come into relation, i.e. act upon one another, what is the condition in which two things which have been acting upon one another in one way begin to act in a different way?"

7   Moore's Notes on Stout's Lectures on Lotze

Moore's notes on Stout's lectures on Lotze are more exegetical than critical, but they help to support the case that his exposure to Lotze's thought via his teachers was comprehensive.[100] As Moore noted, Stout took the problem of Lotze's metaphysics to explain "how thought depends on matter thought of." We saw in Chap. 1 that Lotze's concept of validity was at the core of his influence on the late nineteenth century thinkers, and this comes in for direct discussion by Stout. The key question is "what is real and what is validity"; Lotze's metaphysics "has to answer what is the general system of postulates concerning the real which makes knowledge possible." Moreover, since "we postulate an inner connection of things not directly given by perception," the question that stands out is "how the postulates have validity and of what kind." According to

---

[100]Add. Ms. 8875 10/1/1.

Stout, Lotze's logic (his traditional formulation of concept and of judgment) starts with a Platonic contrast between *ideal* and *real*, such that an "idea" is produced "whenever a modification of consciousness becomes significant of an object"; importantly, "its significance is not so much that it is a universal as that it is distinguished as a content with a meaning of its own from a mere experienced affection." Moreover, "every content of thought has by the nature of thought this abiding self-identity" and its reality consists "not [in] particular existence, nor merely psychical existence, but only validity." Thought-contents are "our way of apprehending reality: they are the tool which fits both us and reality." Stout emphasized that Lotze's method was not that of the post-Kantian idealists ("who put the mind at center"), but closer to that of Kant's "enquiry and questioning of the presuppositions of human knowledge." Lotze (according to Stout) followed his predecessor Herbart by analysing and correcting ordinary concepts: the main divisions of his analysis, according to Stout, were (1) existence, becoming, and interaction; (2) the mode of "orderly union" between real elements; (3) the "relation of objective world to world of mind." This last division shows Stout covering the same ground as Ward does, noting that according to Lotze, "there must be a permanent law of combination, 'Idea'"; and that the "real difficulty is that a law seems rather a truth than a thing which can act." Space and time are difficult: space, because it forces us to consider how "unity in multiplicity generally can be realized"; and time, in that, unlike space, "which is obviously subjective," "enters into the inner states of real existence." Ultimately, "ontology has shewn one being of which all separate beings are only modes" which "alone explains causal relations." " The 'Idea' … states the uniformity in things and therefore points to the ground or reason, which accounts for the reality of the thing." Stout however was unrepentantly critical of this: "He [Lotze] confuses [the] way in which we are led to think of things from [the] way in which they must exist, from his anxiety to distinguish real relations from space and time." In a happy historical parallel, however, Stout ended his last lecture on Lotze with a phrase that not too long afterwards was applied to his student G. E. Moore: "He very properly destroyed the Hegelianism of his time."

8   McTaggart

I will close this chapter with a brief examination of McTaggart's contribution to Moore's philosophical development. McTaggart was at the beginning of his career at Trinity when Moore and Russell were students. He had been elected as Prize Fellow at Trinity in 1891, and the book that he produced from his Fellowship dissertation (McTaggart 1896) was about to appear. At the end of his Fellowship, in 1897, he was appointed as lecturer in Moral Sciences at Trinity. Geach (1995, 568) noted that while Hegel did "exercise a fascination" on McTaggart, he was dismissive of the social and political aspects of Hegel's philosophy and took Hegel's Philosophy of Nature to be "rot." Geach however was not optimistic about McTaggart's textual knowledge of Hegel: "As a guide to Hegel's meaning he is hardly more reliable than a Jehovah's Witness as a guide to Scriptural teaching" (1995, 568) something that Moore echoed in his (1942, 19): "I think most Hegelian scholars would agree that many of the comparatively clear doctrines which he attributed to Hegel were very unlike anything which Hegel could possibly have meant." McTaggart was in this way quite out of alignment with the other British Hegelians of the day—they, according to Geach, were more likely to focus on the social and political philosophy, whereas, at least early on, McTaggart's primary interest was Hegel's Logic (Geach 1995, 568), which amounted to a construction of reality, distinct from experiential appearances, and based on human reason. McTaggart's early scholarship focused on the complexities of the Categories of Hegel's logical system,[101] the dialectical method, and the unreality of time. His *magnum opus The Nature of Existence* was incomplete at his death (only the first volume had appeared in 1921).[102]

---

[101] Although according to Geach (1995, 569) he was forced to abandon making sense of it when it in effect collapsed under its own weight.

[102] The second volume appeared in 1927, edited by C.D. Broad. As Geach (1995) and Dickinson (1931) both note, McTaggart was known to be powerfully influenced by mysticism (but an unrepentant atheist), and also dedicated to the teaching of philosophy to non-philosophers. His intellectual penchant for clarity and "non-woolliness" made the biggest impression on the young Moore and was at the foundation of the influence McTaggart had on him (Moore (1942, 18–9). Possibly McTaggart's commitment to love between souls being the highest good may have been the springboard for Moore's own mature view in PE.

As he noted in his recollections, Moore attended McTaggart's lectures in 1895–1896 on the Philosophy of Hegel. This was the special subject in the Moral Sciences Tripos Part II in 1896 for which Moore ultimately received special distinction. The surviving archival material includes Moore's notebook from McTaggart's Hegel lectures (Add. Ms. 8875 10/3/1), an essay titled "The Categories" for McTaggart, and Moore's notebook for McTaggart's lectures on Lotze and Leibniz in Lent term, 1898 (Add. Ms. 8875 10/3/2–3).[103] McTaggart's lectures on Hegel in 1895–1896 were based on the work he had completed for his (1896),[104] among which is included a formulation of the logical connection of the categories, how these are subject to the dialectical process, how contradictions are at the heart of that process, and how the dialectic is related to ordinary thought and to the nature of experience. Josiah Royce, who reviewed McTaggart (1896), states that in McTaggart's formulation, the dialectic is a process of *reconstruction*. The "lower categories lead on to the highest merely because they themselves are already abstractions from the higher categories, and the logical method merely reconstructs the relation to the higher which the lower category already implicitly involves" (Royce 1897, 69–70).

One connection to time arises in that the dialectic is a *process*—that is, something that has a beginning or undergoes change, which has to be explained ("and the question would arise: why did it begin where it did?"). The dialectic process is, however, conceived by McTaggart as independent of, and transcendentally grounding of, the empirical or the finite (perceptual) elements of our experiences. This then requires, according to McTaggart (or McTaggart's Hegel) that time be rejected as ultimate (though doing so suggests that the universe is perfect, which "involves us again in serious difficulties," about which "we may hope for a synthesis of the opposed position"). McTaggart's own argument concerning the unreality of time underwent some modification between his 1896 and the later work (1927), but its main pillars are that there are in principle two different series that govern the nature of time, the A series and the B series. The question concerns whether or not the appearances we have of "moving" through time are genuine features of reality (or Reality). An

---

[103] Russell attended these as well. His notebook is at the Russell Archive at McMaster University (RA3.Rec. Acq. 385, fos. 98–121).

[104] McTaggart noted in the Preface that the first four chapters had been the basis of his own Trinity College Fellowship Dissertation, and that the fourth and fifth chapters had appeared in *Mind*.

A-series formulates time with respect to a past/present/future distinction, which is a way to characterize movement or process. And one A-theory question is whether the past and future have the same metaphysical status as the present. The B-series, by contrast, rejects the view that time passes in the A-series sense; that of passing from future to present and from present to past. In the B-series, the present is not metaphysically privileged, and the main temporal formulation is *earlier/later than*: an event can be earlier or later relative to another.[105] The A-series (in which there is a present moment) can arise (or appear to arise) within the B-series, but McTaggart's position is that time cannot be real unless both series exist and unless there is real change. But as McTaggart argues, real change depends necessarily on the existence of the A-series, and the A series does not exist (i.e., roughly, there is no present). Thus, time is not real (although of course we do have what we take to be a perception of time or of temporally characterized events or processes).[106]

Moore's notebook (Add. Ms. 8875 10/3/1) contains extensive notes on McTaggart's examination of Hegel, but only one essay (on the Categories) survives of the work Moore produced for the course. A very rough sketch of the Hegelian approach to the dialectic, judgment, the categories and logic is as follows: our experience is *constituted*, via a set of categories, which are logically connected.[107] Categories are predicated of subjects, but as McTaggart explains it, "this connection is of such a kind that any category … is found to lead on to another … [If] we predicate [a certain category] of any subject, we are compelled … to predicate of the same subject the logical contrary of that category. This brings us to an absurdity … [but] on examining the two contrary predicates further, they are seen to be capable of reconciliation in a higher category, which combines the contents of both of them … absorbed into a wider idea." This "synthesis of opposites" is a process that ultimately both preserves and alters the lower categories such that "their opposition vanishes" and they

---

[105] Broad (1933/1938).

[106] Geach (1995), Dickinson (1931).

[107] The Categories are extensive. In McTaggart (1910), an inventory includes Being, Essence, and Notion (which comprise the Logic). Being is further divided into Quality, Quantity, and Measure. Quality includes Being, Nothing, Becoming, Being Determinate, Being Determinate As Such, Finitude, Infinity, Being for Self, The One and the Many, and more. McTaggart also helpfully warns that "we must notice the ambiguity with which Hegel uses the word 'Being'."

can exist (at a higher or further level) "without contradiction" (1896, Chap. 1, section 1).

Moore's notebook section titled "Logic" provides a link between McTaggart's exposition of Hegel's logic and Moore's essay on the Categories, giving us a sense of what Moore was learning courtesy of his only neo-Hegelian teacher. The subject in the lecture on Hegel's logic is (not surprisingly) judgment, and it provides stark evidence of the contrast between a Hegelian or McTaggartian formulation of judgment and what was over the next few years to become Moore's own developing view. According to McTaggart, Hegel's logic is not that of either Mill or Bradley (who "finds metaphysical implication in common forms of thought"), and it is not epistemological ("which for Hegel is not separable from ontology"). For Hegel, every judgment is a contradiction, asserting a universal to be a particular—which would be "meaningless, if it were true." Moreover, "All things are judgments," in that each thing is found only to be in so far as it "has" a universal. Judgments are said to be finite, "because in them the universal and the particular are externally united by a mere assertion. There is a unity of reason in syllogism." McTaggart's emphasis is on the dialectical process, especially with respect to the role of reason and judgment, and he claims on Hegel's behalf that "there must be possible doubt, as to what universal a thing may be brought under, for judgment; but this there must be about everything, if the dialectic is to stand." One thesis is that a "singular thing has universal quality [sic], each of which is more than the other." This is because "subject and predicate are each larger than one another. Pred[icate] larger denotation; subject larger connotation … as Hegel says, a contradiction … H[egel]'s contradiction seems in 'is' … but real contradiction is that particular is contingent to universal … we want to explain whole by universal and turn out unable." Making a universal as "big as particular" will not help: "we cannot say 'Caesar is a man' because that, if true, means 'Caesar is Caesar'." None of this may be entirely perspicuous, but Moore ends this section by giving a relatively clear summary of the background metaphysics: "Taking whole world as one object, you get plurality of universals and again of particulars; and thus objects externally related to one another. This plurality has lasted through since causality; we have been trying to connect them by our own universals."

Moore's essay on the Categories is clearer, however, possibly reflecting the character of McTaggart's approach to philosophy that Moore claimed was so influential. Moore begins by stating that the dialectical process is "thought … trying to determine the extent of its own validity." This method assures us of the validity of thought because "it limits the assertion of its validity, at starting, to a minimum, which cannot be denied." This minimum is "that it is." The "it" in question "cannot have any possible specification, not contained in the predicate, that 'there is,' 'something is,' 'the world is'." This assertion ("that it is") "is a judgment, and the validity of the judgment rests on the impossibility of denying it." In order to think at all, we must do so in terms of a category "with objective validity" so that our assertions are true. An assertion being true, on this model, means that "we have a category with objective validity, we have applied a true predicate to the world." And "since the world … is that predicate, we have made a specification of the nature of reality."

Moore's next section is titled "Thesis" (the first stage of a Hegelian dialectic). Specifying the nature of reality as in the above judgment ("that it is") is the first category: Being. "Thought is certain of the truth of this; but the question is how it can be certain of the truth of any other?" The issue here as Moore addresses it regards the "the nature of Hegel's Logic": the "logical validity" of the transition from thesis to antithesis. That is: to assert Being, there must be Not-Being implicit in Being. Moore cites Bradley as having claimed that the "underlying" nature of thought combines the thesis with antithesis (which he claimed is "no doubt true"), but this does not establish "the test of such validity." This however appears to be as follows: "the necessity of the transition comes from the immediate power of the mind to negate as well as to affirm, and the antithesis is the positive basis for its possible negation of each thesis."

The next page in the surviving bundle (Add. Ms. 8875 11/2/16) is not obviously a continuation of the two before.[108] This material begins with a paragraph marked "1" and begins by formulating the notion of a category in Hegel's view, adding clarity, it must be said, to the essay fragment that precedes it: "A category is a form of thought necessary to constitute experience. It is universally valid … it must be capable of forming the

---

[108] This and the next one are essay answers to set questions, but the questions do not survive.

predicate in a judgment about anything whatever. All thinking must be by categories; and to form the most elementary notion of an object, to have any content of thought whatever, implies that the mind has been active in employing one or more categories." Moore added to this a distinction between Hegel and Kant in their employment of categories of thought. Kant, he noted, takes the categories of thought to apply only to "sensuous material given in the forms of space and time." This limitation was due, Moore claimed, to "the way in which he discovered them"—even for the knowledge presupposed in Humean scepticism the categories of space and time "was demanded." Kant adopted them as true, but did not "enquire upon what their validity rested." Worse than that: since Kant recognized that knowledge has content beyond that given in experience, he was "driven to apply two of the categories, which he maintained to be only applicable to experience, beyond it." Hegel improved on this by "really deduc[ing]" the categories. Had Kant also done so, "he would have found, as Hegel did, that there was only one of primary validity, applicable to the whole thought-content, and that the rest depended on this and led in turn to others."

The next page in this bundle is labelled "2" and is a discussion of Hegel and the category of Being, said to be "the only one directly implied in any judgment whatsoever," including a sceptical judgment, which rests on knowing at least that one doubts. The question for Hegel is (again) how we get beyond this fundamental category of Being. This requires that "the process of Logic is the making explicit what was implicit … Logic naturally starts from the first thing which can be made explicit. You must know a great deal, before you can know what it is you cannot doubt: but logic is knowledge of knowledge."

On the next page of the bundle is another essay, labelled "3," a discussion of thesis and antithesis. "The thesis states some predicate to be universally applicable. The antithesis states not that this first predicate is not universally applicable; but that some other predicate is." This other predicate "must follow immediately from the statement of the first, and hence must be its contrary." In effect thought would be even be stuck at the first category unless "we first make plain what is its contrary. For the essence of a contrary lies in this [:] that it is under the same category with that to which it is contrary … the antithesis states the only other universally applicable thing, which is under the same category with itself." Moore

explains how logic is characterized as a transition between thesis and antithesis in Hegel's view as follows: both thesis and antithesis may be universally applicable, but "neither can be a complete account of the universe." Given that thesis and antithesis are in opposition, logic (the advance "from them to the synthesis") concerns "making explicit what they both imply as underlying the possibility of their opposition." It is the implicit higher categories "in us" that govern the opposition of the lower categories, "and which let us know that their opposition is not a contradiction." The very last page of this bundle is a brief paragraph about the nature of the dialectic: it "shews the relation to one another of the categories, which we unconsciously use in experience—without which we could have no experience at all … when we have found [the categories] we have gone some way to make experience rational." The dialectic "shows that the categories themselves are rational, for which end their connection must be shewn, by a rational deduction of them from that one which is in itself one with rationality" (presumably, the Absolute) … their connection with one another is not found empirically but by a process in pure thought."

I will close this chapter by making the case that the influence of McTaggart on Moore is subject to some ambiguity. Russell and Moore's own official recollections were responsible for the version of the story that their early views were an embrace of the British neo-Hegelianism of the time. And it is quite true that Russell's immersion in idealist philosophical views was far more advanced than Moore's ever was. Indeed, when Russell published his own Trinity Fellowship Dissertation (Russell, 1897/1956a), the dedication was to McTaggart. It was moreover McTaggart's lecture course on Leibniz that Russell was asked to take over in 1899 (with concomitant results for the development of Russell's thought).[109] But the role of McTaggart's philosophical influence on Moore was a bit more equivocal.

---

[109] Dickinson (1931, 72) claimed that "one of McTaggart's most notable characteristics was his genius for friendship." But Williams (1931, 74) added that "men whom he had previously admired and with whom he had intellectual affinities he broke with irretrievably because of actions of theirs … he had the deepest convictions about right and wrong both in public and in personal morality; and any transgression of that code was to him almost unpardonable." This explains how relations between McTaggart and Russell reached the spectacular low that they did when the Trinity College Council removed Russell from his lectureship in 1916 (Hardy (1970; Russell 1975

(255, 295–305)). In brief: Russell had been appointed in 1910 to a five-year Lectureship in Logic and the Principles of Mathematics. This was a not a regular Fellowship, and the Council was going to elect Russell to a proper Fellowship at the end of the term of his lecturership (October 1915). Russell, however, asked for a leave of absence for the 1915–1916 academic year (which would have been the first year of his official Fellowship). According to Hardy, "… it was known that [Russell] proposed to occupy [his time on leave] in 'political' activity, and it is not surprising that there should have been strong opposition to his application" (1970, 27). Hardy however was scornful: "Would they [the Trinity Council] have acted in the same way if he [Russell] had been ardently patriotic, and had proposed to spend a year making recruiting speeches? I can only say that I do not believe it" (1970, 29). Levy (1979, 277) has noted that "The Apostles were badly divided over the war, with some older men like Jackson, Ward, McTaggart and Whitehead being ferociously in favour of killing Germans." Some of these men were also on the College Council, described by Hardy as a body whose power was concentrated "in the hands of Senior Fellows" who had "lost touch with the general opinion of the College" (1970, 8). Thus, when Russell was convicted under the Defense of the Realm Act, the College Council agreed unanimously (11 July 1916) that "he be removed from his lecturership in the College." Among the Council members was McTaggart (Hardy 1970, 41). In 1919, 33 Fellows proposed to the Council that Russell be invited to return to Trinity to hold a Lectureship in Logic and the Principles of Mathematics for five years (1920–1925). McTaggart, however, was one of the members of the Council who, as Hardy puts it, "had voted for Russell's dismissal and would not retract." Hardy is unsparing (1970, 55): "Actually, McTaggart never moved an inch. He was voting against the reinstatement of conscientious objectors in their scholarships long after such an attitude had ceased to be in in any sense 'popular.'" A diary entry of Moore's has some detail as to the opinion of Russell in the McTaggart household: "Mrs. McT [sic] comes up after lecture … very violent against Russell's proposal for international fleet; says she doesn't like him" (24 February, 1915). See also CPBR 14.

Moore's role in all of this is a bit of a mystery; He was a lecturer at Trinity in 1916, but not a Fellow (Moore 1942, 28), and not on the Trinity Council, and so not involved officially in the decisions concerning Russell (either for or against). Levy's account of the period (1979, 276–89) is that Moore's attitude towards the war was difficult to pin down. Moore's surviving letters and diaries for this period (Add. Ms. 8330 1/3/4: February 1914–1918, May 1916), contain mentions of talk of the War, and of Russell, Hardy and others "talking about war" in Hall (as they could hardly fail to do), but very little about his own attitude towards the War. One exception is a letter to Desmond MacCarthy (Add. Ms. 8330 2/5/43): Moore says that the war "gives me much more pleasure than pain, simply because I am so interested in it … though I truly believe that war is horrible … I can't really *feel* miserable about it … But, so far as I can gather, Russell does really *feel* miserable."). I have discussed the *froideur* that hung over Moore's relations to Russell at this period elsewhere (Preti 2008a; OHBR). It is just possible that Russell's conversation in Hall about the war is partly what was behind Moore's diary entries about avoiding Russell and being unwilling to sit next to him in Hall (Add. Ms. 8330 1/3/4; Preti 2008a; OHBR). There is, however, one piece of evidence about Moore's views. This evidence does not concern the Russell situation, nor the war, but (characteristic of Moore) about private meetings dedicated to talking about the war. A year or so after the war had begun, Moore, along with Russell and others, (and after much discussion with his friends MacCarthy and Hardy) assisted in forming the Cambridge branch of the Union of Democratic Control (UDC), an organization that, while not outright pacifist, nevertheless took, on political grounds, an anti-war view. In November 1915, however, the college refused to allow the UDC to meet in one of the members' rooms in college. One result was a spectacularly derisive

Baldwin (1995), Griffin (1991), and Hylton (1990) have all noted that Moore's first published paper (1897) took the view that time was unreal—a hallmark of McTaggart's own views, and which they attribute to the influence of McTaggart. But there is to my mind a puzzle here. Moore's first meeting with McTaggart is described in a letter to his parents:

> Last Sunday evening I was taken to Oscar Browning's at home. I did not get any conversation with him personally; but, most of the time, I was listening to MacTaggart [sic], a fellow of Trinity for metaphysics, who is very interesting. … On Friday I went out to breakfast[110] and met MacTaggart again: he spent nearly an hour in trying to explain to me the metaphysical aspect of 'time.' (18 March, 1893, Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/16)

In his 1942 (13–14), explaining how it was that he was encouraged to study for the Moral Sciences Part II Tripos, Moore says:

> Russell had invited me to tea in his rooms to meet McTaggart; and McTaggart, in the course of conversation had been led to express his well-known view that Time is unreal. This must have seemed to me (as it still does) a perfectly monstrous proposition, and I did my best to argue against it.

Given this, we might briefly examine the question of Moore's first published paper, as I think there is evidence that Moore's commitment to the unreality of Time there is less robust than it may seem.

---

letter by Moore which appeared in the *Cambridge Magazine* (27 November 1915), cataloguing the alleged dangers of private meetings by college members. It ended with the sardonic suggestion that the college might also suspend all services in the college chapel, given a risk of hearing "maxims quite as dangerous to patriotism" as "Love your enemies; do good to them that hate you." Moore's diary noted that he was quite nervous about the appearance of this letter. For all this, however, Moore did continue write respectfully about McTaggart's work (reviewing it and discussing it), went out of his way to discuss his debt to McTaggart in (1942, 3–39), and as editor of *Mind*, he penned a brief but courteous remembrance of McTaggart after McTaggart's death in 1925.

[110] Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/16 (March 18, 1893).

9   "In What Sense, If Any, Do Past and Future Time Exist?"

"In What Sense, If Any, Do Past and Future Time Exist?" (Moore 1897, [PFT]) was a symposium paper delivered at the Aristotelian Society; the symposiasts were Bosanquet, Hodgson, and Moore. The question posed by Bosanquet, on behalf of Lotze, is whether past and future time are "really non-existent" (1897, 228); on behalf of Bradley, he formulated the question as follows: "the character of an existence is determined by what has been, and by what it is (potentially) about to be. But if these attributes, on the other hand, are not present, how can they be real?" (1897, 228–9). Bosanquet proposes an arch-Idealist solution: "It would be quite agreed that the past and the future make a difference to the present … we must choose at this point between accepting the permanent nature of the continuity as the higher form of reality, thus taking the essence of past and future to form one timeless whole along with the essence of the present" (1897, 231). Hodgson adds another element, which is, in effect, that our own (finite) consciousness of time is distortive, and that to a non-finite consciousness "are not what we call past and future states of the real world-process just as really existent *now* inasmuch as they are present realities to that supposed indefinitely heightened consciousness?" (1897, 235).

On closer examination, however, Moore's objections show the inklings of resistance to a full-on metaphysical idealism. His first objection, in recognizably Moorean fashion, noted a self-contradiction. If, as Hodgson argues, the distinction of past and future exists in "quite another sense" in the "consciousness of the *deus ex machina*," then, Moore argued, the consciousness of *that entity* "would be an existent and would have a history; and that being so, in what sense would the past and future moments of his consciousness exist?" (1897, 236). In short: the assumption that "consciousness is in no sense a constituent of reality, and that therefore a succession in consciousness, as not affecting the reality of time, needs no explanation," will involve "an open inconsistency."

As I read Moore, however, his next objection is even more telling. Moore proceeded to call out both Bosanquet and Hodgson on their use

of what he calls "the psychological doctrine" formulated as "empirical present moment of my experience" or "our present" (1897, 237). He says both that he does not "wish to enter into a psychological argument, for which I am very ill-equipped" (and then proceeds to do so) and that he is heretical on the question (of the nature of a present moment of consciousness), and then proceeds to an entirely realist and common-sense objection: "in time, as in space, there is a *minimum sensible*." That is: "the rate of change in our consciousness can only be measured against an objective standard" … "[t]he fallacy … consists in confusing inner perception with scientific knowledge of the world …" (1897, 237–238). What this amounts to, Moore goes to say, is that:

> if neither present, past, nor future is real, there is nothing real left in time as such.
>
> If [Mr. Hodgson] thinks that by such a view I am bound to maintain that I "can count without time, or think without it either," … I should like … to warn Mr. Hodgson that I cannot help making a distinction between the process of thinking and the content of thought. Because I cannot think without taking some time about it, I cannot see it follows that what I think about need also be in time … And if this be so, the mere fact that we can only think in time can never prove that everything we think of need be so, except in so far as we are thinking it.

And as a final flourish, Moore takes his stand:

> For this reason, I think Mr. Bosanquet rather underrates the difficulty of reconciling time with reality. Time must be rejected wholly, its continuity, as well as its discreteness, if we are to form an adequate notion of reality … I would say that neither Past, Present, nor Future exists, if by existence we are to mean the ascription of full Reality and not merely existence as Appearance.

Moore here needs to be read as precisely in the midst of transition—rather like Griffin argues we need to read Russell's ultimately abandoned "Analysis of Mathematical Reasoning" (CPBR 2, 158–9). In PFT, that is, we can see hints of Moore's robust anti-psychologist and continental exposure to the science of psychology, *and* of his determination to blend

some Bradleyan metaphysics into his thinking. Moreover Moore, in rejecting the reality of time whole hog, is doing so (1) by way of a distinction between the content of thought and the possession or thinking of it; moreover, (2) he is, as he warned his audience, "heretically" formulating the issue as to the reality of time in order to emphasize that some reality is entirely independent from empirical characteristics—like our consciousness of it. And this, I would emphasize, is just what we might expect of Moore's developing formulation of the nature of judgment, which matured into full view, not long after.[111]

References

Allison, H. 1990. *Kant's Theory of Freedom*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Anscombe, G.E.M., and G.H. von Wright. 1961. *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Notebooks: 1914–1916*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Baldwin, T., and C. Preti, eds. 2011. *G.E. Moore: Early Philosophical Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [BP].

Bradley, F.H. 1883. *Principles of Logic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [PL].

———. 1887a. On A Feature of Active Attention. *Mind* 12 (46): 314.

———. 1887b. Association and Thought. *Mind* 12 (47): 354–381.

Broad, C.D. 1933/1938. *An Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy* (two volumes), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cambridge University Calendar: 1894–1896.

Cambridge University Reporter, 1894–1898.

Candlish, S. 2007. *The Russell/Bradley Dispute and its Significance for Twentieth Century Philosophy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

---

[111] This paper is some small but significant evidence of what Moore was thinking—and that the influence of Stout's and Ward's mental science was having an effect. PFT appeared in April 1897; Moore did not begin writing his 1897 dissertation until that summer, and I read him as trying to pull together the disparate philosophical influences that surrounded him. We know that Stout encouraged Moore to speak up at Moral Sciences Club meetings from Moore's letters home (Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/57; 2/1/67) and we know that Sidgwick was primarily responsible for setting Moore up at the London School of Ethics to give two series of lectures in 1898 and 1899 (Regan, 1991; See also below, Chap. 4). Stout or possibly even Sidgwick could have encouraged Bosanquet to ask Moore to contribute to the symposium, to start to give him opportunities to flex his philosophical training.

Dawes-Hicks, G. 1925. The Philosophy of James Ward. *Mind*, n.s. 34 (135): 280–299.

Dickinson, G.L. 1931. *J. McT. E. McTaggart*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ewing, A.C. 1934. *Idealism: A Critical Survey*. London: Methuen.

Geach, P. 1995. Cambridge Philosophers III: McTaggart. *Philosophy* 70 (274): 567–579.

Green, T.H. 1885. *The Works of Thomas Hill Green*. Edited by R. Nettleship, 3 vols. London: Longmans.

Griffin, N. 1991. *Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

———. 1992. *The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, vol. 1: The Private Years (1884–1914)*. London: Penguin.

Guyer, P. 1992. *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2017b. The Bounds of Sense and the Limits of Analysis. *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 55 (3): 365–382.

Hardy, G. 1970. *Bertrand Russell and Trinity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hatfield, G. 1992. Empirical, Rational, and Transcendental Psychology: Psychology as Science and as Philosophy. In Guyer, ed. 1992: 200–227.

Hodgson, S. 1887. Subject and Object in Psychology. *Mind* 12 (47): 423–429.

Hylton, P. 1990. *Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kitcher, P. 1990. *Kant's Transcendental Psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Köhnke, C. 1991. *The Rise of Neo-Kantianism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kusch, M. 1995. *Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge*. London and New York: Routledge.

Leary, D. 1978. The Philosophical Development of the Conception of Psychology in Germany, 1780–1850. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 14 (2): 113–121.

———. 1982a. Immanuel Kant and the Development of Modern Psychology. In D. Leary, ed. 1982b: 17–42.

———. 1982b. *The Problematic Science: Psychology in Nineteenth-Century Thought*. New York: Praeger.

Levy, P. 1979. *G.E. Moore and the Cambridge Apostles*. London: Harcourt.

Lindsay, T.M. 1877. Recent Hegelian Contributions to English Philosophy. *Mind* 2 (8): 476–493.

Mace, C.A. 1945. Obituary of George Frederick Stout (1860–1944). *Proceedings of the British Academy* 31: 307–316.

———. 1946. G. F. Stout (1860–1944). *British Journal of Psychology* xxxvi: 51–54.

———. 1954. The Permanent Contribution to Psychology of G.F. Stout. *British Journal of Educational Psychology* 24 (2): 64–75.

McGuinness, B. 2008. *Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents (1911–1951)*. Oxford: Blackwell.

McTaggart, J.E. 1896. *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1910. *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1921. *The Nature of Existence*. Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1927. *The Nature of Existence*. Ed. C.D. Broad (vol. II). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Metz, R. 1938. *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Moore, G.E. 1897. In What Sense, If Any, Do Past and Future Time Exist? *Mind*, n.s. 6 (22): 228–240. [PFT]

———. 1898. Freedom. *Mind*, n.s. 7 (26): 179–204. [F].

———. 1901. Mr. McTaggart's 'Studies in Hegelian Cosmology'. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 2: 177–214.

———. 1902. Experience and Empiricism. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 3: 80–95.

———. 1903. *Principia Ethica*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [PE].

———. 1942. Autobiography. In Schilpp, ed. 1942: 3–39.

Murray, A.H. 1937. *The Philosophy of James Ward*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nasim, O. 2008. *Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers: Constructing the World*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Passmore, J. 1944. G.F. Stout (1860–1944). *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy* 22 (1 and 2): 1–14.

———. 1952. Memoir of Stout. In Stout, 1952.

———. 1976. G.F. Stout's Editorship of *Mind* (1892–1920). *Mind*, n.s. 85 (337): 17–36.

Potter, M. 2009. *Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Preti, C. 2008a. He Was In Those Days Beautiful and Slim: Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore, 1894–1901. *Russell* 28 (2): 97–192.

———. 2008b. On the Origins of the Contemporary Notion of Propositional Content: Anti-psychologism in Nineteenth Century and G. E. Moore's Early Theory of Judgment. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (A)* 39 (2): 176–185.

Regan, T. 1991. *G. E. Moore: The Elements of Ethics*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Royce, J. 1897. Review of McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*. *Philosophical Review* 6 (1): 69–76.

Russell, B. 1975. *Autobiography*. London: Allen and Unwin. [Auto.].

Schaar, M. van der. 1996. From Analytic Psychology to Analytic Philosophy: The Reception of Twardowski's Ideas in Cambridge. *Axiomathes* 7: 295–324.

Schaar, M. van der. 2013a. *Judgement and the Epistemic Foundation of Logic*. Dordrecht: Springer.

———. 2013b. G.F. Stout and Russell's Earliest Account of Judgement. In Textor, ed. 2013: 137–156.

———. 2013c. *G.F. Stout and the Psychological Origins of Analytic Philosophy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Schilpp, P. 1942. *The Philosophy of G.E. Moore (Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. IV)*. Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press.

Sidgwick, H. 1877. Reply to Bradley. *Mind* 2 (5): 122–126.

———. 1879. The So-Called Idealism of Kant. *Mind* 4 (15): 408–410. [see Caird 1879a in Reply].

———. 1880. Kant's Refutation of Idealism. *Mind* 5 (17): 111–115. [see Caird (1880) in Reply].

———. 1883a. A Criticism of the Critical Philosophy (I). *Mind* 8 (29): 69–91.

———. 1883b. A Criticism of the Critical Philosophy (II). *Mind* 8 (31): 313–337.

Spadoni, C. 1976. Great God in Boots!—The Ontological Argument is Sound!. *Russell* (Autumn/Winter): 1–64.

Stout, G.F. 1888. The Scope and Method of Psychology. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 1 (1): 33–54.

———. 1896. *Analytic Psychology* (2 vols.) London: Allen and Unwin. [AP].

———. 1926. Ward as Psychologist. *Monist* 36 (1): 20–55.

———. 1930. *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*. London: Macmillan.

———. 1931. *Mind and Matter*. Gifford Lectures (1919. 1921): Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

———. 1952. *God and Nature*. Gifford Lectures (1919, 1921, ed. A.K. Stout). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Walsh, W. 1966. Philosophy and Psychology in Kant's Critique. *Kant Studien* 56: 186–198.

———. 1981. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Commentators in English, 1875–1945. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 42 (4): 723–737.

Ward, J. 1876. An Attempt to Interpret Fechner's Law. *Mind* 1 (4): 452–466.

———. 1883a. Psychological Principles (I). *Mind* 8 (32): 153–169 (published in (1918) as *Psychological Principles*).

———. 1883b. Psychological Principles (II). *Mind* 8 (32): 465–486 (published in (1918) as *Psychological Principles*).

———. 1886. Psychology. In *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 9th ed. Edinburgh: Black, 37–85.

———. 1887a. Psychological Principles (III). *Mind* 12 (45): 45–67.

———. 1887b. Mr. F.H. Bradley's Analysis of Mind. *Mind* 12 (48): 564–575.

———. 1893. Modern Psychology: A Reflection. *Mind*, n.s. 2 (5): 54–82.

———. 1894. Review of Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*. *Mind*, n.s. 3 (9): 109–125.

———. 1911. *The Realm of Ends or Pluralism and Theism: The Gifford Lectures (1907–10)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1918. *Psychological Principles*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1922. *A Study of Kant*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Watson, J. 1909. The Idealism of Edward Caird. *Philosophical Review* 18 (2): 147–163.

Williams, B. 1931. McTaggart's Friendships. In Dickinson, ed., 71–81.

3

Moral Science and Ethical Systems: Sidgwick's Influence on Moore

1 Introduction

I argued in Chaps. 1 and 2 that a key feature of Moore's early philosophical development can be traced to the developing mental science of the day and its impact on the study of the moral sciences at Cambridge. Here I will examine how this intersected with the early development of the ethical views that are more traditionally associated with Moore. As we have seen, the moral sciences at Cambridge in Moore's day were a blend of logic, psychology, metaphysics, and ethics, understood in a host of different nineteenth century ways. We can now say with some confidence that Moore's introduction to philosophy at Cambridge cannot be characterised as stemming uniquely from the influence of Bradleyan Absolute Idealism. And in this chapter, I will argue that the anti-psychologistic perspective that played such a large role in the study of philosophy at Cambridge was no less featured—and no less influential on Moore—in the ethical views of his teacher Henry Sidgwick.

Sidgwick (1838–1900) was a towering figure at Cambridge: a reformer, a leader and model of ecumenical intellectual curiosity, and "one of the

most influential ethical philosophers of the Victorian era."[1] Sidgwick became a Fellow of Trinity in 1859, was a member of the Apostles Society, and from 1883 until his death in 1900, he was Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge. Sidgwick (along with Alexander Bain in Scotland and T. H. Green at Oxford) represented a new kind of philosopher in Great Britain in the mid-nineteenth century: one with no allegiance to religion, and with a commitment to the practice of philosophy as a professional discipline.[2] Sidgwick published prodigiously, and his influence on Moore was more considerable than Moore's later account of his undergraduate days may make it seem (1942, 16–7).[3]

Moore's direct exposure to Sidgwick came mainly in the form of lectures titled "Ethical Systems" during his first full year of preparation for the Moral Sciences Tripos (1894–1895).[4] The work that featured most prominently in the lectures Moore attended was Sidgwick's monumental *Methods of Ethics*, first published in 1874, and revised thereafter every few years.[5] Moore's surviving undergraduate materials, which we will examine below (sec. 6), include his notebook of Sidgwick's Ethical Systems lectures (Add. Ms. 8875 10/2/1) and a number of essays answering set questions on *Methods of Ethics* (Add. Ms. 8875 11/2/1–7). In later recollection, it is true that Moore did claim that he "gained least from personal contact with Sidgwick," but added that while he found Sidgwick's lectures "dull," he gained a good deal from Sidgwick's published works and was very sympathetic to his "belief in Common Sense" (1942, 16–7). Be

---

[1] Schultz (2004) is the definitive account of Sidgwick. Schneewind (1977) was ahead of its time in respecting the historical context of the development of Sidgwick's views. Crisp (2014) is very clear on the structure of *Methods of Ethics* (ME). See also Sidgwick et al. (1906).

[2] See Schneewind (1977, 4). Spadoni (1979) notes that Sidgwick was something of an odd duck for all his authority, cut off in some ways from his *milieu*. Russell and Moore were not as students in a position to understand the power of his independence from any particular dogma.

[3] As a student, Moore was invited to an at-home at the Sidgwicks', and he wrote to his parents that "the professor is immensely interesting and amusing: he always has plenty to say, wandering on gently from topic to topic, with shrewd remarks and plenty of witty anecdotes" though he does also add "I wish it were the same with his lectures, but they generally seem three times as long as anybody else's and are very difficult to follow" (30 April, 1895; Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/46).

[4] Cambridge University Calendar (1894, 1896). Some of the essays I will discuss may have been produced for Sidgwick's discussion class as well.

[5] Moore read the fifth edition, published in 1893 (ME went to seven editions, the seventh posthumously).

that as it may, Sidgwick's views come in for more direct discussion in Moore's dissertations than any other philosopher save Kant.[6]

The significant strand of influence on Moore in my view is that Sidgwick, like Stout and like Ward, was unconvinced (at best) about Kantian, Hegelian, or neo-Hegelian views of metaphysics, psychology, and ethics. And just as a more scientific understanding and formulation of psychology was taken up, and promoted by Stout and Ward, so too was ethics at this period undergoing a not unimportant revolution of its own, taken up and promoted by Sidgwick. In Sidgwick's enquiry into the methods of ethics, he emphasized the role of common sense in the context of moral motivation and obligation, formulated from a straightforward view of psychology as a science.[7] Moore's general conception of ethics and its metaphysical foundation in his 1897 and 1898 dissertations was in line with Sidgwick's—Moore launched his own examination from Sidgwick's, though (firmly) rejecting his conclusions.

Sidgwick was lauded often for his "openness" and non-partisan approach to theory (Hayward 1901a, 5). Although, as we will see, this did not extend to Bradley and his views, the situation was slightly different with respect to Kant's views, with whom Sidgwick actively engaged.[8] Kant was among a few thinkers from whom Sidgwick claimed to have taken what "he needed" in his reading prior to setting down to write *Methods of Ethics* (ME), and Sidgwick was the first to point out where his own conclusions resemble Kant's (ME, 357; Schneewind (1977, 47)). From an autobiographical sketch published after his death (Sidgwick 1901a), we get a précis of the lines of thought that led Sidgwick to the views in ME.[9] He recounted there that while his initial attraction was to

---

[6] See Chap. 4. Moore's 1897 Fellowship dissertation includes a long Appendix on what Moore calls "some of Professor Sidgwick's fundamental positions in his 'Methods of Ethics'" (BP (2011, xxxv–xlvi, 4)).

[7] Sidgwick also developed an interest in and became deeply immersed in exploration of paranormal psychical phenomena. I will not be discussing that aspect of his work here (there is no evidence that Moore was aware of it), except to say that in his investigations, Sidgwick was exposed to the conception of human psychology—even paranormal psychology and abnormal psychology—as something to be *scientifically* explored. See Schultz (2004, Chap. 5).

[8] For contemporary discussions of Kant's influence on Sidgwick, see Schultz (2004, 2019), Parfit (2011/2017), Paytas and Henning (2020), among others.

[9] This piece also appeared as a preface to the sixth edition of ME, which Sidgwick was too ill to complete. E. E. Constance Jones made the editorial decision to include the sketch in the revised sixth edition (ME, seventh edition, xvii).

Mill's utilitarianism, what came more clearly into view as a theoretical puzzle was the relation between interest and duty. In trying to establish the ground of his conviction that "it was right for me to sacrifice my happiness for the good of the whole of which I am a part," Sidgwick stated that he was compelled, in spite of his "discipleship" to Mill, to "recognize the need of a fundamental ethical intuition" without which the utilitarian method "could not … be made coherent and harmonious" (ME, xviii–xix). He found it, he says, in re-reading Kant's ethics.

The ways in which Sidgwick parts company from Kant are instructive, however. He rejected Kant's account of the activity of thinking or reason as a synthesizing power;[10] he formulated moral notions like benevolence by stressing the importance of the cultivation of feelings and emotion, which Kant left out; he rejected the role of autonomy (which looms large in Kantian accounts of freedom); and he was disinclined to consider Kantian arguments concerning a theoretical incompatibility between the demands of a so-called Categorical Imperative and a form of rational egoism.[11] Thus, while it is true that Sidgwick opposed an empiricist (Humean/Millean) line in ethics and made room for Kantian notions like reason, will, and duty, this did not entail that he was willing to embrace Kant's metaphysical underpinnings.[12] He was relentlessly sceptical about Kantian philosophical fundamentals like the distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal (1883b, 318), the notion of the transcendental, and the coherence of transcendental arguments. He was also unimpressed both by Kant's conception of free will and of the relevance of free will to ethics (1883b, 312). After Sidgwick's death, Ward published a set of Sidgwick's lectures on Kant's philosophy that captured Sidgwick's general misgivings on the Kantian metaphysical enterprise, a robust factor in Sidgwickian thought.[13] A brief synopsis on the state of British ethical thought at this period will (1) situate Sidgwick in his own

---

[10] This particular feature of reason or Thought was a hallmark of Green and Bradley's neo-Hegelian views.

[11] Schneewind (1977 55, 270, 310–13); Schultz (2004, 2019).

[12] About which he was candid: "What commended itself to me … was Kant's ethical principle, rather than its metaphysical basis" (ME seventh edition, xix).

[13] Sidgwick (1905).

context, and (2) set the stage for later discussion of the development of Moore's own ethical views.

2 Nineteenth Century British Ethics: Sidgwick in Context

Singer (1992) has described nineteenth century British ethics as flanked by two quite distinct varieties of utilitarianism: Bentham's at the beginning of the century and Sidgwick's at the end.[14] There were in addition two general streams of thought that characterized the development of ethics and the formulation of ethical judgment at this period. One was empirical: it began with Hobbes, ran through Hume, and came to rest in the views of the classical utilitarians, all of whom defended a formulation of ethical judgment that originated in sensation (desire or feeling).[15] The other stream of thought was intuitionist: a defence of the position that ethical judgments were based in reason (in direct opposition to Humean views) and could be justified by common sense, the authority of God, self-evidence, and moral maxims. The intuitionist in general argued that moral judgments are self-evident or based on other foundational and self-evident propositions; and that moral properties are not reducible to empirical entities. Among these were Reid's and Whewell's intuitionism, which were both quite dominant through the middle of the century.

The nineteenth century also included views that marked out territory around an opposition between theology and science. Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) developed an evolutionary and naturalistic account of society and liberty that added a new element to the dispute between science and religion on ethics.[16] And towards the end of the century, a new form of neo-Hegelian ethics was developed, with Green and Bradley as its principal figures. Green's position (which contained Kantian elements, even if it veered off from strict Kantianism) was that morality was a form

---

[14] See also Schneewind (1977).

[15] Deigh (1992).

[16] Sidgwick lectured on Spencer (whose "natural adaptation" view of ethics predated Darwin's theory of evolution), but was not inclined to accept those views.

of self-realization in an idealized process that brings together will and reason. Bradley's ethics (1876) made use of Green's elements and formed a kind of prologue to his later metaphysics (see below).

Sidgwick's ME introduced a new and different approach to ethical theorizing and was particularly zealous about detaching religion from ethics. Recall that Sidgwick was a powerful force in the mid-nineteenth century Cambridge reforms with respect to the curriculum and to the University's connection to the Church. Schultz has argued that Sidgwick's personal tumult over this decision—the ethics and conformity of subscription[17]—was in fact the motivating force that led Sidgwick to the views and the methodology of ME (2004, 127–136). That is, although ME took a form of utilitarianism seriously, it was concerned mostly to thrash out the question of how to do ethical theory as well as to reveal what kind of ethical intuitions are implicit in our common-sense ethical reasoning. Sidgwick himself thus embraced a form of intuitionism, although explicitly stripped of any of its prior theological underpinnings, in order to ground what ultimately became a generally applied utilitarianism. In his words, the strategy was not to attempt a proof or disproof of any theory in particular, but rather "by reflection on the common morality which I and my reader share, and to which appeal is so often made in moral disputes, to obtain as explicit, exact, and coherent a statement of its fundamental rules" (ME, 216).

I will examine a particular set of exchanges between Sidgwick and Bradley; move on to some of Sidgwick's other writings on Kant and Kantian themes; and conclude with a closer look at ME, to build the case for my view that Sidgwick's particular approach to and interpretations of Kant and of Bradley were powerful influences on Moore's developing thought.

---

[17] This is the title of a pamphlet that Sidgwick published in 1870; Schultz argues it is a "prelude" to ME (Schultz 2004, 124–7).

3   Sidgwick and Bradley

In Chaps. 1 and 2, I argued that the formulations and understanding of the concepts of logic and psychology were subject to wide-ranging, quickly changing, and inevitably clashing features in the mid-to-late nineteenth century. It will come as no surprise that the same could be said for the formulation and understanding of concepts like *idealism*, *transcendental/transcendentalism*, *Hegelian*, and *neo-Kantian* at this period. In a discussion of Sidgwick's debates with the idealists of the day, F. H. Hayward wrote that "[a]ll of these adjectives are more or less unsatisfactory,"[18] but they capture the essence of a framework to which Sidgwick, in slightly uncharacteristic theoretical denunciation, was wholly opposed.[19] With his near-contemporary, T. H. Green of Oxford, however, Sidgwick's resistance to idealist metaphysics and ethics was carried out in convivial exchanges. Green's unfinished *Prolegomena to Ethics* (Green 1885) contained an extended discussion of Sidgwick's ME, and the two of them engaged each other (among other things) on the status of utilitarianism, which Sidgwick thought Green conflated with psychological hedonism by blending the weakest parts of Bentham and Mill (Schultz 2004, 351). Sidgwick found Green, in spite of his idealism, to be "democratic and reforming," in his thought; and described him as an "old friend."[20] The last paper Sidgwick prepared for publication (from the last public lecture he gave, and which appeared after his own death) was a long discussion of Green's philosophy.[21]

---

[18] Hayward (1901a, 150). Sidgwick (1901b, 21) noted some distinctions that may be useful to us in later discussion: Mentalism is the view that Reality is mental (matter is consciousness); Idealism is the view that Reality is thought or thinking activity; Sensationalism is the view that Reality has sensations or feelings as its ultimate elements; and Spiritualism is the view that Reality is conscious, thinking, willing, feeling beings (this may in its turn be Idealistic or Sensationistic).

[19] The only other view that came in for as much Sidgwickian rejection was Spencer's evolutionary ethics (Hayward 1901b, 150). On the relations between Sidgwick, Utilitarianism and Idealism, see also Vincent (1999, 2020), Marshall (2013).

[20] Schultz (2004, 342).

[21] "… Green … particularly objected to *my* labels for him … I called him a 'Transcendentalist' and I called him a 'Hegelian': and he objected to both" (1901b, 18–29). Sidgwick gave the lecture to the Oxford Philosophical Society in May, 1900, and James Ward edited it for publication in *Mind*. Sidgwick had been at school (Rugby) with Green. Schultz (2004, 362) suggests that Sidgwick was aware that Green had more personal influence with his students than he did, and seems to have put

The same collegiality was not in evidence, however, in the relations between Sidgwick and Bradley, who claimed the mantle of chief Idealist after Green's death. This could be down to what Hayward described as the "virtually identical," views of Bradley and Green, although Green's were more "conciliatory "and Bradley's more "bellicose" (1901b, 150–2). Schultz (2004, 350) has suggested that Sidgwick might have thought that "whatever was interesting in Bradley was due to Green and that he [Sidgwick] was better off addressing the latter."[22] Bradley's *Ethical Studies* (ES, 1876) appeared more or less at the same time as ME (1874), and seven years before the posthumous publication of Green (1885). It represented the first published declaration of a new Idealism, the first published criticisms of ME by a contemporary and an Idealist,[23] and "the only sustained criticism of the Methods by a thoroughly unsympathetic opponent in Sidgwick's lifetime."[24] Bradley's chapter on pleasure in ES concluded with a footnote on Sidgwick's views on hedonism (ES 114–7), which focused mainly on a list of assumptions and preconceptions, most of which Bradley thought were tacit and undeveloped, and which (with somewhat bad grace) he claimed he felt obligated to address.[25] The upshot of Bradley's criticism was that there was no coherent way to argue for pleasure as an ethical end: "Pleasure is the one end, or it is not. If it is not, then Hedonism goes. If it is, then *my* pleasure is my end. The pleasure of others is neither a feeling in me nor an idea of a feeling in me" (ES, 114–17). That is: Bradley rejected (if he even took on) Sidgwick's attempt

---

this down to his own view that the teaching of philosophy was dedicated less to zealously encouraging discipleship and more to "training their faculties" to seek ultimate truth (Schultz 2004, 362). Broad (1930,144) didn't mince words: "Even a thoroughly second-rate thinker like T. H. Green, by diffusing a grateful and comforting aroma of ethical 'uplift,' probably made far more undergraduates into prigs than Sidgwick will ever make into philosophers."

[22] Moreover: "he would continue to write and lecture about Green's philosophy, while flatly ignoring Bradley's further productions, including the long pamphlet on 'Mr. Sidgwick's Hedonism' that appeared in 1877" (2004, 350). See Vincent (1999) for a discussion that is more sympathetic to Bradley's criticisms.

[23] Schultz (2004, 347–8).

[24] Schneewind (1977, 392).

[25] "I am far from wishing to deny to it [ME] a certain value, but on the subject of Hedonism I cannot honestly say more than that he seems to me to have left the question exactly where he found it. As other people, however, seem to think otherwise, I am forced to define my position against him" (ES, 114).

to generalize the utilitarian pleasure/happiness principle precisely so as to avoid the pitfalls of psychological hedonism.

Bradley's misfortune was that Sidgwick reviewed ES.[26] The review shows Bradley coming in for as much intellectual condemnation from Sidgwick about his ethics as he did from Ward and Stout about his psychology (see Chap. 2).[27] Sidgwick began by claiming that an "uncritical dogmatism constitutes the largest and most interesting element of Mr. Bradley's work," going on to remark that this is possibly due to Bradley's "limited acquaintance with the whole process of English ethical thought," because "his apprehension of the view which he assails is always rather superficial and sometimes even unintelligent (Sidgwick 1876b, 545)." Bradley was also taken to task for not making a "patient effort of intellectual sympathy" when it came to opposing doctrines; and was called out for being "incapable of maintaining" a "tranquility of temper" (Sidgwick 1876b, 547).

Bradley and Sidgwick parted company quickly on a number of substantive points.[28] Bradley's attack on hedonism was, according to Sidgwick, "always vigorous, and frequently acute and suggestive," which might suggest that Sidgwick found some fellow feeling with Bradley in a critique of hedonism. This didn't last: "just at the nodes of [Bradley's] argument he lapses provokingly into mere "debating-club rhetoric'" (Sidgwick 1876b, 545). Moreover, a theme central to Bradley's ethics was a free will/determinism distinction, to which Sidgwick was not sympathetic (see below). Sidgwick even suggested that Bradley rejected both free will *and* determinism, however, when he argued against a libertarian view that "a man of healthy mind has no objection to the prediction of any actions which he looks on as issuing from his character," because such prediction is not incompatible with responsibility. As against the determinist, though, Bradley argued that "the character of the man is not what

---

[26] Sidgwick (1876b).

[27] Schultz has claimed that this was Sidgwick schooling his "obnoxious, irritable" junior in the right way to do philosophy (2004, 349).

[28] Both approach their criticisms of the other in exactly the same way: that the *other* fails to make his fundamental assumptions clear (Bradley 1877a, 2; Sidgwick 1876b). This may be the most succinct way of demonstrating the clash, during this period, between the idealist metaphysical positions and those of everybody else. Since the terms in use were *prima facie* the same (logic, thought, reality, pleasure, good, etc.), the clash was particularly acute.

is made, but what makes itself out of and from the disposition and environment." Sidgwick noted with some exasperation that "How, as regards the series of volitions by which character thus 'makes itself' we are to avoid the dilemma between Determinism and Indeterminism, I do not see" (1876b, 546).

Sidgwick's most severe criticisms centred on the role of Bradley's conception of the self in his ethics. For Bradley, ethics was a process whose key feature is "the self we try to realize is a whole" (Sidgwick 1876b, 545). Bradley's main ethical principle is something called Self Realization; but, as Sidgwick put it, "the reader is startled by the communication that Mr Bradley does not properly speaking know what he means when he says 'self' and 'real' and 'realise'" (545). We noted in Chap. 2 that Bradley's ES can be read as a prequel to his later metaphysics, which may have been part of the problem. Sidgwick in any case did not stint in his rejection of the intimations of Bradleyan metaphysics running through ES, which he describes as "either irrelevant or inadequate," concluding his review by saying that while Bradley's book is "crude and immature" and its author "hardly possesses the gift of lucid exposition," it was nonetheless "interesting and suggestive: perhaps all the more from its marked antagonism to current philosophical opinion" (545).

The fireworks were just getting started. Bradley wrote an aggrieved reply to Sidgwick's review, complaining about Sidgwick's representation of his views on the self, hedonism and determinism, and defending them indignantly as "not incoherent" (Bradley 1877a). Bradley further added that he would not oppose determinism as soon as it stopped "regarding the Self as a collection, and volitions as 'resultants' or compositions of forces, and will either reform or cease to apply its category of cause and effect" (Bradley 1877a, 123), a position that would not endear itself to Sidgwick's scientific common sense. As for hedonism, Bradley grumbled that he had devoted a large part of his book to hedonism in general, and Sidgwick's hedonism in specific, but failed to get a reply out of Sidgwick on this (Bradley 1877a, 124). Sidgwick, who had penned a quick retort to Bradley's reply, did not let this pass, responding that Bradley oddly appeared to think that in "professing to write a critical notice of his views

on ethics I have been or should have been defending my own."[29] In any case, the main sticking points for Sidgwick remained Bradley's inconsistent formulations of his key notion of Self, his "trite" views of hedonism, and his questionable methodology in ethics, which amounted to being prepared to "rely entirely on his own particular moral intuition allowing no appeal to any express principle or external standard" (Sidgwick 1877, 125). Sidgwick closed with the denigrating flourish that "I still dislike the quality of his rhetoric … which I think is sometimes introduced at important points so as to interfere with the closeness of his reasoning" (Sidgwick 1877, 126).

Bradley was not content to let Sidgwick have the last word, going to the trouble of privately publishing a pamphlet he titled "Mr. Sidgwick's Hedonism."[30] According to Hayward, "no criticism ever passed upon the *Methods* roused so deep a feeling in its author as Bradley's pamphlet," which Hayward described as an "elaborate and violent attack upon Sidgwick's leading principles … an almost complete refusal to recognize the undoubted merits of the *Methods of Ethics*."[31] Sidgwick never replied directly to Bradley's pamphlet, but may all the same have been sufficiently influenced by the criticisms to reformulate certain positions in subsequent editions of ME.[32] In the preface to the second edition, for instance, Sidgwick stated that some of his critics "disregarded" the plan of the book, and took him to be defending one method and assailing the other two of the three he takes as central. One reviewer took him to be attacking intuitionism, he claimed, one to be "suppressing" egoism;[33] while a third:

has gone to the length of a pamphlet under the impression (apparently) that the 'main argument' of my treatise is a demonstration of Universalistic Hedonism. I am concerned to have caused so much misdirection of criti-

---

[29] Sidgwick's reply (Sidgwick 1877) appears at the end of Bradley (1877b).

[30] Bradley (1877b).

[31] Hayward (1901b, 183)

[32] Hayward (1901b, 138–9), Schneewind (1977), Vincent (1999).

[33] This could also refer to Bradley, who titled a section of his pamphlet "The suppression of egoism" (1877b, 33).

cism: and I have carefully altered in this edition the passages which I perceive to have contributed to it. (ME, xii)

An essential element of discord between Bradley and Sidgwick (as indeed between Bradley, Stout, and Ward (Chaps. 1 and 2)) was that Bradley tended—especially in his early work—to assume a metaphysics entirely at odds with that of most of the Cambridge philosophers at this period. And as he did not fully flesh out his assumptions until his later work (PL and AR), ES, his first foray, appeared to its critics as relying illegitimately on this unstated metaphysics.[34] I will briefly summarize Bradley's main lines of attack in his dispute with Sidgwick here, which can start with Bradley's conception of the nature of philosophy or the nature of intellectual activity.

For Bradley this was dialectical, and his style of writing reflected rather than explained the dialectical process (identifying and incorporating contradiction, then resolution).[35] The general drift of Bradley's philosophical approach was thus from the start conceived in a way that would have tested Sidgwick's equanimity and his own no-frills analytical approach. There were moreover "mysterious logical chasms separating the Idealist metaphysics from the Idealist ethics and both from the Idealist practice,"[36] which encompassed a specific ontology of the self, relations, the whole, and ends. This can be roughly explained as follows: if the foundational question of metaphysics is how the one can be many,[37] Bradley's answer was: it cannot. This holism or monism tracked in two different ways across Bradley's thought. Since there is, according to Bradley, no sense to the notion that a so-called relation unifies or relates (it has no unifying power), then a metaphysical picture of individuals and their attributes in relations to other individuals and their attributes is incoherent. Importing this distorted metaphysics into the understanding of our judgments about reality compounds the mistake by (seemingly) distinguishing in thought what is not distinct in reality. Our concepts themselves are,

---

[34] Sidgwick was familiar with the general tenor of the neo-Hegelian metaphysics from disputes with Green.

[35] Vincent (1999); Vincent (2014).

[36] Schultz (2004, 354).

[37] Hayward (1901b, 153).

moreover, defective in making it seem as if we can abstract from things in reality and relate them together, and thus our judgments can never be quite true. For Bradley, there are no independent individuals somehow held together by relations, and there are no independent concepts or ideas somehow held together by a copula.[38] Bradley's overarching monism features in his ethics in that (among other things) he rejects a conception of an individual self, with individual pleasures that form an end (whether universal or egoistic). Thus, moral philosophy, in Bradley's view, is nothing like Sidgwick's conception of a patient and rational examination of the principles that underlie our common sense conceptions of duty and rightness. Rather, for Bradley, moral philosophy is a process that highlights imperfection, lack, and contradiction in the self, which strives (somehow) towards an end that represents completeness and wholeness, in a unique self-undermining or "self-cancelling" activity.[39]

Bradley's specific criticisms centred on Sidgwick's use of the notions of reason, practical reason, the desirable and pleasure, and the conception of a moral end. On the definition of "reason," Bradley found Sidgwick ambiguous: is it the faculty of apprehending universal truth or the faculty of cognizing objective truth? *Is* objective truth universal? (1877b, 10). On "practical reason," Bradley wondered how it is that "reason can order" (in the sense that Sidgwick wanted to defend, which is distinct from desire or sensation): "In morality we prescribe to and dictate to ourselves … how can reason do this …? If we abstract from desire and will, what is left of 'end' and 'ought' and 'imperative'? … what is it after all which gives the end?" (1877b, 11–12). These questions spurred Bradley to accuse Sidgwick both of begging an essential question and of an irrelevant conclusion in giving what Bradley took as the following argument with respect to desire, pleasure, and ends: "happiness or pleasure is desirable feeling or consciousness; and what is desirable is good or end; therefore, pleasure is end or good" (1877b, 17). Worse than that: Bradley also took Sidgwick to conflate the desired and desirable (and thus conflate the descriptive with the normative) and so, according to Bradley, was forced to try to abstract pleasantness from the pleasant. But for Bradley, there

---

[38] Candlish and Basile (2021).

[39] Vincent (2014).

was no abstracting from a subjective, qualitative, individual state. On this point, Bradley rejected Sidgwick's formulation of the greatest sum of pleasures (1877b, 17–18), with his own claim that "the Good must be a whole, and that hence a mere aggregate is not the Good … the Hedonistic end is a mere addition of particulars" (1877b, 19). Things deteriorated from there, when Bradley accused Sidgwick of shifting notions in midstream, as it were. The "thesis to be proved [was] that mere pleasure is the end … Mr. Sidgwick writes conscious life for pleasure and adds desirable to the definition." What Sidgwick's tactics amounted to, according to Bradley, were a dubious way to get from egoistic hedonism, via universalization, to Utilitarianism. He formulated the argument on Sidgwick's behalf as: "My pleasure is not a reasonable end, pleasure in general is not mine, therefore pleasure in general is a reasonable end" (1877b, 37).

The relation of theory to practice was also a point of contention between Bradley and Sidgwick. Sidgwick took this to be something that could be systematically investigated, with the result that we uncover rational, and even self-evident, principles from which we can then derive rules of conduct. Morality is thus "the embodiment of the demands that reason makes on practice under the conditions of human life."[40] His position was that reason directs us to seek out an end (a good), via self-evident intuitive insights. In Sidgwick's particular case, this turned out to be a semi-Kantian categorical imperative to bring about the greatest happiness for all. Bradley rejected this picture of reason and practice entirely. For one thing, for Bradley, reasoning was a process of illegitimate abstraction—logical universalization was a fiction. Bradley even turned Sidgwick's most vexing puzzle against him: where Sidgwick tried to cohere powerful intuitions of self-interest and duty, Bradley maintained somewhat smugly that for all that, Sidgwick's much-vaunted rational intuition in effect collapsed into contradictory principles that could not possibly apply to practice. As far as positing ends for ethical practice, moreover, Bradley asserted that "pleasure" as an end required a view of an individual self (which Bradley rejected as incoherent); there can be no abstracting from my pleasure to a general or universal pleasure; and there can be no "greatest sum" of pleasure overall, since we cannot create a sum

---

[40] Schneewind (1977, 303–4).

of something that in itself is transient (our specific subjective instances of pleasure). And if that were not enough, Bradley also maintained that ethical science was not about practice, but only understanding. Finally, Bradley alleged that Sidgwick's view of ethical science fell afoul of the relation of morality to law. For one thing, laws abstract and must do so; morality may not (1877b, 40). The consequences for Sidgwick, who did not apparently see this, were what Bradley called Sidgwick's "Hedonistic casuistry … 'objective rightness' becomes in fact merely subjective"; "All that is left of the 'system of objective rules' is this. Having judged an act to be the means to the greatest pleasure, you add to your judgment the superfluous, if not senseless formula, And if any one else were I, it would be right for him to judge and act as I do. Then you may call the act Right and Duty" (1877b, 45).

The issues that emerge in the dispute between Sidgwick and Bradley help to make sense of the nature of Sidgwick's influence on Moore, as Moore developed his conception of ethics and its metaphysical basis. One was Sidgwick's account of "the moral spring of action," and its relevance to Kant's notion of freedom. The wider metaphysical/ethical question at stake is how reason is practical at all.[41] This question stymied Kant enough to return to it in a number of different places; preliminarily in the *Critique of Pure Reason*; then in (among others) his successive works on morality.[42] Moore himself described the effort of composing his Trinity Fellowship dissertations as starting with Kant on freedom, which ultimately proved to require further exertion with respect to Kant on reason (1942, 22). The eighteenth and nineteenth century ethical thinkers certainly hotly disputed the distinction between reason and the passions, framing the discussion in terms of impulse and motive. Causation was a problematic concept; clearly mechanical concepts of causation would not do to explain the "moral springs of action," but nobody denied that somehow or another, a variety of elements like obligation, duty, virtue, goodness, desire, and so on had a moral causal force of some kind. Thinkers at this period even seemed to find it easier to account for the

---

[41] "The 'question of questions' in ethics is whether or not reason can act as a motive to the will" Sorley (1904, 16).

[42] *Groundwork of a Metaphysics of Morals* (1785); *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788); *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797). See Kant (1996, 1998).

presumably sort-of-causal force of the passions than to account for the practical force of reason. Hume and Bentham, for instance, uncritically accepted that "passions" or desires are "springs of action" (Sidgwick 1907, Introduction); even more strongly, that there is no way to explain why we do the things we do except via passions or desires. Reason was thought of as (maybe) what we (often fail to) resist *succumbing* to passions with. This suggests that, at least in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a connection between passion and action was simply assumed, and that the tough one to explain, thanks to the normative feature of specifically ethical reasoning, was the connection between *reason* and moral action.[43]

Some of the flavour of this puzzle appears in Hayward's discussions of Sidgwick. For instance: Hayward claimed that Sidgwick "assumes, without entering into the psychology of the process involved, that reason is 'practical' as well as 'speculative,' as did Kant" (1901a, 175). Hayward a bit haplessly went on to remark that "the subject is an extremely difficult one" (1901b, 27); and that "the whole question belongs to psychology and is likely to remain perplexing until that science is in a more satisfactory state than it is at present … we know that ideas *do* influence conduct; cognitions, even abstract cognitions *do* pass into action … [B]ut the exact relation between the cognitive and the emotional or active sides of our nature … these are questions still somewhat obscure" (1901b, 194–95).

Bradley was ferocious in his criticism of Sidgwick on this point. His own metaphysics of dialectical monistic ideal activity definitionally ruled out an empirical account of cause and effect. For Bradley, the problem of how reason formulates non-subjective genuine imperatives on us is moot; freedom and determinism are actually irrelevant; ethics does not concern conduct, still less self-evident rules of conduct that emerge in a genuinely binding way from our own rational deliberations. Kant and Sidgwick of course both accepted that reason (or, in Kant's case, some practical simulacrum of reason) could play the role of "moral spring of action." But they differed dramatically in their account of this role. For Kant, the issue turned on the nature of noumenal as opposed to mechanical or empirical

---

[43] It may be possible, treading carefully, to use contemporary formulations (for instance (Davidson 1963)) to help explain Moore's thinking on this complex issue. See Chap. 4.

causation. Sidgwick was entirely unimpressed by this, mainly because in his view (as in the case of his objections to Bradley) Kant's discussion was based on what (to Sidgwick) was a problematic metaphysical underpinning.

Before I turn to Sidgwick and his engagement with Kant and Kantian thought, I should pause to underscore here is that one reason the history of analytic philosophy has been subject to murky reconstruction—even in the hands of those who inaugurated it—is precisely that formulations of its foundational concepts during this period were subject to obscurity, incoherence, *and* interconnection. As we have seen, even though Ward and Stout were violently antagonistic towards Bradley's attempts at psychology, logic, and the nature of judgment, as melding in a suspect idealist metaphysics, they both all the same went on to develop a metaphysics that they considered to be independent of their analyses of judgment and scientific psychology—and it was not un-Idealist. We saw that Stout, like Lotze, could be described as defending, overall, an *Ideal Realismus*, and that even his most loyal defenders could not help but note that he seemed determined to find a role for every philosophical position on the map in his own later work.[44] Ward himself had had an early brief theological inclination, then a spiritual crisis, and by 1899 in his first set of Gifford lectures, delivered a criticism of scientific materialism. His second set of Gifford lectures (1911) was a criticism of *both* scientific materialism and monistic idealism, which ultimately resulted for Ward in a metaphysical ideal pluralism. Something like this could also be said for Sidgwick with respect to his ethics.[45] Sidgwick to be sure never embraced any sort of idealist metaphysics. But one area of arguably common ground, for instance, can be seen in both Bradley's and Sidgwick's rejection of the role of sensation in ethics. Along with Stout and Ward, all were united in their opposition to the atomistic and associationist picture of mental activity of the classical empiricists, as well as the psychological egoism and the empiricism that characterized the earlier utilitarians.[46] It could be said that Moore's (and Russell's) environment at Cambridge was engaged with

---

[44] Broad (1945); Mace (1945, 1946, 1954).
[45] See Dewey (1974) and Collini (1975).
[46] Schultz (2004).

every philosophical dispute of the day. All the same, however, at Cambridge, what held sway was a tenacious fidelity to anti-psychologism and to the probity of science and scientific method.

While it is not news that the role of Sidgwick's views had a considerable influence on the way that Moore came to approach ethics, I want to examine it in greater detail in order to emphasise that (1) Sidgwick's examination(s) of Kant were substantive in shaping Moore's thinking away from any initial attraction to aspects of Bradleyan idealism; (2) that Sidgwick firmly rejected Bradleyan and Kantian metaphysics as suspect from a common sense (read: scientifically oriented) point of view; and (3) perhaps most importantly, that Sidgwick unrepentantly resisted Kantian transcendental arguments. These elements of Sidgwick's influence complemented and intersected with the anti-psychologistic perspective on Kantian and Bradleyan thinking that Moore received from Stout and Ward; and, I would argue, is the best way to explain how Moore developed his watershed views of the nature of judgment in 1898.

4   Sidgwick on Kant

As we discussed in Chap. 2, the so-called Copernican standpoint was one source of the widespread critical imputation of psychologism to Kant from his eighteenth and nineteenth century critics. Although Kant himself attempted to thwart that imputation with (among other things) the inclusion of "The Refutation of Idealism" to the B edition of the Critique,[47] this made little impact on his critics. In England, the most notable of the nineteenth century critics was Sidgwick. As we noted in Chap. 2, Walsh (1981) characterized Sidgwick's Kant criticism as containing the essential seeds of an attack not only on Kant's (implicit) transcendental psychology but also on the very possibility of a critical philosophy—that is, transcendentalism in general—itself. We need to examine this construal of Sidgwick's approach more closely, to see how this line of criticism could have impacted Moore's developing thought.

---

[47] Kant (1998, 326–9).

Sidgwick's critical views on Kant were represented variously throughout his Tripos lecture courses. Many of these views were worked up into articles which appeared mostly in *Mind* from the late 1870s to 1900. *Methods of Ethics* closes with an Appendix on "The Kantian Conception of Free Will"; the original paper had appeared in *Mind* in 1888, but Sidgwick adapted and made use of the main points throughout other work as well. In 1905, Ward edited and published a set of Sidgwick's lectures on Kant and other figures (Sidgwick 1905). These included a comprehensive account of Kantian metaphysics (12 lectures in all), ranging from the Critical Standpoint through the Transcendental Aesthetic, Analytic, and Dialectic, the Rational Psychology, and the Antinomies. And perhaps no better confirmation of Sidgwick's claim to proficiency in Kantian analysis can come from his account of the project of ME: to try to *ground* a moral choice between general happiness or acquiescence in self- interest (ME, xix)[48]:

> In this state of mind I read Kant's Ethics again: I had before read it somewhat unintelligently, under the influence of Mill's view as to its "grotesque failure". I now read it more receptively … What commended itself to me … was Kant's ethical principle rather than its metaphysical basis.

In what follows I will examine some of the work that Sidgwick published between 1878 and 1889, which illustrates the general tenor of his Kant criticism, and then turn to the development of Sidgwick's views in ME.

In 1886, Sidgwick published a short treatise titled "Outlines of the History of Ethics for British Readers," (OHE) which was "altered and enlarged" from his entry on "Ethics" in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1878).[49] In it, he takes on the whole history of ethics, beginning with a "General Account of the Subject," and moving through early chapters on Greco-Roman ethics; Christianity and Medieval ethics; and pausing in

---

[48] Apparently, according to Sidgwick, Butler's views helped him to find the "support and intellectual sympathy" he had required from Kant. Moore's PE takes a quotation from Butler as an epigraph.

[49] Contributions to the *Britannica* at this period were by leading intellectuals and of superior academic quality (recall Ward (1886)). Singer (1992) has noted that, according to collectors, the eleventh edition represents a pinnacle of the Edwardian worldview (some entries very eyebrow-raising now).

detail on what he calls "Modern, Chiefly English Ethics."[50] The English ethicists are represented in vast number: from Bacon to Mill, passing through Cudworth, Cumberland, Locke, Clarke, Shaftesbury, Butler, Hutcheson, Hume, Hartley, Price, Reid, Whewell, Spencer, Tucker, Paley, Reid, and Green (Bradley did not make the cut). The book ends with a short discussion of both French and German influence on English Ethics, and a more-than-passing discussion of Kant and Hegel's ethical systems. There are two things to note about Sidgwick's discussion here: (1) his introductory thoughts on the relation of psychology and ethics and (2) his critique of Kant's ethics, which we will see remains consistent throughout his work.

After noting that Ethics was to be distinguished from Theology or "the study of Absolute Good," (1886, 2) and partly distinguished from Politics (1886, 2), Sidgwick turns to Ethics and Psychology (1886, 4):

> for the purposes of ethical contemplation, a different relation of Ethics comes prominently into view—its relation, namely to Psychology, the study of the human soul or mind … almost all ethical schools would agree that the main object of their investigation must belong to the psychical side of human life … I have spoken of man's good as being the object of rational choice or aim; meaning thereby to distinguish it from the objects of merely sensual and emotional impulses … but this conception of 'Reason choosing' or 'impelling' is found on reflection to be involved in difficulties … hence careful psychological analysis is found to be necessary to make clear the normal operation of Intellect in the action which we call reasonable … in fact, we may say that all important ethical notions are also psychological; except perhaps the fundamental antitheses of 'good' and 'bad,' 'right' and 'wrong' with which psychology, as it treats of what is and not of what ought to be, is not directly concerned.

Kant's influence on "English moralists," at least according to Sidgwick, was fairly scarce until 50 years or so after the publication of the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) and *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788).[51] But Sidgwick

---

[50] OHE went to five editions, the last one posthumous. Singer (1992) has argued that Sidgwick was among the first, with this book, to address the need for a systematic study of the history of ethics.
[51] OHE, 259.

went on to claim that "careful study of his ethical system by the English moralists" has led to "continually increasing interest in the products of the German mind which Englishmen have shown in the last 40 years" (OHE, 259). Sidgwick even demoted Kant's standing, stating that Reid and Price played the role in British moral writings that Kant's played in Germany, and went on to note what all three figures had in common. This is motive *from* duty (not natural inclination), the only condition that determines the moral worth of an action. Reason is the only thing that can set and compel "immediate obligation in terms of conduct" and—what Sidgwick calls "the only original part of Kant's doctrine"—is that all rules of duty "must be deduced from the one general principle that duty ought to be done for duty's sake" (OHE, 260; 264).

Sidgwick's analyses of the Kantian enterprise emphasized themes that were universal throughout his Kant criticism. He summarized Kant's ethical views as asserting that reason issues "categorical imperatives" (1886, 260); "an action is not good unless done from a good motive" … "duty, to be duty, must be done for duty's sake" (1886, 260). Moreover, according to Kant, "… purely rational volition is possible …" and "… my action can be determined, not 'mechanically,' … in accordance with the laws of my true, reasonable self." A problem, however, according to Sidgwick, was that "if we ask what precisely are the ends of reason … Kant's proposition that 'all rational beings as such are ends in themselves for every rational being' hardly gives a clear answer" (1886, 262). Even more disquieting, as Sidgwick saw it, was that "in the Kantian system the certitude of … fundamental beliefs rests on an ethical basis alone; we cannot, strictly speaking, *know* them to be true, but we must *assume* them to be true in order to fulfill rationally what we recognize as 'categorical imperatives' of the practical reason" (1886, 264).

An example of one debate concerning Kant's ethical views at this period involved Sidgwick, Edward Caird, and Arthur Balfour as disputants.[52] Their discussion raged scathingly across five issues of *Mind* between 1878 and 1880. Balfour had taken an initial shot across the bow of his Kantian contemporaries with an examination of Kantian transcendentalism

---

[52] Arthur James Balfour was a student of Sidgwick's. He went on to become Prime Minister (1902–1905). Sidgwick's wife was Balfour's sister.

(1878), where he took aim at both the transcendental proof of the external world (1878, 499) and the transcendental proof of the law of causation, in part by way of a focus of Caird's study of Kant (Caird 1889). One of Balfour's main criticisms (unsurprisingly) was that "the rules which thought was supposed to impress upon nature, according to which nature must be, because without them she would be nothing to us as thinking beings,--these rules turn out, after all, to be only of subjective validity" (1878, 489).[53] So, Balfour asserted, it is no surprise that there is "the difficulty which most philosophers feel in understanding how that which is an immediate object of perception can be other than *in consciousness*, a difficulty which is certainly not lessened by the Kantian theory of space" with which "Kant himself makes no attempt to deal" (1878, 499). As to causation, Balfour is even less impressed: Kant's transcendental argument requires that, in order to determine objectively what must precede and what must follow in perception, there must be some kind of conformity to a *rule*. Balfour remonstrated that what Kant did was draw an illegitimate inference from the subjective succession of phenomena in apprehension to some kind of objective "coexistence" which constitutes a thing in space; and *then* an objective succession which constitutes a series of events. Thus, Kant tried to argue that the experience of objective events is only possible if we *presuppose* the law of causation. Even Caird, Balfour noted, realized that this argument was at best hypothetical and did little to establish the objectivity of any law of causation (1878, 500).

Caird replied with little patience, but (it must be said) not much argument (1879a). Caird argued that Balfour misunderstood Kant's edict that an object of knowledge must be capable of being thought as an object to a conscious subject (by way of rules impressed by thought on nature, as above), and that Balfour was wrong to take it that "being capable of so being thought" undermines the transcendental argument. Caird's objection was that the *rules* themselves do not have to be objects of knowledge in order to be the necessary condition for knowledge (1879a, 112), and

---

[53] And worse: "… the defects of his exposition are so great that no care will really avert this danger; for he has contrived to state a theory—of great difficulty in itself, and of which his own grasp does not appear to have been at all time perfectly sure—in language which always seems to be struggling to express a meaning which it can never get quite clear, and which possesses an astonishing degree the peculiarity of being technical without being precise" (Balfour 1878, 491).

argued that Balfour conflated Berkeleyan Idealism with Kantian Idealism to press his (Balfour's) point. Caird defended Kant as *not* confused about the distinction between externality to consciousness and externality in space, because transcendentalism makes the issue of existence of things in themselves independent of consciousness "pointless" (1879a, 112). Caird, in addition, adopted a similar point towards Balfour's criticism of the Kantian conception of logic. According to Caird, Balfour claimed that transcendentalism merely assumes that knowledge is possible (via the Transcendental Logic) when it should be giving a *theory* of knowledge. Caird's answer was that the nature of knowledge is of a unique kind, such that "the laws of Logic are reached simply by bringing to clear consciousness … the principles involved in our actual thinking" (1879a, 113).[54]

It was at this point that Sidgwick (1879) joined the fray by tackling Caird's understanding of Kantian idealism. Caird had affirmed on Kant's behalf that the question of whether or not there is an existence of things in themselves independent of our perception of them is "meaningless" (Sidgwick 1879, 409). The *real* question, according to Caird, and as formulated in Kant's refutation of idealism, was whether or not we have consciousness of objects in space prior to the explicit consciousness of self as an object. But Sidgwick rejected Caird's attempt to make Kant's views coherent (Sidgwick 1879, 410). Idealism, Sidgwick claimed, is inevitably understood to apply to views concerning the existence of things. Moreover, even *Kant* thought so, formulating *transcendental* idealism to accommodate his own position that, as concerning the existence of things, "it never came into my head to doubt them." However that may be, Sidgwick claimed that in spite of this professed conviction concerning the objective existence of things, Kant *did* "run into one" the two notions of "externality to consciousness" and "externality in space" (410). Kant claimed that he wanted to prove a "theorem" to the effect that "empirically determined consciousness of my own existence proves the existence

---

[54]To these criticisms (in a note tacked on to Caird (1879a)) Balfour shrugged: "My contention is that, in many of the cases of so-called transcendental necessity, the relation under which we are told an object has to be thought before it can be anything to a thinking being, is one under which … it is *not* thought" (Balfour 1879, 115). Moreover, he rejected the use of "idealism" to apply to the philosophy of Kant rather than to Berkeley's, "as Mr. Caird and Mr. Green habitually do" (1879a, 115).

of external objects in space" (410), but in the (alleged) proof, Sidgwick argued, Kant's language did not sufficiently distinguish between things external to me (i.e., in space) and things external to my consciousness or perception, and thus it fails.[55]

Caird (1879b) answered Sidgwick in a manner that we will see repeated in his examiners' report on Moore's 1897 dissertation (Chap. 4): that, in effect, any seeming conflation or unclarity in Kant's text can be made coherent by a proper respect to context (1879b, 557). He conceded that the whole point of Kant's transcendental argument was to "do away with" things in themselves. But his main objection to Sidgwick was that Kant did not attempt to deduce (transcendentally or otherwise) the existence of things in themselves as objects of experience, in the Refutation of Idealism (B edition). Caird maintained that, for Kant, trying to deduce the existence of phenomenal objects in space would have indeed been "unmeaning," because it must be understood, according to Caird, that "the problem of the relation of inner to outer experience takes for Kant the place which in previous philosophy had been given to the problem of the relation of consciousness to things outside of consciousness" (1879b, 558).

The crux of the argument between Caird, Balfour, and Sidgwick here was what Kant could have meant by "without us" and whether or not this meant "external to our consciousness *and* in space" or merely "external to our ideas of ourselves" (from which it need not follow that such ideas are ideas of objects in space, nor that there are any). Caird read Kant to attribute "two meanings" to any presumed contrast between "my ideas" and "things outside of me." That is, according to Caird, there was a sense in which Kant argued that we know only that which is in our consciousness; but Kant also insisted that we do know things apart from ourselves. Caird read Kant's Transcendental Deduction as the attempt to show that our consciousness of objects is not a matter of sense but of *self*: "in so far as the one self manifests itself … which binds together the manifold of sense by means of the Categories" (1879b, 558). The unity of apperception, that is, blends away the distinction between "things outside of us" and

---

[55] See Morris and Preti (2015) on Moore (1939), where we argue that this distinction is at the heart of Moore's argument and helps to make sense of it.

"our ideas." Thus Caird's reading tried to support the position that Kant's idealism was not the Berkeleyan error of making *percipi* and not *intelligi* the *esse* of things (1879b, 558): "to Kant … individual subjectivity is merely one of the objects of experience, which we know in distinction from, yet in relation to, the other objects of experience." This is because, as Caird saw it, Kant was arguing against Descartes, not Berkeley, in his Refutation of Idealism: Kant argued that it was mistaken to claim that we can only infer the existence of things external to us. Rather, it is *precisely* in being conscious of our own ideas that the consciousness of objects in space is presupposed. Furthermore: the noumenon or the *Ding an Sich* should be understood as a limit to our empirical knowledge, but was more importantly at the core of Kant's conception of freedom, which relied on an "immovable moral law" to secure the operations of reason, and, in particular, was a necessary condition for *practical* reason.

Sidgwick replied (1880) curtly, dismissing Caird's attempt to re-construct coherence for Kant on the questions of things-in-themselves, objects outside of us, and objects in space by placing passages from the *Prolegomena* and from the *Refutation of Idealism* in the B Critique side by side (1880, 112–3): "I maintain … that it is simply incredible … that he should in the two replies have used the same cardinal terms in different senses, with a perfect consciousness of their equivocality and yet without giving a hint of it to the reader."[56] Further, Sidgwick professed to be perplexed by Caird's attribution of the refutation of idealism argument as a counter to Descartes' and not Berkeley's idealism. Descartes made the point that I have a clear and distinct intuition that my mind exists; no such clear and distinct intuition attaches to the material world. It is no satisfying answer to Descartes, as Sidgwick formulated the Kantian answer, that "I will show you how [matter] is constructed by the synthetic action of your thinking self out of your passive feelings: but I show too that you are necessitated to think of it as something distinct from your individual mind" (1880, 114). Caird was given more or less the last word (Caird 1880, 115): that although Sidgwick argued that in the Refutation of Idealism Kant only proved (if at all) that external experience is as real

---

[56] Sidgwick also swats away Adamson (1879) as failing to address his objections even more obviously than Caird (Sidgwick 1880, 114).

as internal experience, and does not prove, though he took himself to prove, that things-in-themselves are real, that this cannot be so, and mis-reads Kant's direction of argument. The only thing that Kant was trying to prove, according to Caird, was that external experience cannot be less immediate than internal experience, since the latter presupposes the for-mer (Caird 1880, 115).

This dispute highlights Sidgwick's unwavering refusal to allow Caird to defend his (particular and idiosyncratic) idealist reading of Kant. Sidgwick's emphasis was strongly on the coherence of Kant's view con-cerning the reality of things outside of consciousness and the unique (not to say unargued for) view that these are somehow psychologically deter-mined in nature. Sidgwick didn't stint on this line of criticism, either. In 1883a and 1883b, 1888, and 1889, Sidgwick went on the offensive with attacks on the Critical Philosophy, Free Will, and Kantian transcenden-talism. His two-part (1883a, b) featured the argument that there are "radical defects" in the procedure of critical philosophy (1883a, 71); his 1888 became an Appendix in ME; and in 1889 Sidgwick underscored his position that Kant's conception of freedom collapses into ambiguity and irrelevance.

In 1883a and 1883b, Sidgwick's line of criticism of Kant swept along in its wake the work of English Kantian scholars (he cites Adamson, Caird, Wallace, and Watson), and their celebration of what they call the Critical Philosophy, with whom and with which he had little forbear-ance.[57] Sidgwick's general criticism is one that is not unfamiliar (by now): namely, that Kant's own system fails to meet its own critical criteria.[58] Sidgwick wanted to know how the Critical Philosophy was to be proved and did not see, he argued, how Kant's own reasoning managed to dodge the criticisms he himself levelled at what counted as the legitimate exer-cise of reason (1883a, 74). Worse yet, Kant appeared to assume at the *outset* of his own procedure that there were cognitions that are really valid knowledge ("Unless the Critical Philosopher can first explain how *his*

---

[57] Sidgwick does commend Stirling as an exception, "who considers Kant's method 'a laborious, baseless, inapplicable, futile superfetation.'"

[58] Even if Sidgwick and the rest of Moore's teachers were wrong about Kant, what matters here is that *Moore* was influenced by how Kant was read at Cambridge.

knowledge is possible, he would seem to be only a dogmatist of a new kind" (1883a, 74)). The problem, as Sidgwick saw it, was that we do not get a consistent account of what Kant meant by the claim that we have "experience of objects" since (for one thing) he does not mean that we know things are as they are (1883a, 84). Sidgwick's main criticism here is (I would argue) telling (1883a, 85):

> I cannot regard as psychologically accurate Kant's account of two successive mental acts involved in any empirical judgement—*first* the judgment of perception, and *then* the reference to an object … I should be willing to accept "objective validity" as merely meaning "universal validity." But I do not understand how Kant can with consistency assert that conversely, a universally valid judgment must be a judgment expressing some property of the object.

Sidgwick here did not hesitate to exploit then-contemporary psychology's understanding of the mind and mental content to the Kantian account of the mind and its objects. He came down even harder on Kant's account of our experience of objects as depending on the account of Space and Time as "mental forms" (1883a, 87). Sidgwick took the view that while it may be indubitable that apprehension of things outside of me requires a notion of space, he does not see how this proves the notion of space as "already there" (1883a, 87). Much apparently turned on the interpretation of "already there," with Caird, among other Kant scholars, taking this to mean *logically presupposed* rather than conceding to the more problematic *subjective in nature*. Kant's thought experiment—space must be necessary because we cannot abolish or annihilate it when we think (1883a, 88)—was less than convincing, according to Sidgwick. This is because while it is quite plausible that I cannot conceive of space as annihilated, it does not follow that it is "a mere form of my—or of human—cognition, but something that exists independently of my cognition of it" (1883a, 89). Notably, in Sidgwick's view, Kant's reasoning "seems … to involve, in a subtle form, that confusion between psychical and physical facts which has been so fruitful a source of error in theories of cognition" (1883a, 90).

In 1883(b), Sidgwick continued this line of attack on the argument in the Transcendental Analytic that purported to establish more forcefully once more that the necessary conditions of experience are the forms of Space and Time. Sidgwick found this problematic, stressing Kant's conflations and ambiguities concerning the nature of an object, as captured in the notion of *Vorstellung*.[59] Sidgwick's main line of attack throughout this work was to underscore the ambiguities that (according to Sidgwick), Kant took advantage of (or, worse, was not aware of). In the disputes above, the ambiguities in Kant identified by Sidgwick centred on the concept of object, object of judgment, and object of knowledge. That Sidgwick was able to employ this kind of criticism was precisely because the perspective he brought to the nature of knowledge, the mind, thought, and its objects sidestepped the excesses of British metaphysics and was much more closely aligned to the (then-)contemporary scientific psychological account we have seen underscored above by Stout and Ward, to the issues treated by Kant.

Sidgwick reserved much of his most pointed criticism of Kant on the role of free will in ethics. Although the idea for Moore's 1897 dissertation on Kant's conception of Freedom apparently came from a suggestion from Ward (Moore 1942, 16), Sidgwick's own line of criticism turns up explicitly in Moore's first dissertation draft. The main features of this criticism concern the (i) the formulation of free will; (ii) the "peculiar" causal role of free will in Kant's ethical system (Sidgwick 1888, 407); and (iii) the notion of transcendental freedom that was meant to resolve both (i) and (ii) in Kant's thought. We will focus more explicitly below on the formulation of freedom in Kant, and, in particular, the problem of causation in Kant's formulation of free will, in our discussion of Moore's line of attack on Kant on Freedom in Chap. 4. For now, we can note that Sidgwick discussed Kant on Free Will quite regularly in his ethical writings, and dedicated an entire chapter to it in ME. A comparison of his brief remarks on Kant's ethics in Sidgwick (1886) with Sidgwick (1888) shows that Sidgwick's reservations about the role free will in Kantian ethics and ethics in general remained steady. In a footnote in (1886, 262), Sidgwick wrote:

---

[59] See Chap. 1.

> Notwithstanding the fundamental importance of the notion of freedom in Kant's ethical system, it does not appear to me possible to state this part of his doctrine distinctly and consistently; because his exposition of it seems to me to contain a confusion between two notions of freedom … (1) the Freedom that is only realised in right conduct, when reason successfully resists the seductions of appetite or passion, and (2) the Freedom to choose between right and wrong, which is equally realised in either choice. It is Freedom in the latter sense, not in the former, that Libertarians have commonly regarded as inseparably connected to moral responsibility.

Sidgwick (1888) similarly argued that Kant's notion of freedom, central to his conception of morality, failed in a number of different ways: (1) it is actually *two* different notions, according to Sidgwick, which Kant conflated throughout his ethical writings; and (2) it falls afoul of what Sidgwick calls "a peculiar metaphysical doctrine of a double kind of causation in human actions" (1888, 407). Sidgwick claimed not to object to the overarching Kantian position that to be free is to be rational, but that if the claim is that one is a free agent insofar as they act rationally, then it cannot also be claimed that it is by one's own free choice that one acts irrationally when one does act (1888, 406). Sidgwick argued that we have to concede that one is free, if free at all, to choose wrongly: there is a freedom we manifest in doing right, and a freedom that is manifested equally in choosing either right or wrong (1888, 407). The main problem for Kant, Sidgwick argued, was that he "relies on" both, depending on what he is claiming. When Kant wants to connect freedom to moral responsibility, he supports the free choice formulation of freedom (Sidgwick calls this "neutral" or "moral" freedom); but when he wants to ground the possibility of "disinterested obedience to Law as such" and the "independence of reason," he explicitly identifies freedom with the independence of reason (1888, 408).

Sidgwick was reluctant to take the free will/determinism debate as a central or fundamental concept of ethics. He strongly rejected Hume's naturalist position that morality was a matter of feeling, against which reason was powerless to influence the will. For Sidgwick, morality was centred on moral judgment, and the question that concerned him centred on the role of judgment in ethical/moral deliberation and intention.

But by rejecting Hume's model in favour of a central role for moral judgment, Sidgwick (as others before and after) had to answer some pressing questions: How is moral judgment defined? Is it reducible to matters of empirical fact (like psychical facts)? If moral judgment is irreducible to matters of empirical fact (such as mental/psychological ones), as Sidgwick did believe, how is it formulated? Can moral judgment by itself motivate action? If it formulated in terms of special non-reductive normative notions like *should* or *ought* (as Sidgwick did believe), how do *those* motivate action? Is motive a central concept? Is motive distinct from intention? Is motive distinct from cause? Does it make sense to talk about causation in the context of defending reason as the "moral spring of action"? What is the role of duty? How are we to understand a *rational* agent, who recognizes that it is right to do a certain action, and at the same time, grasps a *reason* for doing it—and how that reason produces the action as outcome? These are the questions that Moore began to grapple with in preparation for his Tripos and then the work on his dissertation. We turn to a brief look at ME before going on to Moore's notes on Sidgwick's ethics lectures.

5   Methods of Ethics

The main issues at the forefront of Sidgwick's ethical preoccupations were (1) a critical assessment of commonly accepted moral beliefs; (2) an examination of the potential foundations of such criticism; and (3) a series of methodological questions as to how to settle such issues. The meta-procedure that evolved into ME was formed in Sidgwick's attempt to base a version of utilitarianism on a foundation that was neither mystical, wrongly egoistical, nor issued from some form of faith-based authority (Schneewind 1977). Although initially attracted by Mill's utilitarianism as a strategy for addressing these preoccupations, Sidgwick was troubled by the egoism that he took to be one of its central psychological pillars (Sidgwick et al. 1906). The challenge was thus to either reconcile Utilitarian theory with some more defensible moral grounding (prime candidates of the day being self-interest or intuition/common sense); or to reject those and discover others.

To situate Sidgwick's ethics in its philosophical and historical context, we should describe the intellectual atmosphere in which he was forging it. At Cambridge, Whewell was a noted defender of (one kind of) intuitionism: the view that, in general, there were self-evident truths that were given to intuition and immediately graspable as true, and which themselves supported other truths. This is hardly innovative or unusual in philosophy, but *ethical* or philosophical intuitionism like Reid's (for instance), sometimes further employed a set of common sense beliefs or truths as candidates for these sorts of foundational intuitions (Schneewind 1977, 74). The intuitionists were not the only ones who did so, however: Mill took the rules of common sense as the bedrock for evading the so-called dualism of practical reason problem that arises for utilitarianism. This is (in a strong version) that it might seem to require us to sacrifice our own self- interest for the interest of others; or (in a weaker version) that it highlights a conflict between acting in one's own self-interest as opposed to the interests of all.

A form of common sense morality was very much at the centre of the ethical controversies of this period.[60] Common sense beliefs were taken by both intuitionists and classical utilitarians to provide a set of convictions from which a foundational set of practical principles could be constructed. These convictions were *de facto* taken by the parties to these debates both as perfectly binding and valid cornerstones upon which to build an ethical theory, but they also appeared to provide a kind of consensus on the *sorts* of things that could work in project of supplying a set of practical principles. As Sidgwick saw it, the main problem was to determine to what extent morality might be systematized by taking (alleged) common sense self-evidence as its basis (Schneewind 1977, 62). Sidgwick, however, was not convinced that common sense rules could ever provide the transition from the abstract principles of a theory— assuming that these could be made clear—to protocols for what we ought to do in a specific case. Sidgwick even thought of this as an "insoluble" problem of ethics: the problem of how to get from a formal, logical, philosophically coherent ethical judgment to an actual prescription for conduct. However that was to be done, Sidgwick took the view that

---

[60] See Schneewind (1977, 191–214).

neither the Whewellian or Reidian versions of moral intuitionism, nor the Millian version of utilitarianism, could succeed.

5.1   The Method of *Methods of Ethics*

ME represents in part Sidgwick's examination of whether (or indeed how) intuitional morality fails to provide the right kind of abstract formal principles for the self-evident truths of ethical reasoning and what principles could be defended instead.[61] Sidgwick conceived of ME as a scientific or even technical treatise on ethics: an ethical science (Schneewind 1977, 191).[62] The examination was conceived to be methodical and as exacting as possible: "a complete and reasoned synthesis of practical principles" (ME, 2). The main objective was to clarify issues that arose in the attempt to construct a *system* of ethics, but what such a system needed to contain was also one of those issues. Since Sidgwick did assume that considerations about what ought to be done were at the foundation of ethical first principles, for him, *prospective* judgments were more important than *retrospective* judgments: judgments about actions were logically more important than judgments about persons (and properties like remorse, guilt, responsibility, merit, and blameworthiness).[63] Moreover, the basic foundation of ethical reasoning, according to Sidgwick, could not be derived from or reduced to non-ethical premises (he ruled out a foundation in epistemology and in psychology as too descriptive): whatever else they were, they needed to be simple, unique, self-evident, and even indefinable.[64]

In this way, Sidgwick conceived of a system of ethics that would start with and investigate a variety of methods of ethics, in order ultimately to arrive at consensus or agreement on moral matters. Sidgwick approved of

---

[61] See ME (Book III). It is not clear that there is as strong a connection between "self-evident" and "common sense" as it may have appeared to Sidgwick.

[62] See Jones (1904).

[63] See Schneewind 1977 (63–88).

[64] Sidgwick did not rule out, however, the *possibility* that ethical science might actually have to be constructed via non-ethical propositions. Schneewind (1977, 191–214) has noted that there was nothing new at this period in Sidgwick's approach; it was common across a variety of examinations of ethical principles.

the nature of consensus within the sciences and intended ME to provide as close an example of that sort of model in philosophical ethics. The *method* by which this was to occur was to be understood as a procedure by which we determine what is right for us to do. The procedure in specific was to be *rational*; and it was also meant to illustrate or be an example of a regular practice of taking the properties that could in principle be instantiated by acts as the *reason* for the rightness or those acts. Though distinct, *methods* of ethics, for Sidgwick, walked hand in hand with *principles*: a principle asserts that some property, which some acts may or may not possess, is the ultimate reason for the rightness of acts. As a principle asserts the properties in question, the method uses that property to establish the reason for the rightness of the act (Schneewind 1977, 195): they are connected, and both require each other.[65]

Sidgwick's main project, thus, was less directed toward a validation of specific ethical judgments or principles. Instead, he investigated three central ethical methodologies of his day: egoistic hedonism, utilitarianism (or what he called universalistic hedonism), and intuitionism. These were not necessarily exclusive. Sidgwick, however, took himself to be examining only those methods that generated principles about which there was wide enough basic consensus on their rationality, as well as on their fundamental role in supporting a system of ethical principles.[66] ME is divided into four books: Book II is devoted to egoistic hedonism; Book III to intuitionism (non-consequentialist and based on common sense morality); and Book IV to his own formulation of utilitarianism: universalistic hedonism. In the end, the reasonableness of seeking one's own, and even general happiness, was (as he saw it) difficult to deny, and from this Sidgwick directed his main line of argument in ME to a defence of his formulation of utilitarianism.[67]

---

[65] Schneewind has pointed out that there are questions, not thoroughly addressed by Sidgwick, as to the nature of the connection (is it necessary? contingent?). Moreover, it is possible that one method may involve more than one principle, and we would need a criterion of some kind to sort out the relations between them.

[66] The principles in question also had to generate a logically usable method for determining conduct.

[67] The connection Sidgwick makes between perfectionism and intuitionism is disputable (Schneewind (1977, 63–88).

5.2   Common Sense Morality

Sidgwick took it that the fundamental question of ethics was how we should act. A *philosophical* ethics, however, was an attempt to formulate what grounds or justifies not just our actions but the reasons that led to them. Common sense morality is appealing, but a variety of *prima facie* common sense views will contain different and incompatible principles. Sidgwick's focus was what he took as three fundamentally common sense sets of principles: egoism, dogmatic intuitionism, and utilitarianism. But Sidgwick's formulation of "intuitionism" in ME varied to a sometimes-confusing extent.[68] Sometimes Sidgwick meant for it to be the object of examination as *a* method of ethics; but sometimes he took it as featuring in *all* methods of ethics, especially with respect to its role in fundamental principles. Sometimes it was an object of deep criticism, as in when Sidgwick turned his attention to what he took as dogmatic intuitional morality (that of deontological views and non-hedonistic teleological ones). Sometimes, however, Sidgwick alluded to a more advanced version of intuitionism. This accepted the morality of common sense as basically sound, but still in need of a philosophical basis (principles that are absolute and undeniably true and evident) from which rules for conduct can be derived. Adding to the confusion is that Sidgwick formulated his own moral epistemology as intuitionistic. We do, on his view, have ethical knowledge, and we have it via an intuition about the self-evidence of certain propositions. This intuitionism, however, is contrasted with inductivist views that Sidgwick rejected as emphasizing the pleasantness, rather than the rightness or wrongness, of certain actions (Crisp 2015, 92). For Sidgwick, no normative view can be derived inductively; either it is immediately self-evident, or it is derived from some proposition or set of propositions some of which at least are self-evident.

Sidgwick rejected dogmatic intuitionism on the ground that it offered no rational or coherent foundation for common sense morality, so that we could know what obligations we bear in a given situation. But he appeared to defend a form of philosophical intuitionism whereby the necessary conditions for our moral knowledge would include self-evident

---

[68] See Schultz (2004) and Crisp (2015) for detail.

foundations, clarity, consistency, and—perhaps unusually—consensus. But consider the not unlikely disagreement on basic principles between egoists and benevolence theorists, say, or between utilitarians and prudence theorists. These seem hard pressed to end up in consensus. The first edition of ME in fact ended on a bit of a sour note on this, but in subsequent editions, Sidgwick regained a bit more optimism about the possibility of rationalizing ethics. This arose from the main line of argument in ME, which was that the *only* moral intuitions that sound philosophy can accept as ultimately valid were those that provide the philosophical basis of utilitarianism.[69] These were, he argued: that (i) what is right for me cannot but be right for anybody in the same circumstances; (ii) I ought to prefer the greater good of another to my own good, if it is lesser. The problem was how to make it not just plausible but binding that the promotion of universal happiness can count as a moral principle.

Sidgwick's account and defence of utilitarianism in ME is also complicated by the fact that he uses "utilitarianism" to refer to a number of different positions, and also by the fact that Sidgwick was willing to concede a kind of validity to so-called common sense morality.[70] We can try to clarify this as follows. Sidgwick's argument for utilitarianism was ultimately that it needed to be shored up enough to overrule any competing common sense claim to intuitiveness from egoism or dogmatic intuitionism. For Sidgwick, the principle of seeking the greatest good for the greatest number did need to be supplemented by another principle governing some egalitarian *distribution* of that good (Crisp 2014, 87). Sidgwick thus argued for his version of utilitarianism—Universalistic Hedonism—as a combination of the following: (i) the axiom that each one of us is morally obligated to regard the good of another as much as one's own ("rational benevolence"); (ii) that *good* is to be formulated as happiness.[71] These together generated Sidgwick's formulation: that

---

[69] Which may have made it easier for subsequent thought on this to essentially conjoin utilitarianism and common sense more than they were conjoined at this period.

[70] Crisp takes "validity" in Sidgwick's argument to mean "credibility," more than rational foundation (Crisp 2014, 94).

[71] Sidgwick did not rule out, nor did he limit, the formulation of "happiness" to pleasure (Crisp 2014, 93). But he did think that predictions via empirical or practical hedonistic formulations of "happiness" were very, even likely, to go wrong. This was important, because for Sidgwick, the *point*

objectively right conduct is conduct that will produce the greatest amount of happiness overall. This in turn was supported by Sidgwick's philosophical/epistemological intuitionism; that the principle of rational benevolence combined with a form of universal hedonism is self-evident (intuitively knowable). But it also makes room for support from common sense. Since Sidgwick wanted Universalistic Hedonism to overrule any competing claim to moral rational foundations by *other* candidates for common sense morality, his strategy was to give common sense morality the role of "secondary" support (Crisp 2014, 93): it does indeed have normative justification, which is the promotion of an overall balance of happiness over suffering. This amounted to Sidgwick's giving what Crisp has called a better "utility-value" to common-sense morality than dogmatic intuitionism or egoism, via his version of utilitarianism (2014, 95). Sidgwick's positive argument for his version of utilitarianism is not unassailable; but he claimed that similar issues of practical application apply to any moral code, given the uneasy fit between generalizations and the disparities of individual beings and their societies.

As we noted above, Sidgwick was also dedicated to achieving some kind of consensus among the competing claims to common sense morality in ME. The most awkward fit for Sidgwick, however, was between the claims of egoism and the claims of his own Universalistic Hedonism. Sidgwick argued that egoism distorted common sense morality by using its rules as merely an end for individual happiness, which can thus be ignored if self-interest requires it. He also rejected it as legitimately being able to offer any real practical claims to guidance. On the other hand, he could not reject it across-the-board: if anything sounds like common sense, it is that one's own happiness is a dominant criterion for action. Sidgwick did concede that egoism and his form of universalistic hedonism both made claims about what it is ultimately the most reasonable thing to do. But they contradict each other directly, so any argument from self-evidence to a fundamental moral method would look shaky at best. The only comity in such a case would be to successfully defend a formulation of egoism such that promoting one's own happiness is

---

of ethical theory was to *apply* to decisions in real life. Sidgwick's brand of hedonism took its share of fire from his contemporaries, and from Moore.

identical to promoting the greatest happiness overall. This—the dualism of practical reason problem—was something Sidgwick found candidly to be difficult ("a profoundly difficult and controverted question"), and he did not, in the end, resolve it.[72] All the same, he did not end ME by advocating that we "abandon […] morality altogether," but he did claim that "it would seem necessary to abandon the idea of rationalizing it completely," in the absence of a general philosophical theory "of the criteria of true and false beliefs" (ME, 508–9).

5.3   Free Will

I want next to briefly develop Schneewind's claim (1977, 397–8) that Sidgwick "saw before Bradley" that so-called psychological questions ("questions of origin") were irrelevant to claims about the logical status of concepts and the truth-value of moral propositions. I will close this rough sketch of ME with a look at Sidgwick's position on free will, which took the form of an influential anti-psychologism on Moore's thinking. Moore's first Trinity dissertation as we will see in Chap. 4, was dedicated explicitly to an examination of freedom in Kant and included detailed examination of Sidgwick's views on free will. Sidgwick called freedom of the will a "vexed question" and "perturbing" (ME, 57), claiming that his own account of rational action would avoid the difficulties that linking it with free will, by his lights, would bring. Sidgwick argued that whether we have freedom or free will is practically unimportant (ME, 72); what mattered instead are the effects of our will. Sidgwick did not argue that free will was illusory and conceded that it was certainly embedded in common sense conceptions of moral choice. But he did argue that it was, in the main, irrelevant to the kind of ethical science he was labouring to establish in ME. And this is because, I want to emphasise, Sidgwick took free will to be too *psychologistic* an issue to feature coherently in an ethical science.

---

[72] See Jones (1894a, b, 1895, 1917–1918) for then-contemporary discussion. See also Ostertag and Favia (2021).

There is evidence of this in Sidgwick's examination.[73] The first challenge that Sidgwick musters is the equivocation that he suspects drives the supposition that Free Will has any role to play in ethics. As we have seen, he took it that Kant, and Kantian theorists, identified *rational* with *voluntary* or free, in that one is a free agent insofar as they act under the guidance of reason—even more so if unruly appetites or passions are brought to heel. But, Sidgwick argued, why should freedom be associated with rationality only? Why can't it be the case that one acts just as voluntarily when one acts *irrationally*? So-called "freedom to choose" is manifested either way. Though "widely believed to be of ethical importance," Sidgwick argued instead that it was anything but. Volition, Sidgwick claimed, was a complex psychical fact. He took it to be made up of a set of allegedly strictly determinable moral qualities; a definite character, partly inherited, partly historical, and partly formed by physical influences. The question was: was there always "a possibility of my choosing to act in the manner that I now judge to be reasonable and right, *whatever* my previous actions and experiences may have been?" (ME, 65).

Sidgwick also formulated the issue as one of causation, arguing that the determinists have a strong case: no one denies that "events are determinately related to the state of things immediately preceding them." However we specify the "state of things at the preceding instant," (either as "brain and environing forces" or "character and circumstances"), the question that will inevitably arise is: how is it that human volition is meant to be an exception to the scientific causal story? According to Sidgwick, both determinists *and* libertarians are willing to embrace the exception because of (what he claimed was) a specious link between free will and moral responsibility. The determinist, according to Sidgwick, will claim that a man is only morally obligated to do "what is in his power." He then unpacks "what I ought to do I can do" as "what I can do *if I choose*" and not "what I can choose to do." Adding free will to this question renders it as "can I choose to do what I judge to be right to do?" And we certainly do take ourselves to be able to choose as a matter of psychical fact. However, as Sidgwick argued, this conception might be illusory; after all, I can just as easily conceive that I cannot so choose. So

---

[73] Sidgwick tackled free will in ME but added an Appendix (I), which contained explicit attention to the Kantian conception (this section had been previously published in *Mind* (Sidgwick 1888)).

the moral motive with respect to volition is weak: "either I shall not judge it reasonable to choose to do what I should otherwise so judge"; or "if I do pass judgment, I shall also judge the conception of duty applied in it to be illusory, no less than the conception of Freedom." The issue as Sidgwick framed it—which was contrary to the Kantian conception, among others—was that if I am free to choose what I judge to be right, then I have to also be free to choose what I judge to be wrong. So the connection between rationality, moral responsibility, and freedom seems tenuous at best (ME, 65–76).

Sidgwick argued that both the determinist and the libertarian are subject to this problem. If it is coherent to assert that there is just as much probability that *x* will, as will not, choose to do right, then this makes what Sidgwick called the "metaphysical validity of my consciousness of freedom to choose whatever I may conclude to be reasonable" *irrelevant*. The only thing that could return it to relevance is whether or not defending a role for free will would alter the conception of what it would be reasonable to choose, if I could so choose. But Sidgwick denied that this would make any difference: the ultimate end of any rational action, as he would put it, is happiness. The common (and Kantian) view is that duty is the best means of attaining happiness. But Sidgwick's query was: what are the actual *practical* consequences of linking duty to interest? Any action can be a means to an end, *whether or not* it is deliberated on and "chosen," or predetermined. At best, we might have to decide on the free will question in order to get an answer as to whether or not the future is capable of being predicted from the past. But for that we would have to know the *causal nature* of free will, and this is (to say the least) unknown. The "range of effects" that it might be possible to cause by human volition, as Sidgwick enumerated them, are few—three, according to Sidgwick (ME, 72). The control effected by the will over muscular contractions, and thoughts and feelings, is limited (ME, 74). The most important relevant moral candidate to fall under the power of the will—if there is such a thing—is resolve towards future conduct (ME, 74). But, as Sidgwick pointed out, we should not confuse free will with the state of confidence in being able to (say) alter an unfortunate habit for the future. In any case, there looms a paradox: "if by a present volition I can fully

determine an action that is to take place in the future, then when the time comes I shall find myself no longer free."

I have sketched out the basics of Sidgwick's ethical views here in order to prepare the ground for my view that Sidgwick's attacks on Kant and on his own contemporaries, as well as his own positive views, contained specific features that intersected with the anti-psychologistic views in the mental science of Ward and Stout. These are what ultimately took hold in Moore's developing thought. I will start by examining how Sidgwick's views featured in his Moral Sciences Tripos lectures, where they will have influenced Moore's understanding of Bradley, Kant, and the nature of moral science.

6   Moore's Notebooks and Essays for Sidgwick

6.1   Sidgwick's *Ethical Systems* Lectures[74]

The Cambridge University Reporter (CUR 1895, 36) lists Sidgwick as giving lectures in the Michaelmas term of 1894 on Ethical Systems and Elements of Philosophy.[75] Moore attended the Ethics lectures (there is no evidence of his having attended the lectures on Elements of Philosophy), taking closely written notes on Sidgwick's views. Moore's notes show that Sidgwick began with preliminary remarks to introduce his approach concerning the study of Ethics, of which (he stated) a "historical view is useless." The history of Ethics is "of what opinions men have held on this question," but "we must know why these opinions are held." Sidgwick thus claimed that his method was not historical, so his approach to

---

[74] Add. Ms. 8875 (10/2/1). Add. Ms. 8875 (10/3/1), Moore's notebook on McTaggart's Hegel lectures (1895–1896), contains a section titled "Sidgwick on Philosophy."

[75] CUR also lists Sidgwick as lecturing on Green and Spencer in Lent Term 1895. Moore's notebook does contain notes on these. Regrettably, Moore does not date any of his notes. Russell also attended lectures by Sidgwick, Stout, and Ward in preparation for his Part II Moral Sciences Tripos, beginning in the Long Vacation 1893 and continuing through the academic year 1893–1894 (MMD, 10). Russell attended Sidgwick's lectures in the Long Vacation 1893 (July 7–August 23), titled "Ethics." Russell's surviving essays take on different topics than do Moore's, since Sidgwick's lectures in Michaelmas 1894 were on Ethical Systems rather than Ethics.

ethical views "must inevitably arrange [sic] differently from the historian" but "with a view to ascertainment of truth." His strategy (expressed a little facetiously) was to proceed by considering "All systems are wrong but mine, and grouped around mine." Sidgwick, however, did group what he was going to lecture on into two classes: early systems from which his own views were developed, and contemporary systems, "whose relation to mine is negative." These latter (the views of Martineau, Green, and Spencer) came in for more attention, since they "influence current thought." Sidgwick's analysis of the earlier systems was targeted on Butler, Clarke, and other "early intuitionals": Mill and Kant. Sidgwick claimed to have been first impressed by Butler but was more inclined to "adhere to Mill's system" because of his resistance to "modern dogmatic morality."

Sidgwick's first few lectures of the term summarized the way that he came not just to the conclusions of ME, but of its underlying motivation. He narrowed in immediately on what turned out to be a tension or difficulty for the defence of utilitarianism throughout ME, which by 1894 had been in circulation for 20 years. This was the dualism of practical reason, or the problem of giving a definitive argument either for or against some sort of individual hedonism in the face of the arguably equally rational pull of benevolence or general happiness. What Sidgwick did in his early lectures is underscore how much the earlier ethical theorists, explicitly or implicitly, grappled with this problem, commenting briefly on the opposition between Greek (egoistic) and Christian (altruistic) morality. The Christian morality ran aground, as far as Sidgwick was concerned, in "transferring full virtue and pleasure to another world" that is, in relegating the "incoherence between individual and universalistic interest" to be "only resolved by future life." Moving to what he calls the "renaissance of ethics in England," Sidgwick paused to consider the "orthodox answers to Hobbes," on this question, in order to prepare the ground for his discussion of Butler. According to Sidgwick, Hobbes, Shaftesbury, and Clarke are the "important antecedents" that lead to Butler, to whom Sidgwick gives the greatest credit in the development of this era in British ethics.[76]

---

[76] The emphasis in Sidgwick on Butler can explain why Moore chose a passage from Butler as the epigraph to PE.

As Sidgwick saw it, according to Moore's notes, Butler combined the best of ancient and Christian morality, with a dose of common sense. Butler introduces "two supreme principles in man—conscience and self-love, both of which we must obey," dropping reason as the authority. According to Sidgwick, Butler delved more accurately into what we could call moral psychology. He opposed Hobbesianism (if not strictly Hobbes' own views) which claimed that unrestrained egoism was "reasonable, because natural." Rather, Butler argued that "even our appetites are not consciousness for self-good." To be genuinely in accordance with nature, according to Butler, we must obey conscience: "Nature implies (1) disinterested affections (2) harmony of self-love with these affections."

Butler's opposition to utilitarianism may have motivated Sidgwick to try to defend it as a method of ethics that could be adapted somehow to reconcile the problem of egoism and general good. Butler took utilitarianism to be "a terrible mistake," but Sidgwick was obviously not as ready to reject it out of hand. The conflict between "private" and "general" happiness "had to be faced." The first thing that Sidgwick needed to square away was the formulation of a utilitarianism that avoided the usual criticisms levelled at Bentham and Mill. Moore's notes highlight how Sidgwick's critique of utilitarianism focused on the way in which utilitarianism must be formulated: "Utilitarianism then must scientifically mean some kind of hedonism. What kind? Psychological and ethical hedonism are mingled in Bentham and Mill, and this gives their persuasiveness." Here, Sidgwick is concerned to counter Green and Bradley ("certain transcendentalists"), who dismiss utilitarianism as outright "egoistic hedonism," with "the doctrine of universal happiness as only a later and hybrid" utilitarianism. Sidgwick took the development of ethics via Hobbes, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson to show that this cannot be accurate, and further noted that the transition from Hume's position to Bentham's shows that utilitarianism "may be combined with egoism or intuitionalism." There is a path to ethical utilitarianism in Mill's view of the conception of general happiness, according to Sidgwick: "Mill says the individual should be presented with reasons for preferring general happiness. But his position is really that of intuitionals." Moreover,

according to Sidgwick, there was a "relation of Mill with morality of common sense … Mill seems to state commonsense view in saying that necessary beliefs are rules for the vulgar and for the philosopher until he finds better."

Sidgwick devoted at least one of his Kant lectures to a segment that Moore explicitly titles "Criticism of K[ant]." While Kant argued that "nothing good but good will, because everything else may be put to a wrong use," Sidgwick retorted that the "Good will (of a fanatic) without insight, may be as harmful as anything. What Sidgwick goes on to find pernicious is Kant's distinction of the doctrine of motive from that of belief and judgment: "K[ant]'s principle is formal … [a]ction has moral worth even when done from pure love of duty, nor are they [sic] more moral in proportion as this is chief motive. The idea is mischievous." Moreover: "Belief that action is right for me involves that I think it so for everyone under similar conditions—is this fundamental principle? It is useful as a test, but cannot supply a complete criterion of duty; because there are conscientious wrong-doers." Where Sidgwick thinks Kant's principle fails is in cases of promises with coercion: "I can conceive it a law that extorted promises should be made with intent of breaking; but not a permanent law, since promises would cease to be extorted. … Thus what K[ant] regards as test that act is wrong, namely that it would destroy its possibility, is here shown not to prove it wrong."

Sidgwick also devoted at least one lecture to Kant on free will, where he repeated his point that Kant conflates two notions of freedom in the sense that we can be free to choose wrongly. Sidgwick's summary of the problem was as follows; "It is in [the relation of noumenal to phenomenal] that he [Kant] has confused freedom; and he has a corresponding double aspect of noumenal world; which is (1) kingdom of ends … (2) noumenal world includes bad characters wh[ich] it must be [sic] if noumena is to cause whole series of phenomena." In addition: "Will must act either from reason or from sensations … and there is no explanation of noumenon acting wrongly." Sidgwick doesn't develop this next criticism, at least in Moore's notes, but it is suggestive: "Transcendental causal

relation belongs not only to will. … We want noumenal causality for passive states as well as for volitions."

The notebook at this point commences at a new heading—January 1895—and Moore added a note that Sidgwick will lecture on Spencer on Thursdays and Green on Tuesdays (confirmed in the Cambridge University Reporter, 1894–1895). One thing that stands out is that Sidgwick attributed to Green the same conflation with respect to the notion of freedom that he did to Kant. The notebook then appears to shift to notes about the essays that Moore wrote for Sidgwick (most likely for tutorials). In a surviving separate bundle labelled "Philosophy Papers for Ward, Sidgwick, Johnson, McTaggart and Jackson" in Moore's hand are a set of essays that were presumably written in answer to set questions. Two lists of questions survive in the bundle on Sidgwick's ME, but not all the surviving essays for Sidgwick correlate to the questions. In this set of essays, however, there are a few in particular that stand out as suggestive evidence of the context of Moore's developing thought.

6.2   Essays on *Methods of Ethics*

These surviving essays (Add. Ms. 8875 11/2/1–7) are bundled together, and the first sheet (marked as part of 11/2/1, not in Moore's hand nor in Sidgwick's) is a list of nine questions pertaining to ME (Books I and II). The questions range from the objectivity of rational judgment, the relations between practical reason and moral sentiment, the notion of disinterested action, the ultimate ground of action in ethics, distinctions between conceptions of the Right and the Good, Freedom of the Will, the formulation of egoism, happiness, and self-realization, intuitional methods, the hedonistic principle, and the formulation of the notion of sanction in ethics. Moore answered all of these questions in (sometimes quite) short essays, and there are a number of marginal comments in Sidgwick's hand. On the first question (the relation of practical reason to moral sentiment), Moore wrote that once the Practical Reason has discovered "what ought to be," moral sentiment provides "a feeling of approbation" toward that which has satisfied the Practical Reason. "Our calling a thing good implies that we have a liking towards it," after which Moore

goes on to try to make a case that "this liking or intuitive approbation is necessary to the determination of the ultimate end, and that reason is only useful in making it self-consistent." This is because Practical Reason "can only [furnish the object of moral sentiment] if it is capable of apprehending intuitively the fundamental Ethical notion of 'good.'" This, he concludes, is the basis of the "objectivity of ethical judgment:" in "its being universally valid, because in agreement with the universal notion of good."[77]

Essay 2 on disinterested action is an attempt to argue that psychological egoism can be reformulated to include a sense of disinterested action. Moore is defending a view that claims that one's motive determines whether or not the property of disinterestedness applies to an action. Moore cites Butler's distinction between gratification of desires of our own and desire of our own pleasure, and Sidgwick made the criticism that he should have examined and explained his claim that psychological hedonism may be true "if taken in the deepest sense." Essay 3, on "the business of Ethics," was to define "the desire for the Good" or "the only one possible ultimate ground of action." There can be many principles of this, Moore notes, but "happiness or pleasure" and "virtue or duty" deserve special notice. Both of these can be interpreted as either individualistic or imperative, but "there can also be but one ethical method, namely the employment of reason or the laws of thought for fixing the ultimate end and deducing particulars from it."

Essay 4 distinguishes the Good from the Right, in that the Right implies reference to "the action of some real or possible moral agent." Here Moore decided to try passing references to some Bradleyan metaphysics. He states that "the moment a thing is determined to be absolutely good, which means the greatest of what may be called smaller goods, there follows an obligation on every conceivable moral agent to try to bring that thing about … expressed by saying that to bring it about is right." In the margin, Sidgwick asks "is the term good necessarily used in an absolute sense"? There are also hints of a Bradleyan monism taking hold where Moore calls the absolutely good "the greatest of … smaller

---

[77] Sidgwick added a question mark in the margin next to the fragment: "particularly by reason, or the universal laws of thought."

goods." Essay 5 is on the relation of free will to Ethics, which Moore argues is "inseparably connected with the fundamental notion of Ethics," since "[T]he good, as the desirable, is nothing but that which we recognize as to be willed, and willing is meaningless, until it be in some sense free." But at the same time, "we cannot will anything but what seems to us … to be good" (Sidgwick commented: "and good = right?"); and "therefore the will is also in some sense determined." Moore goes on to claim that when "'What is the Good'" is completely answered, "we shall also have an answer to the question of free will: for we shall know both that which the will is free to choose, and that which it must choose, and these two will be the same." To this, however, Sidgwick remonstrated in the margin: "Does the knowledge of what is good imply that the will must choose the good? (a) Universal and Individual, (b) Psychological and (c) Ethical standpoints seem to be confused." Moore then goes on to tackle the question "ought punishment be retributive," claiming that "since it was his action, he is responsible for it; and this means no more than it is right to punish him, merely and for no other reason than because he did wrong." Sidgwick tersely notes "ABC" in the margin, referring presumably to the confusion he noted earlier in Moore's formulation.

In Essay 6, Moore turns his attention to identifying the connection between egoism and ethical ends, which he distinguishes into two: "according as the self or ego meant is the universal factor in the individual (Kant's transcendental ego); or the empirical ego, distinguished as external to other individuals and having separate interests from theirs." The question also asked about "any ambiguities attaching to the terms happiness, self realisation, [sic]" and here Moore refers to Bradley directly. After noting that egoism rarely applies to systems that feature anything like a Universal Ego (which brings an empirical ego into harmony with it), and more often refers to "those less philosophical systems which only concern themselves with isolated individuals," Moore states that happiness as an end in Ethics most often "denotes some sort of pleasurable feeling." This doesn't mean the "greatest intensity of pleasure for the greatest possible amount of time, nor yet the greatest sum of pleasures." Sometimes it will even mean "doing what is right." All of this however highlights "what ambiguities may attach to the word 'self-realization'." The self-realization of the empirical self runs into trouble, since

self-realization in that context suggests that "every desire should be satisfied." As this is impossible, "the sense given to it by Mr. Bradley seems the only one in which it can seriously be considered ultimate; since the universal self to be realized with him is the only possible determinant of the Good in its widest sense, and is itself indeed the Good."

Essay 7 asked the student to consider "the true Intuitional method." Moore considered a few in turn: one that features a notion of conscience ("this kind of Intuitionist will sometimes act on vague analogies"); another "very serious kind" of Intuitionist who "universalises further, but not till he finds the underlying unity, so that he brings forward several principles as ultimately valid."[78] The only "true kind of Intuitionist," Moore goes on to state, is "he who tries to find one ultimate principle from which the morality of all particular actions can be deduced." Essay 8 asks for an examination of the "difficulties involved in applying an empirical method based on the Hedonistic principle." Moore defined this as the view that "a man ought to obtain for himself the greatest possible balance of pleasure over pain—pleasure being defined as a feeling desirable as such to the person feeling it" (Sidgwick questions the word "desirable" here). Moore notes that the empirical method, in the absence of any kind of principle of comparison of degree and kind with respect to "desirable feeling," will have to resort to a collection "of instances of pleasures and pains, compare them with one another, and … trace their causes." This runs into nearly insurmountable difficulties: "we cannot accurately remember past states of feeling … we cannot accurately judge of the feelings of others by their expression … different things are pleasant to different persons and to the same person at different times." Moreover, this kind of analysis runs the risk of us dying, "having had very little more than the pleasure of some discoveries and the pain of having been baffled in many more," and in any case "we may be quite mistaken

---

[78] Moore noted that this most applies to Whewell "because he most recognised what he was doing." Sidgwick, however, complained that Moore's formulation of "till he finds the underlying unity" as a criterion to be "ambiguously expressed."

in our calculation from a lack of knowledge of what feeling is truly desirable for us … a knowledge which can only be supplied by metaphysics."[79] The last essay in this bundle concerns the use of the concept of sanction in ethics and how it can negotiate between individual happiness and the dictates of duty. Moore noted that a sanction can "move us to act … when the intrinsic goodness of such action is not sufficient to move us," thus "the term is therefore only significant in reference to a system which maintains the goodness of certain actions in themselves, not for ulterior consequences." Moore's example is "for a hedonist, the fact that he will obtain the greatest pleasure by a certain course, is a Sanction for the adoption of that course," to which Sidgwick objected, "How in regard to a universal hedonist?"

The next set of papers in this bundle are not unified (Add. Ms. 8875 11/2/1-7). Add. Ms. 8875 11/2/2 is a short essay on the question of ultimate ends and reason, which is chiefly interesting for Moore's assertion that "This idea of 'what ought to be done' is stated in sec. 3 to be unanalyzable, i.e. given intuitively and therefore not prescribed by reason."[80] 11/2/3 consists of a page of typewritten set questions on Book III (chapters I–XII) of ME, and Moore's essay answering the first question. There are eight questions, on topics that include the nature, origin, and validity of moral judgments; the contrast and distinction between ideas of virtue and duty; the difficulties of common sense reflection in judging between objective, subjective, formal, and material rightness; the classification of duties and the role of common sense; the relation between moral judgment and motive; the intuitional and utilitarian conception of benevolence; the ethical conception of justice and its relation to Politics and Freedom of the Will; and finally, on the requisites of a moral axiom and whether they are satisfied in the maxims of common sense morality.

11/2/3 is interesting as an early look at Moore beginning to think about the nature of moral judgment (the essay may be incomplete). He begins by stating that "from the examination of its nature, there follows

---

[79] Sidgwick here questions Moore's use of "truly desirable."

[80] In PE, Moore exempts Sidgwick from the scores of previous thinkers who he claims, commit the naturalistic fallacy. See Baldwin (1990); and Hurka (2003), among others.

(1) that, since a judgment must be either true or false, all moral judgments must in some sense have validity … it must be possible that a moral judgment should be true; moreover, (2) that its origin cannot affect its validity, since in finding its nature as judgment, you have already determined its validity." After thus identifying the nature and validity of moral judgments, Moore goes on to distinguish a moral judgment ("a certain thing is right or wrong") from a judgment of fact ("a certain thing will produce a balance of happiness"). A judgment of fact, thus, can "neither be the origin of the former, as moral, nor a test of its truth (or validity …)."

11/2/4 and 5 are the most suggestive essays in this surviving bundle, as Moore turned his attention (in 11/2/4) to the relation of reason to moral action. 11/2/5 is unusual in that it purports to directly answer Sidgwick's criticisms to the formulations in the earlier essay. Moore here tried once again to engage in some explicit Bradleyan metaphysics in order to argue his corner, but met implacable resistance from Sidgwick. Having set the stage, Moore discusses "moral" action as opposed to "non-moral," which, he claimed, "implies the consciousness of self as will, and hence the knowledge of good and evil, as possible objects of will, and this consciousness of self as opposed to objects, is one of the marks, which distinguishes men from other animals as a rational creature." To this Sidgwick queried, "Do you mean that we never will without judging what is willed to be good or evil?" Moore replied to this in the margin: "No, but that we never will, in a moral sense, without having the faculty which could have judged that our action was good or evil." Moore continued his discussion by further distinguishing moral and rational action as follows: "Reason cannot make an action 'moral,' but can only recognise that a moral action is moral. … A 'rational' action is one which the reason has judged to be so determined by the will, not one which the reason has determined to be good."[81] Things go a little bit to pieces in the next passage, where Moore assays a Bradleyan version of what he is trying to claim about the nature of actions and unconscious willing: "any such action, because preceding from a will, is in one sense good or evil, but, because proceeding from an unconscious will, is equally good and evil, and therefore neither." In the

---

[81] Here Sidgwick asks: "Do you mean that whatever is willed is good?"

margin, Sidgwick dryly suggests that "this statement should, I think, be relieved of the formal contradiction which it at present contains." Moore was at this point gamely attempting a Bradleyan-inspired dialectical approach but ran headlong into Sidgwick's refusal to take the bait.

Moore turned next to the related issues of reason for action and causation:

> can the cognition that an action is good be the cause of our willing the action? We must now be careful what we mean by cause. In the scientific sense, when we discuss the matter psychologically, the paramount feeling of pleasure accompanying the representation of the action as realised is the cause of the volition; but that representation is not the cause of the pleasure and therefore though the judgment that the action is good may be in part what makes the representation pleasurable, that judgment cannot be the cause of the cognition.[82]

Sidgwick noted alongside this paragraph that "desire and pleasure want discussion"; and he wonders "why not" at Moore's claim that a representation "cannot be the cause of the accompanying pleasure." Here Moore struggled against Sidgwick's requests for more clarity. To Moore's claim that "if we mean by cause the object of desire, the final cause of an action, when willed; the cognition that an action is pleasurable may form a part of the content which, as willed is the final cause, and may be called the motive of the volition," Sidgwick crossed out the words "cognition that an [action] is pleasurable" and replaced them with "the represented pleasant concept of the action," and in the margin, added "or rather of judgment and cognition." Moore went on to claim that "the motive of the doing would not be the abstraction known but the universal good immanent in the good will," to which Sidgwick asked, "what does that mean?" On the question of responsibility, Moore stated that "a man's becoming more knowing in the distinctions between good and evil is not the cause of his becoming more responsible. He is responsible when he wills the action consciously, but because he has made it one with his conscious will." Sidgwick, however, remonstrated, "But suppose he did it in

---

[82] The word "volition" is written above the last word of the sentence ("cognition"), as if Moore had been corrected (maybe in a tutorial).

complete ignorance?" Moore concludes this essay with the statement that "Thus the ethical philosopher is not more intellectually virtuous than the metaphysician, because his intellectual virtue is the cognition of what is good, rather than the cognition of what is," because (he claims) "[T]he cognition that an action is good, may be necessary to its being good, but it is not a virtue, until it is itself willed as good, and thus, regarded as an action, can be itself known as good by a further cognition."

Moore attempted another draft of this essay, which he titled "Relation of Reason and Moral Action. An Attempt at explanation in answer to Prof. Sidgwick's criticism" (Add. Ms. 8875 11/2/5). He reiterated his main point that "Reason can in no sense determine what ought to be; it can only look at will and tell us what will has determined ought to be," and remarks, with some dudgeon, that he tried to explain this "at some length," but that "Mr Sidgwick could find 'nothing which he could call an argument' in support of it." Moore goes to say that a successful expla-nation would have obviated the need for argument, since "the proposi-tion is an ultimate truth, the conviction of which must come from intuition." To this Sidgwick demurred "that argument is continually needed about ultimate truths."

At this point, Moore starts a lengthy defence of his view couched in explicitly Bradleyan terms. Moore begins by claiming that he does hold that whatever is willed is good, but that at the same time, "whatever is willed is evil." This paradox is "reached by abstracting the meaning of will, till it is the barest possible form. The content of every particular voli-tion is either good or evil." Moore attributes to Sidgwick the view that "Good … has meaning only as the content of will," although Sidgwick comments, in the margin, that this is "hypothetical … not necessarily actual, in my view." Moore goes on to claim that "since it alone 'deter-mines' the nature of good and evil alike, good and evil must also have no difference from one another," at least in full abstraction of the concepts of both will and good. Moore states that this follows from a Kantian criti-cal investigation of good, then hits his stride in full Bradleyan vein:

If, however, will, as an abstraction, does not exist, the true account of its nature cannot be got by considering it as simple and abstract: just as the true nature of thought is not expressed, by one simple abstract term which

cannot differ from itself. Thought 'determines' itself into various forms of thought; it is at least given us as a unity *in* difference: and we cannot say that its aspect as unity, its definition has any truth at all, unless it can also be shewn that its different forms are necessarily connected with that unity, i.e. unless thought, as abstract, 'determines' and is determined by particular forms of thought—unless they involve one another. In the same way will 'determines' its different forms and is determined by them: its true nature can only be expressed as concrete, as unity in difference; and these different forms of will, implied in the bare notion of will, are what was meant by its content—namely all objects, in so far as they are good … looked upon from the moral standpoint. And by saying they are good, we do not mean that they have that bare form of 'goodness' as an attribute, but that they are the individual embodiments of that universal good, by being in them alone as existence, and they alone by being in it. From this point of view the content of the will, as the objects or actions willed, does not differ from the various forms of will, since they are the same concrete fact … The apparent strangeness of looking at the objects of will, even when being willed, as the will itself, comes from the fact that we generally characterise them by cognitive marks, talking of them *as we know them*, not *as they are willed*. Only when we apply such terms as 'right' 'duty' etc. do we talk of them *as we know them as willed* [italics Moore's].

In sum, Moore adds, "I cannot but think it follows, if the will is to be real at all…what is real must be universal *in* particular or particular *in* universal." Sidgwick ticks off this whole discussion with pencil marks in the margin, deprecatingly commenting "Metaphysics into which I cannot enter" (Add. Ms. 11/2/5, 2–3).

Moore then reconsidered the question "can the cognition that an action is good be the cause of our willing the action?" He states that on this "there was some argument," though he "did not put the connection plainly enough." He goes on: "I may therefore assume that the only 'cause' recognised in the sciences is the efficient cause, a mark of which is invariable and immediate priority in time to its effect. What then is the efficient cause of volition, for the science of psychology?" Moore notes that he had answered this in the earlier essay with "the paramount feeling of pleasure accompanying the representation of the action as realised," and though he was referred to the discussion of pleasure and desire in

ME, he did not find his own position supported there. Thus, he says, the issue is to clarify the confusion "of the pleasantness of an idea of a future action, the pleasure of anticipation, which comes in time before the volition, with the idea of the pleasantness of the action, where the pleasantness, if felt at all, must come after the volition. … [T]he latter is the pleasantness referred to in the doctrine of psychological hedonism … it is not a purely psychological doctrine, whereas ours is." He goes on: "The pleasure, which our view states to be the cause of will, is the pleasure accompanying the idea of action, when that idea is regarded as a psychical fact; whereas the pleasure, in the other doctrine, is the pleasure anticipated, the pleasure which is in the content of the idea." Running out of steam a bit, Moore tries to wrap this up by lamenting that "this whole subject is discussed very fully in Mr Bradley's Ethical Studies, Essay VII, pp. 226–240; from whom I borrowed."

Where Moore first addresses the issue that began to feature strongly in the development of his views is midway through this essay:

My present difficulty in admitting that any cognition can be the cause of volition, is that I cannot see what consistent meaning the psychologist can give to cause at all. According to the physical definition of cause given above, you cannot have the cause without the effect following. But when Mr. Sidgwick says that a moral judgment can be partial cause of a volition, does he mean to say that you cannot have a moral judgment, without a volition following (Sidgwick replied: "certainly not—in that case I should not have called it a part of the cause")? Is this not contrary to fact? It seems like saying that the colour of the gunpowder is a partial cause of the explosion which follows the application of fire to it. … I can only imagine two senses in which the psychologist may give a valid meaning to cause. (1) In which he asserts that the whole psychical state of an individual at one moment is the cause of his state at the next; which would be parallel to the physical truth that the whole condition of matter and motion in the universe at one moment is the cause of its condition in the next. (2) But if we are to apply the notion of cause to particulars, I do not see how we can assert more than that a state of an individual, as feeling, is the cause of his next state as feeling; his state as willing is the cause of his next state as willing; his state as perceiving or judging the cause of his next state as perceiv-

ing or judging.[83] The psychologist appears to be in a dilemma: Either you can have desire, judgment, pleasure, or pain, without volition following; in which case, how can any of these be the cause of volition?[84] Or, if you cannot, they may be the cause, but you must go in to the analysis of unconscious states to discover that they are; and in this region what are your data? It would then seem that you cannot reduce cognition, volition and feeling to a common denomination, so as to assert that one is the cause of the other. Each, as always coexistent with the other two is only one aspect or one element of the whole reality which you are discussing; and neither can be prior to the other two.[85]

Moore goes on, navigating through a series of criticisms from Sidgwick:

Here we have the connection between this point and the point first discussed. If will determines its content, the cognition of its content cannot be the cause of its willing it; and if the cognition of a content of will cannot be the cause of its willing it, will must determine its content.[86] I will try to make the view plainer by defining 'determines'. This points to a necessary connection, such as that between positive and negative, where the one is meaningless except in reference to the other. It does not mean 'discriminates' or 'defines', in their ordinary sense, where they are applied to the action of reason in perceiving differences, already existent, and excluding different things from the object to be defined. 'Determination' is the action of the objects themselves on one another, which they can only exert so far as they are of the same nature.[87] Hence, when we talk of a good will as opposed to a bad, we mean a will which has made itself one with the good; the good being its true nature, as determined by itself, namely a synthesis of the good and evil, which were the same, and expressed its incomplete nature as a mere unity without difference.[88] In this determinate good, pure evil is absorbed, and its opposite is determinate evil, the bad will, as com-

---

[83] Here Sidgwick remarked: "it seems to me that M. has given no reason for this doctrine, which runs counter to experience."

[84] Sidgwick: "they may be part of the cause."

[85] Sidgwick: "No, but certain judgments and feelings may, with a high degree of probability, be shown to be among the causes of certain volitions."

[86] Sidgwick: "I do not see the demonstration."

[87] Sidgwick: "How is that known?"

[88] Sidgwick: "This seems to involve the paralogism, as I regard it, before [given]."

monly understood; which however must also be regarded as ultimately absorbed in an absolutely good will, in which the truest nature of will is expressed.

Finally, Moore concludes:

> We may now return to the notion of final cause. It is this notion which the psychological hedonist[89] uses, when he speaks of our willing for the sake of pleasure, or of pleasure as our motive; but this was not what Hume meant by motive when he said that 'Reason, meaning the judgment of truth and falsehood, can never of itself be a motive to the will'—he was there using motive in the sense of efficient cause and maintaining the view which we have above maintained.[90] The final cause is the motive of action, as being that for the sake of which a thing is done—the object of desire or of will. It is that which will determines and is determined by, when will is looked at from the inside, not as a volitional state, which is how the psychologist deals with it, but in its own nature. From this point of view will must be the sole cause of everything, and a timeless cause[91]; and the final cause is its object, as opposed to it before realisation. Since, however, this object is determined by itself, and in a sense is itself, it is from a metaphysical point of view also a timeless reality, and the object as final cause is identified with the will as cause—but not with the efficient cause, as we have defined it, since that is merely phenomenal, and only has meaning in time.
>
> Finally, with regard to ignorance and responsibility, I never meant to deny that a man, who acted in complete ignorance, would not be responsible; but only, in accordance with the above view, that his ignorance could be *the cause* of his irresponsibility.

I have quoted this essay at length because it provides clear evidence of the views of Ward, Bradley, and Sidgwick that featured in Moore's early exposure to philosophy, and his attempts to wrestle those influences into formulations of positions to defend or criticize. At this stage—his first year as a student of philosophy—he was clearly determined to support a Bradleyan metaphysics in his discussion and

---

[89] Sidgwick: "As I tried to show in lecturing on Hume, I do not think his view of pleasure-pain in relation to motive is consistent."

[90] Sidgwick: "I doubt it very much."

[91] Sidgwick: "unproved assertion again."

formulation of the basics of ethics and ethical theory, but we also see the hints of Ward's mental science and Sidgwick's common sense theorizing acting as a foil.[92]

With this, Moore's moral sciences Part II preparation came to an end. Moore's 1896 Tripos result (a First) included distinction in the special subject on the Philosophy of Hegel, and in that summer, he began to work on a dissertation to submit for the Trinity Prize Fellowship. It is the work that he did during this next period (1896–1898) that illustrates, in striking contour, the shape his ideas began to take on the metaphysical basis of ethics. And as he developed his thinking from an amorphous Bradleyan criticism of Kant on free will to a discussion of the nature of judgment, Moore upended the history of philosophy. We turn to this next.

References

Adamson, R. 1879. *On the Philosophy of Kant*. Edinburgh: David Douglas.
Baldwin, T. 1990. *G.E. Moore.* London: Routledge.
Balfour, A. 1878. Transcendentalism. *Mind* 2 (12): 480–505.
———. 1879. Reply to Caird. *Mind* 4 (13): 115–116.
Bradley, F.H. 1876. *Ethical Studies*. London: Henry S. King and Co. [ES].
———. 1877a. Mr Sidgwick on *Ethical Studies*. *Mind* 2 (5): 122–126.
———. 1877b. *Mr Sidgwick's Hedonism: An Examination of the main argument of the "Methods of Ethics"*. London: Henry S. King and Co.
Broad, C.D. 1930. *Five Types of Ethical Theory*. London: Kegan Paul.
———. 1945. Prof. G. F. Stout (1860–1944). *Mind*, n.s. 54 (215): 285–288.
Caird, E. 1879a. Mr. Balfour on Transcendentalism. *Mind* 4 (13): 111–115.

---

[92] Some of this is visible even in the notes that Moore took on McTaggart's lectures on the Philosophy of Hegel, in his second year studying philosophy (1895–1896). McTaggart approvingly heralded Sidgwick as inaugurating the "epoch of common sense" and describes Green's criticisms of Sidgwick as, while "naively ignorant," nevertheless, "a compromise between Natural Realism (materialism) and Mentalism, which is found in popular science writers, acquainted with Psychological Philosophy of 2nd or 3rd quarter of this century." This leads McTaggart to a discussion of the difference between psychology (which concerns "transient facts" and the "peculiarities and limitation of individual mind" [sic]) and philosophy, which "deals with relations for ideal mind independent of fact … with Psychology as with Physics so far as concerns transient facts: what really underlies may be entirely different …".

———. 1879b. The So-Called Idealism of Kant [reply to Sidgwick (1879)]. *Mind* 4 (16): 557–561.

———. 1880. Reply to Sidgwick. *Mind* 5 (17): 111–115.

———. 1889. *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant* (2 vols.) Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons.

Candlish, Stewart, and Pierfrancesco Basile. 2021. Francis Herbert Bradley. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed., forthcoming. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/bradley/.

Collini, S. 1975. Idealism and Cambridge Idealism. *Historical Journal* 18 (1): 171–177.

Crisp, R. 2014. Sidgwick and Utilitarianism in the Late Nineteenth Century. In Eggleston and Miller, eds. 2014: 81–102.

———. 2015. *The Cosmos of Duty: Henry Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Davidson, D. 1963. Actions, Reasons, and Causes. *Journal of Philosophy* 60 (23): 685–700.

Deigh, J. 1992. Sidgwick on Ethical Judgment. In Schultz, ed. 1992: 241–260.

Dewey, C.J. 1974. Cambridge Idealism: Utilitarian Revisionists in Late 19th Century Cambridge. *Historical Journal* xvii: 63–78.

Eggleston, B. and D. Miller, eds. 2014. *The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Green, T.H. 1885. *The Works of Thomas Hill Green*. Edited by R. Nettleship, 3 vols. London: Longmans.

Hayward, F. 1901a. The True Significance of Sidgwick's Ethics. *International Journal of Ethics 11* (2): 175–187.

———. 1901b. *The Ethical Philosophy of Sidgwick*. London: S. Sonnenschein and Co.

Hurka, T. 2003. Moore in the Middle. *Ethics* 113 (3): 599–628.

Jones, E.E.C. 1894a. Rational Hedonism. *International Journal of Ethics* (1): 79–94.

———. 1894b–1895. The Rationality of Hedonism. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 3: 29–45.

———. 1904. Professor Sidgwick's Ethics. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 4: 32–52.

———. 1917–1918. "Practical Dualism," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (18): 312–328.

Kant, I. 1996. *Practical Philosophy (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant)*. Tr. and ed. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kant, I. 1998. *Critique of Pure Reason (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant)*. P. Guyer and A. Wood, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mace, C.A. 1945. Obituary of George Frederick Stout (1860–1944). *Proceedings of the British Academy* 31: 307–316.

———. 1946. G. F. Stout (1860–1944). *British Journal of Psychology* xxxvi: 51–54.

———. 1954. The Permanent Contribution to Psychology of G.F. Stout. *British Journal of Educational Psychology* 24 (2): 64–75.

Mander, W., ed. 2014. *The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Marshall, C. 2013. Sidgwick's Utilitarianism in the Context of the Rise of Idealism: A Reappraisal. *Revue d'études Benthamiennes*. https://doi.org/10.4000/etudes-benthamiennes.678.

McTaggart, J.E. 1896. *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Moore, G.E. 1939. Proof of An External World. *Proceedings of the British Academy* (25): 273–300.

———. 1942. Autobiography. In Schilpp, ed., 3–39.

Morris, K. and C. Preti. 2015. How To Read Moore's 'Proof of An External World.' *Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy* (vol. 4, no. 1): 1–16.

Ostertag, G., and A. Favia. 2021. E. E. Constance Jones on the Dualism of Practical Reason. *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 29: 327–342.

Parfit, D. 2011/2017. *On What Matters* (vols. 1 and 2). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Paytas, T., and T. Henning, eds. 2020. *Kantian and Sidgwickian Ethics: The Cosmos of Duty Above and the Moral Law Within*. London: Taylor and Francis.

Schneewind, J.B. 1977. *Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Schultz, B., ed. 1992. *Essays on Henry Sidgwick*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2004. *Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2019. Henry Sidgwick. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Fall ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall(2019)/entries/sidgwick/.

Sidgwick, H. 1876a. Philosophy at Cambridge. *Mind* 1 (2): 235–246.

———. 1876b. Review of Bradley's *Ethical Studies*. *Mind* 1 (4): 545–549.

———. 1877. Reply to Bradley. *Mind* 2 (5): 122–126.

———. 1878. Ethics. In *Encyclopedia Britannica* (9th Ed., vol. 8).

———. 1879. The So-Called Idealism of Kant. *Mind* 4 (15): 408–410. [see Caird 1879a in Reply].

———. 1880. Kant's Refutation of Idealism. *Mind* 5 (17): 111–115. [see Caird (1880) in Reply].

———. 1883a. A Criticism of the Critical Philosophy (I). *Mind* 8 (29): 69–91.

———. 1883b. A Criticism of the Critical Philosophy (II). *Mind* 8 (31): 313–337.

———. 1886. *Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers*. London: Macmillan. [OHE].

———. 1888. The Kantian Conception of Free Will. *Mind* 13 (51): 405–412.

———. 1901a., ed. Jones. Prof. Sidgwick's Ethical View: An Auto-Historical Fragment. *Mind*, n.s. 10 (38): 287–291.

———. 1901b. Philosophy of T. H. Green. *Mind*, n.s. 10 (37): 18–29.

———. 1905. The Metaphysics of T. H. Green. In *Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant and Other Philosophical Lectures and Essays*, ed. J. Ward, 209–266. London: Macmillan.

———. 1907. *Methods of Ethics*. 7th ed. London: Macmillan. [ME].

Sidgwick, A., E. Balfour Sidgwick, E. Mildred Sidgwick, and H. Sidgwick. 1906. *Henry Sidgwick: A Memoir*. London: Macmillan.

Singer, M. 1992. Sidgwick and Nineteenth-Century British Ethical Thought. In Schultz, ed. 1992: 65–92.

Sorley, W. 1904. *The Ethics of Naturalism*. Edinburgh: Blackwood and Sons.

Spadoni, C. 1979. 'Old Sidg' (review of Scheewind, (1977)). *Russell* (no. 33–34, Spring/Summer): 1–56.

Vincent, A. 1999. Bradley and Sidgwick on Philosophical Ethics. *Collingwood Studies* 6: 110–126.

———. 2000. Idealism and Hedonism. In C. Pierson and S. Tormey, eds. 2000: 105–118.

———. 2014. The Ethics of British Idealism: Bradley, Green, and Bosanquet. In Mander, ed 2014.

Walsh, W. 1981. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Commentators in English, 1875–1945. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 42 (4): 723–737.

Ward, J. 1886. Psychology. In *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 9th ed. Edinburgh: Black, 37–85.

———. 1899. *Naturalism and Agnosticism: The Gifford Lectures (1896–1898)*. (2 vols.). London: Adam and Charles Black.

———. 1911. *The Realm of Ends or Pluralism and Theism: The Gifford Lectures (1907–10)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

4

The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics

1 Introduction

Between finishing his Moral Sciences Tripos examination in 1896 and submitting his second Trinity Dissertation in 1898, Moore experienced a now-renowned and certainly momentous shift in his philosophical views. From his dogged determination to adapt Bradleyan formulations in his essays for Sidgwick, to receiving Russell's reaction to his 1898 dissertation ("it appears to me to be on the level of the best philosophy I know"[1]), Moore managed not only to harness his own independent philosophical streak, but to impress his contemporaries, his teachers, and even his critics, with his originality and boldness. These are not, to be sure, the words in which a contemporary philosopher would describe Moore today. But at the pre-dawn of the new century, and with his own new direction in philosophical thought, Moore redirected the course of philosophy and its practice, igniting a methodology that we now think of as characteristic of 20th and 21st century philosophy. In this chapter, I will discuss the development of Moore's ideas through his Trinity Dissertations and the

[1] Add. Ms. 8330 8R/33/10 (1 December, 1898).

sharpening of these same views in his immediately subsequent work. I will conclude with an examination of Moore's progress towards PE.

2   Moore's Earliest Philosophical Forays

2.1   Papers for Cambridge Societies (Apostles Papers and others)

It was in his participation at Apostles meetings and at meetings of the Moral Sciences Club that Moore developed his own original lines of philosophical thought and began to bring together the strands of the influences around him, so we should give some attention to Moore's early philosophical forays outside the confines of lectures and tutorials We can also get a better sense of the impact that Moore's personality had on his peers in this material.[2] Though he was quite young (20 years old at his election to the Apostles), his mischievous manner does come across as unexpected to the contemporary reader, accustomed to the "narcoleptic pedantry,"[3] of his mature writing.[4]

---

[2] Russell described Moore's debut at the Apostles (he commented on a paper delivered by Russell on "What Ought Cambridge to Give"? (CPBR 1)) as "electrifying," with Moore demonstrating a "fearless intellect pure and unadulterated" with "potential for stupendous genius" (Levy 1979, 125). Russell repeated similar accolades throughout his life (Preti, 2008a; OHBR).

[3] Potter (2009).

[4] There is no reason to think that in person, Moore ever lost the playful nature of his sense of humour or of the absurd (Preti 2008a). But consider Russell's account of the walking tour in 1894, where he and Moore (whom Russell described to his wife Alys as "very ignorant" and (1975, 61) as "like a child") met a "bawdy fellow" who appears to have participated enthusiastically in the telling of lecherous stories (Levy 1979 135–6; Griffin 1992). Given the content of some of his early Apostles' papers, I don't think it is quite true that Moore was so very innocent, but it's also possible that his friends might have been also teasing him in their assignment of Saturday night topics. If they were teasing their perhaps guileless friend, he rose to their challenge. In any case, Moore's reaction to the man might have been merely that he found him exceptionally vulgar or boorish, not least for using news of Moore's Classics training as an excuse to indulge in increasingly ribald banter. I think that it's possible that Moore might actually have been disgusted with *Russell.* Russell did write to Alys that not only did he egg the man on, he "pretended to be just as bad myself." Russell might hint at this in his later recounting of the same story: "I do not believe that [Moore] has ever in all his life derived the faintest pleasure from improper stories or conversation" (Russell 1975, 61), though Russell might have revealed more about his own impatience with middle class mores than about Moore here. In any case, I do think that Moore's sense of humour tended to fail him at Russell's teasing (Preti 2008a; OHBR); and perhaps at Russell's "homilies" (Preti 2008a, 122).

Moore was elected to the Apostles Society in February 1894 and gave his first paper in May. Between May 1894 and November 1898, Moore read 16 papers to the Apostles Society.[5] Their meetings were boisterous. Sidgwick described the general tenor of the Apostles (1906, 127) as "the spirit of the pursuit of truth with absolute devotion and unreserve by a group of intimate friends, who were perfectly frank with each other, and indulged in any amount of humorous sarcasm and playful banter … absolute candour was the only duty that the tradition of the society enforced." The practice of the Society at this time was to meet on Saturday nights during term. Subjects were voted on and assigned, and the chosen speaker delivered a short paper on the assigned topic at the next meeting.[6] The topics were meant to spur discussion, then proceed to a vote on a question or distinction, which was deliberately only tenuously related to the subject of the paper. It is incidentally also quite clear from the text of Moore's surviving Apostles papers how much McTaggart dominated the Apostles experience at this juncture. There are countless facetious asides to McTaggart and his metaphysics; and we know that the young men amused themselves by communicating in a vernacular borrowed from Bradleyean metaphysics.[7] Though Russell was sometimes impatient with the quality of the discussion (Griffin 1992, 60), both he and Moore testified in recollection that their participation in the Society was a greatly satisfying intellectual experience of their undergraduate days.[8]

---

[5] Add. Ms. 8875 12/1/1–28. Between 1895 and 1897, he gave four papers to the Trinity Sunday Essay Society, on mostly religious subjects (Levy, 1979). Between 1895 and 1899, he read three papers to the Moral Sciences Club. All are unpublished, but Levy (1979) has an account of some of them.

[6] "The brothers must not blame me for treating so special a subject, since they had full power to make me treat another" (Add Ms. 8875 12/1/3).

[7] Russell described it like this: "*Real* is what relates to the Society, *phenomenal* everything and everybody else. We all have to speak in turn and lots are drawn as to the order: and we all speak from the *hearthrug*" (Griffin 1992, 61). In 1899, Russell gave a paper almost entirely couched in this style, which took aim at Moore's view concerning beauty's intrinsic worth. Moore seems to have taken this amiss (CPBR 1, 112; Preti 2008a, 117–18; OHBR).

[8] Russell is described as having found "delight and stimulation" among this group, characterized as having "a high regard for the pursuit of truth and complete speculative freedom" (CPBR 1, 76). See Skidelsky (2003, 72–79, 85–92).

Moore's first paper, "What End" (Add. Ms. 8875 12/1/1) addressed the questions "what is the end of human life and what ought to be its end?" At this stage, Moore was just finishing his Classics Part I Tripos and had not yet begun to study moral science in any formal way. But it is a testament to the effect that the Apostles meetings had on him that the intellectual concerns of the Apostolic brotherhood became his.[9] In this first Apostles paper, Moore took on an issue that he later fully developed in PE. The paper begins with an account of what motivates the will and then moves on to the "practical" question of how to help the person with the will to choose "which course to pursue." What stands out is Moore's attempt to conjoin an account of the will with an account of what he calls "consciousness." Moore states that the desire for pleasure is inseparable from life and that the will is "always" choosing "pseudo consciously" or "pseudo-unconsciously" what it believes to be the pleasanter. Moore devotes some space to a formulation of consciousness, in order to defend the view that whatever the relation is between consciousness and will, "they cannot be separated: that relationship is the relation of object to subject (and likewise 'pseudo-conscious' will to consciousness)." Moore defines "consciousness" as "the Subject whose function is perception." Of this, Moore goes on to say that, "perception is the definitive quality of consciousness," and that "sensation or feeling is a subdivision of perception." Moore archly notes that "wine and women," though "no doubt causes of pleasant states," might nonetheless be such as to result in the sacrifice of "that more pleasant state of being in harmony with the world" and goes on to rank-order pleasures ("that of which our organs are the vehicles … perception of other consciousnesses like ourselves … morality and understanding … those which are most capable of becoming mental are the highest"), concluding that "pleasure, desire, and will" must always be "attendant upon consciousness" and that reason is what needs to determine choice. Clearly, Moore's early original attempts at philosophy contain themes that are familiar in his later work: hedonism, for instance, and an attempt at a definition of good; not surprising, as these were part

---

[9] Moore does say (1942, 13) that "during this second year at Cambridge…I found that I was very keenly interested in certain philosophical statements which I heard made in conversation"; that is, what he was hearing at Apostles meetings.

of the Cambridge moral science backdrop. But so was the straightfor-wardly up to date conception of consciousness he voices here.

Moore's next two papers for the Apostles, "Achilles or Patroclus?" (Add. Ms. 8875 12/1/2, November 1894) and "Shall We Delight in Crushing Our Roses?" (Add. Ms. 8875 12/1/3), December 1894) addressed, respectively, perfect friendship and lust. Moore's tone is facetious,[10] but again, both papers contain seeds of what become pillars of his view in PE: that "the one final end in life" is "such love as may be felt for one other human being." This topic was not unfamiliar at the Apostles' meetings at this period, though not necessarily as sexualized.[11] It was a long (and for Moore, often arduous) process to get from these early forays into the nature of perfect friendship and the good to PE, but that it did may explain some of the impact that his membership in the Apostles had on him and the impact that PE (and Moore himself) had on his friends and his students. It is not surprising that, when it appeared, they took PE to be the most advanced form of an argument for—a rea-soned defence of—what they took to be central and essential to their lives: beauty and love.

---

[10] Levy ([1979], 139) has claimed that Moore in these papers shows that he could tease his Apostolic brothers back by making light of his own very conventional views about sex. Levy was likely con-cerned not to offend or upset Dorothy Moore, through whose generosity Levy had access to Moore's papers before they were sold (Dorothy Moore died two years before Levy's book appeared; the Moore literary estate was subsequently controlled by Timothy Moore until his death). Moore's relationship with his future brother-in-law, A. F. Ainsworth, remains something of a mystery. Moore did not destroy these early Apostles papers, nor did he destroy one of his early lists which contains some boyish but quite ardent references to Ainsworth (Add. Ms. 8330 1/1/2). Levy walked on eggshells concerning Moore's relationship to Ainsworth; to his credit, however, he did not ignore it. It is difficult to be clear as to the extent of the intimacy between Moore and Ainsworth (Levy cites Woolf as denying they had a physical relationship ([1979], 212)), although they lived in Edinburgh together between 1904 and 1908. Ainsworth's surviving letters to Moore in the Moore papers at Cambridge are inside of a folded piece of paper upon which is written (not in Moore's hand): "Moore's greatest friend at Cambridge. Strachey tried to convince them they were homo-sexual lovers. Ainsworth married Moore's sister—a disaster." See Levy ([1979], 213).

[11] Like many men of this class, the Apostles had had their emotional life developed nearly exclu-sively in a homosocial environment (see Lubenow ([1998])). Of course, the wider (and legal) impli-cations of homo*sexuality* in the society at large then were chilling. Some of the ambiguity surrounding the sexual content of these Apostles papers can be seen in Russell's disdain of the overt homosexuality that took over, though after his time (Auto., 71; Rosenbaum ([1984], 25)). Levy has claimed (1979, 140) that in the late 1890s, it was all the rage to be (merely) campy about sex. Levy asserts this was mostly verbal, continuing a tradition set by earlier brothers and continued by McTaggart and Lowes Dickinson (1979, 140).

"Achilles and Patroclus" begins with the question of "how far in friendship … one party should be active and the other passive and what effects on the happiness of each follows from this activity or passivity" (Moore adds mischievously "in sodomy or otherwise"[12]). But the paper for the most part is centred on his claim that "we must … love the best real thing we know, in order to attain the utmost happiness … and this thing will be another human soul"[13] and Moore's attempts to define "more exactly the nature of this permanent emotion or passion which I call love." What he proposes is that "it seems necessary … to define 'the good' and show the relation of friendship to it," although he does not ultimately come to any conclusions about it.

Levy's (1979, 145) analysis of "Shall We Delight in Crushing our Roses," however, comes across as far too stately. Levy has claimed that in this paper we see Moore baring his sweet, trusting, and largely innocent soul to his intimate friends in an early show of how intellectually scrupulous he could be on the subject of lust (both other-and-self-directed), even when his own character was far more prim than the rest of the Society. I instead read Moore as now entering with verve into the riotous nature of Apostles' meetings.[14] This wouldn't be the first time a group of undergraduates approached a suggestive topic with grandiosity as well as the giggles, and Moore, after all, had been raised in a household pious enough to make him feel diffident about writing home that he was taking up dancing lessons.[15] But like students before and since, Moore was finding his own voice among trusted friends. In this paper, Moore's comparison of the loss of maidenhood with crushing a garden of full-blown roses for the sake of mischievous pleasure is over the top, as are the deliberately syrupy descriptions of such a garden ("leaving naked in their place the shining green seed-vessels"). What Moore does in this paper that sounds

---

[12] At least part of the discussion afterward seems to have concerned whether sex was a crucial aspect of friendship (Levy, 142), and the brothers voted on the question "Are solid friendships best?" Moore voted no.

[13] Moore seems to have backed off of "pleasure" as the highest good by this second paper.

[14] I find it preposterous that Levy takes seriously the claim Moore makes in this paper that he didn't know there were homosexuals outside of classical Latin and Greek texts until he came to Cambridge. It is also not impossible that the young Apostles did a fair amount of drinking at their Saturday night meetings, as undergraduates will.

[15] 30 October 1895 (Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/55); Russell (Auto., 65).

familiar, however, is give a *conceptual* analysis of "lust," (shame, prevalence, ignorance, and innocence are discussed as conditions); along with his closing excuse that "I did not leave myself time enough to write it properly."[16]

By May 1895, when Moore delivered "What is Matter" (Add. Ms. 12/1/5), he had spent a full year studying philosophy. This paper is the first of Moore's Apostles papers that explicitly formulates an epistemological/metaphysical issue, and in it, he appears to meld *all* of the influences he was gathering from his friends and his teachers. The ostensible topic of the paper was "to search out what reasons I have beyond the common practice of men for believing these ... existential propositions: I am, you are, it is." Berkeley's view, partly the stalking horse here, was taken to suffer from quite a few defects. For one thing, there was a "strange fact empirically given" which Berkeley "does not sufficiently explain": how it was that "the order of my perceptions and the combining power of the percipient have somehow forced upon me the belief that there persists through time an infinite ordered universe, independent of my perception of it, and made up of qualities which I only know as capable to exist within a mind"; moreover, "I must be wrong in believing that this world is composed of such qualities, though I cannot help thinking so." On that, he quotes Lotze: "the impression is overwhelming." Moore says he was led to this because "we do actually believe in the existence of things, which we cannot see to be dependent on us." Surely, he says, what makes me say "it is" of the fountain in Trinity Great Court is that it is not *only* my perceptions of it. Moore concludes that this belief can act as a probable premise in the argument that there is something that exists apart from me. Berkeley's own view, he claims, won't do: it leads to solipsism, because (he borrows this point from Stout's lectures), "I have no experience of how the perception in one mind (he presumably means that of God's) could be transferred to another."

---

[16] "Can God Be Serious?" (Add. Ms. 12/1/4) took on the attributes of a perfect being, whether we can know them, and whether a sense of humour would be one of the perfect or necessary goods that a perfect necessary being would have. Moore demurs: "Since God is absolutely indeterminate, I cannot say if he has a sense of humour; though I may safely declare that he may *not* have it...." As to the essence of humour itself, Moore apparently teased the brothers (as I read him) by arguing that there is a proper object of laughter and an improper one, and indecent humour is "a bad kind."

What makes this paper notable in the reconstruction of Moore's early philosophical development is that in it we can detect elements of Moore's year-long exposure to philosophy via Stout and Ward.[17] For instance, we saw above that Ward took it that we could know only the content of our own minds (which was hardly controversial), but also that there was no reason to infer from that that the world of common sense science did not exist. We also noted the role of "activity" in Ward's mental science, something that Moore formulates here as "what am I if I am not active … an agent cannot be without acting and without acting something." There are, moreover, plenty of allusions to Kant, such as on the notion of the "mere possibility of sensation," of which Moore claims that "possibility is an abstract term, and denotes only a property of some real thing, which is able to become something else."

Others have argued that this paper shows Moore officially embracing the idealist metaphysics of his *milieu*.[18] I think this is mistaken. Rather I take Moore to be laughing with his brothers here, in the spirit of Apostolic Saturday nights. When he says that "I am … convinced that there is a certain collection of perceptible qualities which I call Crompton, sitting behind me … is not each one of you convinced by some similar proposition?" I read him as poking fun of the McTaggartean idealism that tended to define the gatherings by giving a paper in which he *jokingly* contrasts their common sense with their affectations of idealism. The joke is that he is appearing to allow that the only merit in the paper is in his finally capitulating to a metaphysics that includes some unifying spirit: "Its chief interest is for myself, that it signifies my departure from the materialism, which I once thought I could uphold and sets out (I fear not even plainly) such poor idealistic system as I can construct in its place." Throughout the paper, Moore makes a few asides to views about which the brethren "will not feel as strongly as I do," one of which he formulates as that "we all commonly believe": that there are some other real being(s), which are not merely part of the content of my perceptions. Moore closes the paper by saying, "I will recapitulate the point, on which chiefly I would like

---

[17] For one thing, Moore explicitly does say, "To those brethren who have at all studied philosophy, it will be plain how much I had borrowed, though indeed I have modified the loan, by borrowing without intelligence."

[18] Levy (1979), Regan (1986a, b), Baldwin (1990), Hylton (1990), Griffin (1991), among others.

something said: (1) the difficulty there is in our belief of the real existence of sensible things in space; (2) the argument against solipsism; (3) the dependence of our knowledge of the existence of other persons upon the knowledge of the existence of that other real being, which we may call 'matter'; and (4) the immortality of the soul." Moore seems to be going Ward one better by claiming in (3) that there is a way to claim that "matter" is the metaphysical element that stands behind our perceptions, as the unifying element so beloved by the idealists. Although this paper is more exuberant than coherent—and needs to be read with an ear to the roguish way in which it would have been received—there is something in Moore's ambitious attempt to knit together *all* the philosophical elements that he had been hearing and studying that may begin to explain how his philosophical charisma, at this early stage, was thought to be so auspicious.[19]

By Michaelmas term 1895, after a year of solid study in philosophy, Moore's Apostles papers began to sound less frisky and more philosophically practiced.[20] Moore's developing philosophical progress,

---

[19] Moore wrote in another paper that he is taking seriously "the apostolic privilege of confusing and confounding into the hotch-potch of our paper all subjects that seem to shew the slightest vestige of a fit ingredient for the mess that should satisfy the cravings of our hungry spirit" (Add. Ms. 8875 12/1/11).

[20] In "Is Character Habit" (30 November 1895; Add. Ms. 8875 12/1/6), Moore is chiefly concerned with carving out for the nature of habit something *short* of Bradleyan "unreality." Though "we should like not to be in the world," the question is "if it is not true that even a good habit is an indignity to our nature, though better than phenomenal nature." His next two papers were given on two successive Saturday nights (22 and 29 February, 1896), on hypocrisy. McTaggart had been called a "holy humbug" by another Apostle, in that he had professed to be "distressed" when the Vice Master walked by a group of the brothers, one of whom—Russell's brother Frank—was smoking (on a Sunday). So the question was whether "McTaggart's distress at Lord Russell's conduct was certainly real; and if it was partly due to regret at the loss of the vice master's esteem, not to abhorrence of the act, that was not the reason we are seeking." The following week, Moore summarized his points, in particular the one that he found the most difficult: "a person might be a hypocrite to himself, not merely deceiving himself…but willfully deceiving himself as to his own character for the sake of his gratification," though he does not come to any solid conclusion. "Would We Be Catholic or Protestant" (Add. Ms. 8875 12/1/9) is Moore's analysis of a discussion in Hegel's *Philosophy of History* on the relative merits of each church. Moore (interestingly) comes down on the side of the Catholic church for claiming that relics and images can in themselves be holy; whereas for the Protestant church, "holiness" amounts to our own subjective attribution. "Is Beauty Truth" (Add. Ms. 8875 12/1/10) is a defence of the claim that art and goodness are in some sense connected; Moore ends in an anticipation of a familiar theme in PE by saying that "I cannot see by what possible logical necessity we can be driven from …'this is' to the assertion 'this is good'".

however, became explicit in his Moral Sciences Club papers.[21] In October 1895, Moore delivered "Kant's Ethical Principle" (Add. Ms. 8875 12/3/1). This paper is the first of Moore's early surviving philosophical forays that shows more clearly how he was attempting to fuse the variety of influences that surrounded him in a philosophical direction. Moore began by asserting that Kant's critical method entailed more success for Ethics than for Metaphysics in that Kant had concluded, with respect to knowledge of reality: "there are some things that [the mind] could not know." The *metaphysical* remedy, according to Moore, was Hegel's: had Kant inquired more fully into his basic assumptions (that only sensuous experience was knowable, and that it *was* knowable), he would have been able to claim instead that "Reality touches thought in Pure Being."

As for Ethics, however, Moore points out that "we can no more help willing something than we can help thinking something" and that "the pure form of will corresponds to the synthetic a priori action of the mind in cognition." There was, in short, an "objective something" which is implied in the universality of the will. The will, he argued, was composed of two cooperative elements: willing itself, and the good. Kant's ethical principle was to be understood as the most abstract possible form of will together with the most abstract possible form of goodness. Moore took exception to Kant's formulation that "the Good Will is the only thing that is good in itself," arguing that Kant did not confront the "illogicality" of it, in that it entails an empirical distinction between good and evil, and implies that a will could be evil. For all that, Moore was willing to look more closely at "the good will is the good" and at what "everybody" calls its worthlessness as a principle, because "it deals in mere abstractions." Moore defends this aspect of (what he has called) Kant's Ethical Principle, in that it is "incomparably more worth [sic] than all the egoisms and utilitarianisms in the world" since it brings us face to face "with the ultimate."

---

[21] The Moral Sciences Club is a specifically philosophical gathering, and graduate students in Moore's day (like today) will have been encouraged to deliver papers to professional audiences in order to hone their skills. See Preti, 2008b.

In considering another way to formulate Kant's universal will (freedom), Moore explicitly refers to most (if not all) of the elements at play in his philosophical environment: "Hegel thinks it contemptible that Kant should have found in his Practical rather than in his Pure Reason an object of reverence. … We hear the same thing from Mr. Bradley—this absolutely free will is a will that wills nothing. Mr. Sidgwick brings us to the point when he tells us that Kant confused the freedom of a will, which could choose either good or evil, and that of a will, which was only free in doing the right." Moore then rejects the attempts of Kant, Hegel, *and* Bradley to set things conceptually aright: "It is quite true that Kant did confuse them … But have Hegel and Mr. Bradley done any better? They both assume that it is with the latter kind of freedom that the will is really free." Sidgwick's formulation is met with Moore's approval: that of the "ordinary libertarian" whose will is "the indeterminate free will." Hegel's (and Bradley's) by contrast are rejected: "Good and Will are not being and thought." In fact: "The object of thought is pure being; perhaps we may call the object of the will pure good, *expressed in terms of thought*; but pure good, as practical, has all the difference (and similarity) which there is between will and thought."

Moore concludes by proposing that what is necessary is a "dialectic of will" for "Ethics to stand beside Ontology. There must be a Metaphysic of Morals differing … from all previous Ethics," he claims. Moore has a suggestion for the completion of the dialectic process: "Bradley's self-realization." The end-stage, however, will differ from Bradley's, in that it must be "viewed, as Ethics requires, from the point of view of will; and hence can be deduced, as his never could be, from what we have called Kant's Ethical Principle. It is the realization of the self as will, not as thought, nor as the combination of the two."

Even though Moore's early stab here at figuring out a "Metaphysic of Ethics" is more than slightly garbled, what does stand out is a seed of what develops more clearly in the 1897 dissertation. Moore underscores that there is a difference between thought and will and their respective objects: namely, that the objects of will have to be thought; have to be good; and also have to have a practical effect. Moore's proposal to solve this, at this stage, was by way of a version of Bradley's Absolute ("the ultimate"): Moore proposes that the nature of the Being in which the

process of self-realization comes to its final end will be an *ethical* universal: the Good.

A year later (6 November, 1896; Add. Ms. 8875 12/3/2), Moore delivered "Causality" to the Moral Sciences Club.[22] He described this event to his parents a week later: "It was a very small point, but I had to maintain it for an hour; and succeeded … McTaggart and Stout … endorsed me, in the main."[23] We saw in Chaps. 2 and 3 that causality was a distinct feature of Moore's moral sciences Tripos preparation. In this paper, Moore again brought a number of his influences together—citing Hegel, Lotze, Sigwart, and Bradley—in order to "raise a difficulty as to the principle of causality." His conclusion, moreover, also blends in some mental science.

After a brief summary of Hume's denial that we can know that "like cause must always have like effect," Moore considers what he takes to be the inadequacy of Kant's answer: that "we could not know particulars at all, unless they were conformed to certain universal principles." Moore claims that this position rests on a mistake, in common not only to Kant, but to Berkeley and Hume: namely, the supposition that "the knowledge, which comes to us on reflection, that our impressions do succeed one another, is prior in time and logically presupposed in, our knowledge of an objective world." The problem, according to Moore, is that Kant takes it as legitimate to "abstract from the time-relation"—that "when we pronounce two events to be necessarily connected we must mean that their contents, as abstracted from their time-positions, are so connected; time, being merely a uniform relation between events, cannot be suffered to have anything to do with their connection." Moore puts pressure on one of Kant's conditions for knowledge of phenomena: the world is "necessarily known in time." According to Moore, that is a *schema*, and as such, it cannot be "applied to objects in abstraction from the time-schema." Bradley's formulation is also given very short shrift here, however. Bradley (in AR) had claimed that for any succession to be true it is necessarily

---

[22] This paper builds on one that he had read to the Cambridge Natural Sciences Club on 15 August, 1896 (Add. Ms. 8875 12/4/1) called "The Philosophical Basis of the Natural Sciences." There, Moore covered much of the same ground concerning time, succession in time, universal time-truths, and mental-physical causation. He concluded, however, that causality can never account for the nature of "ideas as beauty and goodness."

[23] Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/56.

true (because nothing is separate from anything else): "causation" is only tenable on the view—his view—that there are no pluralities.[24] But Moore objects: to claim that it is the case that *e* occurred is not to entail that it *always* does and "brings you no nearer to 'like cause, like effect'"; moreover, he criticizes Bradley for embracing "how far you will have to go against the ordinary use of language, if his view is correct."

Part of the problem here is the nature of time, which Moore takes to inform a dilemma: "Either we must say that cause and effect as such are independent of the time relation; in which case we can get 'like cause, like effect' but can not see what business in the world they can have to follow on another. Or we may say that any particular observed succession is a fact, in which case we get the proposition that each state of the world must follow the last; but no means of proving 'like cause, like effect.'" As Moore formulates the issue, Kant seems torn between both horns of the dilemma; whereas Bradley accepts the first (as does Hegel). To answer Bradley, Moore deploys the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Bradley appeals to this principle to claim that difference of position in time must be quite indifferent to the real nature of objects. But Moore asks: "in what respect has space the advantage over time?"

Moore appears to claim towards the end of this paper that Lotze's solution "seems to be" the only escape,[25] and notes for Bradley "the existence of mind not causally connected [to] matter" cuts against the universality of the causal law. But Moore explains that the law, as Kant conceived of it, is "only meant to imply there is a common substratum other than mere time for the changes connected." This "common substratum," Moore claimed, is supplied in physics by space; but "in psychology it may be supplied by feeling or consciousness … whatever most general term we can find for Kant's 'object of inner sense.'" Note that here Moore does not use "psychology" to mean "epistemology" or "logic"; but to mean precisely what Ward and Stout would have taken it to mean.

---

[24] Moore here noted that Bradley's view "is calculated to induce belief by the mere bravado"; and calls the view "oracular."

[25] Lotze's strategy according to Moore was to hold that the principle of "like cause, like effect" "really holds" but he "comforts himself under the conviction…that perhaps after all it does not always hold" because the conditions at work in the world are of "infinite complexity"; thus, we cannot be sure that "precisely the same are ever reproduced."

Moore's early papers for these Cambridge societies gesture towards several of the theoretical elements that made up his philosophical environment. Moore was attempting to fit many different elements together, however, rather than offering a coherent or straightforward defence of (say) Bradleyan metaphysics. But one theme that does seem to stand out across quite a number of these papers is that of abstraction. This is not surprising: Bradley's views concerning universals, particulars, and abstraction were at the heart of his Absolute metaphysics; abstraction played a role in Kant's transcendental arguments; and (probably most important) it gave the young philosophers (and classicists) a suitably philosophical way to discuss art, love, friendship, goodness, and the like. But abstraction also played a role in the nineteenth century understanding of judgment as the mechanism by which reason makes a shift from particulars to universals. Bradleyan logic and metaphysics both centred around the question how the many can be one, and one aspect of this issue concerned the way in which the apparent chaos of experience and feeling could be *thought*. And this in turn raised the question of how it is that we can think anything that is not connected to the chaos of experience and feeling.

Moore took this on in his Apostles paper "Can We Mean Anything, When We Don't Know What We Mean?" (23 January, 1897; Add. Ms. 8875 12/1/11). It has been argued that this paper contains the first obvious signs of his beginning to shrug off the Bradleyan elements he had been adapting into his thinking.[26] As I have shown, however, there are plenty of signs of Moore's ambivalence in papers before this one; moreover, the language of this paper *is* on the face of it Bradleyan. However, this paper does contain a few more obvious hints of the themes that would eventually come to characterize PE.

On 18 January, 1897, Moore wrote to his friend Desmond MacCarthy that:

Dickinson and McT [sic] joined in choosing subjects here on Sat. night, and they carried 'Can we mean anything, when we don't know what we mean?' against Trevy's single vote for English superiority. The question cho-

---

[26] Baldwin (1990), Griffin (1991), Hylton (1990).

sen is meant to bear on 'abstractions' (the one I told you I cared most for) and will be illustrated by love and goodness.[27]

We saw that love and goodness were not strangers to Moore's papers for the Society; or indeed as topics for the Society.[28] Moore takes the title question, however, to concern the question "in what sense abstracts are real" and specifically, what the distinction between general and particular amounts to. Moore (ultimately) interprets the question "can we mean anything when we don't know what we mean?" as an analysis of how to understand "good," with respect to what it can refer to. His object is to give reasons to accept that the meaning of the word "good" need not be anything "given" in sense experience. There are (he argues) two different kinds of universals—some are true universals, some aren't. That is, some expressions have meaning via what is immediately given (whatever is given in experience to a subject), and the others are "that in which reference to anything seems impossible, since the meaning is its essence universal and can only be explained by its connection with other universals." Moore's point is that an abstract expression is not necessarily a true universal. He argues that "redness" and "unity" are both abstract, "and as such might both be termed universal." But because "redness" (and like expressions) are only comprehensible "in reference to what is directly given," they are "essentially particular." This is because they can only be applied to an element of our own experience. So "redness" is not a true universal; at best, it is *general*, across any or all states of subjective experience. A true universal, of course, is independent of subjective experience; as Moore claims, this was "the secret of the hypostatization of the Platonic ideas" and (interestingly) that "it was this distinction that Locke's way of ideas neglected." Ultimately, Moore wanted to at least suggest that "goodness" is a true universal—we may not know what we mean by it in the sense of being able to fix its reference to anything immediately given or knowable (like pleasure), but propositions containing the expression are not "nonsense."

---

[27] Add. Ms. 8330 2/5/4 (18 January 1897).

[28] This paper, he says, will consist of "references to a distinction which [he has] often talked about before."

There are some familiar Moorean themes in this paper, not least of which is Moore's determination to define the good as something other than pleasure. What is of interest is Moore's use of what we would recognize as closer to our own understanding of logical, even analytical, vocabulary. The "logic" here is clearly Bradleyan and the formulations are those of the early chapters of Bradley's PL.[29] But one hint of a difference however is that, while Moore is looking for a way to detach the abstract "good" from any suspicion of the subjective psychological, he does not embrace Bradley's dialectical insistence that qualities and relations are, from whatever perspective we try to capture them, contradictory.

Once his Tripos were over, Moore set to work to produce a dissertation to submit for a Trinity Fellowship.[30] I will turn now to discussing the shift in Moore's views between his work on the 1897 dissertation and the 1898 version, which developed into his novel argument for the nature of judgment, and which paved the way for PE.

3   The Revolution: Moore's Trinity Prize Fellowship Dissertations (1897–1898)

The Trinity College Prize Fellowship competition was one of the (few) avenues available for Moore and his peers at Cambridge to pursue an academic post-graduate career. Fellowships were tenable for six years, provided a stipend, carried no teaching nor even residence responsibilities, and could in the best-case scenario lead to a position as a lecturer at Trinity at the end of their run. In McTaggart's case, this did happen—his own Fellowship was awarded in 1891, ended in 1897, and he was thereafter appointed as a lecturer at Trinity. Russell was

---

[29] The stress on meaning here could look (to us) to be an anticipation of the twentieth century method that Moore was later credited with introducing. But this method of clarifying the meaning of a chosen formulation was likely to be McTaggart's (1942, 19).

[30] See BP (2011, xvii–xx) for the regulations concerning the Fellowship. The dissertation was only one part.

awarded a Fellowship in 1895, but in that year he also came into his inheritance and married his first wife Alys, so he did not immediately pursue an official academic career. Moore himself was not awarded the Fellowship in 1897,[31] but he was successful in 1898, and spent the next six years at Cambridge.[32] The scholarly outcome of those six years was PE.[33]

There is a clear trajectory from some of Moore's earliest philosophical studies all the way to PE, and it runs straight through the dissertations. We have already seen that the themes of love, goodness, and personal affection were everyday currency among the Apostles. But the arguments of PE are a far cry from rollicking Apostles' meetings, and Moore's journey to those arguments was arduous (see Preti (2008a, b, OHBR)). I will begin with a look at the 1897 dissertation and then track the changes that appeared a year later in the 1898 version, to examine the development of Moore's views.[34]

---

[31] It was not unusual to be passed over for the Fellowship. Russell was encouraging: "…as Fletcher and Lawrence were both at their last chance I suppose they could not be passed by." The important thing, Russell emphasized, is "what people say of your chances for next year, and whether they commended your dissertation. Please write and tell me all such facts as may be told concerning the examiners' opinions…." (Add. Ms. 8330 8R/33/3). See BP (2011, 97–116; 245–9).

[32] The Fellowship competition consisted not only of a thesis but also on an examination "in the subjects of their dissertations and in matters connected with them," but the questions were not necessarily "confined to the subjects indicated by the candidates." The candidate moreover needed to be prepared to field questions "on Modern Philosophy" and was invited to provide a list of works in that tradition, with the caveat that "the questions will not be confined necessarily to these works." Moore prepared a list of works on which he was prepared to be examined and this survives. The works were, in the main, what Moore called "Kant's works on the Principles of Morals," (he notes he will be reading the Abbott translation (1889)), which included the *Critique of Practical Reason*, parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the *Metaphysics of Morals*, and others (BP 2011, xix).

[33] As Moore was not offered a lectureship at the end of his Fellowship, he left Cambridge. From 1904 to 1908 he was in Edinburgh with Ainsworth (who later married Moore's sister), and from 1908–1911, he was in London living with one of his own sisters. During 1910–1911, he gave a set of lectures at Morley College, later published as Moore (1953). In 1911, he took up a position at Cambridge, where he remained until he retired in 1939.

[34] See below; and Preti (2008a, 2019, OHBR).

4   The 1897 Version of *The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics*

Moore's own account of his dissertation work (Moore 1942, 20) was that in consultation with Ward (his director of studies) he "decided to try to write on Kant's Ethics." Moore (1942, 20–2) described this work as, starting with 1897, "an attempt to make sense of [Kant's] extremely mysterious assertions concerning freedom and the self": "each of us had two 'selves' or 'Egos', one of which he called the 'noumenal' self, the other an 'empirical' self, and he seemed also to say or imply that the 'noumenal' self was free, whereas the 'empirical' self was not."[35] Having failed to win that year's fellowship, but encouraged to believe by Sidgwick and by Ward that his work was thought of favourably ("the right kind of nonsense"),[36] Moore turned his attention in 1898 to another "mystifying" Kantian notion, that of Reason. He states that "Kant's term 'Reason' involved a reference to the notion of 'truth,'" but "it seemed to me that it was extremely difficult to see clearly what Kant meant by 'reason'" (1942, 22). This motivated Moore to "think about truth," from which he was led to take a passage from Bradley's PL as a focus of criticism. This was the first step to Moore's iconoclastic view of the nature of judgment. The question is: how exactly did he get to it?

---

[35] Moore's description in 1942 was that what he managed to eke out of his understanding of Kant in 1897 bore as much resemblance to Kant's own meaning as McTaggart on Hegel (i.e. little to none), and that the paper he published out of this work (Moore 1897) was "absolutely worthless." (1942, 21). From the perspective of contemporary Kant scholarship, the topic he chose is considered among the most difficult in Kant studies. Allison (1990) notes that Kant himself describes the theory of freedom "the keystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even of speculative reason," adding that it is "the most difficult aspect of his philosophy to interpret let alone defend," given the "bewildering number of ways in which Kant characterizes freedom and the variety of distinctions he draws between various kinds/senses of freedom" (1990, 1). We could take this as some contemporary confirmation that Moore was not entirely off base to point out the lack of cohesion in Kant's formulation of freedom (in spite of the indignation of Caird (BP 2011, 99–116). Nor that he was entirely off base to shift his attention from freedom to Kant's conception of reason in 1898, given Kant's own views on the connection between practical reason and reason itself.

[36] Moore reported that Sidgwick warned Ward not to be too discouraging in his assessment of Moore's new work so as not to ruin Moore's chances (1942, 21), as Ward took Sidgwick's place as examiner in 1898. Russell wrote to his wife that it was nevertheless a "very close shave…" (Griffin (1992, 189)).

Kant's account of freedom was an idiosyncratic compatibilism, as we saw in Chap. 3. Kant agreed that ordinary natural determinism is a feature of the phenomenal realm, but he maintained that freedom applies to the noumenal. The question is how to understand human agency in terms of this noumenal freedom, however. Kant's moral psychology didn't help: it emphasized autonomy, uniquely under obligation to law, as the key characteristic of human volition. This led to the problem of accounting for two *prima facie* attributes of the rational agent—an empirical character (an agent *acts*) and an intelligible character (an agent acts in the light of, or in obligation to, the moral law).[37] Kant moreover appeared to shift his argumentative strategy over time—in the *Groundwork*, he attempts a deduction of the moral law by assuming the idea of freedom; in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, he argues instead that the moral law, established as a "fact of reason," can serve as the foundation from which to deduce freedom.[38] Some underlying puzzles include (i) how transcendentally free agents have the causal power to produce an action without being causally determined by antecedent phenomenal causation (including their own mental states); and (ii) how to square the empirical nature of actions (they occur in time) with transcendental freedom. Another puzzle is how the notion of freedom can play a role in ethics, when freedom is (at best) a feature of the intelligible character (the noumenal), about which we can know nothing.[39]

---

[37] See Allison (1990) for a detailed study. Allison has argued that a "two-aspect" rather than a "two-object" understanding of Kant's phenomenal/noumenal distinction—and the related empirical/intelligible character of the rational agent—is the most charitable way to interpret Kant's Transcendentalism and his conception of Freedom. Moore and his teachers, however, took Kant's distinctions ontologically (so, consistent with the latter of Allison's proposed readings), which could explain their resistance to his transcendentalism (Baldwin 1984; Preti 2008a, 2008b).

[38] Allison (1990) has noted that Kant does not discuss the problem of freedom directly in the first critique; his examination of it there comes in the Third Antinomy, where he examines the nature of causality. For Kant's moral writings, see Kant (1996).

[39] Recall that this was one of Sidgwick's criticisms (see Chap. 3). One option is that Kant was examining at most the logical possibility of freedom (Pereboom 2006). See below for Moore's view on this.

Moore's own main plot points in the 1897 dissertation hint at the dim view he took of Kant's success in accounting for the role of freedom in ethics, as follows. Kant as a declared determinist argued that freedom was not "naturally" possible (BP 20–5), so the nature of causality requires consideration (BP 25–9). Kant further maintained that things in themselves are free causes, but a free cause is not (Moore asserts) a cause at all (BP 29–35). We might perhaps be able to accept a notion of reality as possessing Kant's transcendental freedom, but Kant goes too far (Moore argues) when he applied this transcendental freedom to the human will, which is not a thing in itself (BP 35–9). We are not likely to find an absolutely self-caused cause in the world of experience; moreover, this libertarian position will require accepting an uncaused choosing, for which (Moore argues) there is no defence (BP 41–51). Moore debates the question as to how there can be a sense in which an empirical object can be a self or have a self *and* be free; he concluded that the notion of "organism" as having freedom is untenable (BP 54–7). Moore then attempts to explain how Kant could argue that freedom can belong to natural objects and the Will ("confusions exposed" BP 64–70). Connecting Freedom with End did not help: Moore argues that this move is undercut when End itself is referred to as Will. A "Pure Will," as Kant would have it, is impossible, Moore claimed, as willing implies time; thus, there is no practical freedom. Moore's concluding remarks concern the connection (or lack thereof) of the notion "good" with freedom (BP 78–86).

A caveat about the 1897 dissertation is that Moore did not finish the thesis as he intended, and there is more than a little evidence that he in effect did not turn in an entirely complete piece of work, at least from a conceptual standpoint. Moore explains in his preface that he was compelled to leave out "the discussion of Kant's attitude toward Hedonism and Practical Ethics" (which was supposed to have made up a second chapter); special criticisms of Green and Bradley, which were to form appendices; his own positive theory of practical applications; and more on Freedom (which was meant to be a third chapter).[40] What he turned in consisted of a general introduction, a long chapter on Freedom ("with

---

[40] It is not clear how seriously Moore meant to take a stab at these. The topics do not appear in 1898, probably because Moore's new view on the nature of judgment had taken hold.

special reference to Kant"), and a short Appendix on some of Sidgwick's fundamental positions in ME; in particular, hedonism.

We can begin with the Preface, which contains the most explicit statement of Moore's commitment to Bradley's philosophy at this point in his philosophical development, and which is invariably cited as conclusive evidence of Moore's idealist early stages. But I think it is more important to stress that the acknowledgment to Bradley comes in the context of Moore explaining that, though he did consult Caird's Kant commentary (Caird 1889), he was inclined to reject Caird's idealist-leaning use of the Kantian notion of 'the unity of consciousness' as the foundation of his explanation and criticism, especially of the *Ding an Sich*.[41] Moore notes that he was far more greatly drawn to Bradley's "general philosophical attitude," and that it is to Bradley's work (PL and AR in particular) that he "chiefly owes [his] conception of the fundamental problem of Metaphysics." This fundamental problem is, as we have seen, "the great problem of the relation between Thought and Reality."[42] In the most general terms there is nothing particularly idealist or absolutist about a commitment to this particular philosophical problem; indeed perhaps few philosophers could be said *not* to address it. In 1897, Moore attempted to rework what he described as a "too psychologistic" Kantian account between thought and reality into the terms of a Bradleyan one. Moore's

---

[41] It was Moore's bad luck that Caird was one of the examiners for the 1897 dissertation (BP 2011, 99–116). Caird in his examiners' comments claimed that what made it difficult to assess Moore's dissertation was that "Kant is read so much through the eyes of Bradley and Lotze, which leads…to an imperfect realization of the best points in Kant's work, and an exaggeration of his inconsistencies." (BP 2011, 99).

[42] Candlish and Basile (2021). This might be the right time to address a slight scholarly puzzle concerning Moore's 1903 claim to having "refuted" idealism in RI. RI on the face of it seems more directed onto *Berkeleyan* idealism than *Bradleyan* idealism (although in Morris and Preti (2015), we argue that there is a way to read Moore's early and later work as demonstrating the same critical direction of view). It is indeed the case that Bradley specifically avoided what I would call a *locally* subjectivist position on Reality, arguing instead that Reality consisted of a kind of unknowable one-ness between Thought and Reality (the Absolute). This, as we see, initially attracted Moore to Bradley's metaphysics as a basis for ethics, as Bradley's Absolute appeared to be distinct from human psychical states (importantly, it was timeless, since it was dialectically *beyond time*). But Moore here (and ever after) remained unconvinced and unimpressed with any view that linked psychological/mental activity with its object, *whatever* way it did so. Kant's transcendentalism and Bradley's monism came to be rejected; and Berkeley's perceptual idealism followed a few years later. In all of these views, the fundamental problem for Moore remained the same: the object of thought was conflated with the act of thought.

emphasis in 1897 was to develop Bradley's notion of Reality as, specifically, an adequately non-psychologistic candidate upon which to base a metaphysics of ethics.[43]

In the introduction, Moore spent some considerable time in carving out an understanding of Ethics as metaphysical and not practical. Here, Moore engaged with Sidgwick's own introduction to ME, but took in effect an opposing position. Where Sidgwick staked out a position on ethics as an enquiry into the art of conduct, Moore instead carved out a distinction between an Art and a Science, to support his view that the "practicality" of ethics depends on a closer examination of "not even what we ought to pursue" but "what is meant by saying that a thing is good" or ought to be pursued. This is an enquiry that is different from a normative science, which *assumes* the end is good without investigating the nature of that good. (BP 2011, 9). Moore then goes on to make a distinction between Metaphysics of Ethics and Ethics (BP 2011, 8), via an analogous distinction between Science and Metaphysics. Science, he says, ascertains laws which obtain among things that exist, but it doesn't enquire into the meaning of "exists"—this is the job of Metaphysics. Moore claims that the distinction between science and metaphysics with respect to existence can supply the model for the distinction between Metaphysics of Ethics and Ethics with respect to *good*. To show this, Moore introduces a preview of the naturalistic fallacy argument. Moore argues that the question "what is good" may "involve a metaphysical enquiry" to which "no identification of the good with any one empirical datum such as pleasure can ever furnish an answer." The fallacy, he claims, would be akin to identifying "chair or table, because they are, with 'being' or matter with reality" (BP 2011, 9).[44]

Moore gives some context to his conclusion concerning the so-called naturalistic fallacy when it comes to discussion of the good: if we propose

---

[43] For Moore, the insuperable problem that came with greater focus into view was the conflation of the object of thought with the act of thought, a conflation he ultimately rejected as problematically subjectivist, whether it appeared in Locke, Kant, Berkeley, Hume, or Bradley. We could say that Moore's view on this is analogous to his formulation of the naturalistic fallacy in PE: the problem with *all* previous accounts of the connection between thought and reality is that reality was made subordinate to thought (one way or another).

[44] See Preti (2018) on the naturalistic fallacy in the mature Moore.

to discuss what a word ought to be used to mean (or what it really does mean), then "it must always be implied that there is some real object or relation for which a term is required for the purposes of scientific discussion." The problem with all empirical definitions of the good is that they immediately run aground on the issue of what standard of good is being disputed. Take any two disputants: each one will define "good" according to their preferred empirical standard. But the dispute between them will then run aground on one of the two following problems: (i) it's an empirical non-starter to claim that one's preferred empirical definition is what the term "good" is "usually employed to convey" (since if so, what are they disputing?). Thus (ii) it would seem that a dispute between two empirical conceptions of good is implicitly a dispute about what "good" *must* or *ought* to convey, in which case the disputants are begging the question. Moore is also clear in this section that his examination is not "lexicographical" or merely about "the meaning of words" but that the issue is metaphysical—"it is maintained that there is a real object or relation" that corresponds to the words "good" and "ought to be." This is a hint that Moore's opposition to "naturalistic" definitions of "good" rests on a suspicion that they depend (if we put it in Bradleyan terms) on appearances and not reality; but also that (in Stoutian terms) that they risk being too formulated too psychologistically. At this stage of his thought the metaphysical ground was still shifting a bit beneath him, but Moore's position remained stable all the way through to his mature work: whatever the word "good" is meant to convey, it must, to do the metaphysical and ethical work required of it, refer to a non-mental reality. I would argue that this conception does not change; what changes in Moore's thought between 1897 and 1898, instead, is his conception of that reality.

One thing that does stand out in the 1897 dissertation is how Moore does shift—seemingly without being aware of it—from a criticism of Kant to a position of his own, something for which he was dressed down by his examiners.[45] The other notable characteristic of his examination is that he is relentlessly critical of the Kantian position, especially with respect to the notion of transcendental freedom. We will begin with the

---

[45] BP (2011, 93; 99).

first point. When Moore introduces his examination as a Metaphysics of Ethics, he struggles to formulate a sense of 'good' by marrying a kind of Kantian transcendentalism to Bradley's Absolute. By this, he seems to mean that his own enquiry will be distinguished from "all such as start with an empirical definition," and which fail as a proper metaphysics of ethics, because of their emphasis on "how the principle may be applied" and "what are the means of attaining an end." And while it is true that Kant "has done the most to recognise the distinction" and to "try to give a systematic exposition of the nature of the concept good," he assigns the enquiry to *practical* philosophy (like Sidgwick does, Moore points out). For Moore, however, this misses the point: "a complete answer to this question … [implies] a discussion of what ought to be, whether or not we can do it" (BP 2011, 13).

This distinction prompts another example of Moore's efforts at formulating his view along a neo-idealist orientation. He introduces a formulation of "ought to be" that is not limited to "the sphere of human action." Moore's intention was to defend a notion of practice that is wider than this, and he tried to explicate this by linking it to the Bradleyan conception of the nature of time. The proposed position goes something like this: the contrast between "what is" and "what ought to be" "seems to involve a distinction in time" which Moore will reject. In order to defend the view that "what ought to be" is identical with "good," he wanted to avoid conflating the notion of "being" as existing in time with the notion of "being" in a transcendental sense. That is: Moore took it that what we ought to do was something that would exist in time, and this, on a Bradleyan understanding, would not suffice to provide a proper understanding of the concept of "ought." Thus Moore proposes to defend a position such that whatever "ought" to exist in time must "be" in the transcendental sense ("the wider notion is always logically the more fundamental" (BP 2011, 14)). The notion of what we ought to do, thus, is not to be formulated as a question of practice: Moore explicitly says he wants to reject the distinction of Reason between the theoretical and the practical. The practical, he argues, is too "inextricably bound up with mere existence" to properly represent "what ought to be." Here, Moore claims that his approach is close in spirit to a Platonic one: "the good is to be considered as an Idea 'beyond being,' perhaps, but the really

essential distinction is between *being* and *becoming*. The practical …
belongs to the latter class" (BP 2011, 14).

Moore takes his next point from Sidgwick: the best starting point
for an ethical enquiry is Kant, who has had the "most direct influence
on modern thought" (BP 2011, 15). But Moore is not sympathetic to
Kant's formulation of ethics in terms of the will (or, as he also puts it,
the moral law). Kant's claim is that freedom of the will rests upon
"transcendental" freedom, which Moore will argue is a "speculative
notion" not "demonstrable by speculative means." Kant makes another
blunder as well, as Moore argues. Given that will, as he defines it, "is
a power of being [a] cause," Kant cannot have it both ways and also
take will as a *pure* manifestation of *practical* reason (BP 2011, 15). To
do so, he in effect conflates ("doesn't distinguish enough") between
the "relation of reason to consequent and that of cause to effect." The
kind of will that Kant needs to defend his notion of transcendental
freedom (a "pure" will) cannot, argues Moore, "be a will at all," since
even Kant concedes that causality can only apply to relations of phe-
nomena. Moore thus rejects Kant's transcendentalism with respect to
freedom and the will; moreover, he implies that Kant errs in not tak-
ing "good" as the basis for his own metaphysics of ethics. On Moore's
reading, Kant does not do so because "good" necessarily implies an
object to which it may be applied. Since such an object, to be an
object of our knowledge, must either contain some empirical notion
or "refer to the object of an Idea … the existence of which we cannot
ratify," Kant is, as it were, hamstrung, theoretically speaking: "not
only does he make the law and not the object the fundamental notion
of his ethical philosophy," he "does infer the existence of objects of
Ideas from the moral law." To say (as Kant does) that "if it were not
for the moral law we should know nothing of that notion [good]" is a
fallacy: in spite of warning against it himself, Kant "confuses the *ratio
cognoscendi* with the *ration essendi.*" Kant, in short, mistakes the
datum from which we infer the good for the logical ground of the
inference, and there is, Moore objects, "nothing in what Kant says to
shew that the notion 'good' is not logically more fundamental than
the moral law."

Moore demonstrates in what survives of his dissertation manuscripts a habit he maintained all his life, which was to cut and paste bits of material from draft to draft when he wanted to retain it.[46] One way to understand the shift in Moore's thinking from 1897 to 1898 is to examine the changes in the dissertations—that is to say, what he left out, and what he replaced it with. The 1897 dissertation was in effect one long chapter called "Freedom." The 1898 dissertation instead was composed officially of five chapters, two of which appear in the surviving material as a typescript of large swaths of 1897, although not all of it. Moore composed his new material as Chaps. I and II (now mostly missing), and tacked on parts of his 1897 as Chaps. III and IV, but with some notable changes and rearrangements.[47] The chapters of the 1898 dissertation are more cohesively structured, probably to address the examiners' complaints that Moore had not sufficiently distinguished his criticisms of Kant from his own views. The 1898 chapter titles thus reflect Moore's attempts at clarification: Chap. I (On the meaning of 'Reason' in Kant), Chap. II (Reason), Chap. III (The meaning of 'Freedom' in Kant); and Chap. IV (Freedom).[48] Moore further added a new Chap. V on Ethical Conclusions, in which there are a few notable elements that bear examining.

The largest portion of 1897 that is omitted entirely in 1898 is Moore's discussion of what he titled "Meaning and Ambiguity of Causality" and "Ding an Sich as Free Cause" (BP 2011, 25–37). In this section of 1897, Moore directed his attention to trying to explain Kant's proof that there is free causality, which required an explanation as to "why he calls it causality and why he calls it free." Moore notes that Kant might better have avoided calling his conception "causality" since "there must evidently be a most important difference between the temporal relation of successive phenomena, usually denoted by the term, and the relation of real to

---

[46] This is partly what made reconstructing the 1897 and 1898 dissertations challenging. Moore's pagination is not continuous, and in the case of 1898, large parts of Chaps. I and II are missing. See Preti (2008a) and BP (2011, lxxv–lxxxii) for the evidence that the missing pages of Chaps. I and II of 1898 were used to compose a draft of NJ. No draft of NJ survives, as far as we could tell.

[47] He gets this the wrong way around in his recollection (1942, 23).

[48] Moore had moreover published a part of his 1897 dissertation as F (Moore 1898), and he seems to have used a typescript of 1897, repurposed, for Chaps. III and IV of the 1898 dissertation (BP 2011, lxxii–lxxv).

phenomenal things." Moore locates the problem in Kant's tricky formulation of the *Ding an Sich* itself. Kant formulated it as "cause of a phenomenon," which Moore claims sounds as if he is characterizing "the nature of Reality to Appearance" by way of a notion that is only "applicable to the mutual relations of Appearances" (BP 2011, 25). The issue was (as Moore read Kant) that Kant needed a relation "which should combine the absolute certainty" of logical implication with the synthetic nature of causality, given that the moral law must ultimately govern our actions. The object that for Kant "which could be regarded as the ultimate ground of all others," in the same way as universal law is the ground of its "exemplifications," was the *Ding an Sich*. The *Ding an Sich* has Freedom, but all the same, it cannot be a cause the way particular appearances are causes, and it cannot be formulated as reason "in the sense in which a logical universal is a reason."

In these 1897 passages, Moore formulates his criticism in Bradleyan terms: Kant's Transcendental Freedom "is the relation of Reality to Appearance"; it is "the relation in which the world as it really is stands to events as we know them" (BP 2011, 35). There is even an attempt to insert a Bradleyan understanding of unity in diversity through Kant's conception of Intelligible Character (BP 2011, 36–7). According to Moore, Kant calls Transcendental Freedom a free cause in the sense of "the logical relation of reason to consequent," to which he is more or less compelled, given that no empirical formulation of causality would do (it's not free, and not a ground, thus scuttling any possible role in ethical theory). But this has the result of disconnecting Kant's notion of freedom from human volition, as (*n.b.*) the "science of psychology" would characterize it (BP 2011, 35). Neither would such a conception secure a logical relation of reason and consequent, however. A logical reason cannot be considered actual in and of itself; an actual existence as the ground for another gets us "mere cause," which won't do (BP 2011, 35). But of course, Transcendental Freedom is "no part of the temporal series of event," so it is not in that sense a cause. And it is not "a mere logical reason" either, "because it has all the self-subsistence which appears to belong to the given temporal series"—that is, it is not a *purely* formal category, given its (alleged) role in characterizing the Will (which is subject to temporal series). In short, Moore argues, there is no coherent formulation of

either "free" or "cause" that would work to elucidate Kant's notion of Freedom.[49]

Moore's discussion of this topic in 1898, and in particular the role of the *Ding an Sich*, is more efficient (he replaces 12 pages with three), and was stripped of many of the Bradleyan formulations that appear in 1897. In essence, it remained the same.[50] Moore summarizes Kant's approach to Freedom in the first Critique as not that "freedom exists, but merely that it is possible," because the "world of existents … is merely phenomenal" and that besides this world, there is "a world of Dinge an Sich which are in some sense the ground of phenomena." With respect to Kant's argument that Freedom is possible by presupposing that it is real *and* his further argument that it must be unconditioned (i.e. free), Moore refers to his new 1898 chapters (Chaps. I and II), where he undermines the entire support that Kant tries to give for the nature of the *Ding an Sich* (BP 2011, 186). However, Moore retained, in his 1898 version, his criticism of the role of causality in the Kantian formulation of freedom, just as it appeared 1897.[51]

---

[49] Moore identified the problem with Kant's conception of Transcendental Freedom in two ways: both the nature of Transcendental Freedom itself, and in the formulation of the so-called Intelligible Character which is alleged to possess it. And while he decided to try to work in a Bradleyan metaphysical perspective about the nature of individuals, admitting all the same that "our conclusions will not enable us to decide between a Monadism and a Monism," Moore wrote off Kant's formulation of Intelligible Character from the perspective of an up-to-date psychology: "it must be admitted that there is no longer any reason for connecting the 'Intelligible Character' with the psychological character, which distinguishes one individual from another" (BP 2011, 37). The notion of Intelligible Character latter is one important element of contemporary Kant scholarship concerning the "two-aspect" and "two-worlds" interpretations of Kant's Freedom. Thus, for instance, Allison (1990) claims that in spite of what is suggested by Kant's own formulations, a "two-aspect view" makes it possible to offer a "more appealing" interpretation of Kant's views on freedom and free agency which (i) avoids attributing to Kant the view that free agency belongs to an Intelligible Character which is distinct from the empirical character; and (ii) that supports the view that noumenal realms or activities have causal roles to play, but not natural/empirical causal roles. Allison's argument is that we can make sense of Kant's theory of human free action by considering it under two descriptions: that is, a rational agent can be described as having both an empirical and intelligible character. Moore appears to reject a version of this line of argument in his own criticisms.

[50] Some Bradleyan language made the cut, but only in the repurposed material from 1897 in Chaps. III and IV of 1898, which might have eluded Moore's editing eye.

[51] Paragraph 2 (BP 2011, 188) is repurposed from 1897, with a few alterations. Moore adds a new paragraph (BP 2011, 189) and reverts to 1897 material (BP 2011, 59–78/189–206).

The upshot of his position is that since Freedom for Kant is to be conceived as "having something in common with causality," we can note that "that which is free is not … a cause in the ordinary sense, since it implies nothing … with regard to time." But since it is an existent, it "bears a greater resemblance to a cause than to a reason." In sum: "Kant conceives Freedom as something combining the notions of causal and logical priority," which, as Moore sees it, is both a "main motive of his philosophy" as well as "one main cause of its confusion" (BP 2011, 186–7). This mainly stems from Kant's attribution of Transcendental Freedom to natural causes (such as ourselves) by way of a faculty which was meant to be only purely intelligible.

To the material from 1897 which forms this part of Chap. III in 1898, Moore added one new paragraph (BP 2011, 189): Kant's notion of "practical" freedom, he says, "seems to partake partly of the nature of … transcendental freedom." The result of this, he argues, is that the "discrepancy between the causal and the rational strains bursts out into open incompatibility." In other words: where Transcendental Freedom was meant to have provided the *logical ground* of the nature of human volition, what it does instead is bequeath to Kant's formulation of the will a "hybrid conception … further tainted by a second mixture with the causal parent." Where Kant seems to have gone too far, according to Moore, is to in effect invent a novel understanding of "free" such that (i) our will is "singled out by having a special kind of causality" and (ii) formulating a special kind of causality "determined to action by the presentation of certain laws" (BP 2011, 191).[52]

The 1897 dissertation is an important document in the history of analytic philosophy, containing significant details of the evolution of Moore's thought. In 1897, Moore wrestled with the language and metaphysical context of Kantian idealism, reframed with Bradleyan metaphysics, yet tentatively articulated the views of the new psychology, as he thought his way through a metaphysical foundation for ethics. What is particularly significant is that Moore's 1897 criticism of Kant contains more than a

---

[52] This latter is Moore quoting Kant himself.

few hints of the distinction that he elevates into prominence in 1898. In 1898, he defended a radical ontological break between psychical states and their contents. That spark was smouldering, however, even in 1897 (BP 2011, 61/191):[53]

> The 'mere conception' in the only justifiable sense for freedom, would be the laws themselves, and not the 'presentation' of the laws. Every 'conception' may be regarded from two points of view, either as a psychical existent, or from the point of view of its content; and it is this very important (and obvious) distinction which Kant appears to have neglected.[54]

The last gasp of Moore's Bradleyanism, such as it was, is found in the last eight pages of 1897 (BP 2011, 78–86). In this material, Moore did his level best to adapt the Bradleyan Absolute as a role for "that which is ultimately real … and alone necessarily good."[55] Moore's argument up to this point, in 1897, had focused on Kant's error in tying his ethics to volition. This was a mistake, according to Moore, because it required an account of causation that (i) made no sense; and (ii) required a link between the will, freedom, and the thing-in-itself (*Ding an Sich*), that

---

[53] It re-appears in 1898 as part of the repurposed 1897 material (BP 2011, 189–206).

[54] Bradley of course, didn't neglect it, which explains why Moore was attracted to his view, but he certainly didn't frame it as a radical ontological distinction.

[55] Moore now formulates the issue in a way that shows the influence of Sidgwick: Kant did not see that there are good grounds for saying that we are just as free to do evil as to do good (BP 2011, 208). Kant's view, says Moore, amounts to "I can because I ought," or "if anything ought to be, it must be possible." Moore questions the nature of this "possibility"; it is not mere logical possibility, for Kant needs "objectivity, validity or real possibility" for morality. But what is morally possible is not necessarily naturally possible. Moore claims thus that for Kant, moral possibility is "of some third kind"—something for which Kant offers no argument. At best, Kant shifts ambiguously between logical and natural possibility in accounting for moral possibility (freedom), each taking on more prominence depending on whether he is emphasizing the noumenal as cause or reason, or freedom as Transcendental or practical. And with this, Moore claims, "the whole construction of Kantian Freedom falls to the ground … Neither the moral principle itself nor action in accordance with it can be taken in any way to prove or to depend on the existence of Transcendental Freedom…Kant fails to prove that there is any other than the Deterministic way of regarding human action" (BP 2011, 209).

similarly made no sense. The problem according to Moore was that Kant took the objective validity of his foundational ethical principle—the Categorical Imperative—to emerge from the very nature of the will itself. But this cannot be the will of ordinary human psychology, which is subject to both time and ordinary causation (as a psychical state). Thus, the freedom that Kant attributes to the will requires positing a transcendental version of the ordinary will (a "Free Cause," BP 2011, 81). And this Moore rejects, although in 1897 his rejection took the form of a Bradleyan/Hegelian gloss on the Kantian link between good and free. Moore formulated it like this:

> The object which is said to be good and that which is said to be real are identical, if that object is taken to be Reality, as such, and it is not bad, only because 'good' is more adequate to that object than bad; whereas the objects denoted by good and bad and real are all identical, if those objects be treated as mere Appearance (BP 2011, 83).

Moore however also realized that "it has not yet been shown that what is real or free must be good, and that what is absolutely good must be real; and this, it may as well be confessed at once, I do not see any way of completely proving" (BP 2011, 84). What does survive the Bradleyan formulations of this last section of 1897, however, is Moore's adherence to his preferred view: that whatever good may be, it is independent of being "actually pursued by any will or not." And even in 1897, Moore asks: "from the fact that what is good is good, can we infer that what is good, *is*? Because good is an *objective* notion, must it have an object?" (BP 2011, 85). His position is that our assertion of "good is good" is not that our *idea* of good is our idea of good—"this meaning cannot be that the notion of goodness exists in our minds."

The examiners for Moore's 1897 dissertation were Sidgwick and Caird, both of whom, in spite of their different philosophical commitments, agreed that Moore did not read Kant with enough charity, nor take into consideration that there may have been relevant "changes of view … in works written with different aims during a period of 16 years" (BP 2011,

98).[56] Caird emphasised a similar point, going so far as to argue that Moore's attempts to "prove that Kant is inconsistent *from his own point of view* [sic]" fail precisely because Moore did not accurately read Kant. The accurate method of reading was (unsurprisingly), Caird's own, which attributed to Kant a method of "critical" and "transcendental" regress (1889, vol. 1, 22–24). This was a more or less dialectical process required to "resolve" apparent inconsistencies in appearances/phenomena, such as the objects of our own experience. Caird thus unblushingly asserted that putative problematic concepts like the ego, the will, and freedom in Kant should be read via this Cairdean method, which Moore failed to do (BP 2011, 100–1).[57] Both men did however praise Moore's "first-rate" ability which showed him unafraid to follow "his ideas to their ultimate results" (BP 2011, 97–9).

5   The 1898 Version of *The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics*

Moore busied himself in the next year to prepare for another attempt at a Fellowship. Moore's own account of his developing thought from 1897 to 1898, however, belies the immeasurable historical impact that it went on to have. There is no definitive evidence of how exactly Moore came to the views that he later described as "certain tendencies in me which have led people to call me a Realist" (1942, 22), nor, it must be said, exactly when they came to him. This puzzle intersects with the puzzle of Russell's

---

[56] Moore in fact rejected the notion that Kant did make substantive changes in his view over time and included a statement to this effect to the end of the 1898 dissertation which he called "Appendix on the Chronology of Kant's Ethical Writings" (BP 2011, 238–42). There is also an intriguing paragraph in Moore's hand on the verso side of the title page of the 1898 dissertation, on the question of how best to do specifically *philosophical* analysis of the views of an author. It is difficult to say what the source of this is. It could be Moore's notes on someone's advice to him (Sidgwick? Ward? Russell?), or a response of a sort to the criticisms his examiners made that he did not always distinguish his own views from those of Kant. It reads in part: "The man who is not an independent (if not original) thinker himself, has no chance of discovering new meaning in an author's views— even the author's own meaning…" (BP 2011, li). Moore expanded on this line of thought in the new material added to the Introduction in the 1898 dissertation (BP 2011, 129–32).

[57] Moore might have thought this to be a flagrant instance of begging the question.

extravagant credit to Moore for wiping the Hegelian scales from his eyes and paving the way for a new philosophy.[58] We know that the transformation for both men took hold in earnest in the spring and summer of 1898.[59] In January 1898, Russell was writing "On the Idea of a Dialectic of the Sciences," so he was still immersed in that Hegelian project.[60] Russell and Moore both attended McTaggart's lectures on Lotze in the Lent term at Trinity, so there will have been opportunities for philosophical talk at this time.[61] By March 1898, Russell was mulling over the constituents of space and "their mutual relations," and also delivered a paper, with Moore in the audience, on "the old question, whether existence means anything or not."[62] In early May, Russell spent a few days with Moore and worked on amending his paper "On the Relations of Number and Quantity."[63] This paper had been delivered the year before, and in writing to his wife about it afterwards, Russell stated "Moore despised it … we had a long argument … afterwards … in which he completely vanquished me as usual, but I couldn't find out how he proved his own view, so I don't see how to amend my paper."[64] Russell and Moore met a number of times for philosophical talk in May and June, 1898, when

---

[58] The scholarly puzzle mainly concerns how Russell could have so unrestrainedly credited to Moore the metaphysical and logical insights that broke the stranglehold of Bradley's metaphysical idealism on Russell and led him to PoM, since Moore was neither a mathematician nor a logician. Russell (MMD, 11–12; MPD, 54; Auto., 65; 71). See Preti (2019) for detailed discussion. See Griffin (forthcoming).

[59] See Preti (2008a; OHBR); Griffin, forthcoming.

[60] Griffin (1991), Hylton (1990), Russell (MPD 37–53; MMD, 11; PFM 17–18).

[61] No record of any exists, however (Griffin, 1992, 185).

[62] (CPBR 2, xxxvii); Griffin (1992, 182). The paper is lost; but Russell wrote to his wife about it, saying that "though you mightn't think it, you can knock philosophy into a cocked hat if you can prove that existence has a meaning." As we will see below, at the heart of Moore's 1898 dissertation was an ontological reformulation of existence. Russell explained it a few years later like this: "the object of any abstract thought is not a thought, either of the thinker or anyone else, and does not *exist* at all, though it *is* something…whatever one can think of must be something and must be other than the thought of it" (Griffin 1992, 298).

[63] CPBR 2, 68–82.

[64] A year later, Russell's amendment involved connecting "number and quantity…by using the idea of relation." That is: "quantity is a conception of relation, of comparison; it expresses the possibility of a certain kind of comparison with other things." But Russell's conception of relations here was still internal (CPBR 2, 68–82). See Griffin (forthcoming).

Russell was working on his ultimately abandoned manuscript titled, *An Analysis of Mathematical* Reasoning (AMR).[65] After a meeting at the end of June,[66] Russell reported to his wife Alys that he and Moore had been up until the wee hours talking and that Moore had been "not at all discouraging."[67] Moore also apparently shared something of his own thoughts, as Russell added that "we talked also about his work a great deal, and as usual I was pleased with his remarks."

In one of his lists,[68] Moore noted that in 1898, "during first two terms and Long til end of August work for second Dissertation but probably write nothing til May Term. Also write review of Kroeger's Fichte … also probably in Long write review of Guyau."[69] On 19 June, 1898, Moore wrote to Desmond MacCarthy saying he had not done much work on his revision: "I have written about 6 pages dissertation [sic]."[70] There is no evidence that Moore and Russell talked about Moore's radical new formulations of existence, judgments, and propositions between May and July 1898, when they were meeting. However, in a letter to Couturat dated 3 June 1898, Russell wrote that "in truth, I have changed my philosophy greatly since I wrote my book [Russell, 1897/1956a]," and given how Russell phrased this, it could refer to something of Moore's ideas.[71] Also, since Moore's usual tendency was to worry through numerous formulations of his ideas before beginning to write, it is possible that any new views he was even dimly formulating may have been mulled over at the talks he had had with Russell in May, if he was just about setting pen to paper in mid-June, 1898.

It is not clear that Russell and Moore had much if any philosophical interaction after the end of July, 1898. Russell left for the continent in

---

[65] See Griffin (1991, Chap. 7); CPBR 2.

[66] CPBR 2, 160.

[67] CPBR 2, 167.

[68] Add. Ms. 8330 1/1/1–7.

[69] Add. Ms. 8875 1/1/1. See Moore, 1898b, 1899b; Preti, 2008a, OHBR.

[70] "…and done less work than ever" (Add. Ms. 8330 2/5/5).

[71] Moore reviewed EFG (Moore 1899c), but it is not clear when he wrote the review itself. Moore and Russell might have discussed Russell's work during this period, and Moore could have adapted the results of their talk into his review. The letter to Couturat is in Griffin (1992, 188).

mid-September, and they did not see each other again until November, 1898. On 14 August, 1898, Moore wrote to MacCarthy that he had written 60 new pages on "Metaphysics—not a word of Ethics," adding: "I have arrived at a perfectly staggering doctrine."[72] This "staggering doctrine" was that "reality is in fact independent of existence."[73] But Moore also added that while his new "philosophy" is that "an existent is nothing but a proposition: nothing *is* but concepts"; he also noted that "it seems to work so far; but I don't know what I shall be able to say about the Absolute, which I want to keep." The Absolute did not make the final cut, however, by the time the dissertation was submitted.

On 11 September, 1898, Moore wrote to Russell to tell him about the final draft, and his description suggests that the crux of the new view had not previously been discussed between them:[74]

> My chief discovery, which shocked me a good deal when I made it, is expressed in the form that an existent is a proposition. I see now that I might have put this more mildly. Of course, by an existent must be understood an existent existent—not what exists, but that + its existence. I carefully state that a proposition is not to be understood as any thought or words, but the concepts + their relation *of* which we think. It is only propositions in this sense, which can be true, + from which inference can be made. Truth therefore does not depend on any relation between ideas and reality, nor even between concepts and reality, but is an inherent property of the whole formed by certain concepts + their relations; falsehood similarly.

These, then, were the ideas that throughout his life Russell claimed ignited the revolt against idealism and inaugurated a new direction in philosophy and philosophical method.[75] Moore presented them to the Moral Sciences Club in October 1898, and to the Aristotelian Society in December 1898. As noted above, the surviving 1898 dissertation

---

[72] Add. Ms. 8330 2/5/6.

[73] Add. Ms. 8330 2/5/6.

[74] Original is at McMaster University, Bertrand Russell Archives (710.052.981); BP (2011, xxxiv–v).

[75] Russell (MPD, 54); Preti (2019, OHBR). See Griffin, forthcoming.

manuscript is missing a large portion of the pages that make up the new chapters (I and II). In BP (2011, lxxv–lxxix), we make the detailed case that the missing pages were used to compose NJ (Moore 1899a).[76] There is also the evidence from a letter, written to Moore from one of his friends (Theodore Llewellyn-Davies), who had read the dissertation, and asked for clarification on "that part of the chapter on Reason which deals with Concepts and Properties generally." Llewelyn-Davies pinpoints the contentious issue: "What is a judgment? I presume from your point of view, it is the occurrence of a unique relation between a thinker … and a proposition or complex concept. But is it not also a mental operation in which my ideas come in?"[77]

In the 1898 dissertation what his 1897 examiners had noted as Moore's boldness in following out the logic of his own ideas came to the fore. He formulated his main criticism of Kant and articulated his own novel proposal to answer the "great question of metaphysics" much more decisively. In his examination of Kant on reason (and by extension, on *practical* reason, since reason determines the will),[78] Moore rapidly zeroes in on what he took to be the fundamental defect of Kant's epistemology, namely the subjectivism that infects his account of reason and of truth. The core Moorean objections are found in passages that he carried over from the 1897 dissertation, and the terminology of the new psychology is explicit in both versions:

> in the special instance, which Kant takes to be the only truly 'moral' willing, where the idea which acts as cause, is the idea of conformity to a universal law, the content of the idea is so abstract, that it may confidently be asserted that only reasonable beings are capable of having such an idea. But … the idea is even here still 'an appearance,' and, as such separated by an impassable gulf from *the content, of which it is an idea.* And inasmuch as it is in its character of idea, i.e. as a psychical existent, that it produces an effect, the causation is still merely 'natural' … but it is only the more

---

[76] See BP (2011, lxxix).

[77] Add. Ms. 8330 8D/8/2. See also Preti (2008b, 180). Llewelyn-Davies (along with his brother Crompton) was a very close friend of both Russell and Moore. He drowned in a swimming accident in 1905. See Griffin (1992, 294), Russell (1944, 9–10; Auto. 54–9).

[78] BP (2011, 193).

remarkable that [Kant] should speak of Reason in the same context, as 'giving laws of Freedom,' as if it were Reason in the same sense, which is the source on the one hand of objectivity, and on the other hand of abstract ideas, whether true or false. In this Kant betrays the psychological standpoint, which has been fully discussed in our first two chapters. ... The distinction between what is true and what is only believed is one which cannot be done away or bridged over ... and it this distinction which is here in question. Knowing, the function of Reason, is on one side a natural function, and as such, it is indistinguishable from believing; but in so far as knowing *is* distinct from believing, i.e. in so far as that which is known is true, there are not two words which express a difference more profound. (BP 2011, 62–3/192–3)

Moore's view was that Kant's argument concerning freedom violated this basic distinction between psychical act and the content of that act. Kant's account failed, according to Moore, in that Kant helped himself to the notion of a transcendental aspect to "the purely natural process of human volition" in order to ascribe a notion of practical freedom via a notion of practical reason. The idea that acts as a cause in volition cannot *itself* contain any imperative or obligatory aspect, since it is a psychical event. If it has abstract content, all well and good; but then how can that content act causally on our ordinary empirical psychological states?[79] As Moore points out, the only way reason can be said to determine the will is "whenever the idea, which causes our actions, implies the power of knowing concepts." In short: the abstract content we need for the moral law may be *grasped* by the practical reason; but it cannot thus have any causal relation *to* practical reason or *via* practical reason, to our "purely natural process" of human volition.[80]

We can draw this examination of Moore's dissertations to a close by examining the now-celebrated distinction that Moore formulated in

---

[79] The causal problem of content has come in for much contemporary discussion (see Fodor 1987). Moore did not have our resources to formulate it, but it may be possible to make a case that the outlines of the issue are visible in his discussion (BP 2011, 63–5/193–5).

[80] Moore summarized his position as follows, in quite contemporary terms: "there is, in short, no reason for supposing that such a science as has been called 'Transcendental Psychology' in distinction from empirical psychology does exist; or for regarding 'Reason' as anything other than an object of 'empirical psychology'" (BP 2011, 156).

order to capture his objections to Kant's conceptions of reason and practical reason. This appeared in the new material in the 1898 dissertation, Chaps. I and II.[81] Moore begins by noting that given Kant's own conviction that there "was something in common between Practical and Theoretical Reason," that an examination of his conception of reason or the *a priori* is required, in order to understand Kant's his account of Practical Reason (BP 2011, 133). Moore then considers Kant's conditions for the *a priori* (specifically, the synthetic *a priori* (BP 2011, 139), rejects "universality" (BP 2011, 135), and gestures toward a novel view of propositions and concepts (BP 2011, 136). In order to determine the difference between an empirical proposition and an *a priori* one, as Moore sees it, "The difference seems to lie rather in the nature of the concepts of which the necessary relation is predicated" (BP 2011, 136). Propositions that involve no necessity are the purely existential propositions—the ones, that according to Moore, do not involve notions of substance and attribute, understood to assert something with regard to an actual part of actual time. Empirical concepts are those that exist in time. This would seem to be the only manner of distinguishing them. Thus: "it would, therefore, appear that the true distinction upon which Kant's division of propositions into *a priori* and *a posteriori* (necessary and empirical) is based, is the distinction between concepts which exist in parts of time and concepts which seem to be cut off from existence altogether but which give rise to assertions of an absolutely necessary relation" (BP 2011, 138).[82] Moore then goes on to dismiss Kant's own formulation of the analytic *a priori* as reducing in effect to a synthetic proposition *a posteriori* about my own state of mind (since for Kant, "analytic" means that the predicate is *judged* to be contained in the subject). His verdict: "analysis, in the sense in which it gives a name to analytic propositions, is in reality either 'only a synthesis of words with the objects they denote' or 'something that applies to an individual's mind'" (BP 2011, 140).

With this, however, Moore contends that Kant's own argument for the *a priori* involves him in a hopeless subjectivism (BP 2011, 145) since by

---

[81] Moore (1899a). As noted above, the manuscript material is lost, but we are confident that Moore (1899a) represents the essential position (BP 2011, lxxi–lxxxii).

[82] See Kripke (1980, Lectures I and II) for the definitive account of how and why the concepts of *a priori* and necessity should be distinguished.

his own lights "necessary propositions can only be explained, if they are contributed to experience by the subject … but it cannot possibly prove or explain their validity" (BP 2011, 148).[83] And this will condemn Kant's notion of Practical Reason as well, which Moore asserts "embraces accordingly not only all the confusions to be found in his conception of Reason in general but also new ones peculiar to itself."[84] These amount to the following: the fundamental principle of Ethics will require a necessary *a priori* proposition about what is good. Kant argued that this is given by Practical Reason, but this then means that practical reason both construes *and* justifies the proposition. It is (among other things) both the cause of the principle and the cause of action in accordance with the principle. Moore was not having it: "Against this monstrous conception we have to urge … that there is no reason for ascribing the fundamental principle of Ethics to any entity whatever" (BP 2011, 160).

In Chap. II, Moore doubled down on his criticism of Kant by giving an explanation of the presuppositions he acknowledges that he has made in that criticism. He notes that although "proposition" was used in Chap. I as an ultimate term in his attack on Kant, this will not imply a mental formulation, and asserts his specific opposition to any mentalist construal of the notion of a proposition. He rejects the term "judgment" as "even worse," since it denotes a mental event, implies mental activity, and is also commonly used as the name of a mental faculty. And so he turns to his now-famous argument that "whatever name be given to it, that which we call a proposition is something independent of consciousness, and something of fundamental importance for philosophy" (BP 2011, 162).

Moore first notes approvingly that Bradley *does* assert that "'ideas' are not merely states of my mind," but that when Bradley goes on to say that "meaning consists of a part of the content … cut off, fixed by the mind, and considered apart from the existence of the sign," he makes a fatal error. In claiming that meaning is a mental activity (the part of the content cut off and fixed by the mind), "Bradley does not remain true to this

---

[83] "Reason is regarded throughout Kant's Critical Philosophy, as if it were not only the source of a priori propositions but also explained their validity" (BP 2011, 158).

[84] BP (2011, 159–60).

conception of the logical idea as the idea of something"; this will not get us beyond the idea as a psychological entity (BP 2011, 162). Moore then presses his new view against Bradley *and* against Kant: he argues that "the idea used in judgment" is not produced by any action of our minds. That is—ideas are psychic events with *content*, and where Bradley and Kant both err (and land into the psychologistic/subjectivist soup), is by failing to formulate that content as entirely separate from any activity of mind. Moore's view, in contrast, is that what is of primary importance is the relation of the content of our ideas to each other, something they bear entirely independent of our minds or mental acts:

> A proposition is composed not of words, nor yet of thoughts, but of concepts. Concepts are possible objects of thought … It is indifferent to their nature whether anybody thinks them or not … the relation into which they enter with the knowing subject implies no action or reaction … it is of such entities … that a proposition is composed. In it certain concepts stand in specific relations with one another. … A proposition is a synthesis of concepts; and, just as concepts are themselves immutably what they are, so they stand in infinite relations to one another equally immutable. A proposition is constituted by any number of concepts, together with a specific relation between them; and according to the nature of this relation the proposition may be either true or false. What kind of relation makes a proposition true, what false, cannot be further defined, but must be immediately recognized. (BP 2011, 165–66)

It cannot be denied, however, that one of the most obscure parts of Moore's view is his conception of existence, which he discusses in the passages that follow those above, in his 1898 manuscript. The way Moore engages with the nature of time and timelessness in the 1897 dissertation, and the transition of his thinking on this in 1898, is a way to explain (i) the import of his new view and (ii) the nature of the impact that his views had on Russell. The concept of existence plays a key role.

Moore's new view was that "Existence is itself a concept; it is something we mean, and the great body of propositions, in which existence is joined to other concepts or syntheses of concepts, are simply true or false according to the relation in which it stands to them … existence is

logically subordinate to the truth" (BP 2011, 166). This, as we will see below, caused Bernard Bosanquet, an examiner to the 1898 dissertation, to remark apoplectically that Moore's work seemed to go beyond the limit of paradox. Moore was aware of it too: "I am fully aware how paradoxical[85] this theory must appear, and even how contemptible. But it seems to me to follow from premises generally admitted … Truth … would certainly seem to involve at least two terms, and some relation between them; falsehood involves the same … we regard truth and falsehood as properties of certain concepts, together with their relations—a whole to which we give the name of proposition."

Moore's initial attraction to Bradley was that Bradley, unlike Kant, demoted Time as an aspect of reality. Any putative experience we have of time is an Appearance, thus unreal. Kant on the other hand made Time part of the structure of the mind, and thus (on Moore's reading) too subjective. Moore's embrace of Bradleyan metaphysics (such as it was) was motivated by arguing for the metaphysical basis of ethics as something time*less*, something that could serve for the basis of ethics as entirely separate from any human psychical states or events (like volition), which are characterized as events or states in time.[86] But Moore's closer and critical inspection of Kant on reason in 1898 also paved the way to a closer inspection of Bradley on reason and ideas—and Moore came to the conclusion that Bradley was no less guilty than Kant of a suspect form of psychologism, even if both of them would deny it.

Moore identified the conflation in terms of the new psychology: as a conflation between the psychological act of judgment, its constituents, and its object(s) (BP 2011, 162–4). Having arrived at this rejection of Bradley, Moore then went one better, making a striking metaphysical move. In order to mount a committed defence of the view that the object of thought is independent of the act of thought, Moore asserted that the

---

[85] Moore called it "paradoxical" in his letter to Russell as well (BP 2011, xxxiv).

[86] I don't think Moore formulated the distinctions between timelessness and the unreality of time as carefully or as clearly as he could have, in particular with respect to mental or psychological activity like judgment or volition. But he spent a good deal of his 1897 work on battling with these, and here I try to account for what it was about those notions that attracted him, but that also spurred his thinking in the new direction. We could say that Moore turned Bradley's understanding of timelessness upside down: Moore tried to take the notion of "timelessness" not as unreal, but as independent of the mind.

constituents of thought are equally entirely independent of the mind. What we think/judge/grasp, when we think/judge/grasp, is a complex, timeless, mind-independent, relational entity. Its truth belongs to itself, and the relation of its constituents is "logically prior to any proposition" (that is, any combination of concepts thought or judged by thinkers). The nature of thought is thus most fundamentally characterized by the nature of what is thought, *independent* of a thinker: concepts "are possible objects of thought … and in order that they may do anything, they must already be something … the relation into which they enter with the knowing subject implies no action or reaction" (BP 2011, 165). Concepts themselves are thus entirely mind-independent, and Moore daringly includes existence itself: existence is a concept, and thus a timeless mind-independent entity. So-called existential propositions are merely the conjunction of this timelessly objective entity in a (timeless, objective) relation to other(s).

With the conception of existence as a timeless objective entity, Moore in effect *did* knock "philosophy into a cocked hat" (Griffin (1992, 182) by making it possible to sweep idealist metaphysics off the twentieth century map.[87] So I want to conclude this examination of Moore's dissertations with a look at the effect his ideas had on Russell. A crucial aspect of this story is how Russell could have given fulsome and lifelong credit to Moore for changing the course of philosophy (and essentially and importantly influencing his own philosophical development). To help explain the effect Moore's ideas had on Russell, we can briefly look at the effect Moore's new ideas had on his examiners.

---

[87] See Russell (1959b). See Griffin (forthcoming). This is captured in Moore's letter to Russell (BP 2011, xxxiv): "…I see no proof that there is any existent reality, beside Appearance." Moore here meant to convey that "appearance" is not to be contrasted with a Reality characterized by thought. Rather, "appearance" is meant to capture states of mind *as well as* mind-independent objects of thought (BP 2011, xxxiv). Russell grasped the audacity of Moore's views immediately, replying, "I fear Caird's hair will stand on end when he learns that an existent is a proposition. I think your expression needlessly paradoxical but I imagine I agree with what you mean. I agree most emphatically with what you say about the several kinds of necessary relations among concepts, and I think their discovery is the true business of Logic (or Meta[physics]—if you like)" (Add. Ms. 8330/8R/33/8).

Moore was relatively unlucky in the selection of the non-Cambridge examiners.[88] Neither was pleased. In 1897, Caird had remarked that Kant, according to Moore, "confuses his epistemological view of things … with a psychological view of them as determined by their relation to man's peculiar kind of subjectivity," which, Caird went on to say, is "unfair … or at least reached by merely emphasizing Kant's weaknesses." Bosanquet, a year later, remarked "I found myself almost wholly unable to appreciate the theoretical point of view which the author has adopted. It appears to me to lie beyond the limits of paradox."[89] He went on:

> The intellectual motive of the Dissertation … is to dissociate Truth from the Nature of Knowledge, and Good from the nature of Will, so as to free Metaphysic from all risk of confusion with Psychology. The theory of the proposition and the concept … is set out in chapter 2. I confess that I feel a difficulty in regarding it as serious … To get rid of mere psychology, the essential idea of consciousness and cognition as an endeavor towards unity has been abandoned … if it had been sent to me for review by 'Mind,' I should … have endeavored to point out that its positive stand-point and … treatment of the subject were hopelessly inadequate … the writer was not successful, to any appreciable extent, in representing the real nature and interconnection of the factors involved in the problem with which he was concerned. (BP 2011, 247–9)

Russell, however, understood immediately how these stalwart elders of the prevailing British Idealist faction might have been as flummoxed as they were, and this in a way accounts for the nature of the influence that Russell consistently credited to Moore. We can appreciate the impact that Moore's thought had on Russell in this way: Moore's views arose, fundamentally stemming from a dissatisfaction with what he called "Kant's

---

[88] Bosanquet examined the 1898 dissertation along with James Ward (BP 2011, 97–116; 245–9). Russell wrote to his wife: "Bosanquet…betrayed, according to Moore, a crass ignorance of the subject, even of its literature" (Griffin, 1992, 190). I would argue that this could be a reference to the literature on mental science, or even the way Kant was being read by Sidgwick, Stout, and Ward, among others.

[89] BP (2011, 246). In a 1904 letter to Ellis Edwards (CPBR 1, xxvii), Russell explained: "the reality of relations is a fundamental point in Mr. Moore's philosophy. Kant, and all subsequent idealists, depend throughout upon the assumption that relations are not objective, but are the work of the mind" (RA 3 797.1904/07/30.56677). See Griffin (forthcoming).

too-psychological standpoint" in the formulation of thought, knowledge, and reality.[90] What Moore grappled with in 1897 was the project of trying to make coherent sense of ethics both in itself and in its role in human volition, assuming a Bradleyan metaphysics, with the Kantian analysis of free will as the initial spur to his ideas. But Moore had along the way also absorbed a few significant insights from his teachers: Sidgwick's own criticisms of Kant's psychologism,[91] and the anti-psychologism of Stout and Ward on both Kant's transcendental arguments and an account of the nature of judgment from the point of view of psychology as a science. The turning point in Moore's thinking was his realization that he could reject the background Bradleyean metaphysical distinctions between appearance and reality from the same motives as he was rejecting Kant's transcendentalism, captured in his August 1898 letter to Desmond MacCarthy that "it had never occurred to me … that existence was separate from Reality."[92]

Russell had studied the same texts as Moore in his own preparation for the Moral Sciences Tripos, and had indeed had reservations as early as 1895 about a lurking subjectivism in Kant. But the influence of the "definitely bad"[93] Cambridge mathematics—and in particular, the neglect at Cambridge of continental progress in mathematics—caused Russell's ideas to deadlock. Russell was trying to work out his "Tiergaarten programme" at this period, conceived specifically as a *dialectic* of the sciences, but even *his* diligence was thwarted in the attempt to resolve the puzzles, antinomies, and contradictions that plagued his progress. These, it turned out, were the result of the Bradley an conflation of metaphysics, logic, and psychology that he couldn't shake off. [94] This is where Moore had the advantage: he wasn't wedded to an ambitious project presupposing a

---

[90] BP 2011, 159.

[91] "I am glad to find how largely I agree with [Sidgwick's] 'Criticism of the Critical Philosophy' *Mind* viii, 29, 31 in my discussion of Kant's speculative philosophy also" (BP 2011, 117).

[92] See Preti (2008a,109); Add. Ms. 8330 2/5/6 (14 August 1898).

[93] MPD, 38; Auto., 64; PFM, 15.

[94] Russell (Auto., 11); Griffin (1991).

Bradleyan metaphysics.[95] The Moral Sciences Tripos unsurprisingly made a far more intelligible blend of conceptual and terminological elements in logic, psychology, metaphysics, and ethics, than it did with respect to logic, psychology, metaphysics, and *mathematics*. Moore's influences were, in this context, a more natural blend of criticism of the epistemological and metaphysical conclusions of Kant and their specific outcomes for ethics (via Sidgwick); the more informed mental science at Cambridge (Stout and Ward), and the criticism both of Kantian psychologism and Oxford neo-Hegelianism (Sidgwick, Stout, and Ward). Because of this, Moore's new view managed to cut across central logical, epistemological, psychological, and metaphysical disputes of the day in one fell swoop. Russell consistently extolled Moore's boldness in NJ and the monumental influence of those ideas on him and on the practice of philosophy precisely because Russell himself had not managed it.[96] Russell had been methodically grinding out a series of complex ideas for some time, hitting inexorable dead ends as his attempt to account for the sciences (eventually including the foundations of mathematics) continued to elude a dialectical formulation. What Russell did not see was that what was needed instead was a simple but audacious metaphysical step: abandoning the entire Hegelian structure. Moore was the one who took that step, and Russell never undersold his gratitude to what he called this "conclusive proof of genius" (Russell 1959b).

---

[95] See CPBR 2; Griffin (1991), Hylton (1990), Preti (2019.)

[96] Russell cited Moore as the principal architect of the philosophical views from which he "derived" his "position" in PoM. These were: "the non-existential nature of propositions (except such as happen to assert existence) and their independence of any knowing mind; also the pluralism which regards the world, both that of existence and that of entities, as composed of an infinite number of mutually independent entities, with relations which are ultimate, and not reducible to adjectives…Before learning these views from him, I found myself completely unable to construct any philosophy of arithmetic, whereas their acceptance brought about an immediate liberation from a large number of difficulties which I believe to be otherwise insuperable…I owe much to Mr G. E. Moore besides the general position which underlies the whole" (PoM, Preface, xviii). See also Russell (Auto. 61; 70; 146), (1959a, b). Russell also extolled Moore's new "logic" for some time (letters to Moore, 13 September, 1898 (Add. Ms. 8330 8R/33/8); 1 December, 1898 (Add. Ms. 8330 8R/33/10); Letters to Couturat (2 July 1899, 5 May 1900, in Griffin (1992, 194–195, 198–199)). See Preti (2019).

6   Fellowship Years

Once Moore had secured the Fellowship in 1898, he had six years in which to pursue his own research in philosophy.[97] By October 1902, he had submitted the manuscript for PE to Cambridge University Press. His intellectual development between 1898 and 1902 will be the focus of what remains of this account, so as to show that PE was a final phase of the early period of Moore's philosophical development. There are, as we will see, interesting historical details in Moore's philosophical life that have been little examined before now and that add depth to the story of this key period in the history of analytic philosophy.

Moore was quite busy during his Fellowship period, while nevertheless lamenting his lack of productivity to his friends and family.[98] He continued to give talks to the Apostles society, the Moral Sciences Club, and the Trinity Sunday Essay society.[99] Between 1897 and 1903, he published over 15 articles and reviews in *Mind*, *International Journal of Ethics* and *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, including his classic RI (1903).[100] Moore also wrote short new book notices for *Mind*,[101]

---

[97] Moore's description was "…I wished to reside in College and to work at philosophy; and accordingly for the next six years I was living in a set of Fellows' rooms on the north side of Nevile's Court—a very pleasant place and a very pleasant life" (1942, 23).

[98] Russell and Moore met "for philosophical talk once a week" around 1899–1900 (Add. Ms. 8330 1/1/2), and Russell seems to have thought he needed a talking-to about it, which may have contributed to the significant *froideur* that developed between them beginning around 1899 (See Preti 2008a; OHBR).

[99] For the Trinity Sunday Essay Society, Moore wrote and delivered the following during his Fellowship period: "Religious Belief" (Nov. 1898); "Natural Theology" (5 November, 1899); "Immortality" (3 June, 1900); "Art, Morals and Religion" (5 May, 1901); "The Philosophy of Clothes" (18 May, 1902). None of these are published (Add. Ms. 8875 12/2/6–10). For the Moral Sciences Club, Moore delivered a paper on 20 October, 1899, called "Kant's Idealism," which was culled from his lectures at the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy in 1899 (and published as Moore 1903–1904). On 2 November, 1900, he delivered part of a rejoinder to a criticism written by E. E. Constance Jones on Moore's review of Ward's "Naturalism and Agnosticism" (*Cambridge Review*, Nov. 2, 1899).

[100] Regan (1986a) was the first time many of these appeared in reprint.

[101] These were common at the time, along with notices of the contents of the continental journals and publications of books, though not always signed. Moore did a good number of these (Add. Ms. 8330 1/1/1–7). Of interest is Moore (1899d), which noted that Bon's formulation of what he calls "philosophy's problem" as the analysis of concepts (421) is inconsistent. Moore additionally criti-

attended McTaggart's and Russell's lectures at Trinity,[102] aided Russell in his requests for Latin translations for Russell's book on Leibniz, and wrote a review of Russell's EFG (1899c).[103] He also wrote 12 entries for Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (Baldwin 1901–03).[104]

---

cised Bon who "rejects scornfully" words like "true" and "Ideals" as "phrases without meaning," and retorts that "there is a notion which gives a meaning to the questions, "Is it true that this ought to be," "Is it true that this is good"? quite independent of what anybody thinks about the matter…" (422). Both Russell and Moore contributed signed new book notices in *Mind* (October 1898); Russell reviewed Goblot on the sciences (CPBR, 1); Moore reviewed *La Morale de Kant* by Cresson tersely, dismissing it in so many words as explicitly committing the naturalistic fallacy (568–9).

[102] Moore attended and took notes at Russell's lectures on Leibniz (Add. Ms. 8875 10/4/1–2). His notebook is misdated as "1898"; Russell gave the lectures in Lent Term 1899. See Arthur, et al. (2017) for detailed discussions of Russell's own notes for the book, Moore's notes of Russell's lectures, and the surviving texts of *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, which appeared in 1900.

[103] See Preti (2008a).

[104] James Mark Baldwin (1861–1934) was an American psychologist. The dictionary grew to three volumes, devoted to entries that spanned the latest scholarship on the wide selection of entries. The British consulting editors were Sidgwick and Stout; the philosophical contributors were Bosanquet, Sidgwick, and Moore; Adamson and Sorley contributed entries in Logic; and Mrs. H. Sidgwick as well as G. F. Stout contributed entries in Psychology. Ward was cited as an important source in the literature on the classification of mental phenomena (Baldwin (1901–03, vol. 1, 188)) and for his "recognition and encouragement" Baldwin (1901–03, vol. 1., 18, 102). The American contributors to these topics included John Dewey, Josiah Royce, Christine Ladd-Franklin, and C. S. Peirce.

Moore's entries are: "Cause and Effect," "Change," (both in Vol. I); "Nativism (and Empiricism)," "Quality," "Real," "Reason," "Relative (and Absolute)," "Relativity of Knowledge," "Substance," "Spirit," "Teleology," and "Truth," appeared in Volume II. Pettit (1972) is right that, contrary to most citations, Moore did not write the entry for "Relation" (Baldwin did, and Stout added the entry on "Relation, consciousness of"). Moore called these the first piece of philosophical work that he "undertook during this period [of the Fellowship]," saying "I took very great pains over these articles, aiming particularly at analysing out the fundamental notions involved in the use of the terms I was asked to define…I think my efforts after clear analysis gave the articles a sort of merit which might enable other people to learn something from them" (1942, 23). This could suggest that as far as Moore was concerned, those articles were the first to exhibit the analytical method he became famous for having inaugurated. In any case, Moore was criticised quite firmly (though not named) on his entry concerning "Cause and Effect" by D. G. Ritchie in his review of the Dictionary (Ritchie 1902) who asked tartly if the definition given ("…such that whenever the first ceases to exist, the second comes into existence immediately after, and whenever the second comes into existence, the first has ceased to exist immediately before") is "applicable to 'cause,' either in its scientific or in its popular sense?"

6.1   "The Elements of Ethics" and "Kant's Moral Philosophy": Moore's Lectures at the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 1898–1899

One of the most significant pieces of work that Moore was engaged on early in his Fellowship period was a set of lectures titled respectively "The Elements of Ethics" (EE) and "Kant's Moral Philosophy" (KMP).[105] These were delivered to the newly founded London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy in London, and were originally announced as a lecture series on "The Elements of Ethics, with a view to an appreciation of Kant's Moral Philosophy."[106] The school was meant to provide "students of Philosophy in London with some of the teaching which the philosophy faculty of a teaching university might be expected to provide."[107] Accordingly, Moore travelled to London once a week to lecture to what were supposed to be avid students of philosophy from a less-than-privileged class, though his audience in fact consisted quite often of his friends, and notably, his brother. Moore never lectured in ethics in his career at Cambridge, so these lectures are the only evidence we have of

---

[105] Moore mixes up the order in his 1942 (23). Regan (1991) published EE but was not aware that (1) there were two bound typescript volumes of this material or (2) that the KMP lectures had survived (Add. Ms. 8875, 14/2/1–11). The EE bound volume contains the Syllabus, which gives the title and summary of each lecture, a reading list, and a set of 33 examination questions (Regan 1991, xxxix).

[106] The president of the school was Bosanquet; one vice-president was Sidgwick (who likely proposed to Moore that he should take on the job). Bosanquet was sufficiently cognizant of his frosty examiners' report on Moore's 1898 thesis to write to Moore to tell him he hoped they "could meet as fellow students of philosophy" (30 October 1898; Add. Ms. 8330 8B/16/1), in proposing a meeting about this teaching appointment. See Regan (1991) for the details of the inception of the school. First and Second annual reports of the school are in the Cambridge University Library. The school lasted from 1897–1900, when it closed for lack of funding.

[107] Bosanquet, First Annual Report, 1897–1898 (Regan 1991). The school was an attempt to provide a substantive and authoritative study of philosophical subjects to those who were not in a position to attend a university. Bosanquet had left his Fellowship at Oxford in 1881 and became active in social reform and adult education and so was in position to identify such a need. One problem that developed was that the lecturers (including T.H. Green, Leslie Stephens, Stout, and McTaggart) tended to attract university students, rather than "workingmen," turning the school into a kind of Oxbridge extension campus. Moore's own reading list for his lectures was straightforwardly academic: Kant's first critique—in the original German—was on the list, though Moore indicated acceptable translations.

how Moore would have taught ethics to students. I have said that it is possible to trace a line to PE from Moore's earliest work in philosophy—his papers for the Apostles and other Cambridge societies and his Trinity Fellowship Dissertations. That line took its next direction through these sets of lectures. Moore returned to his work in the 1898 dissertation to refashion it for these lectures, as was his usual method of working (BP 2011, lxxix).[108] In time, the EE lectures made it, with some significant editing, into the final draft of PE (see below). KMP remains unpublished, but the surviving material contains a few clarifications of Moore's thought at this period.

The syllabus included in the surviving material lists the components of the lectures.[109] Lectures I and II of KMP covered Kant's "compromise": he is a "Rationalist with regard to 'form'; empiricist with regard to 'matter.'" Along with the "insufficiency" of the distinctions between understanding and sensibility, Moore also takes on the "Critical or Transcendental Philosophy." Kant's Idealism is compared—"both are unjustified"—with Berkeley's, and the phenomenal/noumenal distinction is given substantial criticism. In Lectures III and IV, Moore covered the "relation of Transcendental Freedom to Morality" and the "fallacy involved in contention that Freedom is *ratio essendi* of Morality" which is "[D]ue to Kant's confused notion of Reason." More confusions ensue in the "identification of Pure Practical Reason with Pure Will," as well as in the distinction between the "intelligible and empirical characters" that underlie the "Relation of Transcendental to Practical Freedom." Lecture V dismisses the Categorical Imperative as "not an imperative." Lecture VI

---

[108] For instance, three pages of Moore's paper for the Moral Sciences Club in 1899 on "Kant's Idealism" have survived. This material is inscribed in Moore's hand "Lectures on Kant's Ethics 1899" and "1899 parts of Lecs. II and III" (Add. Ms. 8875 12/3/3), which explains why Lectures II and III of the surviving manuscript material of KMP is missing pages. The paper begins: "This paper was not written for an audience of philosophical specialists and it is also a mere fragment out of a general discussion on K.'s philosophy." The "general discussion on Kant's philosophy" was the 1898 dissertation. The rest of this paper, now lost, was also likely used in drafting Moore (1903–1904).

[109] This is a printed pamphlet announcing the syllabus of a "course of ten lectures on Kant's Moral Philosophy" and which includes titles and a short summary of the ten proposed lectures, the reading list, and 31 questions on Kant's ethics. The summaries track the topics that Moore covered at length in his dissertations, so we can be sure that the dissertations form the basis for KMP (Add. Ms. 8875 14/2/1).

tackles "Kant's failure to see that 'End' is presupposed in the Moral Law." Lecture VII considers Kant's Doctrine of Happiness, distinguishing it from Psychological Hedonism. Lecture VIII tackles the Postulates of Practical Reason and the "paralogism involved in moral proof of God's existence." Lecture IX covers the Good Will and the "reasons for Kant's emphasis of motive as a condition of morality," which ultimately fails because of a "want of connection between this practical doctrine and his rationalism," and "[A]mbiguity in the sense he gives to 'duty'". Lecture X is the concluding lecture, where Moore's critical summary of Kant's Moral Philosophy is summed up as "his psychology … [unites] the contradictory conceptions of a Rational and a Volitional Ethics."

The prompts that Moore posed for his students are of the standard-issue essay examination kind and run the gamut from "Distinguish Kant's Idealism from that of Berkeley" to "What is Kant's idea of duty"? But one of his "students" was his brother, the poet Thomas Sturge Moore, who wrote his answers out and sent them to Moore, who commented on them in detail.[110] In some of his answers to his brother's philosophical essay efforts, we can see the shift in Moore's thinking that had begun in 1898 becoming more pronounced.

6.2   Replies to Thomas Sturge Moore[111]

On the question of the principles of Rational and Empiricism, Moore criticized his brother for not "quite hit[ting] the point" on empiricism. For Moore, the empiricists failed to (among other things) recognize that a law is not a cause though it can be a reason. Hume, for instance, "assumes that habit is a cause of our thinking there are causes." Moore was also significantly severe on his brother's answers to the question of the

---

[110] Thomas Sturge Moore (1870–1944) was a poet, playwright, and artist, three years older than his brother George.

[111] This material (Add. Ms. 8330 4/4/117) consists of a set of five letters, each between 3–5 pages, with Moore's answers bundled in on separate pages. They are dated in Moore's hand "Jan/Feb 1899." Sturge Moore's son Dan sent them to Dorothy Moore in 1965 saying he had found them in some family papers: "…it seemed to me they might interest people as a contribution to Uncle George's biography and development." They are numbered consecutively, and cover Sturge Moore's answers to the first 17 of Moore's 31 examination questions.

meaning of "a priori" and "necessary", sprinkling "no" throughout: for example, on Sturge Moore's assertion that an analytical proposition is "the first step of every philosophy." Moore replies that "an analytical proposition is of no use anywhere in philosophy, and 2 + 2 = 4 is not, as was thought, an analytical proposition." The mistake was that Sturge Moore defined "a priori" as if only analytic propositions were *a priori*. To this, Moore claims that "a priori" means logically prior; it cannot therefore be strictly distinguished from empirical; and similarly all empirical propositions are necessary."[112]

On the question of the distinction between Kant's Idealism and that of Berkeley, Moore clarifies his point by noting that "Kant does not admit that our supposed knowledge of matter is really only knowledge of mind … matter he takes to be something different from what Berkeley meant by mental facts and something of which the existence is more immediately certain … for K[ant] matter is composed of mental elements, but mental elements arranged in a different way." Moore also goes on to say that his own criticism of Kant's Idealism is not a criticism of Kant's "critical" method, but rather of Kant's view that "a priori propositions are true, because they are due to forms of our mind's receptivity and activity. Against this one has to say … that it is no explanation why anything should be true at all; since the fact that a belief is caused or conditioned in a certain way has no bearing on its truth."

Moore continued his criticism of his brother's answer with a clarification of the ways in which he brought together his views on existence and on propositions in the 1898 dissertation:

> If what someone means by "there is something which I call 'I', 'Something which I call I exists [sic],' then that seems to me no more certain than 2 + 2 = 4. For, if your proposition means anything at all, then it means 'Existence and something else are connected,' just as 2 + 2 = 4 means '2 and + and 4 are connected" … I think you have been mixing up 'I (whatever I am) exists' and 'I means something [sic]'. These, I think, are different questions … I am assuming a distinction between what is meant by 'is'

---

[112] Recall that NJ defends the position that all propositions consist of mind-independent concepts in necessary relations to one another. The defence of this is not obvious. See Baldwin (1984) and Hylton (1990).

when you say 2 + 2 is 4, and what is meant by exists when you say 'I exist'. This distinction between 'being' and 'existence' is very important and I think quite plain.

Moore then adds, "'Something is good' must mean 'something other than good is good' and this is equivalent to 'Something is good as an end.' But 'An end exists' is quite a different proposition from this."

To Sturge Moore's attempt to answer the question on Kant's conception of the Transcendental Ego, Moore again asserts his new formulation on the nature of a proposition with more force: "K[ant] generally explains the Trans[cendental] Ego by saying that it is what is implied in the fact that every proposition is an object of thought. My criticism of him is that a prop[osition] is not necessarily an object of thought, although it can be such." As for Kant's conception of Transcendental Freedom, Moore efficiently sums up the position he formulated and defended in the dissertations: "What may be said of Trans[cendental] Freedom is this. It is a causal relation, which may possibly hold between the real world and temporal effects. K[ant] argues that this relation does hold, because he confused the reason of an action with its cause."

6.3   Moore's "Elements of Ethics" and *Principia Ethica*

The EE lectures are significant because they are the intermediary link between Moore's views in the 1898 dissertation and PE. Moore reworked the ideas in his dissertation in order to lecture about them, and then ultimately used much of that lecture material for PE.[113] The story of how this came to pass involves a few puzzles, and I will draw this examination of Moore's early philosophical development to a close with a brief look at those.

By 1900, Moore was occupied with a variety of writing projects: "Necessity" (Moore 1900b) had been submitted to *Mind*; a debate paper replying to Jones on Ward's Gifford Lectures for the Moral Sciences Club was underway, as were some of the commissioned Baldwin dictionary

---

[113] See Baldwin (1993, Appendix (312–3)) for a detailed concordance of what was used in PE.

pieces, and work on assorted academic miscellanies.[114] Then Sidgwick resigned his Professorship. Moore wrote to Desmond MacCarthy (2 June 1900):[115]

> what I wanted to talk of, but have had no chance yet, is that I can't help hoping I might get it. I fear the hope is quite absurd. I must talk to McT[aggart] and if he says no, I should probably not go in. But you know both Ward and he have mentioned it as a possibility for me, *a few years later*. I feel perhaps I ought to regret now that I did not make more effort to get my Lectures published. Now it's too late. I can't think of anyone very distinguished who could go in: Richie, Sorley Mackenzie: I don't think so well of them as myself … Certainly I shan't be able to help thinking a lot of it, till it is over; and I shall be disappointed pretty badly … I may be perfectly mad … P.s. Sunday evening. McT[aggart] just said he was going in for the Professorship, as better than Mackenzie. He did not seem to have thought of me, and it was not a time to raise the question. But I must.

Quite apart from the near absurdity of a young Fellow with a modest list of publications going in for Sidgwick's Professorship, Moore at least displays a morose understanding that having produced a book out of his Fellowship work (like McTaggart and Russell had done before him) might have helped his case.[116] In the same letter, however, Moore also noted that given his other commitments, "I shall certainly get nothing

---

[114] He had also been assisting Russell with the Leibniz book. In one list (Add. Ms. 8330 1/1/7), Moore noted that he spent the Long Vacation of 1900 reading Russell's Leibniz book proofs. In letters to his parents at this period, we get a sense of Moore's difficulty writing. 27 Feb 1900: a paper Moore had written had been rejected, "so it won't appear in print. And I am now at work on my old volume of Ethical Lectures, of which I fear the fate will be the same" (Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/84). 18 March 1900: Moore wrote that "I've only begun correcting my Ethical Lectures" (Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/85). 3 June 1901: Moore wrote that he was finding the last few Baldwin articles "very troublesome" and … "I have done nothing else this term…" (Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/94).

[115] Add. Ms. 8330 2/5/16.

[116] The Professorship went to W. R Sorley. (1855–1935), a firmly traditional nineteenth century metaphysician and ethicist. He was publicly opposed to the admission of women at Cambridge, on the ground that their lust for power would destroy the University (McWilliams-Tulberg 1975, 171–3, 175, 192). Moore remarked to his friend Desmond McCarthy: "You saw Sorley was elected to the Professorship? It is very satisfactory, in the sense that nobody can be disappointed or think himself wronged. But I think he must be a weak person. I've not read anything of his, except a puff of Ward" (12 July, 1900 (Add. Ms. 8330 2/5/17)).

done this vac.—nothing of my future book. I only hope I may do this."[117] By Michaelmas term 1901, Moore lamented his lack of progress to his parents and in his annotated lists: "Sept. 30–Dec. 17: Write at Ethics Freedom and Metaphysics" (Add. Ms. 8330 1/1/4); "Finish last Baldwin article during Long Vac[ation] Aug[ust] 10. And try to write at book on Ethics (Add. Ms. 8330 1/1/7)"; "October Term: try to write at book on Ethics." Things did not seem to improve over the next few months. Moore wrote to his parents that "as for my work, I wish it advanced more visibly. I have made no great progress with any single piece of writing this term. I seem to find it increasingly difficult to satisfy myself with anything; which sometimes makes me feel very desperate" (14 Nov. 1901, Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/98). Downcast, Moore wrote again on 27 January, 1902, that "my only writing work has been a review of McTaggart's last book" (Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/100).

An entry on one of Moore's lists dated 6 March 1902, however, is that he "offers his lectures to the Press" (Add. Ms. 8330 1/1/4). The evidence suggests that Moore gave up trying to revise his lectures and sent them off as they were. Cambridge University Press accepted the material but made it clear that it was going to need revision. It was coincidentally Sorley who both wrote to Moore on behalf of the Syndics and personally as well:

> I hope you will not hesitate to put a good deal of trouble into it in order to make it as good as you can. I don't believe that it can be adequately revised by simply making corrections in the bound volume. The difference between a book and a set of lectures requires a certain amount of recasting.[118]

One of Sorley's suggestions was "I think the main divisions of your argument should be made the divisions of the chapters, and if possible, the chapters divided into paragraphs corresponding with the steps of the argument."[119] Sorley also helpfully supplied a few of his own

---

[117] Regan (1991) has claimed that Moore was both planning a book *and* thinking about publishing his EE lectures at this juncture as if they were two separate projects. I don't think this is right.

[118] Add. Ms. 8330 8S/32/1. Moore wrote to his parents in a more buoyant mood upon receiving the news from the Press (18 March, 1902, Add. Ms. 8330 2/1/101). The minutes of the Syndics meeting note that Moore's typescript was discussed on 14 March 1902 and 12 April 1902.

[119] The published PE follows something like this plan (see Baldwin 1993).

philosophical criticisms: "There is one very important point about the difference between pleasure and consciousness of pleasure that seems to me so obviously due to a confusion that I fear I must have not understood your point." It must be said that Moore didn't think much of the criticism, as the passage appears with scant revision in PE: "What is pleasure? It is certainly something of which we may be conscious, and which, therefore, may be distinguished from our consciousness of it."[120] Also preserved with this material is a separate sheet of paper (not in Moore's hand nor in Sorley's) of criticisms which were to "apply to the four chapters revised for press as well as to the remainder of the book." These were that (1) the reader is constantly addressed in the second person; (2) repetitions are more frequent than desirable; and (3) passages containing modifications of view or obvious afterthoughts should be revised.

A puzzle concerning this material is that there are two bound typescripts of the EE lectures that survive, one of which contains marginalia.[121] Neither are dated, so we do not know when Moore sent his lectures out for typing. Regan (1991) refers to the material he was working from (Add. Ms. 8875 14/1/2) as a *manuscript* (there is no manuscript of these lectures in the Moore papers with which to compare the typescript) and does not mention the marginalia. Rosenbaum (1969) on the other hand mentions the marginalia in his discussion of a typescript (Add. Ms. 8875 14/1/1). As to the marginalia, some are in Russell's hand, though not all of them.[122] Relations between Moore and Russell were at an all-time low just at this period, in spite of the fact (or perhaps because of the fact) that they saw one another "for talk regularly one afternoon a week" (Add. Ms. 8330 1/1/2).[123] Things were bad enough that Moore tried to avoid Russell when he could, so it might seem odd that he would seek out comments on what he was

---

[120] In EE (Regan (1991), 75, Lec. IV) the text reads "What is pleasure? It is certainly something of which we may be conscious, and something, as most psychologists would admit, which may be in our minds even though we are not conscious of it." See Baldwin (1993, 139).

[121] Moore's student Casimir Lewy was in possession of many Moore's philosophical papers, including the typescript with marginalia (14/1/1) which Rosenbaum saw and Regan did not. Both believed the KMP lectures were lost, but Lewy had them as well.

[122] See Preti (2008a, 118; OHBR).

[123] See Preti (2008a).

going to submit to the Press (though not impossible, since Moore did separate his philosophical and social relationship with Russell).[124] But if Russell did read the typescript, when did he read it? There is no evidence that Moore asked Russell for comments, and Rosenbaum (1969, 217) noted that a query to Russell himself resulted in the reply that Russell had no recollection of Moore's typescript. We could speculate that *if* Moore submitted this particular typescript the Press, and *if* Moore didn't know that Russell had read the typescript until he got it back and saw Russell's marginal comments (perhaps Sorley asked Russell to act as an informal referee?), he would have been furious and probably unforgiving, and this could partly explain why Moore's relations with Russell were so fraught at this time.[125]

On the verso side of page nine of the 14/1/1 typescript is a series of calculations in Moore's hand. Moore wrote: "estimate of McT[aggart] and Russell 385 per page," so Moore may have spoken to them about his revisions. "Exactly length of Russell's" could mean anything, but maybe Moore meant to use Russell's Leibniz book as a model. Moore also drafted out some chapter titles, which are not identical to the titles of the lectures, nor identical to the chapters of PE. Moore's draft chapter headings do however all refer to topics he has covered in 1898 or in EE—save for the last one. Chapter X on this list is "The Ideal." There is no way to know when Moore made this notation—was it as early as 1902, when he received the good news from the Press? Or just before he submitted his final draft of PE to Cambridge? "The Ideal" is the title of the last chapter of PE. It is wholly new and not derived from anything in EE and is the chapter that contains perhaps what is the most familiar conclusion of PE: "By far the most valuable things, which we can know or imagine, are certain states of consciousness, which may be roughly described as the pleasures of human intercourse, and the enjoyment of beautiful objects."[126] And what we have seen is that the seeds for this view were sown and cultivated in Moore's earliest philosophical forays.

---

[124] See Preti (2008a, 2019, OHBR).

[125] Russell did in fact read the lectures (CPBR 1, 361).

[126] Baldwin (1993, 312–13).

7   Conclusion

The nature and role of the initial influences on Moore's philosophical development show that PE is best understood as the final stage of his earliest exposure to philosophy at Cambridge. In clarifying the historical context of Moore's philosophical coming-of-age I have also tried to shed some light on the complex knotted strands of the intellectual discourse of the late nineteenth century (especially at Cambridge) and how those strands led to the new analytical method that emerged from Moore's (and Russell's) struggles in their early work. I have argued that an emerging emphasis on a science of psychology, and specifically the novel formulations of judgment in nineteenth century mental science, were key elements that led to Moore's iconoclastic insight with respect to a metaphysical distinction between consciousness and its objects. This might suggest a lurking irony: after all, Moore's great achievement in PE was, ultimately, to give consciousness a primary role in his analysis of "the ultimate and fundamental truth of Moral Philosophy" (PE, Chap. 6, sec. 113). However, we can also say that Moore's view is grounded in his defence of the intrinsic value of entirely independent *objects* of consciousness. What "is beautiful in Art or Nature" is good in itself; even if "*all* the greatest, and *by far* the greatest goods we can imagine" are "personal affections and aesthetic enjoyments" (PE, 237–8). And as have seen, it is certainly true that personal affections were prime inspirations for Moore. So it may be as fitting an end as any to note that the epigraph to the EE lectures was carried over, intact, to PE:

<div align="center">

Doctoribus Amicisque Cantagbrigiensibus
Discipulus Amicus Cantabrigiensis
Primitias
D. D. D.
Auctor

</div>

References

Allison, H. 1990. *Kant's Theory of Freedom*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Arthur, R.T.W., and N. Griffin (eds). 2017. Russell's Leibniz Notebook. *Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies* 37 (1): 5–56.

Baldwin, J.M. (1901–03). *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (3 vols.). New York and London: Macmillan.

Baldwin, T. 1984. Moore's Rejection of Idealism. In R. Rorty, J. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner, eds. 1984: 357–374.

———. 1990. *G.E. Moore.* London: Routledge.

———., ed. 1993. *G.E. Moore: Principia Ethica*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baldwin, T., and C. Preti, eds. 2011. *G.E. Moore: Early Philosophical Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [BP].

Caird, E. 1889. *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant* (2 vols.) Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons.

Candlish, Stewart, and Pierfrancesco Basile. 2021. Francis Herbert Bradley. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed., forthcoming. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/bradley/.

Fodor, J. 1987. *Psychosemantics*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Bradford).

Griffin, N. 1991. *Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

———. 1992. *The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, vol. 1: The Private Years (1884–1914)*. London: Penguin.

———. forthcoming. Russell on Relations, 1898: A Reconsideration.

Hylton, P. 1984. The Nature of the Proposition and the Revolt Against Idealism. In Rorty, R., J. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner, eds. 1984: 375–398.

———. 1990. *Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kant, I. 1996. *Practical Philosophy (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant)*. Tr. and ed. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1998. *Critique of Pure Reason (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant)*. P. Guyer and A. Wood, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kripke, S. 1980. *Naming and Necessity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

LaPointe, S., ed. 2019. *Logic From Kant to Russell: Laying the Foundations for Analytic Philosophy*. London: Routledge.

Levy, P. 1979. *G.E. Moore and the Cambridge Apostles*. London: Harcourt.

Lubenow, W.C. 1998. *The Cambridge Apostles, 1820–1914: Liberalism, Imagination, and Friendship in British Intellectual and Personal Life*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

McWilliams-Tulberg, R. 1975. *Women at Cambridge*. London: Gollancz.

Moore, G.E. 1897. In What Sense, If Any, Do Past and Future Time Exist? *Mind*, n.s. 6 (22): 228–240. [PFT]

———. 1898. Freedom. *Mind*, n.s. 7 (26): 179–204. [F].

———. 1899a. The Nature of Judgment. *Mind*, n.s. 8 (30): 176–193. [NJ].

———. 1899b. Review of Russell (1897/1956a). *Mind*, n.s. 8 (31): 397–405.

———. 1899c. Review of Russell. *Mind*, n.s. 8 (31): 397–405.

———. 1899d. Review of Bon. *Mind*, n.s. 8(31): 420–422.

———. 1900. Identity. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 1: 103–127.

———. 1942. Autobiography. In Schilpp, ed., 3–39.

———. 1953. *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*. London: Collier Books.

Morris, K. and C. Preti 2015. How To Read Moore's 'Proof of An External World.' *Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy* (vol. 4, no. 1): 1–16.

Pereboom, D. 2006. Kant on Transcendental Freedom. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 73: 537–567.

Pettit, P. 1972. The Early Philosophy of G.E. Moore. *Philosophical Forum* 4 (2): 260–298.

Potter, M. 2009. *Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Preti, C. 2008a. He Was In Those Days Beautiful and Slim: Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore, 1894–1901. *Russell* 28 (2): 97–192.

———. 2008b. On the Origins of the Contemporary Notion of Propositional Content: Anti-psychologism in Nineteenth Century and G. E. Moore's Early Theory of Judgment. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (A)* 39 (2): 176–185.

———. 2018. The Context and Origin of Moore's Formulation of the Naturalistic Fallacy in *Principia Ethica*. In Sinclair, ed. 2018: 54–72.

———. 2019. What Russell Meant When He Called Moore A Logician. In LaPointe, ed. 2019: 189–205.

Regan, T. 1986a. *G.E. Moore: The Early Essays*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

———. 1986b. *Bloomsbury's Prophet: G.E. Moore and the Development of his Moral Philosophy*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

———. 1991. *G. E. Moore: The Elements of Ethics*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Ritchie, D.G. 1902. Review of Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*. *Mind*, n.s. 11 (44): 547–556.

Rorty, R., J. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner, eds. 1984. *Philosophy in History: Essays in the Historiography of Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rosenbaum, S. 1969. G.E. Moore on the Elements of Ethics. *University of Toronto Quarterly* 38 (3): 214–232.

———. 1984. Bertrand Russell in Bloomsbury. *Russell* Summer (1): 11–29.

Russell, B. 1897/1956a. *An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry*. New York: Dover. [EFG].

Russell, B. 1903. *The Principles of Mathematics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [PoM].

———. 1944. My Mental Development. In Schilpp, ed., 1–20. [MMD]

———. 1959a. *My Philosophical Development*. New York: Simon & Schuster. [MPD].

———. 1959b. The Influence and Thought of G.E. Moore: A Symposium of Reminiscence by Four of His Friends. *The Listener* (April 30, pp. 755–758).

———. 1975. *Autobiography*. London: Allen and Unwin. [Auto.].

———. 1993. An Analysis of Mathematical Reasoning. In *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 2: Philosophical Papers (1869–99)* [CPBR 2]: 163–242. Ed. N. Griffin and A.C. Lewis. London and New York: Routledge. [AMR].

Sidgwick, A., E. Balfour Sidgwick, E. Mildred Sidgwick, and H. Sidgwick. 1906. *Henry Sidgwick: A Memoir*. London: Macmillan.

Sinclair, N. 2018. *The Naturalistic Fallacy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Skidelsky, R. 2003. *John Maynard Keyes 1883–1946: Economist, Philosopher, Statesman*. New York: Penguin.

References

Adamson, R. 1879. *On the Philosophy of Kant*. Edinburgh: David Douglas.

———. 1884. Review of Bradley's *Principles of Logic*. *Mind* 9 (3): 122–135.

———. 1885a. Review of Lotze, *Logic, in Three Books*. *Mind* 10 (37): 100–115.

———. 1885b. Review of Lotze, *Metaphysic*. *Mind* 10 (40): 573–588.

Adickes, E. 1899. German Philosophy During the Years 1896–1898. *Philosophical Review* 8 (3): 273–289.

Albertazzi, L., ed. 2001. *The Dawn of Cognitive Science: Early European Contributions*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Albertazzi, L., M. Libardi, and R. Poli, eds. 1996. *The School of Franz Brentano*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Allard, J. 2005. *The Logical Foundations of Bradley's Metaphysics: Judgment, Inference, and Truth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2014. Early Nineteenth Century Logic. In Mander, ed., Chap. 2.

Allard, J., and G. Stock, eds. 1995. *Writings on Logic and Metaphysics: F. H. Bradley*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Allison, H. 1990. *Kant's Theory of Freedom*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ambrose, A., and M. Lazerowitz. 1970. *G.E Moore: Essays in Retrospect*. London: Routledge.

Ameriks, K. 2017. *Cambridge Companion to German Idealism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Anscombe, G.E.M., and G.H. von Wright. 1961. *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Notebooks: 1914–1916*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Arthur, R.T.W., and N. Griffin, eds. 2017. Russell's Leibniz Notebook. *Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies* 37 (1): 5–56.

Bain, A. 1876. Mr. Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics. *Mind* 1 (2): 179–197.

———. 1886. Mr. James Ward's 'Psychology'. *Mind* 11 (44): 457–477.

———. 1887a. On 'Association'-Controversies. *Mind* 12 (46): 161–182.

———. 1887b. On Mr. Ward's Psychological Principles (III). *Mind* 12 (46): 311–313.

Baldwin, J.M. 1901–1903. *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (3 vols.). New York and London: Macmillan.

Baldwin, T. 1984. Moore's Rejection of Idealism. In R. Rorty, J. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner, eds. 1984: 357–374.

———. 1990. *G.E. Moore.* London: Routledge.

———., ed. 1993. *G.E. Moore: Principia Ethica*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baldwin, T., and C. Preti, eds. 2011. *G.E. Moore: Early Philosophical Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [BP].

Balfour, A. 1878. Transcendentalism. *Mind* 2 (12): 480–505.

———. 1879. Reply to Caird. *Mind* 4 (13): 115–116.

———. 1893. A Criticism of Current Idealistic Theories. *Mind*, n.s. 2(8): 425–440.

Beaney, M. 1997. *The Frege Reader*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

———., ed. 2007a. *The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology*. London: Routledge.

———. 2007b. The Analytic Turn in Early Twentieth Century Philosophy. In Beaney, ed. 2007a: 1–30.

———., ed. 2013. *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Beaney, M., and E. Reck, eds. 2005a. *Gottlob Frege: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers (Volume I: Frege's Philosophy in Context)*. London and New York: Routledge.

———. 2005b. *Gottlob Frege: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers (Vol. II: Frege's Philosophy of Logic)*. London and New York: Routledge.

Becher, H.W. 1980. William Whewell and Cambridge Mathematics. *Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences* 2: 1–48.

———. 1986. Voluntary Science in Nineteenth-Century Cambridge. *British Journal of the History of Science* 19: 57–87.

Beiser, F. 2017. The Enlightenment and Idealism. Chap. 2 in Ameriks, ed. 2017: 21–42.

Bell, D. 1999. The Revolution of Moore and Russell: A Very British Coup? In O'Hear, 193–208.

Benecke, E.C. 1898. On the Logical Subject of the Proposition. *Mind*, n.s. 7 (25): 34–54.

Betti, A. 2013. We Owe It to Sigwart! A New Look at the Content/Object Distinction in Early Phenomenological Theories of Judgment from Brentano to Twardowski. In: Textor, ed. 2013: 74–96.

Bonino, G., J. Cumpa, and G. Jesson, eds. 2014. *Defending Realism: Ontological and Epistemological Investigations*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Boring, E. 1929. *A History of Experimental Psychology*. New York: Century Press.

Bosanquet, B. 1884. *Lotze: Metaphysic in Three Books: Ontology, Cosmology, and Psychology*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bradley, F.H. 1876. *Ethical Studies*. London: Henry S. King and Co. [ES].

———. 1877a. Mr Sidgwick on *Ethical Studies*. *Mind* 2 (5): 122–126.

———. 1877b. *Mr Sidgwick's Hedonism: An Examination of the main argument of the "Methods of Ethics"*. London: Henry S. King and Co.

———. 1883. *Principles of Logic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [PL].

———. 1887a. On A Feature of Active Attention. *Mind* 12 (46): 314.

———. 1887b. Association and Thought. *Mind* 12 (47): 354–381.

———. 1893. *Appearance and Reality*. London: Swann and Sonnenschein. [AR].

Brentano, F. 1995a, ed. P. Simons. *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. Edited by O. Kraus and L. McAlister and Translated by A. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, and L. McAlister. London and New York: Routledge.

———. 1995b. *Descriptive Psychology*. Translated and edited by B. Müller. London and New York: Routledge.

Brett, G.S. 1921. *A History of Psychology, Vol. 3: Modern Psychology*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Broad, C.D. 1927. John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart, (1866–1925). *Proceedings of the British Academy* 13: 307–334.

———. 1930. *Five Types of Ethical Theory*. London: Kegan Paul.

———. 1933/1938. *An Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy* (2 vols.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1945. Prof. G. F. Stout (1860–1944). *Mind*, n.s. 54 (215): 285–288.

———. 1966. The Local Historical Background of Contemporary British Philosophy. In Mace, ed. 1966: 11–62.

Caird, E. 1879a. Mr. Balfour on Transcendentalism. *Mind* 4 (13): 111–115.

———. 1879b. The So-Called Idealism of Kant [reply to Sidgwick (1879)]. *Mind* 4 (16): 557–561.

———. 1880. Reply to Sidgwick. *Mind* 5 (17): 111–115.

———. 1889. *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant* (2 vols.) Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons.

Cambridge Student Guide. 1863–1876.

Cambridge University Calendar. 1894–1896.

Cambridge University Reporter. 1894–1898.

Candlish, S. 1996. The Unity of the Proposition and Russell's Theories of Judgment. In A. Palmer and R. Monk, eds. 1996: 103–135.

———. 2007. *The Russell/Bradley Dispute and its Significance for Twentieth Century Philosophy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

———. 2013. Philosophy and the Tide of History: Bertrand Russell's Role in the Rise of Analytic Philosophy. In Reck, ed. 2013.

Candlish, Stewart, and Pierfrancesco Basile. 2021. Francis Herbert Bradley. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed., forthcoming. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/bradley/.

Cavallin, J. 1997. *Content and Object: Husserl, Twardowski, and Psychologism*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Cerullo, J. 1988. E.G. Boring: Reflections on a Discipline Builder. *The American Journal of Psychology* 101 (4): 561–575.

Chrudzimski, A., and Wolfgang Huemer, eds. 2004. *Phenomenology and Analysis. Essays on Central European Philosophy*. Frankfurt: Ontos.

Coffey, P. 1912. *The Science of Logic*. London: Longmans, Green and Co. [reviewed by Wittgenstein, L. 1913. *The Cambridge Review* (vol. 34, no. 853): 351].

Collini, S. 1975. Idealism and Cambridge Idealism. *Historical Journal* 18 (1): 171–177.

Craik, A.D.D. 2008. *Mr. Hopkins' Men: Cambridge Reform and British Mathematics in the 19th Century*. London: Springer.

Crane, T. 2014. *Aspects of Psychologism*. Harvard University Press.

Crisp, R. 2014. Sidgwick and Utilitarianism in the Late Nineteenth Century. In Eggleston and Miller, eds. 2014: 81–102.

———. 2015. *The Cosmos of Duty: Henry Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Croom Robertson, G. 1876. Prefatory Words. *Mind* 1 (1): 1–6.

———. 1883. Psychology and Philosophy. *Mind* 8 (29): 1–21.

Cussins, A. 1987. Varieties of Psychologism. *Synthese* 70: 123–154.

Dappiano, L. 1994. Cambridge and the Austrian Connection. *Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of Science and the Humanities* 54: 99–124.

Dathe, U. 2005. Frege in Jena. In M. Beaney and E. Reck, eds. 2005a: 40–53.

Davidson, D. 1963. Actions, Reasons, and Causes. *Journal of Philosophy* 60 (23): 685–700.

Dawes-Hicks, G. 1925. The Philosophy of James Ward. *Mind*, n.s. 34 (135): 280–299.

Deigh, J. 1992. Sidgwick on Ethical Judgment. In Schultz, ed. 1992: 241–260.

Dewey, C.J. 1974. Cambridge Idealism: Utilitarian Revisionists in Late 19th Century Cambridge. *Historical Journal* xvii: 63–78.

Dickinson, G.L. 1931. *J. McT. E. McTaggart*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dummett, M. 1973. *Frege: Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

———. 1993. *Origins of Analytical Philosophy*. London: Duckworth.

Dyde, S. 1884a. Bradley's Principles of Logic (I). *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 18 (3): 287–299.

———. 1884b. Bradley's Principles of Logic (II). *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 18 (4): 399–424.

———. 1885. Bradley's Principles of Logic (III). *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 19 (1): 1–32.

Eastwood, A. 1892a. Lotze's Antithesis Between Thought and Things (I). *Mind*, n.s. 1 (3): 305–324.

———. 1892b. Lotze's Antithesis Between Thought and Things (II). *Mind*, n.s. 1 (4): 470–488.

Ebert, P., and M. Rossberg, tr. 2013. *Gottlob Frege: Basic Laws of Arithmetic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———., eds. 2019. Essays on *Frege's Basic Laws of Arithmetic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Eggleston, B., and D. Miller, eds. 2014. *Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Erdmann, J.E. 1890. *German Philosophy Since Hegel*. Sonnenschein.

Ewing, A.C. 1934. *Idealism: A Critical Survey*. London: Methuen.

Ferriani, M., and D. Buzzetti, eds. 1987. *Speculative Grammar, Universal Grammar, Philosophical Analysis: Papers in the Philosophy of Language*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins and Co.

Flint, R. 1876. Review of Brentano, *Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte*. *Mind* 1 (1): 116–122.

Floyd, J. 2009. Recent Themes in the History of Early Analytic Philosophy. *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 47 (2): 157–200.

Fodor, J. 1987. *Psychosemantics*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Bradford).

Frechette, G. 2014. Austrian Logical Realism? Brentano on States of Affairs. In G. Bonino, G.J. Cumpa, and G. Jesson, eds. 2014: 379–400.

Gabbay, D., and J. Woods, eds. 2004. *The Rise of Modern Logic from Leibniz to Frege* (vol. 3: *Handbook of the History of Logic*). Elsevier/North Holland.

———, eds. 2008. *British Logic in the Nineteenth Century* (vol. 4: *Handbook of the History of Logic*). Elsevier/North Holland.

Gabriel, G. 2002. Frege, Lotze, and the Continental Roots of Early Analytic Philosophy. In E. Reck, ed. 2002: 39–51.

———. 2013. Frege and the German Background to Analytic Philosophy. In Beaney, ed. 2013: Chap. 7.

Galaugher, J. 2013. *Russell's Philosophy of Logical Analysis: 1897–1905*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Geach, P. 1995. Cambridge Philosophers III: McTaggart. *Philosophy* 70 (274): 567–579.

Glock, H.-J., ed. 1997. *The Rise of Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Blackwell.

———. 2008. *What Is Analytic Philosophy?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Green, T.H. 1885. *The Works of Thomas Hill Green*. Edited by R. Nettleship, 3 vols. London: Longmans.

Griffin, N. 1985. Russell's Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment. *Philosophical Studies* 47 (2): 213–247.

———. 1986. Wittgenstein's Criticism of Russell's Theory of Judgment. *Russell* (Winter (1985)–86): 132–145.

———. 1991. *Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

———. 1992. *The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, vol. 1: The Private Years (1884–1914)*. London: Penguin.

———. forthcoming. Russell on Relations, 1898: A Reconsideration.

Guicciardini, N. 2003. *Reading the Principia: The Debate on Newton's Mathematical Methods for Natural Philosophy from 1687–1736*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Guyer, P. 1992. *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2017a. Absolute Idealism and the Rejection of Kantian Dualism. Chap. 2 in Ameriks, ed. 2017: 43–64.

———. 2017b. The Bounds of Sense and the Limits of Analysis. *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 55 (3): 365–382.

———. 2020. Freedom and Happiness: Sidgwick's Critique of Kant. In Paytas and Henning, eds. 2020: Chap. 7.

Haaparanta, L. 1994. *Mind, Meaning, and Mathematics*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Hamlyn, D. 1968. Bradley, Ward, and Stout. In B. Wolman, ed. 1968: 298–320.

Hanna, R. 2011. *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hardy, G. 1970. *Bertrand Russell and Trinity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hatfield, G. 1992. Empirical, Rational, and Transcendental Psychology: Psychology as Science and as Philosophy. In Guyer, ed. 1992: 200–227.

———. 2002. Psychology, Philosophy, and Cognitive Science: Reflections on the History and Philosophy of Experimental Psychology. *Mind and Language* 17 (3): 207–232.

———. 2005. The History of Philosophy as Philosophy. In T. Sorrell and G.A.J. Rodgers, eds. 2005: 19–22.

———. 2014. The Emergence of Psychology. In Mander, ed., Part 3, Chap. 6.

Hayward, F. 1901a. The True Significance of Sidgwick's Ethics. *International Journal of Ethics 11* (2): 175–187.

———. 1901b. Mr. Hayward's Evaluation of Professor Sidgwick's Ethics: A Reply. *International Journal of Ethics* 11 (3): 360–365. [Hayward Replying to Jones (1901)].

———. 1901c. *The Ethical Philosophy of Sidgwick*. London: S. Sonnenschein and Co.

Heis, J. 2012. Attempts to Rethink Logic. In A. Wood and S. Songsuk, eds. 2012: 95–132.

———. 2013. Frege, Lotze, and Boole. In Reck, ed. 2013: 113–138.

Hickerson, R. 2007. *The History of Intentionality: Theories of Consciousness from Brentano to Husserl*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Hodgson, S. 1880. Dr. Ward on Free-Will. *Mind* 5 (18): 226–253.

———. 1882. Philosophy in Relation to Its History. *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 16 (3): 225–244.

———. 1884. The Metaphysical Method in Philosophy. *Mind* 9 (33): 48–72.

———. 1887. Subject and Object in Psychology. *Mind* 12 (47): 423–429.

Huemer, W. 2004. Husserl's Critique of Psychologism and his Relation to the Brentano School. In A. Chrudzimski and Wolfgang Huemer, eds. 2004: 199–214.

———. 2019. Franz Brentano. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, (Spring Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr(2019)/entries/brentano/.

Hurka, T. 2003. Moore in the Middle. *Ethics* 113 (3): 599–628.

Hylton, P. 1984. The Nature of the Proposition and the Revolt Against Idealism. In R. Rorty, J. Scheewind, and Q. Skinner, eds. 1984: 375–398.

———. 1990. *Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Irvine, A.D., and G.A. Wedeking, eds. 1993. *Russell and Analytic Philosophy*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Jacquette, D., ed. 1991a. *Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychologism: Critical and Historical Readings on the Psychological Turn in Philosophy*. Dordrecht: Springer.

———. 1991b. Psychologism Revisited in Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology. In Jacquette, ed. 1991a: 245–262.

———. 2001. *Fin de Siècle* Austrian Thought and the Rise of Scientific Philosophy. *History of European Ideas* 27 (3): 307–315.

———. 2004a. Brentano's Concept of Intentionality. In Jacquette, ed. 2004b: 98–130.

———. 2004b. *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jones, E.E.C. 1894a. Rational Hedonism. *International Journal of Ethics* (1): 79–94.

———. 1894b–1895. The Rationality of Hedonism. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 3: 29–45.

———. 1901. Mr. Hayward's Evaluation of Professor Sidgwick's Ethics. *International Journal of Ethics 11* (3): 354–360.

———. 1904. Professor Sidgwick's Ethics. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 4: 32–52.

———. 1917–1918. Practical Dualism. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (18): 312–328.

Judd, C.H. 1895. Philosophy in the German Universities. *Science* 2 (31): 126–128.

Kant, I. 1996. *Practical Philosophy (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant)*. Tr. and ed. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1998. *Critique of Pure Reason (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant)*. P. Guyer and A Wood, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Keynes, J.M. 1949. *Two Memoirs*. New York and London: Augustus Kelly.

Kitcher, P. 1990. *Kant's Transcendental Psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Klement, K. 2018–2019. G. E. Moore's Unpublished Review of *The Principles of Mathematics*. *Russell* (38): 131–164.

———., ed. forthcoming. *The Oxford Handbook of Bertrand Russell*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [OHBR].

Köhnke, C. 1991. *The Rise of Neo-Kantianism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Körner, S. 1987. On Brentano's Objections to Kant's Theory of Knowledge. *Topoi* 6: 11–17.

Kripke, S. 1980. *Naming and Necessity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kunne, W., M. Textor, and M. Siebel, eds. 1997. *Bolzano and Analytic Philosophy*. Rodopi: Grazer Philosophische Studien.

Kusch, M. 1995. *Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge*. London and New York: Routledge.

LaPointe, S., ed. 2019. *Logic From Kant to Russell: Laying the Foundations for Analytic Philosophy*. London: Routledge.

Leary, D. 1978. The Philosophical Development of the Conception of Psychology in Germany, 1780–1850. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 14 (2): 113–121.

———. 1982a. Immanuel Kant and the Development of Modern Psychology. In D. Leary, ed., 17–42.

———. 1982b. *The Problematic Science: Psychology in Nineteenth-Century Thought*. New York: Praeger.

Levy, P. 1979. *G.E. Moore and the Cambridge Apostles*. London: Harcourt.

———. 2005. *The Letters of Lytton Strachey*. New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux.

Lewy, C., ed. 1962. *G.E. Moore: Commonplace Book 1951–1953*. London: Thoemmes.

———., ed. 1966. *Lectures on Philosophy by G.E. Moore*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Lindsay, T. 1876. Hermann Lotze. *Mind* 1 (3): 363–382.

Lindsay, T.M. 1877. Recent Hegelian Contributions to English Philosophy. *Mind* 2 (8): 476–493.

Lotze, H. 1841/1879. *Metaphysic*. Edited and Translated by B. Bosanquet. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

———. 1843/1874. *Logic*. Edited and Translated by B. Bosanquet. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

———. 1880. Philosophy in the Last Forty Years. *Contemporary Review* 37: 134–155.

———. 1856–1864/1885. *Microcosmus*. Translated by E. Hamilton and E.E.C. Jones. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

———. 1892. *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*. Ed. F.C. Conybeare. London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co.

Lubenow, W.C. 1998. *The Cambridge Apostles, 1820–1914: Liberalism, Imagination, and Friendship in British Intellectual and Personal Life*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mace, C.A. 1945. Obituary of George Frederick Stout (1860–1944). *Proceedings of the British Academy* 31: 307–316.

———. 1946. G. F. Stout (1860–1944). *British Journal of Psychology* xxxvi: 51–54.

———. 1954. The Permanent Contribution to Psychology of G.F. Stout. *British Journal of Educational Psychology* 24 (2): 64–75.

———., ed. 1966. *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Makin, G. 2000. *The Metaphysicians of Meaning*. London: Routledge.

Mander, W.J. 1994. *An Introduction to Bradley's Metaphysics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

———. 2014. *The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Manser, A. 1983. *Bradley's Logic*. New Jersey: Barnes and Noble.

Marshall, C. 2013. Sidgwick's Utilitarianism in the Context of the Rise of Idealism: A Reappraisal. *Revue d'études Benthamiennes*. https://doi.org/10.4000/etudes-benthamiennes.678.

McGuinness, B. 2008. *Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents 1911–1951*. Oxford: Blackwell.

McTaggart, J.E. 1896. *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1910. *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1921. *The Nature of Existence*. Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1927. *The Nature of Existence*. Edited by C.D. Broad (vol. II). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McWilliams-Tulberg, R. 1975. *Women at Cambridge*. London: Gollancz.

Mellone, S.H. 1894. Psychology, Epistemology, Ontology, Compared and Distinguished. *Mind*, n.s. 3 (12): 474–490.

Merz, J. 1906. *On the Development of Mathematical Thought During the Nineteenth Century (Vol. 2 of A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century)*. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and sons.

Metz, R. 1938. *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Milkov, N. 2000. Lotze and the Early Cambridge Analytic Philosophy. *Prima Philosophia* 13: 133–153.

———. 2004. G.E. Moore and the Greifswald Objectivists on the Given and the Beginning of Analytic Philosophy. *Axiomathes* 14 (4): 361–379.

———. 2008a. Russell's Debt to Lotze. *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science (A)* 39 (2): 186–193.

———. 2008b. Rudolph Hermann Lotze. In *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Mill, J. 1829. *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*, 2 vols., London: Baldwin and Cradock.

Mill, J.S. 1843. *A System of Logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mohanty, H. 1991. The Concept of Psychologism in Frege and Husserl. In Jacquette, ed. 1991: 113–130.

Monk, R. 1991. *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius*. New York and London: Penguin.

Moore, G.E. 1897a. In What Sense, If Any, Do Past and Future Time Exist? *Mind*, n.s. 6 (22): 228–240. [PFT]

———. 1897b. Review of Brunschvicg. *Mind*, n.s. 6 (24): 554–557.

———. 1898a. Freedom. *Mind*, n.s. 7 (26): 179–204. [F].

———. 1898b. Review of Fichte. *International Journal of Ethics* 9: 92–97.

———. 1899a. The Nature of Judgment. *Mind*, n.s. 8 (30): 176–193. [NJ].

———. 1899b. Review of Guyau. *International Journal of Ethics* 9: 232–236.

———. 1899c. Review of Russell. *Mind*, n.s. 8 (31): 397–405.

———. 1899d. Review of Bon. *Mind*, n.s. 8 (31): 420–422.

———. 1900a. Identity. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 1: 103–127.

———. 1900b. Necessity. *Mind*, n.s. 9 (35): 289–304.

———. 1901a. Mr. McTaggart's 'Studies in Hegelian Cosmology'. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 2: 177–214.

———. 1901b. The Value of Religion. *International Journal of Ethics* 12 (1): 81–98.

———. 1902. Experience and Empiricism. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 3: 80–95.

———. 1903a. *Principia Ethica*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [PE].

———. 1903b–1904. Kant's Idealism. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 4, 127–140.

———. 1903c. Mr. McTaggart's Ethics. *International Journal of Ethics* 13 (3): 341–370.

———. 1903d. The Refutation of Idealism. *Mind*, n.s. 12 (48): 433–453.

———. 1912. *Ethics*. London: Williams and Norgate.

———. 1925. Death of Dr. McTaggart. *Mind*, n.s. 34 (124): 269–271.

———. 1939. Proof of an External World. *Proceedings of the British Academy* 25: 273–300.

———. 1942. Autobiography. In Schilpp, ed. 1942: 3–39.

———. 1953. *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*. London: Collier Books.

Morris, K. and C. Preti. 2015. How To Read Moore's 'Proof of An External World.' *Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy* (vol. 4, no. 1): 1–16.

Muirhead, J.H. 1896. The Place of the Concept in Logical Doctrine. *Mind*, n.s. 5 (20): 508–522.

Mulligan, K. 2004. Brentano on the Mind. In Jacquette, ed. 2004a: 66–97.

———. 2013. Acceptance, Acknowledgment, Affirmation, Agreement, Assertion, Belief, Certainty, Conviction, Denial, Judgment, Refusal and Rejection. In Textor, ed. 2013: 97–136.

Mulligan, K., and B. Smith. 1985. Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 45 (4): 627–644.

Murphy, G., and J. Kovach. 1949. *An Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Murray, A.H. 1937. *The Philosophy of James Ward*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nasim, O. 2008. *Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers: Constructing the World*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Notturno, M.A. 1997. *Perspectives on Psychologism*. Leiden: Brill.

O'Hear, A., ed. 1999. *German Philosophy Since Kant*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ostertag, G., and A. Favia. 2021. E. E. Constance Jones on the Dualism of Practical Reason. *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 29: 327–342.

Palmer, A. 1988. *Concept and Object: The Unity of the Proposition in Logic and Psychology*. London: Routledge.

Palmer, A., and R. Monk, eds. 1996. *Bertrand Russell and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy*. London: Thoemmes.

Parfit, D. 2011/2017. *On What Matters* (vols. 1 and 2). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Passmore, J. 1944. G.F. Stout (1860–1944). *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy* 22 (1 and 2): 1–14.

———. 1952. Memoir of Stout. In Stout, ed., 1952.

———. 1966. *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*. London: Penguin.

———. 1976. G.F. Stout's Editorship of *Mind* (1892–1920). *Mind*, n.s. 85 (337): 17–36.

Pattison, M. 1876. Philosophy at Oxford. *Mind* 1 (1): 82–97.

Paytas, T., and T. Henning, eds. 2020. *Kantian and Sidgwickian Ethics: The Cosmos of Duty Above and the Moral Law Within*. London: Taylor and Francis.

Peckhaus, V. 1999. 19th Century Logic between Philosophy and Mathematics. *Bulletin of Symbolic Logic* 5 (4): 433–450.

Pereboom, D. 2006. Kant on Transcendental Freedom. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 73: 537–567.

Pettit, P. 1972. The Early Philosophy of G.E. Moore. *Philosophical Forum* 4 (2): 260–298.

Philosophical Studies. 2006. Book Symposium on Soames 129 (3): 605–665.

Picardi, E. 1987. The Logic of Frege's Contemporaries. In Ferriani and Buzzetti, ed., 173–204.

Pierson, C., and S. Tormey, eds. 2000. *Politics on the Edge (Political Science Association Yearbook)*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Potter, M. 2009. *Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2020. *The Rise of Analytic Philosophy, 1879–1930*. London: Routledge.

Preston, A. 2017. *Analytic Philosophy: An Interpretive History*. London: Routledge.

Preti, C. 2008a. He Was In Those Days Beautiful and Slim: Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore, 1894–1901. *Russell* 28 (2): 97–192.

———. 2008b. On the Origins of the Contemporary Notion of Propositional Content: Anti-psychologism in Nineteenth Century and G. E. Moore's Early Theory of Judgment. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (A)* 39 (2): 176–185.

———. 2013. The Origin and Influence of G.E. Moore's 'The Nature of Judgment'. In Textor, ed. 2013: 183–205.

———. 2017. Some Main Problems of Moore Interpretation. In Preston, ed. 2017: Chap. 5.

———. 2018. The Context and Origin of Moore's Formulation of the Naturalistic Fallacy in *Principia Ethica*. In Sinclair, ed. 2018: 54–72.

———. 2019. What Russell Meant When He Called Moore A Logician. In LaPointe, ed., 2019: 189–205.

———. forthcoming. Yours Fraternally: G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. In Klement, ed., OHBR.

Pulkkinen, J. 1994. *The Threat of Logical Mathematism: A Study on the Critique of Mathematical Logic in German at the Turn of the 20th Century*. Frankfurt: Peter Wein.

Putnam, H. 1990. *Realism with a Human Face*. Ed. J. Conant. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Reck, E., ed. 2002. *From Frege to Wittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———., ed. 2013. *The Historical Turn in Analytic Philosophy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Regan, T. 1986a. *G.E. Moore: The Early Essays*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

———. 1986b. *Bloomsbury's Prophet: G. E. Moore and the Development of His Moral Philosophy*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

———. 1991. *G. E. Moore: The Elements of Ethics*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Ritchie, D.G. 1896. The Relation of Logic to Psychology (I). *The Philosophical Review* 5 (6): 585–600.

———. 1897. The Relation of Logic to Psychology II. *The Philosophical Review* 6 (17): 1–17.

———. 1902. Review of Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*. *Mind*, n.s. 11 (44): 547–556.

Robins, E.P. 1898. Modern Theories of Judgment. *Philosophical Review* 7 (6): 583–603.

Rorty, R., J. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner, eds. 1984. *Philosophy in History: Essays in the Historiography of Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rosenbaum, S. 1969. G.E. Moore on the Elements of Ethics. *University of Toronto Quarterly* 38 (3): 214–232.

———. 1984. Bertrand Russell in Bloomsbury. *Russell* Summer (1): 11–29.

Rothblatt, S. 1968. *The Revolution of the Dons*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rouse Ball, W.W. 1889. *A History of Mathematics at Cambridge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Royce, J. 1897. Review of McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*. *Philosophical Review* 6 (1): 69–76.

Russell, B. 1900. *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [PoL].

———. 1901a. On the Notion of Order. *Mind*, n.s. 10 (37): 30–51.

———. 1901b. Is Position in Time and Space Absolute or Relative. *Mind*, n.s. 10 (39): 293–317.

———. 1903. *The Principles of Mathematics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [PoM].

———. 1906–1908. On the Nature of Truth. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 7: 28–49.

———. 1944. My Mental Development. In Schilpp, ed., 1–20. [MMD]

———. 1897/1956a. *An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry*. New York: Dover. [EFG].

———. 1956b. *Portraits from Memory and Other Essays*, London–Allen and Unwin. [PFM].

———. 1959a. *My Philosophical Development*. New York: Simon and Schuster. [MPD].

———. 1959b. The Influence and Thought of G.E. Moore: A Symposium of Reminiscence by Four of His Friends. *The Listener* (April 30, pp. 755–758).

———. 1961. My Religious Reminiscences. In Slater, ed., 3–8. [MRR].

———. 1975. *Autobiography*. London: Allen and Unwin. [Auto.].

———. 1993. An Analysis of Mathematical Reasoning. In *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, vol. 2: Philosophical Papers (1896–1899)*, 163–242. Ed. N. Griffin and A.C. Lewis. London and New York: Routledge. [AMR].

Ryle, G. 1970. G.E. Moore's 'The Nature of Judgment'. In Ambrose and Lazerowitz, eds., 1970: 89–101.

Santayana, G. 1889/1971. *Lotze's System of Philosophy*. Edited by P. Kunz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Schaar, M. van der. 1996. From Analytic Psychology to Analytic Philosophy: The Reception of Twardowski's Ideas in Cambridge. *Axiomathes* 7: 295–324.

———. 2013a. *Judgement and the Epistemic Foundation of Logic*. Dordrecht: Springer.

———. 2013b. G.F. Stout and Russell's Earliest Account of Judgement. In Textor, ed. 2013: 137–156.

———. 2013c. *G.F. Stout and the Psychological Origins of Analytic Philosophy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

———. 2016. Brentano, Twardowski and Stout: From Psychology to Ontology (Supplement to Beaney (2013)): Oxford Scholarship Online. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780(1999)5314.013.67.

Schilpp, P. 1942. *The Philosophy of G.E. Moore (Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. IV)*. Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press.

———. 1944. *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. V)*. Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press.

Schneewind, J.B. 1977. *Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Schroeder, E. 1898. On Pasigraphy. *Monist* 9 (1): 44–62.

Schuhmann, K. 2004. Brentano's Impact on Twentieth-Century Philosophy. In Jacquette, ed., 2004a: 277–297.

Schultz, B., ed. 1992. *Essays on Henry Sidgwick*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2004. *Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2019. Henry Sidgwick. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Fall ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall(2019)/entries/sidgwick/.

Seth, A. 1892. Psychology, Epistemology, and Metaphysics. *Mind*, n.s. 1(2): 129–145.

Sidgwick, H. 1876a. Philosophy at Cambridge. *Mind* 1 (2): 235–246.

———. 1876b. Review of Bradley's *Ethical Studies*. *Mind* 1 (4): 545–549.

———. 1877. Reply to Bradley. *Mind* 2 (5): 122–126.

———. 1878. Ethics. In *Encyclopedia Britannica* (9th Ed., vol. 8).

———. 1879. The So-Called Idealism of Kant. *Mind* 4 (15): 408–410. [see Caird 1879a in Reply].

———. 1880. Kant's Refutation of Idealism. *Mind* 5 (17): 111–115. [see Caird (1880) in Reply].

———. 1883a. A Criticism of the Critical Philosophy (I). *Mind* 8 (29): 69–91.

———. 1883b. A Criticism of the Critical Philosophy (II). *Mind* 8 (31): 313–337.

———. 1884. Review of Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*. *Mind* 9 (34): 169–187.

———. 1886. *Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers*. London: Macmillan. [OHE]

———. 1888. The Kantian Conception of Free Will. *Mind* 13 (51): 405–412.

———. 1889. Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies. *Mind 14* (56): 473–487.

———. 1901a, ed. Jones. Prof. Sidgwick's Ethical View: An Auto-Historical Fragment. *Mind*, n.s. 10 (38): 287–291.

———. 1901b. Philosophy of T.H. Green. *Mind*, n.s. 10 (37): 18–29.

———. 1902. *Lectures on the Ethics of T. H. Green, Mr. Herbert Spencer, and J Martineau*, ed. Jones. London: Macmillan.

———. 1905a. The Metaphysics of T. H. Green. In *Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant and Other Philosophical Lectures and Essays*, ed. J. Ward, 209–266. London: Macmillan.

———. 1905b. *Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant and Other Philosophical Lectures and Essays*, ed. J. Ward. London: Macmillan.

———. 1907. *Methods of Ethics*. 7th ed. London: Macmillan. [ME].

Sidgwick, A., E. Balfour Sidgwick, E. Mildred Sidgwick, and H. Sidgwick. 1906. *Henry Sidgwick: A Memoir*. London: Macmillan.

Simons, P. 1995. Introduction to the Second Edition. In Brentano, 1995a: xiii–xx.

———. 2004. Judging Correctly. In Jacquette, ed., 2004a: 45–65.

Sinclair, N. 2018. *The Naturalistic Fallacy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Singer, M. 1992. Sidgwick and Nineteenth-Century British Ethical Thought. In Schultz, ed., 1992: 65–92.

Skidelsky, R. 2003. *John Maynard Keynes, 1883–1946: Economist, Philosopher, Statesman*. New York: Penguin.

Skorupski, J. 1989. *John Stuart Mill*. London: Routledge.

———. 2006. *Why Read Mill Today?* London: Routledge.

Slater, R. 1961. *Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell*. New York and London: Routledge.

Sluga, H. 1980. *Gottlob Frege*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Smith, B. 1989. On the Origins of Analytic Philosophy. *Grazer Philosophische Studien* (35, 1): 153–73.

———. 1994. *Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano*. Chicago: Open Court.

Snyder, L. 2006. *Reforming Philosophy: A Victorian Debate on Science and Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Soames, S. 2003. *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century: Vol. 1: The Dawn of Analysis* and *Vol. 2: The Age of Meaning*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sorley, W. 1901. Henry Sidgwick. *International Journal of Ethics 11* (2): 168–174.

———. 1904. *The Ethics of Naturalism*. Edinburgh: Blackwood and Sons.

Sorrell, T., and G.A.J. Rogers, eds. 2005. *Analytic Philosophy and History of Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Spadoni, C. 1976. Great God in Boots!—The Ontological Argument is Sound! *Russell* (Autumn/Winter): 1–64.

———. 1979. 'Old Sidg' (review of Scheewind, (1977)). *Russell* (no. 33–34, Spring/Summer): 1–56.

Stang, N. 2019. Platonism in Lotze and Frege. In LaPointe, ed.: 138–159.

Stern, D., B. Rogers, and G. Citron, eds. 2016. *Wittgenstein: Lectures, Cambridge 1930–1933, From the Notes of G.E. Moore*.

Stewart, J.A. 1876. Psychology—A Science or a Method? *Mind* 1 (4): 445–451.

Stout, G.F. 1888a. The Scope and Method of Psychology. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 1 (1): 33–54.

———. 1888b. The Herbartian Psychology (I). *Mind* 13 (51): 321–338.

———. 1888c. The Herbartian Psychology (II). *Mind* 13 (52): 473–498.

———. 1889a. Herbart Compared with English Psychologists and with Benecke. *Mind* 14 (53): 1–26.

———. 1889b. The Psychological Work of Herbart's Disciples. *Mind* 14 (55): 353–368.

———. 1891a. Belief. *Mind* 16 (64): 449–469.

———. 1891b. Thought and Language. *Mind* 16 (62): 181–205.

———. 1893. The Philosophy of Mr. Shadworth Hodgson. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 2: 107–120.

———. 1895–1896. In What Sense, If Any, Is It True That Psychical States Are Extended? *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 3 (2): 86–97.

———. 1896. *Analytic Psychology* (2 vols.) London: Allen and Unwin. [AP].

———. 1899. *A Manual of Psychology*. London (W.B. Clive); New York (Hinds and Noble): University Correspondence College Press. [MP].

———. 1902–1903. Mr. Bradley's Theory of Judgment. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (vol. 3): 1–28.

———. 1911. Some Fundamental Points in the Theory of Knowledge. In Stout, ed., 1930: 353–383.

———. 1926. Ward as Psychologist. *Monist* 36 (1): 20–55.

———. 1930. *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*. London: Macmillan.

———. 1931. *Mind and Matter*. Gifford Lectures (1919. 1921): Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

———. 1952. *God and Nature*. Gifford Lectures (1919, 1921, ed. A.K. Stout). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Strawson, P.F. 1966. *The Bounds of Sense*. London: Methuen.

Sullivan, D. 2018. Hermann Lotze. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win(2018)/entries/hermann-lotze/.

Sully, J. 1876. Physiological Psychology in Germany. *Mind* 1 (1): 20–43.

Textor, M., ed. 2006. *The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy*. Routledge.
———., ed. 2013. *Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell. 1983. Vol. 1. Edited by K. Blackwell, A. Brink, N. Griffin. New York and London: Routledge. [CPBR 1]
———. 1990. Vol 2. Edited by N. Griffin and Lewis. New York and London: Routledge. [CPBR 2].
———. 1993. Vol. 3. Edited by G. Moore. New York and London: Routledge. [CPBR 3].
———. 1995. Vol. 14. Edited by R. Rempel, L. Greenspan, B. Haslam, A.C. Lewis, and M. Lippincott. New York and London: Routledge. [CPBR 14].
———. 1997. Vol. 11. Edited by J. Slater. New York and London: Routledge. [CPBR 11].
Thomas, E.E. 1915a. Lotze's Relation to Idealism (I). *Mind*, n.s. 24 (94): 186–206.
———. 1915b. Lotze's Relation to Idealism (II). *Mind*, n.s. 24 (95): 367–385.
———. 1915c. Lotze's Relation to Idealism (III). *Mind*, n.s. 24 (96): 481–497.
Titchener, E.B. 1921. Brentano and Wundt: Empirical and Experimental Psychology. *American Journal of Psychology* 32: 108–120.
Twardowski, K. 1977. *On the Content and Object of Presentations*. Translated by R. Grossman. The Hauge: Martinus-Nijhoff.
Valentine, E. 2001. G.F. Stout's Philosophical Psychology. In L. Albertazzi, ed. 2001: 209–233.
Veitch, J. 1877. Philosophy in the Scottish Universities I. *Mind* 2 (5): 74–91.
Vincent, A. 1999. Bradley and Sidgwick on Philosophical Ethics. *Collingwood Studies* 6: 110–126.
———. 2000. Idealism and Hedonism. In C. Pierson and S. Tormey, eds. 2000: 105–118.
———. 2014. The Ethics of British Idealism: Bradley, Green, and Bosanquet. In Mander, ed., 2014.
Vincent, A., and D. Boucher, eds. 2000. *British Idealism and Political Theory*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Von Wright, G.H. 1969. The Wittgenstein Papers. *Philosophical Review* 78 (4): 483–503.
Vrahimis, A. 2013. *Encounters between Analytic and Continental Philosophy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wall, B. 2007. John Venn, James Ward, and the Chair of Mental Philosophy and Logic at the University of Cambridge. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 68 (1): 131–155.

Walsh, W. 1966. Philosophy and Psychology in Kant's Critique. *Kant Studien* 56: 186–198.

———. 1981. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Commentators in English, 1875–1945. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 42 (4): 723–737.

Walsh, R., T. Thomas, and A. Baydala. 2014. *A Critical History and Philosophy of Psychology: Diversity of Context, Thought, and Practice* (Chap. 4: 151–201).

Ward, J. 1876. An Attempt to Interpret Fechner's Law. *Mind* 1 (4): 452–466.

———. 1883a. Psychological Principles (I). *Mind* 8 (30): 153–169 (published in (1918) as *Psychological Principles*).

———. 1883b. Psychological Principles (II). *Mind* 8 (32): 465–486 (published in (1918) as *Psychological Principles*).

———. 1886. Psychology. In *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 9th ed. Edinburgh: Black, 37–85.

Ward. 1887a. Psychological Principles (III). *Mind* 12 (45): 45–67.

Ward, J. 1887b. Mr. F.H. Bradley's Analysis of Mind. *Mind* 12 (48): 564–575.

———. 1890. The Progress of Philosophy. *Mind* 15 (58): 213–233.

———. 1893. Modern Psychology: A Reflection. *Mind*, n.s. 2 (5): 54–82.

———. 1894. Review of Bradley, *Appearance and Reality. Mind*, n.s. 3 (9): 109–125.

———. 1899. *Naturalism and Agnosticism: The Gifford Lectures (1896–1898)* (2 vols.). London: Adam and Charles Black.

———. 1911. *The Realm of Ends or Pluralism and Theism: The Gifford Lectures (1907–10)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1918. *Psychological Principles*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1922. *A Study of Kant*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Watson, J. 1893. Metaphysic and Psychology. *The Philosophical Review* 2 (5): 513–528.

———. 1909. The Idealism of Edward Caird. *The Philosophical Review* 18 (2): 147–163.

Whewell, W. 1849. *Of Induction, With Especial Reference to Mr. J. Stuart Mill's System of Logic*. London: John W. Parker.

Williams, B. 1931. McTaggart's Friendships. In Dickinson, ed., 1931: 71–81.

Windelband, W. 1926. *A History of Philosophy*. Translated by James H. Tufts. London: Macmillan.

Winstanley, D.A. 1940. *Early Victorian Cambridge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1947. *Later Victorian Cambridge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wolenski, J. 1998. Twardowski and the Distinction Between Concept and Object. *Brentano Studien* 8: 15–35.

Wolman, B. 1968. *Historical Roots of Contemporary Psychology*. Harper and Row.

Wood, A., and S. Songsuk. 2012. *The Cambridge History of Philosophy in the nineteenth century (1790–1870)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Woodward, W. 1996. Lotze's Philosophical Anthropology. *History of the Human Sciences* 9 (1): 1–26.

Woolf, L. *Sowing: An Autobiography of the Years 1880–1904*. London: Hogarth Press.

Wundt, W. 1877. Philosophy in Germany. *Mind* 2 (8): 493–518.

———. 1904. *Principles of Physiological Psychology*. Translated by Titchener. London: Allen. Translation of *Grundzüge der phsiologischen Psychologie* (1873–4).

Index[1]